Current & Future Amphibious Capability - General Discussion
-
- Senior Member
- Posts: 4094
- Joined: 15 Dec 2017, 10:25
Re: Current & Future Amphibious Capability - General Discussion
All of these points feed into the fact that FCF, MRSS and T32 were aspirations in a completely different global security environment.
The tumultuous events of 2022 has changed everything.
Funding and planning simply hasn’t caught up yet.
The tumultuous events of 2022 has changed everything.
Funding and planning simply hasn’t caught up yet.
- These users liked the author Poiuytrewq for the post (total 2):
- Scimitar54 • wargame_insomniac
- mrclark303
- Donator
- Posts: 853
- Joined: 06 May 2015, 10:47
Re: Current & Future Amphibious Capability - General Discussion
I thought the original plan was to move the whole organisation to FCF, with an enthesis on Company level and smaller operations?jedibeeftrix wrote: ↑29 Jan 2023, 11:27The word "all" is doing some heavy lifting there.
Of the three proper commandos, one has been transformed from the Commando21 model to the small-unit raiding model.
Is there indication that both the remaining two will be substantially transformed from the Commando21 model?
Regardless of whether that is too the small-unit raiding model, or something new designed for company-level operations...
I wonder if Ukraine will force a rethink, as Norway and in future Sweden will be looking towards a possible renewed need for a traditional RM northern flank reinforcement role?
- These users liked the author mrclark303 for the post:
- wargame_insomniac
- Tempest414
- Senior Member
- Posts: 5619
- Joined: 04 Jan 2018, 23:39
Re: Current & Future Amphibious Capability - General Discussion
What we need is to think bigger and in terms of joint force i.e LRG/N working as a re-enforced battalion battle group enabling entry of a Army light mechanised brigade into the high north and Baltic area of operations as at the same time having LRG/S working as at a re-enforced Company battle group able to be re- enforced buy elements of 16AA EoS
- These users liked the author Tempest414 for the post (total 3):
- jedibeeftrix • mrclark303 • wargame_insomniac
Re: Current & Future Amphibious Capability - General Discussion
Events dear boy events as someone said..Poiuytrewq wrote: ↑29 Jan 2023, 11:55 All of these points feed into the fact that FCF, MRSS and T32 were aspirations in a completely different global security environment.
The tumultuous events of 2022 has changed everything.
Funding and planning simply hasn’t caught up yet.
It has shown that the much hyped conventional threat from Russia was to a large part an exaggeration. Their conventional threat has been seriously depleted over the past year by relatively simple equipment. they would have had little chance with the things currently available to nato. With sanctions and their level of losses it will take them sometime to rebuilt a credible force.
It has shown defence of territory and integrity and resilience of our infrastructure, enabling capabilities and supply lines is back in vogue rather than questionable foreign adventures. Also how timely and credible intelligence and political action can have significant effect on outcomes. It would do well for us not to take our eyes of event along the African coast and central and South America in that regard.
- These users liked the author SW1 for the post (total 2):
- Caribbean • wargame_insomniac
-
- Member
- Posts: 525
- Joined: 09 May 2015, 22:54
Re: Current & Future Amphibious Capability - General Discussion
First, you'll have to define what "FCF" actually is!mrclark303 wrote: ↑29 Jan 2023, 11:56I thought the original plan was to move the whole organisation to FCF, with an enthesis on Company level and smaller operations?jedibeeftrix wrote: ↑29 Jan 2023, 11:27The word "all" is doing some heavy lifting there.
Of the three proper commandos, one has been transformed from the Commando21 model to the small-unit raiding model.
Is there indication that both the remaining two will be substantially transformed from the Commando21 model?
Regardless of whether that is to the small-unit raiding model, or something new designed for company-level operations...
I wonder if Ukraine will force a rethink, as Norway and in future Sweden will be looking towards a possible renewed need for a traditional RM northern flank reinforcement role?
You will find this challenging if you choose to rely on published facts, rather than an aspirational faith that a collection of soundbites and a leaked powerpoint slide reveal a detailed and finalised conops.
I would hope so, it is an invaluable capability for both nato and indo-pac engagement.
- These users liked the author jedibeeftrix for the post:
- mrclark303
- Tempest414
- Senior Member
- Posts: 5619
- Joined: 04 Jan 2018, 23:39
Re: Current & Future Amphibious Capability - General Discussion
We are moving into a new age that needs us to have capability to move effort and effect from place to place and this is why for me we need a EoS command withSW1 wrote: ↑29 Jan 2023, 12:54Events dear boy events as someone said..Poiuytrewq wrote: ↑29 Jan 2023, 11:55 All of these points feed into the fact that FCF, MRSS and T32 were aspirations in a completely different global security environment.
The tumultuous events of 2022 has changed everything.
Funding and planning simply hasn’t caught up yet.
It has shown that the much hyped conventional threat from Russia was to a large part an exaggeration. Their conventional threat has been seriously depleted over the past year by relatively simple equipment. they would have had little chance with the things currently available to nato. With sanctions and their level of losses it will take them sometime to rebuilt a credible force.
It has shown defence of territory and integrity and resilience of our infrastructure, enabling capabilities and supply lines is back in vogue rather than questionable foreign adventures. Also how timely and credible intelligence and political action can have significant effect on outcomes. It would do well for us not to take our eyes of event along the African coast and central and South America in that regard.
1 x Logistics sea base
1 x Tanker
4 x Type 31's
2 x OPV's
This Command would be to over see the Indo-Pacific but it main area of operation would be the Gulf and East African coast. I think we will also need to get back to having a South Atlantic group made up of 2 x type 31 and 2 OPV 's these are going to be key areas challenged by China
Re: Current & Future Amphibious Capability - General Discussion
We do need to invest in the logistical enablers and intelligence gathers but we also need to make the fighting force logistically lighter.Tempest414 wrote: ↑29 Jan 2023, 13:42We are moving into a new age that needs us to have capability to move effort and effect from place to place and this is why for me we need a EoS command withSW1 wrote: ↑29 Jan 2023, 12:54Events dear boy events as someone said..Poiuytrewq wrote: ↑29 Jan 2023, 11:55 All of these points feed into the fact that FCF, MRSS and T32 were aspirations in a completely different global security environment.
The tumultuous events of 2022 has changed everything.
Funding and planning simply hasn’t caught up yet.
It has shown that the much hyped conventional threat from Russia was to a large part an exaggeration. Their conventional threat has been seriously depleted over the past year by relatively simple equipment. they would have had little chance with the things currently available to nato. With sanctions and their level of losses it will take them sometime to rebuilt a credible force.
It has shown defence of territory and integrity and resilience of our infrastructure, enabling capabilities and supply lines is back in vogue rather than questionable foreign adventures. Also how timely and credible intelligence and political action can have significant effect on outcomes. It would do well for us not to take our eyes of event along the African coast and central and South America in that regard.
1 x Logistics sea base
1 x Tanker
4 x Type 31's
2 x OPV's
This Command would be to over see the Indo-Pacific but it main area of operation would be the Gulf and East African coast. I think we will also need to get back to having a South Atlantic group made up of 2 x type 31 and 2 OPV 's these are going to be key areas challenged by China
I highlighted something similar from a naval perspective(less the opvs and “sea base”) but it needs in my opinion to be tied into Gurkha unit already in the region and enabling there deployment in the region.
We are fortunate that we have sovereign territories in the regions suggested that we can project from but investment in infrastructure to make it happen in those locations will require a clear set of priorities and better capital allocation from those at the top than we have seen the past 2 decades.
There is far too much navy centric thinking on here in how it will all play out and the outcomes to be achieved with the assets we currently have in those regions.
Re: Current & Future Amphibious Capability - General Discussion
While I agree what I put forward is on the optermiistic side I also agree with the point stated earlier on the SSS thread that basing a future fleet make on that is 10 plus years away on the crew numbers of today is very poor planning.donald_of_tokyo wrote: ↑29 Jan 2023, 10:29Sorry I understand this discussion stands on optimistic "what should have been" viewpoint. But I cannot stop pointing out thatJake1992 wrote: ↑29 Jan 2023, 10:20Wouldn’t this concept be best served by not just thinking of it made up solely of the amphibious replacements but also the T32s.
My thinking is if we replaced the Albions, Bays and Argus with a fleet of 6 large LPDs / LSDs based off the same hull ( like the USN is doing with LPX and San Antonio ) this would give the core for large scale ops but can also dispersed. We then replace the waves with 2 Karel Doorman JSS, these can resupply the wider fleet ( leaving sss and tides to the QEs ) while also offering additional aviation and lane meterage to larger scale ops. ...
- RFA Argus's crew is needed for the 2nd FSSS. Choose which?
- Waves are gone. Anyway, there is no crew to man them. With the 3rd FSSS coming, which also does not have any crew, I think 2 Waves now in extended readiness will simply go. One vessel out of the 10-12 RFA fleet "without crew" is needed to account for long maintenance/modernization, but you do not need more than one.
Planning of future fleet build should always be based on what the expected need is and the paired back to from there to meet realistic expected budge and crew recruitment, with rectuitment being the keep word and not on what crew is avible 10 years before said fleet is in service.
My plan has the RFA at 13 vessels
4 Tide
3 SSS
2JSS
4 LSD
Compared to the current thinking of 11 vessels
4 Tide
3 SSS
4 MRSS ( most likely replacing Bays and Argus )
Are we really saying that over the next 10 years we can’t expect to try and up tic of crew for 2 JSS some 300 odd extra recruited over 10 years ??
Re: Current & Future Amphibious Capability - General Discussion
If you zoom up the picture at the top of the article the MRSS you talk about. Helicopters hangers big flight deck, iso containers assault craft all in one image. Not to mention fuel ammo and provisions. One in Asia one in the South Atlantic.
https://www.navylookout.com/rfa-wave-kn ... -in-haiti/
Shame there tied up along side to rot.
https://www.navylookout.com/rfa-wave-kn ... -in-haiti/
Shame there tied up along side to rot.
-
Online
- Senior Member
- Posts: 5594
- Joined: 06 May 2015, 13:18
Re: Current & Future Amphibious Capability - General Discussion
I understand your point, but think the other way. RFA size will go better, and it will also go worse. Military is reality, so thinking both is better.Jake1992 wrote: ↑29 Jan 2023, 14:40While I agree what I put forward is on the optermiistic side I also agree with the point stated earlier on the SSS thread that basing a future fleet make on that is 10 plus years away on the crew numbers of today is very poor planning.
Planning of future fleet build should always be based on what the expected need is and the paired back to from there to meet realistic expected budge and crew recruitment, with rectuitment being the keep word and not on what crew is avible 10 years before said fleet is in service.
My plan has the RFA at 13 vessels
4 Tide
3 SSS
2JSS
4 LSD
Compared to the current thinking of 11 vessels
4 Tide
3 SSS
4 MRSS ( most likely replacing Bays and Argus )
Are we really saying that over the next 10 years we can’t expect to try and up tic of crew for 2 JSS some 300 odd extra recruited over 10 years ??
Replacing 3 Bays and 1+1 Albions with 2 JSS and 4 LSD is your plan (I think Argus will be "replaced" by 2nd FSSS). That means you increasing the number by one, as well as making them all bigger. Good, if everything goes well, it is a good future. But, what if UK can only prepare resources for 4 hulls? 1 JSS and 3 LSD?
I think RFA shall go with 4 LSD plan (better be 5, and 6 as maximum). The LSD in my mind is;
- JMSDF Osumi-class LSD (13000t FLD) like (or enlarged Itanian San Georgio class like), with smallish dock and flat top.
- slightly enlarged to 15000t FLD.
- limit the well-dock to be "2 LCU capable", and prepare an area "to be used as helicopter hangar" at the fore with an elevator (which could be relatively slow and cheap ones)
- make the bridge superstructure smaller, more like Casablanca-class escort carrier.
- no need for fuel supply. 4 Tides are more than enough for 1 CVTF (not 2), and at least 1 Tide could go along with the LRG in operation.
- if going along with CVTF, "an area to be used as helicopter hangar" can be used for vehicles. Even the front-half of the flight deck can be used as such.
- If LRG is operating alone (with a single LSD), the internal "an area to be used as helicopter hangar" shall be used as a space for 6 Merlins, or 4 Merlins and several UAVs. The front-half of the flight deck can be used as vehicle deck, or flight-deck or run-way for the UAVs and helicopters.
In this plan, UK can have 4 such LSD as minimum. 2 as Albion replacement (with command), and 2 as Bay replacement (without). In "better" case, 2 as Albion replacement (with command), and 3 as Bay replacement (without). In "optimistic" case, increase it to 6 LSDs, 2 with command and 4 without. I think two of them can be operated as UAV/USV/UUV carrier, and 4 as landing assets.
Here, I assume an LRG operating alone will be made of, 2 LSDs, 1 Tide, 1 T31 and 1 River B2 OPV. "1 Tide, 1 T31 and 1 OPV" can provide lily-pad for 4 Merlins, (2 on Tide, 1 on T31, and 1 on OPV) and carry 2 Merlins or 4 Wildcats in their hangar.
Another LRG? It will be made of only 1 LSD and 1 T31/River OPV. It is not commencing landing operations (UK shall never do two amphibious operations at once), so no need for more escorts nor Tide.
Not bad, I think?
- These users liked the author donald_of_tokyo for the post:
- Djpowell1984
- Tempest414
- Senior Member
- Posts: 5619
- Joined: 04 Jan 2018, 23:39
Re: Current & Future Amphibious Capability - General Discussion
But the current plan as layout by the MOD isdonald_of_tokyo wrote: ↑29 Jan 2023, 15:39I understand your point, but think the other way. RFA size will go better, and it will also go worse. Military is reality, so thinking both is better.Jake1992 wrote: ↑29 Jan 2023, 14:40While I agree what I put forward is on the optermiistic side I also agree with the point stated earlier on the SSS thread that basing a future fleet make on that is 10 plus years away on the crew numbers of today is very poor planning.
Planning of future fleet build should always be based on what the expected need is and the paired back to from there to meet realistic expected budge and crew recruitment, with rectuitment being the keep word and not on what crew is avible 10 years before said fleet is in service.
My plan has the RFA at 13 vessels
4 Tide
3 SSS
2JSS
4 LSD
Compared to the current thinking of 11 vessels
4 Tide
3 SSS
4 MRSS ( most likely replacing Bays and Argus )
Are we really saying that over the next 10 years we can’t expect to try and up tic of crew for 2 JSS some 300 odd extra recruited over 10 years ??
Replacing 3 Bays and 1+1 Albions with 2 JSS and 4 LSD is your plan (I think Argus will be "replaced" by 2nd FSSS). That means you increasing the number by one, as well as making them all bigger. Good, if everything goes well, it is a good future. But, what if UK can only prepare resources for 4 hulls? 1 JSS and 3 LSD?
I think RFA shall go with 4 LSD plan (better be 5, and 6 as maximum). The LSD in my mind is;
- JMSDF Osumi-class LSD (13000t FLD) like (or enlarged Itanian San Georgio class like), with smallish dock and flat top.
- slightly enlarged to 15000t FLD.
- limit the well-dock to be "2 LCU capable", and prepare an area "to be used as helicopter hangar" at the fore with an elevator (which could be relatively slow and cheap ones)
- make the bridge superstructure smaller, more like Casablanca-class escort carrier.
- no need for fuel supply. 4 Tides are more than enough for 1 CVTF (not 2), and at least 1 Tide could go along with the LRG in operation.
- if going along with CVTF, "an area to be used as helicopter hangar" can be used for vehicles. Even the front-half of the flight deck can be used as such.
- If LRG is operating alone (with a single LSD), the internal "an area to be used as helicopter hangar" shall be used as a space for 6 Merlins, or 4 Merlins and several UAVs. The front-half of the flight deck can be used as vehicle deck, or flight-deck or run-way for the UAVs and helicopters.
In this plan, UK can have 4 such LSD as minimum. 2 as Albion replacement (with command), and 2 as Bay replacement (without). In "better" case, 2 as Albion replacement (with command), and 3 as Bay replacement (without). In "optimistic" case, increase it to 6 LSDs, 2 with command and 4 without. I think two of them can be operated as UAV/USV/UUV carrier, and 4 as landing assets.
Here, I assume an LRG operating alone will be made of, 2 LSDs, 1 Tide, 1 T31 and 1 River B2 OPV. "1 Tide, 1 T31 and 1 OPV" can provide lily-pad for 4 Merlins, (2 on Tide, 1 on T31, and 1 on OPV) and carry 2 Merlins or 4 Wildcats in their hangar.
Another LRG? It will be made of only 1 LSD and 1 T31/River OPV. It is not commencing landing operations (UK shall never do two amphibious operations at once), so no need for more escorts nor Tide.
Not bad, I think?
4 x Tide class already in service
3 x SSS now under order
6 x MRSS been moved to the right but is still the current plan
So the MOD must know what man power is needed and are working to this end and as said the RFA could be planning to crew
3 x Tides
2 x SSS
3 x MRSS with the RN planning to operate 1 or both of the remaining MRSS
-
- Senior Member
- Posts: 4094
- Joined: 15 Dec 2017, 10:25
Re: Current & Future Amphibious Capability - General Discussion
I think your proposal is sound with a good rationale. It is likely such platforms will more popular especially if optimised for drones. Possibly a future export opportunity if done right?
The only thing that everyone appears to agree on is that current planning is not the way forward.
What level are you expecting the MRSS budget to be set at?
-
- Senior Member
- Posts: 4094
- Joined: 15 Dec 2017, 10:25
Re: Current & Future Amphibious Capability - General Discussion
Moved across….
The rise in SSN numbers is welcome but not without further funding. If the budget remains the same the Amphib fleet will not be fully replaced in the 2030s when the costs of the SSNs are realised.
The “defence spending will increase when the security situation warrants it” mantra has now be replaced by “ defence spending will increase when economic conditions allow”. Clearly shows the first priority of government is no longer the first priority.
IMO the direction of travel for RN is the right one:
1. One CSG always available with both CVFs operating concurrently in extreme circumstances.
2. Two LRGs operating either side of Suez combining to form a LSG when required.
3. CASD maintained
4. Kipion and standing NATO and JEF commitments maintained.
5. OPV filling in the gaps globally
It’s a very achievable and affordable if the political will existed.
Even with defence spending fixed at 2.5% GDP it should be perfectly achievable if sensible decisions are made around manpower and vessel procurement.
Adjusted for inflation HMS Ocean for around £350m is amazing value for money. Likewise the T31s, even if upgraded to GP spec would come in around £375m each. Great value.
High Capacity OPVs for £125m each to replace the RB1s would allow the rest of the fleet to concentrate on the main areas of operation.
The main priority however appears to be increasing RN/RFA manpower by around 1200 over the next 5 years or more and more vessels will continue to be tied up for extended periods.
Exactly but we are where we are.
The rise in SSN numbers is welcome but not without further funding. If the budget remains the same the Amphib fleet will not be fully replaced in the 2030s when the costs of the SSNs are realised.
The “defence spending will increase when the security situation warrants it” mantra has now be replaced by “ defence spending will increase when economic conditions allow”. Clearly shows the first priority of government is no longer the first priority.
IMO the direction of travel for RN is the right one:
1. One CSG always available with both CVFs operating concurrently in extreme circumstances.
2. Two LRGs operating either side of Suez combining to form a LSG when required.
3. CASD maintained
4. Kipion and standing NATO and JEF commitments maintained.
5. OPV filling in the gaps globally
It’s a very achievable and affordable if the political will existed.
Even with defence spending fixed at 2.5% GDP it should be perfectly achievable if sensible decisions are made around manpower and vessel procurement.
Adjusted for inflation HMS Ocean for around £350m is amazing value for money. Likewise the T31s, even if upgraded to GP spec would come in around £375m each. Great value.
High Capacity OPVs for £125m each to replace the RB1s would allow the rest of the fleet to concentrate on the main areas of operation.
The main priority however appears to be increasing RN/RFA manpower by around 1200 over the next 5 years or more and more vessels will continue to be tied up for extended periods.
- These users liked the author Poiuytrewq for the post (total 2):
- wargame_insomniac • jedibeeftrix
Re: Current & Future Amphibious Capability - General Discussion
Poiuytrewq wrote: ↑22 Mar 2023, 11:08 Moved across….Exactly but we are where we are.
The rise in SSN numbers is welcome but not without further funding. If the budget remains the same the Amphib fleet will not be fully replaced in the 2030s when the costs of the SSNs are realised.
The “defence spending will increase when the security situation warrants it” mantra has now be replaced by “ defence spending will increase when economic conditions allow”. Clearly shows the first priority of government is no longer the first priority.
IMO the direction of travel for RN is the right one:
1. One CSG always available with both CVFs operating concurrently in extreme circumstances.
2. Two LRGs operating either side of Suez combining to form a LSG when required.
3. CASD maintained
4. Kipion and standing NATO and JEF commitments maintained.
5. OPV filling in the gaps globally
It’s a very achievable and affordable if the political will existed.
Even with defence spending fixed at 2.5% GDP it should be perfectly achievable if sensible decisions are made around manpower and vessel procurement.
Adjusted for inflation HMS Ocean for around £350m is amazing value for money. Likewise the T31s, even if upgraded to GP spec would come in around £375m each. Great value.
High Capacity OPVs for £125m each to replace the RB1s would allow the rest of the fleet to concentrate on the main areas of operation.
The main priority however appears to be increasing RN/RFA manpower by around 1200 over the next 5 years or more and more vessels will continue to be tied up for extended periods.
Imo your points one and two are actually one group. It’s very much a U.K. variation on a U.S. expeditionary strike group that simple can be deployed in either one location or splits and can sent to 2 locations. A smoke and mirrors move by our part to pretend otherwise by giving them different names neither will be sustainable in place over the long term.
On pt 3 yes
On pt 4 and 5 we have different views and I think it needs more focus than u suggest.
As for the increasing ssn number means more money. I will again slightly disagree. More money maybe but if it is more money it needs to be from elsewhere in the defence budget it can’t come from hoped for future increases it’s a fools errand.
Yes I would increase ssn number but it would be at the expense of scaling back the surface fleet as I’ve mentioned before. In the event of very high end conflict with russia or China the surface fleet will not imo be of much use the ssn fleet will. The surface fleet in general is for lower peer conflict than that and should scaled accordingly.
Re: Current & Future Amphibious Capability - General Discussion
Moved my comment also
But Argus is not taking over the LPH role. The world has changed and so has the requirement. The fact is that there are two capable LPDs with large flight decks that can receive helicopters either from a CVF or ASS.
The fact that amphibious assault is down the priority list for many reasons including aversion to ground wars after Gulf and Afghanistan, is the underlying cause no matter how you want to dress it up. If the priority is Carrier Strike two large CVFs is absolute the right decision.
”We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow." - Lord Palmerston
Re: Current & Future Amphibious Capability - General Discussion
I’m comfortable that the UK has decided to prioritised other things over a LPH or even a LHD force.
The 1997 SDSR dream of 2 ARGs each comprised of a LPH, LPD and 2 LSDs, was just that a dream. It was based on Blair’s crusade of nation building, it is dead and always was. Even the shining example of Sierra Leone could be done today with the current assets and what’s more be done better.
The 1997 SDSR dream of 2 ARGs each comprised of a LPH, LPD and 2 LSDs, was just that a dream. It was based on Blair’s crusade of nation building, it is dead and always was. Even the shining example of Sierra Leone could be done today with the current assets and what’s more be done better.
- These users liked the author Repulse for the post:
- donald_of_tokyo
”We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow." - Lord Palmerston
- shark bait
- Senior Member
- Posts: 6427
- Joined: 05 May 2015, 21:18
Re: Current & Future Amphibious Capability - General Discussion
The prioritising is fine. If the Navy didn't prioritise they would look like the Army.
- These users liked the author shark bait for the post:
- Ron5
@LandSharkUK
-
- Senior Member
- Posts: 4094
- Joined: 15 Dec 2017, 10:25
Re: Current & Future Amphibious Capability - General Discussion
Moved across,
If they were 200m LHDs with 1500m2 hanger space, 6 spot flight deck, 2 LCU floodable dock, 300pax plus crew, a Role 2 medical facility and around 1500lm of RORO who would complain?
Maybe it’s time to admit the French were actually pretty much spot on with their Mistrals.
The Bay class are so popular because they are so versatile.
The MRSS is a clean sheet design. If the budget is around £400m per hull virtually any design configuration is possible. Therefore why not spend the £2.5bn on six vessels that are truly transformational for RN. The current Amphibious fleet is a 20th century relic and although highly capable it is too expensive to operate properly which is why it has been continuously cut since 2010.
The next-gen Amphibs need to capable and cost effective with highly efficient HADR capabilities for when they are not being used for Amphibious Assault or Littoral Strike. That will save them from the chopping block regardless of how many flattops RN operates.
Large amounts of hanger space is going to be critically important on all logistic vessels going forward as heavy lift UAVs increasingly become one of the most important ship to shore connectors. How big will these heavy lift UAVs become? Moving large amounts of equipment ashore from an OTH position will be most efficiently handled by XL heavy-lift UAVs so something Merlin or Chinook sized is not out of the question.
Adding all of the capabilities required to a Frigate is a very expensive ambition. Probably unaffordable and highly likely the size and displacement would increase to a modest MRSS level really quite quickly.
IMO the best compromise remains to build a highly capable Littoral enabler around a High Capacity OPV design with a defensive suite that can be rapidly upgraded by PODs if required. Any offensive capability really should be on the accompanying escort(s) or via the aviation assets.
Calling in the CSG every time a LRG or LSG is formed would be massively expensive and a guaranteed way to get the whole concept scrapped.
It would be much better to build a more capable MRSS and only involve the CVF when the F35 are required. Downgrade the T32 programme to an affordable level and build a structure that can be afforded for the foreseeable.
LRG: 1x Hi Cap OPV, 1x MRSS, 1x T31+.
LSG: 2x Hi Cap OPV, 2x MRSS, 2x T31+.
ESF: 2x Hi Cap OPV 2x MRSS, 2x T31+, CSG
Really depends on the design of the MRSS.
If they were 200m LHDs with 1500m2 hanger space, 6 spot flight deck, 2 LCU floodable dock, 300pax plus crew, a Role 2 medical facility and around 1500lm of RORO who would complain?
Maybe it’s time to admit the French were actually pretty much spot on with their Mistrals.
RN just doesn’t have the mass anymore for the tailored bespoke solution to every problem.It is based on the principle that six large ships would give flexibility to scale, which is true to a point but actually the FCF needs are more complex and there are better solutions than a one common platform fits all approach.
The Bay class are so popular because they are so versatile.
That sounds great and also very expensive.For example, an “Airborne” Littoral Strike Group (ALSG) consisting of a CVF sailing with a LPD and a FSS can arguably support a Cdo sized helicopter assault OTH, along with the ability to resupply using LCMs restocked from the support ship. Therefore, keeping two large LPDs with large flight decks is a key capability - MRSS flight decks are relatively small and there is no need for a hangar.
The MRSS is a clean sheet design. If the budget is around £400m per hull virtually any design configuration is possible. Therefore why not spend the £2.5bn on six vessels that are truly transformational for RN. The current Amphibious fleet is a 20th century relic and although highly capable it is too expensive to operate properly which is why it has been continuously cut since 2010.
The next-gen Amphibs need to capable and cost effective with highly efficient HADR capabilities for when they are not being used for Amphibious Assault or Littoral Strike. That will save them from the chopping block regardless of how many flattops RN operates.
Why not enable all of the MRSS vessels to provide such a capability? A Bay class with a 1000m2 hanger added could achieve that now. As a surge capability it’s not that expensive as the full potential of the hull is not utilised on a regular basis. Other nations Enforcer designs had a Airborne Littoral Strike capability built in from the start.Add an Aviation Support Ship capable of operating six helicopters and 200 troops then adds the ability to doing large SF airborne raids. It could do this by itself when operating in low threat maritime environments, but if could also be added to a ALSG or part of an allied force.
Large amounts of hanger space is going to be critically important on all logistic vessels going forward as heavy lift UAVs increasingly become one of the most important ship to shore connectors. How big will these heavy lift UAVs become? Moving large amounts of equipment ashore from an OTH position will be most efficiently handled by XL heavy-lift UAVs so something Merlin or Chinook sized is not out of the question.
Perhaps but a Littoral enabler that is self protecting is a sensible proposition if it can be afforded both in terms of procurement and operating costs.What is left is the requirement to land sub company sized units directly to shore and able to support them by operating further inshore in the Littorals. This is where the T32 becomes interesting, but with the need for multiple vessels then I think the term Frigate is overdoing it.
Adding all of the capabilities required to a Frigate is a very expensive ambition. Probably unaffordable and highly likely the size and displacement would increase to a modest MRSS level really quite quickly.
IMO the best compromise remains to build a highly capable Littoral enabler around a High Capacity OPV design with a defensive suite that can be rapidly upgraded by PODs if required. Any offensive capability really should be on the accompanying escort(s) or via the aviation assets.
Calling in the CSG every time a LRG or LSG is formed would be massively expensive and a guaranteed way to get the whole concept scrapped.
It would be much better to build a more capable MRSS and only involve the CVF when the F35 are required. Downgrade the T32 programme to an affordable level and build a structure that can be afforded for the foreseeable.
LRG: 1x Hi Cap OPV, 1x MRSS, 1x T31+.
LSG: 2x Hi Cap OPV, 2x MRSS, 2x T31+.
ESF: 2x Hi Cap OPV 2x MRSS, 2x T31+, CSG
- These users liked the author Poiuytrewq for the post:
- jedibeeftrix
Re: Current & Future Amphibious Capability - General Discussion
Did the French get it right with mistral I think so, did we get it right with ocean I think so. The cost capability trade off was pretty much spot on for a military of our size. Ocean could have been improved on if some of its systems installed were more widely used within the maritime sector. We became myopic in our bigger shinny things elsewhere and moved away from this path.Poiuytrewq wrote: ↑12 Apr 2023, 14:31 Moved across,
Really depends on the design of the MRSS.
If they were 200m LHDs with 1500m2 hanger space, 6 spot flight deck, 2 LCU floodable dock, 300pax plus crew, a Role 2 medical facility and around 1500lm of RORO who would complain?
Maybe it’s time to admit the French were actually pretty much spot on with their Mistrals.RN just doesn’t have the mass anymore for the tailored bespoke solution to every problem.It is based on the principle that six large ships would give flexibility to scale, which is true to a point but actually the FCF needs are more complex and there are better solutions than a one common platform fits all approach.
The Bay class are so popular because they are so versatile.That sounds great and also very expensive.For example, an “Airborne” Littoral Strike Group (ALSG) consisting of a CVF sailing with a LPD and a FSS can arguably support a Cdo sized helicopter assault OTH, along with the ability to resupply using LCMs restocked from the support ship. Therefore, keeping two large LPDs with large flight decks is a key capability - MRSS flight decks are relatively small and there is no need for a hangar.
The MRSS is a clean sheet design. If the budget is around £400m per hull virtually any design configuration is possible. Therefore why not spend the £2.5bn on six vessels that are truly transformational for RN. The current Amphibious fleet is a 20th century relic and although highly capable it is too expensive to operate properly which is why it has been continuously cut since 2010.
The next-gen Amphibs need to capable and cost effective with highly efficient HADR capabilities for when they are not being used for Amphibious Assault or Littoral Strike. That will save them from the chopping block regardless of how many flattops RN operates.
Why not enable all of the MRSS vessels to provide such a capability? A Bay class with a 1000m2 hanger added could achieve that now. As a surge capability it’s not that expensive as the full potential of the hull is not utilised on a regular basis. Other nations Enforcer designs had a Airborne Littoral Strike capability built in from the start.Add an Aviation Support Ship capable of operating six helicopters and 200 troops then adds the ability to doing large SF airborne raids. It could do this by itself when operating in low threat maritime environments, but if could also be added to a ALSG or part of an allied force.
Large amounts of hanger space is going to be critically important on all logistic vessels going forward as heavy lift UAVs increasingly become one of the most important ship to shore connectors. How big will these heavy lift UAVs become? Moving large amounts of equipment ashore from an OTH position will be most efficiently handled by XL heavy-lift UAVs so something Merlin or Chinook sized is not out of the question.Perhaps but a Littoral enabler that is self protecting is a sensible proposition if it can be afforded both in terms of procurement and operating costs.What is left is the requirement to land sub company sized units directly to shore and able to support them by operating further inshore in the Littorals. This is where the T32 becomes interesting, but with the need for multiple vessels then I think the term Frigate is overdoing it.
Adding all of the capabilities required to a Frigate is a very expensive ambition. Probably unaffordable and highly likely the size and displacement would increase to a modest MRSS level really quite quickly.
IMO the best compromise remains to build a highly capable Littoral enabler around a High Capacity OPV design with a defensive suite that can be rapidly upgraded by PODs if required. Any offensive capability really should be on the accompanying escort(s) or via the aviation assets.
Calling in the CSG every time a LRG or LSG is formed would be massively expensive and a guaranteed way to get the whole concept scrapped.
It would be much better to build a more capable MRSS and only involve the CVF when the F35 are required. Downgrade the T32 programme to an affordable level and build a structure that can be afforded for the foreseeable.
LRG: 1x Hi Cap OPV, 1x MRSS, 1x T31+.
LSG: 2x Hi Cap OPV, 2x MRSS, 2x T31+.
ESF: 2x Hi Cap OPV 2x MRSS, 2x T31+, CSG
The problem with the whole littoral groups is they all just look like an after thought of the ooops I didn’t really mean it was all about the carriers what do we do now. Is the marines future just all fwd reconnaissance and very small scale direction action and boardings? Is the high water mark now an operation Paraquet equivalent?
Problem is the supporting arms and a/c. If the “plan” really is to have both carriers in commission and JPR element with them with let’s say 4 commando Merlins assigned that pretty much gobbles up commando helicopter force deployable strength with little left for anything else so these littoral groups live and die by the deployments of the carrier.
If you really wanted a hard look at such things then it would really be around much more than their single service role but instead within the armed forces as a whole. If both the marines and the paras are to have a sort of tier 2 global SF style role then there air/land and sea support and new types of delivery really need considered in the whole.
-
- Senior Member
- Posts: 1149
- Joined: 20 Nov 2021, 19:12
Re: Current & Future Amphibious Capability - General Discussion
I am assuming that reflects your previously noted desire to add at least one T31, which might be pushing it in terms of both current Budger and likely available manpower. I hope this will be the case but I fear a toich optimistic.Tempest414 wrote: ↑29 Jan 2023, 13:42We are moving into a new age that needs us to have capability to move effort and effect from place to place and this is why for me we need a EoS command withSW1 wrote: ↑29 Jan 2023, 12:54Events dear boy events as someone said..Poiuytrewq wrote: ↑29 Jan 2023, 11:55 All of these points feed into the fact that FCF, MRSS and T32 were aspirations in a completely different global security environment.
The tumultuous events of 2022 has changed everything.
Funding and planning simply hasn’t caught up yet.
It has shown that the much hyped conventional threat from Russia was to a large part an exaggeration. Their conventional threat has been seriously depleted over the past year by relatively simple equipment. they would have had little chance with the things currently available to nato. With sanctions and their level of losses it will take them sometime to rebuilt a credible force.
It has shown defence of territory and integrity and resilience of our infrastructure, enabling capabilities and supply lines is back in vogue rather than questionable foreign adventures. Also how timely and credible intelligence and political action can have significant effect on outcomes. It would do well for us not to take our eyes of event along the African coast and central and South America in that regard.
1 x Logistics sea base
1 x Tanker
4 x Type 31's
2 x OPV's
This Command would be to over see the Indo-Pacific but it main area of operation would be the Gulf and East African coast. I think we will also need to get back to having a South Atlantic group made up of 2 x type 31 and 2 OPV 's these are going to be key areas challenged by China
Assuming that when you say South Atlantic that you are including the BOT's of Ascencion / St Helena / Tristan de Cunha, as well as covering west coast of Africe and east coast of South America, as well as the current deployment for Falklands Islands Guard Ship, then I would be comfortable with that suggestion assuming extra funds can be made available to improve the Naval budget.
Re: Current & Future Amphibious Capability - General Discussion
I would because they would soak resources weakening the overall balance of the fleet. It’s not necessary.Poiuytrewq wrote: ↑12 Apr 2023, 14:31 If they were 200m LHDs with 1500m2 hanger space, 6 spot flight deck, 2 LCU floodable dock, 300pax plus crew, a Role 2 medical facility and around 1500lm of RORO who would complain?
I disagree, by having an appropriate mix of platforms ensures that you can meet the mixture of requirements. By having a generic fleet means that in some areas they are overkill in others they are seriously exposed.Poiuytrewq wrote: ↑12 Apr 2023, 14:31RN just doesn’t have the mass anymore for the tailored bespoke solution to every problem.
Would disagree, the LPDs are paid for and can last another 15-20 years, and Aviation Support ship would be @£1/2bn. The smaller craft I’m proposing is a fraction of a MRSS. LPDs are expensive to run, but much of the costs are related to HQ costs which would be required anyway.Poiuytrewq wrote: ↑12 Apr 2023, 14:31 That sounds great and also very expensive.
... The current Amphibious fleet is a 20th century relic and although highly capable it is too expensive to operate properly which is why it has been continuously cut since 2010.
Spreading the limited CHF over more than three platforms makes no sense, it’s too costly and each will be limited. To land a Cdo Company requires 6 spots, this can be done from a CVF. Combined with a couple of Chinooks operating from the LPD large deck it gives a serious first wave assault capability. You would need multiple Enforcers to get close.Poiuytrewq wrote: ↑12 Apr 2023, 14:31 Why not enable all of the MRSS vessels to provide such a capability? A Bay class with a 1000m2 hanger added could achieve that now. As a surge capability it’s not that expensive as the full potential of the hull is not utilised on a regular basis. Other nations Enforcer designs had a Airborne Littoral Strike capability built in from the start.
Would agree a high capacity OPV/Sloop is something definitely worth exploring.Poiuytrewq wrote: ↑12 Apr 2023, 14:31 IMO the best compromise remains to build a highly capable Littoral enabler around a High Capacity OPV design with a defensive suite that can be rapidly upgraded by PODs if required. Any offensive capability really should be on the accompanying escort(s) or via the aviation assets.
Using the ASS for SF ops and more usual HADR / evacuation operations would mean that using a CSG is exceptional which ultimately it is, you can count on one hand the operations in the past 25 years.Poiuytrewq wrote: ↑12 Apr 2023, 14:31
Calling in the CSG every time a LRG or LSG is formed would be massively expensive and a guaranteed way to get the whole concept scrapped.
My fear on costs is quite the opposite, I think multiple MRSS will cost more and it will be easy to salami cost cut.
”We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow." - Lord Palmerston
Re: Current & Future Amphibious Capability - General Discussion
The fallacy that you can do first tier amphibious assault without carrier strike is a dream, what’s more it’s a dangerous dream. France does have 3 basic LHDs, but only one carrier and not enough escorts to put them in harms way outside of an allied force. They also lack logistics.SW1 wrote: ↑12 Apr 2023, 19:23 Did the French get it right with mistral I think so, did we get it right with ocean I think so. The cost capability trade off was pretty much spot on for a military of our size. Ocean could have been improved on if some of its systems installed were more widely used within the maritime sector. We became myopic in our bigger shinny things elsewhere and moved away from this path.
The problem with the whole littoral groups is they all just look like an after thought of the ooops I didn’t really mean it was all about the carriers what do we do now. Is the marines future just all fwd reconnaissance and very small scale direction action and boardings? Is the high water mark now an operation Paraquet equivalent?
Problem is the supporting arms and a/c. If the “plan” really is to have both carriers in commission and JPR element with them with let’s say 4 commando Merlins assigned that pretty much gobbles up commando helicopter force deployable strength with little left for anything else so these littoral groups live and die by the deployments of the carrier.
If you really wanted a hard look at such things then it would really be around much more than their single service role but instead within the armed forces as a whole. If both the marines and the paras are to have a sort of tier 2 global SF style role then there air/land and sea support and new types of delivery really need considered in the whole.
Operation Paraquet is definitely one future scenario, but equally are Operation Palliser, amd id argue the helicopter assault part of Operation Telic.
”We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow." - Lord Palmerston
Re: Current & Future Amphibious Capability - General Discussion
We have done everything up to brigade level amphibious operations without carrier strike. And we no longer have brigade level amphibious capability and battlegroup level is doubtful.Repulse wrote: ↑12 Apr 2023, 20:48The fallacy that you can do first tier amphibious assault without carrier strike is a dream, what’s more it’s a dangerous dream. France does have 3 basic LHDs, but only one carrier and not enough escorts to put them in harms way outside of an allied force. They also lack logistics.SW1 wrote: ↑12 Apr 2023, 19:23 Did the French get it right with mistral I think so, did we get it right with ocean I think so. The cost capability trade off was pretty much spot on for a military of our size. Ocean could have been improved on if some of its systems installed were more widely used within the maritime sector. We became myopic in our bigger shinny things elsewhere and moved away from this path.
The problem with the whole littoral groups is they all just look like an after thought of the ooops I didn’t really mean it was all about the carriers what do we do now. Is the marines future just all fwd reconnaissance and very small scale direction action and boardings? Is the high water mark now an operation Paraquet equivalent?
Problem is the supporting arms and a/c. If the “plan” really is to have both carriers in commission and JPR element with them with let’s say 4 commando Merlins assigned that pretty much gobbles up commando helicopter force deployable strength with little left for anything else so these littoral groups live and die by the deployments of the carrier.
If you really wanted a hard look at such things then it would really be around much more than their single service role but instead within the armed forces as a whole. If both the marines and the paras are to have a sort of tier 2 global SF style role then there air/land and sea support and new types of delivery really need considered in the whole.
Operation Paraquet is definitely one future scenario, but equally are Operation Palliser, amd id argue the helicopter assault part of Operation Telic.
Re: Current & Future Amphibious Capability - General Discussion
Sorry, which operation are you talking about?
”We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow." - Lord Palmerston
Re: Current & Future Amphibious Capability - General Discussion
Iraq in 2003 no uk carrier strike there. Same serria leone