Integrated Review (previously SDSR 2020)

[whitelancer]

Been otherwise occupied; has anyone noticed any hints of what the promised 'by the summer' next installment will contain?

Haven't heard anything, but going on recent (and not so recent) history it will have all changed by the summer.

Joking aside I wouldn't mind a small bet on the proposed structure of the Army never being fully implemented and that within 5 years (probable less if they can find some money) they will be looking at acquiring an IFV of some description. Either a version of Boxer or a tracked vehicle, originating in Germany, perhaps!

[SW1]

Well if you listen to the background on some of this the army have mentioned on numerous occasions and they don’t make it all that clear at first glance is that “strike” is a concept of operation that is independent of vehicles and is still very much how they intend to operate.

What appears to have been decided good or bad is that an Ajax regiment has been replaced with a challenger regiment in the original “strike” brigade concept structure. Maybe from lessons that have come out of the experiments or maybe for politics but that’s what it seems to be.

[Anthony58]

House of Commons Defence Committee is looking for written evidence, into Navy and Naval procurement, via its web portal.

[ArmChairCivvy]

The RAND Organisation (its blog) has revisited the USMC transformation plan, from a year back:

The RAND Blog
>Indications of Institutional Inertia: The FY2021 USMC Budget



by Jonathan P. Wong

March 26, 2020


"In August 2019, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, General David Berger, issued the Commandant's Planning Guidance (PDF) (CPG) that is notable in its clear emphasis on naval operations. He followed up the CPG with a pointed article that explicitly named 10 capabilities that should be divested to enable the acquisition of 11 new ones. It is rare to see such high-level planning documents clearly articulate capabilities that could be jettisoned. The list includes:

surge-layer capacity resident within the reserve component and the current maritime prepositioning force
manned anti-armor ground and aviation platforms
manned ground transportation and associated movement capabilities
traditional towed-artillery that cannot be modified for potential high-velocity projectile use
manned ground reconnaissance
short-range mortar systems lacking necessary precision, range, and lethality
non-lethal small tactical unmanned aircraft systems
excess equipment maintained in administrative storage
exquisite platforms with unsustainable manpower/personnel requirements
vehicles, aircraft, and systems that the service can neither afford to procure nor afford to sustain over their anticipated lifespans."

In the first five (bolded), other than being picky ( to assure future proofing) about artillery pieces to be kept in the inventory, the remaining four seem to be high on our list of investment priorities (for prepositioning one must substitute 'enhanced forward presence' though).
- the last two points seem to read like 'code' for curtailing the F-35 investment; of course the points can apply to many other things, too

[ArmChairCivvy]

keeping up with the Joneses... https://forecastinternational.us11.list ... 63a7cb0531
Russia aside, of the biggest 'blobs' 5 EoS and 4 (us ranking in there) to the West
- there is a counterweight to China, but someone will have to stitch it together... which seems to be what Blinken is thinking. And we are palying 'willing' with the carrier group deployment

[SW1]

https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/articl ... llace.html

“Russia's submarines are circling Britain's entire coastline as Putin's forces remain 'our number one threat', says Defence Secretary Ben Wallace”

If this is the case one may ask why are we sending the fleet to Asia

[Lord Jim]

The CSG21 deployment is really a political decision with little military value in my opinion. Great for the PR people, allowing them to put out multiple releases on how Global Britain can deploy military mass, and matches up with the "Tilt" to the Far East many are talking about, but the actual forces we will have forward deployed in that theatre will be minimal with little military substance. If we truly pursue this policy then we will have a military that is spread far too thin for its size. The CSG need to be committed to NATO as a standing force, allowing the USN to allocate at least another Carrier Group to the Pacific where they are far more effective and capable than we can be.

[ArmChairCivvy]

the Far East many are talking about, but the actual forces we will have forward deployed in that theatre will be minimal with little military substance. If we truly pursue this policy then we will have a military that is spread far too thin for its size.

Too thin is absolutely right, but then again the Far East is just a part of the Indo-Pacific. Other than these types of solidarity tours, I would think in a year or so one can draw a straight line thru where we actually will be:
- the Gulf (both a navy and an airforce base)
- Oman (a maintenance and logistics hub)
- Cabo Delgado; as a token to AFRICOM (a drawdown on their brief and area of ops is being speculated about), illustrating that they - and only them - are not expected to turn up everywhere, but others are also showing not just interest but also commitment

So instead of EoS... West of DG (mainly)

[Lord Jim]

But what if the Government demands a greater presence forward to back up their grand standing about a Global Britain? How often is our Carrier Strike Group going to be at sea each year, in the Atlantic, Med/Gulf, Indian Ocean or elsewhere? How many Marines are we going to have dotted around the world in penny packets, both ashore and onboard RN or RFA ships? Is the RAF still going to have detachments almost permanently operating overseas? Are units other than the new "Rangers", also going to be deployed?

The best we could do naval wise is announce that a SSN will regularly be deployed EofS but never confirm sailing dates or other details. Worked way down south.

[ArmChairCivvy]

How many Marines are we going to have dotted around the world in penny packets, both ashore and onboard RN or RFA ships? Is the RAF still going to have detachments almost permanently operating overseas? Are units other than the new "Rangers", also going to be deployed?

Good questions, though on the part of the RAF I think the rotation is well managed and only some HQ units might be outside of it... if I was part of that team, I wouldn't actually mind, RE:

Is the RAF still going to have detachments almost permanently operating overseas?

- the almost 'permanently' are contracted out, as for a/c; even though all the Bells are coming under review; with the result to be announced in the mid-30s

[Lord Jim]

the almost 'permanently' are contracted out, as for a/c; even though all the Bells are coming under review; with the result to be announced in the mid-30s

That does dovetail nicely with the awarding of the future contract for the new "Medium" Helicopter replacing the Balls , Puma and so on. However if forward deployed elements are expected to be able to fight if needed, would we still use Contractors, maybe of the Black Water variety, or return the role to the RAF or AAC, hopefully increasing the number of trained pilots in those two services?

[ArmChairCivvy]

would we still use Contractors, maybe of the Black Water variety

So far the contractors have made their living out of oil men, and the British Forces (in those 4 locations) have been a nice sideline.
... Wgagner, by that time, might have shed all state affiliations and could give a competitive quote

[Lord Jim]

Mi-8s in AAC colours would be interesting

[jedibeeftrix]

So instead of EoS... West of DG (mainly)

As it i put it - UK role in the IndoPac is largely being...
...the 'Guardian of the (western) SLOC's!"

[ArmChairCivvy]

As it i put it - UK role in the IndoPac is largely being...
...the 'Guardian of the (western) SLOC's!"

Well said. Having in mind, not just the brittleness (the JIT nature) of our economy, we can draw the analogy to the brittleness of the British army, an after-the-fact remark of the British field commander, Gnrl Rupert Smith:

"In the Gulf in 1990-91, commanding the British armoured division... I had all the up-to-date tanks in the British army, and because the engines were unreliable I was also given very nearly every tank engine in the inventory. The rest of the army had been stripped of its equipment to give me a sustainable force. I was conscious that I had the bulk of the army's modern assets in my command, that there were no production lines standing ready to replace losses, and that we had other commitments that might require them. I thought at the time, and still do, that I was the first British General for a long time who had to consider how to fight so as to not lose the army."

as we have so little of everything (in today's army), we must take great care
1. that it is kept ready for use
2. and that we have the capability not just to keep the SLOCs open,
3. but also the capability to ship & sustain the relevant formations, and
4 with reference to the second part of the quote's italics: be able to shunt the deployable parts between other locations, should an urgent need arise

A great parallel this "how to fight so as to not lose the army" to the plight of the Fleet Commander for Op Pedestal, who had to consider the same, as for not losing the bulk of the navy
- while at the same time being ready to accept heavy losses for not, in consequence, losing the only army fighting a land campaign (N. Africa) and only being sustained around the Cape (and through Africa), while potentially the OpFor would gain an unimpeded short hop to build up, and sustain their force much faster

[Lord Jim]

Montgomery had the same problem in Europe in 1944/45 as the British Army he commanded was comprised of the last recruits that were deemed fit for service and many rear area troops had been moved to the frontline units to be replaced by recruits who would not have been accepted a few years earlier. He had no more Infantry reserves to call on, which is why he was hesitant in their use for the rest of the war

As for today, all three of our Armed Services are far too brittle. Nobody seems to want to believe that any form of attritional warfare can take place in the future. Imagine the UK taking the losses we received in the Falkland's, but with todays force structure. The Navy alone would lose almost a third of its escort strength, and that would be just the beginning. Of course this is assuming an opponent with near peer capabilities.

Basically in a conflict with a peer level adversary our Military is now a one shot weapon, once it is gone it is gone. There are few if any material reserves and limited manpower reserves. WE have definitely forgotten to old mantra of "Quantity has a quality all of its own", and this could come home to bite us.

[ArmChairCivvy]

with a peer level adversary our Military is now a one shot weapon, once it is gone it is gone. There are few if any material reserves and limited manpower reserves

Indeed, but considering the readiness in most Nato (Europe) armies (France excepted, but they have overreach), we must do one better; hence
must take great care with both readiness AND deployability, as per before
1. that it is kept ready for use
2. and that we have the capability not just to keep the SLOCs open,

[ArmChairCivvy]

Some further thoughts on the above; what if
as - our forces are designed for operations in (initially) relatively uncontested environments that allow for sequential campaigns based on predictable approaches
which - assume air and naval supremacy, ie. extensive shaping with air and naval
then - our forces through joint combined arms operations face an enemy that is already degraded in strength and/or freedom for manoeuvre

In this sort of scenario the force structure we are aiming at could work well. It is also suited, not quite to the old US planning premise for two and a half wars - but rather, dealing with a major contingency arising somewhere else while NOT denuding our contribution to deterrence in Europe.

But, WHAT IF Russia (or China, for that matter, judging from their build-up in Taiwan facing areas) seeks to achieve physical stand-off by employing layers of anti-access and area denial systems designed to rapidly inflict unacceptable losses on NATO and partner military forces and thus achieve campaign objectives within days>>> Fait accompli, faster than NATO jointly or the U.S. separately can respond.

Well, we have a BG in Estonia as part of the EP tripwire, a recce squadron in Poland so that the ground is known if a UK contribution to the MD NE will arrive - and we have an infantry bn (rgmnt) traversing Romania as part of the v high readiness force, yes.
BUT the question remains at the higher level (and thus regarding what the future force mix should be and how to budget for it, including the normal "what can we sustainably afford")

[Lord Jim]

With the armed Services and especially the Army below the line of being able to conduct effective operations in a Peer level conflict, and may still be below it once the Army has completed its current transformation plan, questions like "What can we sustainably afford", start to become irrelevant. Instead questions like "What is the minimum we need to be able to contribute and survive in a Peer level conflict" should arise.

The point made that the British Army could do well against an opponent has been seriously degraded by air attack due to our air superiority, is really looking backwards. Yes it will allow the Government to send in the Cavalry to save the day, earn much praise for allies and make great headlines in the media, but it would also cover over the fact that in a Peer level conflict our forces would be out matched and suffer casualties at a level not seen since the World Wars.

The alternative is to publicly back out of the business of deterring and if necessary fighting Peer level conflicts if a tall possible. This would lead to a substantial drop in our standing within NATO and with our closest allies. But wait we have our CASD, surely that will save the day? Well you have to wonder at what threshold out Government would consider using it. Would "Little Green Men" setting of a chemical weapon at the base of our BG in Estonia causing say 75% fatalities be a good enough reason? Would a nuclear detonation in the UK of a device smuggles in by unknown agents cause us to retaliate at who we think might be responsible but have no proof and might be found to not be responsible a few days later?

I have defended the CASD in the past but am now seeing it and especially its renewal programme as a drain on resources the MoD cannot afford to bear with the shortfalls we have in our conventional defences. The recent IR was a wonderful piece of writing outlining a future vision of our Armed Forces that looked impressive. That is until you look how small they are and how long it will take to implement and the gapping holes where essential capabilities should be.

The Treasure should have quietly filled the shortfall in the Equipment Plan, given that it knew of the Global posture the Government was planning to take regarding defence, and the amount of equipment that was going to be added to the EP out to 2030. The so called "Transformational", increase in defence spending over the next four years should have been just that, a REAL increase. And it should have been spent on programmes that would have delivered results during that four years, especially regarding the Army. It desperately need to accelerate and revise nearly all its procurement programmes, which are progressing as a snail's pace.

The recent decision to replace Hellfire on the Apaches with a US made missile beggars belief. What we are buying is a copy of Brimstone developed by the US because they didn't want to select a non "Made in the USA", weapon for such a major programme. But we already have Brimstone in service with the RAF and seem to be aiming for it to be used in the ground role as a long range precision and anti tank weapon. It had already bee successfully trailed for helicopter launching as well. Yet contrary to the Government stating it wanted future contract to take into account their benefit to the UK, we have discarded a UK weapon for one still under development in the US.

And why are we developing a whole family of future ATGWs, when in reality we are going to reinvent the wheel. Many of the requirements could already be met by weapon systems either already in service or nearing the completion of their development and soon will be in production. Here we have the Army trying to copy the RAF's Complex Weapons programme, whereas the latter is delivering unique weapons to meet the requirement of the RAF and also have export potential, the Army's programme will deliver systems that will be in common with our allies already, and for quite some time and will probably be more expensive that their competitors, restricting exports.

The IR has left the Army planning for a force of two medium Brigades with armour support and two Brigades of Light Infantry with protected mobility options. It could really get any lighter or could it, role on the review of 2025!

[ArmChairCivvy]

With the armed Services and especially the Army below the line of being able to conduct effective operations in a Peer level conflict, and may still be below it once the Army has completed its current transformation plan, questions like "What can we sustainably afford", start to become irrelevant. Instead questions like "What is the minimum we need to be able to contribute

Actually, the same question. As in tossing the coin; heads or tales is not the question (technically, it is a question).

The point made that the British Army could do well against an opponent has been seriously degraded by air attack due to our air superiority, is really looking backwards

If you are referring to my point, then you should read it within the context of defence doctrine: against a peer enemy, we will not fight alone. Which stance does not exclude the need (and thus capability) to deal with a medium contingency rising elsewhere.
- so the glass half empty perspective has changed? To a different hue on the lenses through which to see the world around us? Or am I misreading?

The recent IR was a wonderful piece of writing outlining a future vision of our Armed Forces that looked impressive. That is until you look how small they are

REF points above: the outline (stress on that word) deals with
A. how can we best contribute to an Alliance (Nato being primary when talking about peer opponents), and
B. what independently deployable capabilities on the side do we need/ can afford, given A, above

Many of the requirements could already be met by weapon systems either already in service or nearing the completion of their development and soon will be in production.

Meeting a defined capability and developing a new weapon are not the same thing (always). SDB2 got as close to being the SPEAR3 capability as being a hair's width away from being selected, to meet the capability. We chose another Spear, and with hindsight its next development iteration looks very promising, as for filling a capability gap that we have accepted for well over a decade.

I started with our defence doctrine. Let me conclude with US Army doctrine development ( we are mentioned , though 'anonymously' ) in how MDO will be implemented, by the way, the first roll-out to Europe will be in September (has been used on exercises with assets brought in for that specific purpose):
" Strike long-range fires systems.
The Joint Force generates cross-domain synergy to overcome point defenses protecting enemy long-range systems. The main Army strike capability against enemy long-range systems is long-range precision fires (LRPF). It is the lowest cost, lowest risk, and most responsive method to attack enemy targets as they are identified in the Deep Maneuver and Deep Fires Areas. LRPF does not require suppression of enemy defenses for access, can be ready to fire in case the precise time of engagement is unknown, and can engage opportunity targets over large areas.

LRPF, however, is best suited for attacking stationary targets due to its long time of flight. Naval strikes and stand-off air strikes (air-launched cruise missiles and similar systems) have characteristics similar to LRPF. Fifth-generation aircraft are the primary means of engaging moving targets or those with reliable but low-fidelity location data that the aircraft and pilot can improve. The Army’s persistent enabling of the Joint Force to stimulate, see, and strike the enemy’s long-range systems results in the initial key task in dis-integrating the anti-access and area denial systems.

Neutralize enemy mid-range fires systems.
While the field army suppresses or defeats enemy long-range systems, the corps focuses on destroying enemy mid-range fires systems (self-propelled artillery and standard MRLs).36F37 This effort occurs simultaneously with the operational maneuver (next section), with the corps shifting resources between the two as necessary. The corps’ operational fires command destroys enemy mid-range fires by converging multiple see-strike combinations of Army and joint capabilities. While the enemy has dozens of long-range systems in each combined arms army, they possess hundreds of mid-range systems. In comparison to the long-range systems, attacking the large quantity of mid-range systems requires simpler methods of convergence that can be executed more quickly and on a larger scale. Rather than stimulate individual enemy radars, batteries, or battalions through meticulously planned stimulate-see-strike combinations (as required for the long-range systems), the corps creates simpler, quickly repeatable see-strike combinations to neutralize the enemy’s mid-range systems. Presented with this approach, the enemy mid-range fires formations face a three-fold dilemma: support their at -risk maneuver forces and risk destruction by U.S. fires; displace and risk detection and destruction; or remain inactive, thereby leaving their maneuver forces without support and risk eventually being outmaneuvered or isolated.

See mid-range fires systems.
The corps employs multiple sensors to see enemy mid-range systems, which cover a large area over the duration of the counterfire fight (several days). During such an extended period, the enemy will counter any single surveillance or reconnaissance method, so the corps must present a shifting array of multiple, layered sensors to complicate enemy counteractions. The corps’ primary system for identifying enemy mid-range fires systems before they engage is persistent, wide-area high-altitude or space-based solutions"

Jointness here is used more widely than in our speak, covering partner forces. In the renewal of their divisional set up (that implies a plural for divisions ) Germany has set a goal for a full digital compatibility with US Forces by 2026
- I have not seen a specific goal on our part (the topic gets many mentions, though)
- even if our contribution is/ will be "a" division and even if it will be committed piecemeal (Enter: the BCTs), it is easy (?) to see, in the longish quote above, where our (land forces, especially) will fit in.

AND, to conclude, I mentioned that the quote comes from a doctrine development context, with the sights set for 2028 for a full roll-out
- seems like many of the dates that the IR doc is interspersed with, no?
- and ISD should have by the end of this year reached a point**) where it exist in the form of three such theatre-wide units, on the US side, One of them in Europe (Trump's cut to forces in Germany turned 'on its head') and two in the Pacific (to me that implies that the space is too big to be handled as one theatre.. there's nothing official about it as the lingo is different from what exists as Joint Commands... the latter already copied by the Ruskies and China has also started a transition).

----------
**) Let's remember that when Iraq kicked off (the sequel) only one US Bde was fully digitised, and it did make a difference... so ISDs are nothing to be sniffed at

At this strange hour, all this typing calls for another mug of coffee!

[Lord Jim]

I am still struggling to see how the Army's planned structure in the 2030s will be able to fight effectively against a Peer opponent. Before that we are simply not in a position to do so except as a mini roundabout or sacrificial lamb. Yes we will be fighting as part of NATO, but our contribution will stand out to the opposition Intelligence and Recce resources as weak compared to other NATO groupings and so will likely be seen as the best place to make a move.

This could be countered by integrating our BCTs with other NATO Brigades forming multinational Divisions, and if this is the case maybe these should be permanent formations. This would mean our giving up completely the idea of a UK Division, but this does not mean the UK could not provide the HQ to one of these types of Division.

The Red flags I see which contribute to my consistent "Glass half empty" feeling regarding the Army's Transformation Programme, it the total lack of real detail especially regarding the multitude of capability gaps and shortfalls. Even when a plug is announced by default its date for FOC falls in the 2030s and no sooner. This means the Army is taking a huge and in my opinion irresponsible holiday from being able to fight high intensity operations for at least another ten years.

Regarding the Army's list of requirements for future weapon systems, like the new family of Anti Tank weapons. As an example the Israeli Spike family meets 95% of these now in my opinion, as well as many family members being in service with our allies. We could even use Spike NLS or Spike-ER2 or a combination of both to replace Hellfire on our Apaches as the Israelis already do. France has already developed a family of new ATGWs very recently and the US is rapidly working on their own Hellfire replacement and boosting he performance of Javelin further. Ideally we should have doubled down on Brimstone and decided to adopted for both the Apache and a ground launched overwatch system. Having commonality not just in the missile itself buy the the targeting and control systems would have led to a very powerful weapon system indeed, even more so if Spear 3 was added at a later date.

I maybe being too negative, but history has a way of reinforcing that train of though, especially over the past few decades.

[ArmChairCivvy]

This could be countered by integrating our BCTs with other NATO Brigades forming multinational Divisions, and if this is the case maybe these should be permanent formations.

It would be interesting to have more detail as to where the MD North and especially the MD NE will draw their constituent parts from
- in addition, there is a US Div HQ positioned in Poland

Having BCT-like parts that can readily slot into the next level up formations surely won't be a bad thing

[Lord Jim]

Agreed, as I mentioned maybe this should be formalised by NATO.

[ArmChairCivvy]

I started with our defence doctrine. Let me conclude with US Army doctrine development ( we are mentioned , though 'anonymously' ) in how MDO will be implemented, by the way, the first roll-out to Europe will be in September

A little snippet from DE&S (April 1), worth highlighting as we do not use 'MDO' as a catch phrase, unlike the cousins across the Pond:
" key operational information and improved situational awareness has received a £47-million spending boost.

DE&S has awarded the new five-year support contract to Thales for the Multi Domain Mission Support System (MD MSS).

Both the Royal Air Force and Royal Navy use MD MSS to exploit operational information, which is crucial to dominating the battlespace."
- as the only real form of divisional artillery (for now) is our MLRS, getting a brush up for its FC & comms, I wonder if the army will get better linked in the same instance?

[ArmChairCivvy]

At least for me, this one has passed thru under the radar; does it cut thru DE&S and Logs - or is it just a new name for Logs?
"Our newly formed Defence Support organisation will continue to deliver critical logistic support to operations around the world. They will begin modernisation programmes which will enhance decision making and the effectiveness and resilience of Support operations, to increase equipment availability and readiness. Through this change, Defence Support will ensure that our strategic base is efficient, modern and suited to the strategy of persistent engagement."