Current & Future Amphibious Capability - General Discussion

[donald_of_tokyo]

In heavy conflict, you will have 3 T45 and 3 T26 in escort fleet.

The 5 River B2 OPV, with their very high sea-going days, can provide 4 vessels if needed. All these ship can carry for long period, significant number of RM soldiers.

60 for Type-45. 3 of them will give 180.
72 for Type-26. 3 of them, 216.
50 for River B2. 4 of them, 200.

In total 596 soldiers can be transferred to the theater for long period. Right before the landing operation, they will go to CV/LPH, LPD, and Bays.

We shall not forget this, because RN payed a lot to make it happen.

[ArmChairCivvy]

In simple round numbers, the EMF PAX capacity for each ship is:
•Ocean - 700
•Albion - 300
•Bay - 400

So, in troop numbers, going from Ocean to (one at a time) QE: 700 to 250
Albion (only one when warning is not provided by a gradual build up) 300
Bay x 2 makes 800
1350 (plus some recce elements from destroyers / frigates)

That only just keeps up with the Joneses (our closest neighbours) but not with our own ambition
- keeping my ear to the ground about what modifications PoW might get , to bridge the gap
- withdrawing the 3rd Bay from MCM mothership duties could be the key, until the above becomes reality
... much shorter lead time than bringing the 2nd Albion back to life from moth balls

[shark bait]

The lead commando unit of 700 will not be deployed without various commando sub-units (RA, RE, Log, HQ, etc.). All this, plus the Aviation Group personnel plus the landing craft crews, comes to a total of 1800.

Sorry I was referring to vertical lifting only, and limiting that to the main manoeuvre commando only. What I was trying to discuss is what would it take to deliver them vertically.

In this scenario I assume the supporting elements still come over a beach because the cost per mile doesn't add up favourably when we start lifting heavy stuff. I believe even the US marines cut back on that ambition.

RE that 1800 figure, I'm not convinced it's still valid, with regiment's being hollowed out across the board. The commando engineers are now down below 300, still following a square 3 structure to match 3 Commando leaves less than 100 to deploy. Its a similar story across the other commando regiments.

[Aethulwulf]

In simple round numbers, the EMF PAX capacity for each ship is:
•Ocean - 700
•Albion - 300
•Bay - 400

So, in troop numbers, going from Ocean to (one at a time) QE: 700 to 250
Albion (only one when warning is not provided by a gradual build up) 300
Bay x 2 makes 800
1350 (plus some recce elements from destroyers / frigates)

That only just keeps up with the Joneses (our closest neighbours) but not with our own ambition
- keeping my ear to the ground about what modifications PoW might get , to bridge the gap
- withdrawing the 3rd Bay from MCM mothership duties could be the key, until the above becomes reality
... much shorter lead time than bringing the 2nd Albion back to life from moth balls

No. Ocean to QE is 700 to 900. But these are both EMF numbers, not troop numbers. So, the switch to QE will for example allow for Apache + 9 Merlin AEW and 5 Merlin Crowsnest to be carried that could never be carried by Ocean along with the military lift helicopters. This will increase the size of the Aviation Group personnel, increase the size of the EMF but not increase troop numbers.

Modifications to POW will increase the 900 EMF capacity, could result in increased troop numbers.

[ArmChairCivvy]

This will increase the size of the Aviation Group personnel, increase the size of the EMF but not increase troop numbers.

- I was trying to drill down to troop numbers (1350?) in the new set up. A USN carrier is a small floating town, 5000 in it, no wonder they are talking about using the early Americas (sans dock) as mini-strike carriers
- Ocean was always advertised as being designed to take a whole cdo bn (600) with their Bergens on, no mention of any supporting specialists

[Aethulwulf]

This will increase the size of the Aviation Group personnel, increase the size of the EMF but not increase troop numbers.

- I was trying to drill down to troop numbers (1350?) in the new set up. A USN carrier is a small floating town, 5000 in it, no wonder they are talking about using the early Americas (sans dock) as mini-strike carriers
- Ocean was always advertised as being designed to take a whole cdo bn (600) with their Bergens on, no mention of any supporting specialists

Okay - again in round numbers the current 1800 EMF is made up of...
•about 130 landing craft crew
•about 470 aviation group personnel
•about 1200 in a quite basic Lead Commando Group.

The 1200 is made up of about 700 from one of the infantry Commandos and the rest from HQ, Log, RE, RA etc. This is well below the full number of enablers that would normally deploy to fully support a single infantry Commando.

[R686]

In heavy conflict, you will have 3 T45 and 3 T26 in escort fleet.

The 5 River B2 OPV, with their very high sea-going days, can provide 4 vessels if needed. All these ship can carry for long period, significant number of RM soldiers.

60 for Type-45. 3 of them will give 180.
72 for Type-26. 3 of them, 216.
50 for River B2. 4 of them, 200.

In total 596 soldiers can be transferred to the theater for long period. Right before the landing operation, they will go to CV/LPH, LPD, and Bays.

We shall not forget this, because RN payed a lot to make it happen.

That's a logistical planning nightmare if you a planning on that FUBAR material

The ADF did that to a degree on OP Morris Dance, this op was the catalyst Amphibous Warfare vessels.

[ArmChairCivvy]

•about 130 landing craft crew
•about 470 aviation group personnel
•about 1200 in a quite basic Lead Commando Group.

The 1200 is made up of about 700 from one of the infantry Commandos and the rest from HQ, Log, RE, RA etc. This is well below the full number of enablers that would normally deploy to fully support a single infantry Commando.

OK, 1330 from the RM and the (permanently) assigned army units. The rest purpose-specific aviation crew (not counting the ships normal crewing)>Is the bolded part
- because of the reaction speed stipulated. or:
- because the shipping cannot deliver them in one go?
I think we have been focussing on the latter; both are important considerations.

We are pretty much in the same ball park, capability wise, as the French:
" the CNOA fixed the aim to project a force comprising four combat companies (1,400 men, 280 vehicles, and 30 helicopters) for ten days, in a 100 kilometre-deep sector". I put that originally on the carrier thread, luckily SB guided us to a better place, ie. this thread.
- may be lighter on vehicles (initially)
- with a good number of Chinooks, the reach will be better than 100 km (for other than just recce)
- with SSS coming we might be starting to better from the 10-day benchmark of sustaining the force, too

[Aethulwulf]

The current amphibious capability is centered around a 'fighting force' of 700 from a infantry Commando which is deployed as part of total force package of 1800. As I said this is well below the total number of enablers normally required to support the fighting force.

For example, back in early stages of Op Herrick the UK's deployment was centered around a single infantry battalion (about 700 men) but the total force package was 3000+ strong. After a while the UK decided to triple the size of the fighting force to 3 infantry battalions. This increased the total force package to about 5000.

So a single battalion of 700 men required support from 2300+ enablers. However 3 battalions (2100 men) required support from just 2900 enablers.

Although there are clear differences, the number of enablers a commando infantry requires is very similar. But with a total force package of just 1800 quite a bit of risk is being taken.

(All these Op Herrick numbers are very approximate - my memory is not so good. I'm sure some else can check)

[ArmChairCivvy]

Must be a graduated scale
- stay 10 days, 30
- or for years?

Anyway, I understand the point, just not sure of the reason. Readiness costs a lot , so having a light force is better than having a heavier one, but not so ready.

[marktigger]

In heavy conflict, you will have 3 T45 and 3 T26 in escort fleet.

The 5 River B2 OPV, with their very high sea-going days, can provide 4 vessels if needed. All these ship can carry for long period, significant number of RM soldiers.

60 for Type-45. 3 of them will give 180.
72 for Type-26. 3 of them, 216.
50 for River B2. 4 of them, 200.

In total 596 soldiers can be transferred to the theater for long period. Right before the landing operation, they will go to CV/LPH, LPD, and Bays.

We shall not forget this, because RN payed a lot to make it happen.

These numbers give me problems, Firstly you are spreading units all over the place making co-ordination and deconfliction a nightmare also passage of information for briefing. In planning any operation you need to know and confirm all your subordinate commanders are singing of same hym sheet. Also many of these "Escorts" will not be in a position to land their embarked force. I would also scrub the River batch 2 from a task force as some how I don't see them being available. Cross decking is a risky operation as G sqn 22 SAS found out in the falklands. The commandos were lucky then they transfared onto the LPD's in the falklands I think from Hermes or Canberra that they got a good weather window. Effectively you are looking at isolating 3 companies from their parent units. No commander is going to be comfortable with that. I would suggest your available bunspaces will be reduced by the number of add on systems now comming out and by the suggestions of additional bolt on systems here the bunk spaces will be reduced by specialists embarked to support various UAV's Drones, additional weapons and sensors.

[PAUL MARSAY]

For me the issue with our amphibious force is Albion and Bulwark and their heavy manning and the fact that with one always in reserve it requires a refit on every swap over , but there are other issues with these two ships under the current structure .

[shark bait]

Agreed that is a big issue, it certainty do no help with the affordability of the amphibious force. If something had to go to prop up the rest of the fleet my bet is on the Albion's.

It's why I was discussing what could be moved vertically, and what could be offloaded onto merchant shipping.

[marktigger]

Agreed that is a big issue, it certainty do no help with the affordability of the amphibious force. If something had to go to prop up the rest of the fleet my bet is on the Albion's.

It's why I was discussing what could be moved vertically, and what could be offloaded onto merchant shipping.

you can't rely on always having vertical movement for a variety of reasons you need flexibility and merchant shipping doesn't provide that. Amphibious vessels are specalised and you can rely on the "Market" to provide them

[donald_of_tokyo]

These numbers give me problems, Firstly you are spreading units all over the place making co-ordination and deconfliction a nightmare also passage of information for briefing. In planning any operation you need to know and confirm all your subordinate commanders are singing of same hym sheet.

Agreed. But, with network technologies improve a lot from 1982, the information sharing in remote location is greatly improved.

Also many of these "Escorts" will not be in a position to land their embarked force. I would also scrub the River batch 2 from a task force as some how I don't see them being available. Cross decking is a risky operation as G sqn 22 SAS found out in the falklands. The commandos were lucky then they transfared onto the LPD's in the falklands I think from Hermes or Canberra that they got a good weather window. Effectively you are looking at isolating 3 companies from their parent units. No commander is going to be comfortable with that.

The escorts has Chinook capable flight decks. They need at most 2 sorties to send them onto CV, LPD and Bays. It will be several days before the "D"-day, and the transport operation will have little impact on escorts fighting capability (because you do not need to use LCU/LCVP). Chinook capable, is the big difference, I guess. (and RN payed a lot to make it realize).

If you cannot find weather window within 1 week before the "D"-day for Chinook transport, there will be no "D"-day as well, because it means there will be no helicopter available also AFTER the "D"-day. In that circumstance, you should not land, too risky.

River B2s cannot handle Chinook. But they also have NO TASK to fight (simply because they cannot). They are as armed as a Bay (= not armed), so I think they will act as a member of landing ship fleet. May be for SBS with OSC onboard, or any detachments to cover a cape or peak near the landing beach (such as Fanning head near San Carlos water).

Anyway I am not saying River B2 is a good landing ship. I am just saying River B2 CAN join the landing operation. Much better to have another Bay, but there is none left. RN can send 4 out of 5 River B2 at any moment. If they have other tasks, good, do it. But, I guess there will be ~2 River B2 left and can be used for landing. And with current very small fleet of amphibious ships, they can contribute a lot. Especially, now all landing ship are so large (good), but with small number (restrict the tactics). So having small alternative is nice, I guess.

[marktigger]

donald how do you communicate to isolated units in electronic silence?
The sort of electronic silence you still need to use to mask your position/strength/intentions in advance of a landing operation. in 82 commanders were having to be shuttled round ships by helicopter or by light ship to ship.

[shark bait]

They we're being shuttled round ships because they didn't have the right equipment, not because it gave them any tactical advantage. One of the lessons learned was better comms systems, different units had different systems which caused cock ups.

[shark bait]

What inherent flexibility does a LPD provide today?

Really its a bit of a dated practice. Opposed landings are a definite no, and the bad guys are far to willing to exercise hybrid tactics, which is pushing a landing force much further away from the objective than in the past. That's going to change amphibious manoeuvres dramatically, requiring either vertically lifting direct to the objective, or landing a heavier force further away and driving to the objective.

[marktigger]

They we're being shuttled round ships because they didn't have the right equipment, not because it gave them any tactical advantage. One of the lessons learned was better comms systems, different units had different systems which caused cock ups.

one of the commandos had to be moved from Canberra to fearless and intrepid a few days before the landing to put them on ships with the facilities to off load them in an efficient and tactical manner

[marktigger]

What inherent flexibility does a LPD provide today?

Really its a bit of a dated practice. Opposed landings are a definite no, and the bad guys are far to willing to exercise hybrid tactics, which is pushing a landing force much further away from the objective than in the past. That's going to change amphibious manoeuvres dramatically, requiring either vertically lifting direct to the objective, or landing a heavier force further away and driving to the objective.

they provide landing craft which are as flexible as helicopters and in the build up post landing before break out they can carry greater loads of stores, personnel and equipment which there will never be enough lift capability to do with helicopters.......can a chinook lift a oshkosh tanker ?

[ArmChairCivvy]

What inherent flexibility does a LPD provide today?

One of the lessons learned was transferring command from maritime to land commander (the design reflects that need)

one of the commandos had to be moved from Canberra to fearless and intrepid a few days before the landing to put them on ships with the facilities to off load them in an efficient and tactical manner

they provide HEAVY landing craft

- I am sure mark meant that, but the lighter ones can be provided by other means. too, whereas LCUs not (and LCACs we cant afford )

[RetroSicotte]

Here's a crazy idea.

Why don't Australia and the UK swap amphibious vessels? We are dreadfully short of flattops and will have a STOVL aircraft, while many Australians I've spoken to are very unhappy with the Canberra as not entirely suitable to their needs, not having enough helos to justify the big flat decks and there only being a couple of them with a Bay.

We get the two Canberras with ramps, plus we get our 4th Bay back.

They get 2 Albions and HMS Ocean.

Straight swap, both nations remain happy.

[ArmChairCivvy]

we get our 4th Bay back.

They get 2 Albions and HMS Ocean.

- I do see the logic with the other Albion (but write off Ocean)
- both need the Bay; build one more to test the SJP model
- agree a standing (but not permanently deployed) task force for the Indian Ocean (includes the Gulf); and train together to show it is for real

What we would have , this side of Suez , will be enough. And the TF , on the "other side" will be more than the sum of its parts

[shark bait]

Yes LPD's provide landing craft, but that isn't a capability exclusive to the Albion's.

I'm not suggesting shifty everything to a vertical lift, the cost per tonne per mile just doesn't add up for sustaining an operation vertically, but there are more efficient ways of shifting equipment than using the LPD's.

Unless the Albions are going to be fitted with guns and missiles and operate in a hostile environment it will become increasingly difficult to justify their huge cost. In a permissive environment, there are more than one ways to skin a cat.

[shark bait]

Here's a crazy idea.

Should trade that extra Albion and get our Bay back!