Falkland Islands (British Overseas Territory)

[SKB]

^ Ignore the 'Claimed By' bit. They lost.

^ Port Stanley, Falkland Islands


^ RAF Mount Pleasant

[SKB]

A 58 minute long BBC documentary of the 1982 conflict, presented and narrated by Peter Snow and his son, Dan Snow. Made in 2007.


'The Falklands Play', a 92 minute long BBC political play. Made in 2002
A dramatisation of the political events before and during the conflict.

[SKB]

'Operation Black Buck' - the mission which sent a squadron of RAF Vulcan bombers from the UK to bomb the runway at Port Stanley.

[The Armchair Soldier]

Lost today 33 years ago. Lest we forget.

[QuaPatetOrbis]

A 58 minute long BBC documentary of the 1982 conflict, presented and narrated by Peter Snow and his son, Dan Snow. Made in 2007.

I watched this for the first time back in 2007 when it aired on the Military Channel. Highly illuminating as I never even heard of the conflict. Great program.

[QuaPatetOrbis]

Btw wasn't the Dutch Marines attached to the RM at the time. why did they not deploy with them to the Falklands?

[Pseudo]

Btw wasn't the Dutch Marines attached to the RM at the time. why did they not deploy with them to the Falklands?

IIRC, they were disappointed that they didn't, but the Falklands wasn't a NATO deployment.

[QuaPatetOrbis]

Btw wasn't the Dutch Marines attached to the RM at the time. why did they not deploy with them to the Falklands?

IIRC, they were disappointed that they didn't, but the Falklands wasn't a NATO deployment.

do you have a link? So was their amphibious force strictly only for NATO purposes?

[Happyslapper]

Btw wasn't the Dutch Marines attached to the RM at the time. why did they not deploy with them to the Falklands?

IIRC, they were disappointed that they didn't, but the Falklands wasn't a NATO deployment.

do you have a link? So was their amphibious force strictly only for NATO purposes?

They just weren't at war with Argentina; not their dog in the fight. New Zealand also considered sending warships as part of the task force, and several senior US politicians (Caspar Weinberger in particular) were keen to militarily support the UK.

[desertswo]

They just weren't at war with Argentina; not their dog in the fight. New Zealand also considered sending warships as part of the task force, and several senior US politicians (Caspar Weinberger in particular) were keen to militarily support the UK.

We did. Just not so you noticed. Trying to appear like the honest broker and all that.

[Gloomy Northern Boy]

Indeed so...US assistance with respect to munitions, logistics and intelligence have all been mentioned in the past as having been essential...and I think there was some suggestion that the Cousins might actually lend us a carrier if we needed one, although I don't recall the provenance of that. Likewise, interestingly, the French...who had the Argentine running about all over the place looking for fictitious Exocets.

But not the Spanish, obviously...

Gloomy Northern Boy

[desertswo]

Indeed so...US assistance with respect to munitions, logistics and intelligence have all been mentioned in the past as having been essential...and I think there was some suggestion that the Cousins might actually lend us a carrier if we needed one, although I don't recall the provenance of that. Likewise, interestingly, the French...who had the Argentine running about all over the place looking for fictitious Exocets.

But not the Spanish, obviously...

Gloomy Northern Boy

It was USS Iwo Jima (LPH 2); and the Congress would have gladly sanctioned that one. I had some personal involvement in the aftermath in that in the years immediately following, I trained RN officers and senior ratings in USN damage control and firefighting systems and techniques, as apparently the Sea Lords felt that more expertise in those practices might have saved a ship. I don't know if that is true because one cannot disprove a negative; but when I look at Stark, Samuel B. Roberts, and Cole, and the very different outcomes from similar battle damage, I have to think there might have been some credence in their concerns.

[Gloomy Northern Boy]

Possibly so, although I believe the extensive use of aluminium in RN Vessels was a big issue in respect of fire management...I'd guess there will be someone hereabouts who knows more about that than I do? I think lessons were probably learned right across NATO and beyond from those events.

[desertswo]

Possibly so, although I believe the extensive use of aluminium in RN Vessels was a big issue in respect of fire management...I'd guess there will be someone hereabouts who knows more about that than I do? I think lessons were probably learned right across NATO and beyond from those events.

Our hulls were HY-80 carbon steel, but until the Arleigh Burke-class went to sea, our superstructures were aluminum. I had a .50 cal round pass clean through CIC in the cruiser to which I was assigned. I was the Tactical Action Officer and we were engaging Iranian Boghammars during Earnest Will, and it was quite an eye opener.

[RetroSicotte]

I can safely say that I had no idea the fighting got so close to the ships during those times. I'm going to have to do a ton more reading on that conflict...

[QuaPatetOrbis]

[/quote]

They just weren't at war with Argentina; not their dog in the fight. New Zealand also considered sending warships as part of the task force, and several senior US politicians (Caspar Weinberger in particular) were keen to militarily support the UK.[/quote]
I guess your're right. Butt was it an issue at the time that the Dutch wouldnt allow them to deploy with the rest of the Marines? Did the Brits understand in a cordial manner?

Were the Kiwis really going to send warships? Why exactly?

[desertswo]

I can safely say that I had no idea the fighting got so close to the ships during those times. I'm going to have to do a ton more reading on that conflict...

It was a laugh a minute.

[Happyslapper]

Were the Kiwis really going to send warships? Why exactly?

At the time New Zealand was led by a conservative government with Rob Muldoon as PM. He and Thatcher were sort of cut from the same cloth.
Plus at that time New Zealanders themselves strongly identified with the idea of being British post-colonial, with the UK as a true motherland.

They sent warships to relieve standing RN patrols in the Indian Ocean, even abiding by British protocols (not that it's too different from RNZN's anyway). They provided full use of New Zealand's signals intercept facilities, which were best placed to snoop on Argentina's comms. Muldoon also pretty much raced to London to meet with Thatcher, and offered a Leander Class Frigate to relieve a similar type within the TF, should it be requested by the UK MoD (it never was in the end).

He gave quite a well known speech about "the follies of appeasement" (or something like that) which are as apt today as they were in 82! He was certainly emphatic in how NZ considered the UK/FI to be family members in distress, and offered full and if necessary physical support.
Barely recognisable to the political landscape in NZ today sadly.

[Foxbat]

Possibly so, although I believe the extensive use of aluminium in RN Vessels was a big issue in respect of fire management...I'd guess there will be someone hereabouts who knows more about that than I do? I think lessons were probably learned right across NATO and beyond from those events.

Sheffield (and the rest of the Type 42s) had a steel hull and superstructure so aluminium couldn't have played a major role in her loss. Ardent and Antelope did have aluminium superstructures (though steel hulls) but both suffered huge amounts of combat damage which made any issues with aluminium mostly irrelevant. Ardent took seven bombs of between 500 and 1000 pounds which, on a ship of that size, was always going to be fatal whilst Antelope suffered a magazine explosion when some unexploded bombs detonated whilst EODs were trying to defuse them.

I think the only ship where aluminium might have played a role was Sir Galahad.

[Happyslapper]

Possibly so, although I believe the extensive use of aluminium in RN Vessels was a big issue in respect of fire management...I'd guess there will be someone hereabouts who knows more about that than I do? I think lessons were probably learned right across NATO and beyond from those events.

Sheffield (and the rest of the Type 42s) had a steel hull and superstructure so aluminium couldn't have played a major role in her loss. Ardent and Antelope did have aluminium superstructures (though steel hulls) but both suffered huge amounts of combat damage which made any issues with aluminium mostly irrelevant. Ardent took seven bombs of between 500 and 1000 pounds which, on a ship of that size, was always going to be fatal whilst Antelope suffered a magazine explosion when some unexploded bombs detonated whilst EODs were trying to defuse them.

I think the only ship where aluminium might have played a role was Sir Galahad.

There was a massive cock-up in the case of Sheffield. Several actually. Starting with the fact that the air search radar was foolishly switched off (albeit only briefly to establish comms), a relatively lacklustre approach to pre-emptive damage control, and poor response once the exocet was identified. All of which centred around some poor leadership onboard. In the case of Coventry, she took 3 direct hits, engine room and JR mess (2 of the largest sub waterline spaces) and beneath the ops rm - there's no coming back from hits like that. Sadly it was the culmination of a series of bad luck incidents which all occurred in quick succession, to an otherwise extremely effective ship. The Broadsword/Coventry pairing were dealing out some serious punishment to the Arg AF/Navy.

As for Aluminium, it's the effect of heat, rather than the effect of an impact which is significant. Aluminium deforms at much lower temperatures than steel, hence it was extremely difficult for DC teams to respond while they struggled to open hatches which had contorted, or ladders which would collapse and break. T21's were built on the cheap, for a quick buck, and seized upon by the Wilson government(s). It looked the part, but was not a great warfighter.

[desertswo]

There was a massive cock-up in the case of Sheffield. Several actually. Starting with the fact that the air search radar was foolishly switched off (albeit only briefly to establish comms), a relatively lacklustre approach to pre-emptive damage control, and poor response once the exocet was identified. All of which centred around some poor leadership onboard. In the case of Coventry, she took 3 direct hits, engine room and JR mess (2 of the largest sub waterline spaces) and beneath the ops rm - there's no coming back from hits like that. Sadly it was the culmination of a series of bad luck incidents which all occurred in quick succession, to an otherwise extremely effective ship. The Broadsword/Coventry pairing were dealing out some serious punishment to the Arg AF/Navy.

Says who?

[Happyslapper]

There was a massive cock-up in the case of Sheffield. Several actually. Starting with the fact that the air search radar was foolishly switched off (albeit only briefly to establish comms), a relatively lacklustre approach to pre-emptive damage control, and poor response once the exocet was identified. All of which centred around some poor leadership onboard. In the case of Coventry, she took 3 direct hits, engine room and JR mess (2 of the largest sub waterline spaces) and beneath the ops rm - there's no coming back from hits like that. Sadly it was the culmination of a series of bad luck incidents which all occurred in quick succession, to an otherwise extremely effective ship. The Broadsword/Coventry pairing were dealing out some serious punishment to the Arg AF/Navy.

Says who?

Says the official, now declassified, report:

http://www.rna-10-area.net/files/boi_hms_coventry.pdf

[desertswo]

There was a massive cock-up in the case of Sheffield. Several actually. Starting with the fact that the air search radar was foolishly switched off (albeit only briefly to establish comms), a relatively lacklustre approach to pre-emptive damage control, and poor response once the exocet was identified. All of which centred around some poor leadership onboard. In the case of Coventry, she took 3 direct hits, engine room and JR mess (2 of the largest sub waterline spaces) and beneath the ops rm - there's no coming back from hits like that. Sadly it was the culmination of a series of bad luck incidents which all occurred in quick succession, to an otherwise extremely effective ship. The Broadsword/Coventry pairing were dealing out some serious punishment to the Arg AF/Navy.

Says who?

Says the official, now declassified, report:

http://www.rna-10-area.net/files/boi_hms_coventry.pdf

Yeah, I first saw that report in 1983 when it was still classified, and I was tasked with training RN junior officers and senior ratings in how to save the ship USN style. I didn't believe it then or now.

[downsizer]

What don't you believe specifically?

[desertswo]

What don't you believe specifically?

Read Section V and then consider what might be done a priori. To a naval engineer and damage control expert it stands out like a sore thumb.