General UK Defence Discussion

[dmereifield]

Wondering if this crisis with Russia will have the knock in effect and make countries bolster their defences and defence budgets ? ,, Maybe the exact opposite as to what Putin/ Russia wants

Sensible though that would be, I expect it to be wishful thinking (I'm the UK context)

[SW1]

IR review- Russian is the biggest threat to national security the pacing threat.
MOD command paper - let’s paddle about in the South China Sea

Ooooooops

[SW1]

[Lord Jim]

Why do I now want to watch Khartoum with General Gordon all of a sudden. Looks like an Article Five "Speed Bump", to me.

[SW1]

https://static.rusi.org/315-WHR-Utility ... -Power.pdf

FOLLOWING THE UK’S 2021 Integrated Review, a combination of changed strategic circumstances and anticipated technological transformation is driving a restructuring of the British Army. Although this will be informed by experimentation, it is vital that the emerging force provides policymakers with the tools that the UK’s interests demand from the British Army. This Whitehall Report provides a framework for how the Army must structure itself to meet the demands of policy. It also provides the Army with a list of tests to measure the policy relevance of its capabilities and structures.

The report concludes that the UK military must perform three broad tasks: deterrence by denial of Russian aggression against NATO; deterrence by punishment to protect UK interests; and the projection of influence to build and strengthen strategic partnerships to secure the UK’s prosperity. Operationally, these tasks correspond to three broad areas. First, there is the area of the Joint Expeditionary Force straddling NATO’s eastern flank and the High North where deterring Russia is the primary concern. Second, there is an area of expeditionary operations to assist partners and deter threats to UK interests covering the Balkans and running through the Gulf to the East African Community. Here, threats against UK interests emanating from state competitors could require significant military responses, while partners in this area may seek substantial support in ensuring their security if they are to strengthen their relations with the UK. UK bases in Kenya, Oman and Cyprus provide key hubs for maintaining capability in theatre, though partnerships extend further. The third area might be described as those states where the UK has a strategic interest in strengthening its relationships – India, Malaysia, South Korea, Japan and Australia – but where defence engagement will be principally limited to technological and industrial cooperation, and exercising against common threat systems like layered standoff, rather than operational cooperation.

To be able to meet these disparate tasks, any proposed force structure or capability can be judged against a series of key tests. The key questions are:
• Is the force informed about its operating environment?
• Is the force able to project its combat and support arms in an expeditionary capacity?
• Is the force able to deploy into theatre within a policy relevant timeframe?
• Does the force overmatch adversary formations of the equivalent echelon in terms
of its firepower?
• Is the force compatible with the partners and allies alongside whom it will need to fight?

The present force fails most of these tests. Where it passes, it does so with insufficient mass. The Army’s Future Soldier programme – outlining the force’s restructuring following the Integrated Review – promises to bring the force closer to what is required, so long as longer-term investments are delivered by the Land Industrial Strategy. However, a range of
cultural changes are also necessary to succeed. Furthermore, the force must make several bets as to where it invests in establishing critical mass within particular capabilities to ensure its relevance in upholding NATO’s deterrence posture

The second quality of a policy-relevant land force for the UK government is that it must be expeditionary. A distinction is often drawn between the demands of a conflict in Europe and the requirements for operations in Africa or the Middle East. The premise is that, in Europe, forces can be prepositioned to have a strong deterrent effect and armies ensuring security can therefore sacrifice mobility for protection. This is bolstered by a historical record that shows that heavy armour has a disproportionate deterrent effect where it is forward deployed.128 Conversely, those operating in lower-threat environments can sacrifice protection for mobility. This distinction between the European theatre and ‘out of area operations’ was prominent in the Cold War.129 For the UK, however, it is an increasingly false dichotomy.

In modern warfare, a credible formation is not primarily determined by the number of main battle tanks it has but by the wrap that enables and protects the force irrespective of the exact composition of the combat arms. Against long-range precision fires and modern ISR, an armoured force is little more survivable than a light one if it is not protected by counter-ISR, EW, air defences, fires, recce and mobility support elements. In many contexts, the lower signature of less protected platforms makes them more survivable in the indirect fire zone, though this comes at the expense of their survivability in the direct fire zone. This is not to say that light and heavy forces have equal offensive potential. Heavy forces clearly have more offensive combat power. Rather, it is to argue that what determines the UK’s deployment of effective units of military action is where it places its support arms. Seeing as the UK cannot afford sufficient combat support elements to maintain them in all theatres, the question becomes how readily these elements can be moved to where they are needed. For this reason, achieving timely deterrence in Europe or projecting forces further afield requires an expeditionary force, since both will need assets to be sent from the UK and sustained at reach. Therefore, whatever the balance of heavy and medium forces in the combat arms, UK land forces should be built around deployable units of action which are defined by the number of protective and enabling envelopes the UK can put into the field.

Operation Pitting should not be seen as unique in the way in which speed trumped most other considerations. When Russia seized Crimea in 2014, it took just 10 days. When Azerbaijan opened a full-scale offensive against Armenian forces to retake Nagorno-Karabakh in 2020, the transition from border clashes to full-scale war took less than 72 hours. In 1982, the UK’s retaking of the Falklands was crucially enabled by the fact that the Task Force could be assembled and put to sea within 72 hours. Had the military not been able to act this quickly, the political will could easily have faded. Once at sea, the fact that forces were deployed narrowed the political debate. It is consistently the case that the judgement to go to war revolves around crises with a limited window of opportunity in which deterrence can be messaged. Any major war requires more materiel than can be assembled in a matter of hours. There is a need for a second echelon. However, a politically relevant military must be able to project a credible force package at a relevant speed. Historically, the political decision to apply force or not has often demanded that options be presented and that the leaders have a tangible demonstration of their decision being in motion within 72 hours.

That units are held at staggered levels of readiness makes sense. It is highly resource intensive to hold units at very high readiness, and this constrains the ability to train or take holiday, which affects retention. For this reason, the Army holds high- and low-readiness forces. However, much of the lower-readiness force presupposes that government will plan effectively and thereby make decisions in time to bring relevant parts of the force up to readiness in the lead up to crises. There is no historical evidence to support this assumption.

[dmereifield]

Any ideas/evudence that the recent events in Ukraine will lead to HMG/MoD to reverse the announced cuts to the Army?

[Repulse]

Any ideas/evudence that the recent events in Ukraine will lead to HMG/MoD to reverse the announced cuts to the Army?

Is that the answer? I can see the argument to keep more CR2s, but what are we expecting this slightly larger force to do that the current envisaged force cannot? Looking at things in a different way is a must, and robbing the RN budget or even the RAF one isn’t the way - they are both doing equally valuable things, they are just doing it better.

Plus when we talk about cuts, we shouldn’t forget some of the biggest are self inflicted by the army on themselves through shit poor management.

[SW1]

Why would it? The integrated review specifically stated that the euro Atlantic area was the principal security concern for the U.K. and Russia the pacing threat.

You could argue that the defence command paper ignored that and got all excited about far flung places of much less security concern to us.

Having a bigger army or armed force didn’t stop Russia annexing Crimea 8 years ago. Despite the pr it will take the army a full week to move the remaining parts of a single battle group from paderborn to Estonia which is far too long, it has to become more deployable and sustainable the defence review did little to address that.

[Repulse]

In terms of deterring Russia along the middle of NATOs eastern land border most of the heavy lifting needs to come from Poland and Germany, with support from France. Even the US will not be a main player longer term.

The UK can play a supporting niche role providing specialist skills / forces, but it’s focus needs to be on the flanks. In the Baltics / Nordics through JEF and in the North Atlantic/ Artic.

Where we should be concerned is the southern flank, of which Ukraine is a key part. It is almost certain that Russia will turn east itself and form closer relations with China; to do this it will want a secure western flank. The areas where it will get interesting will be the area from Turkey to India. Turkey is key, but relations with the likes of France are at a low. This is where the UK can come in to shore things up in NATO.

It’s perhaps in this region (unfortunately that includes Afghanistan) where Russia and China will focus and where the Army should think what it can offer as part of a new Great Game.

[SW1]

In terms of deterring Russia along the middle of NATOs eastern land border most of the heavy lifting needs to come from Poland and Germany, with support from France. Even the US will not be a main player longer term.

The UK can play a supporting niche role providing specialist skills / forces, but it’s focus needs to be on the flanks. In the Baltics / Nordics through JEF and in the North Atlantic/ Artic.

Where we should be concerned is the southern flank, of which Ukraine is a key part. It is almost certain that Russia will turn east itself and form closer relations with China; to do this it will want a secure western flank. The areas where it will get interesting will be the area from Turkey to India. Turkey is key, but relations with the likes of France are at a low. This is where the UK can come in to shore things up in NATO.

It’s perhaps in this region (unfortunately that includes Afghanistan) where Russia and China will focus and where the Army should think what it can offer as part of a new Great Game.

I don’t necessarily agree with that we have to able to deter Russia anywhere along the nato border that it chooses to exert pressure they can’t be everywhere and we can’t either so we have to flexible enough to rapidly move to counter and support allies were req.

We can have areas of focus during less heightened security times were we exercise with allies, obviously our bases in Cyprus allow us presence in the south and long term garrison history in the north mean we can move from there as well as the uk.

[ArmChairCivvy]

Deliberations and what is to be / needs to be decided... the latter in fact the definition of what a Command Paper is to be, can be wildly different.

The integrated review specifically stated that the euro Atlantic area was the principal security concern for the U.K. and Russia the pacing threat.

You could argue that the defence command paper ignored that and got all excited about far flung places of much less security concern to us.

[Lord Jim]

I would like the MoD to hold a short notice Brigade sized exercise to move one of Army's "Heavy" Brigades to Poland. I thinkthe MoD needs to do this to show the Government what the Army can and cannot do and importantly what additional capabilities and capacity it needs. The last few decades have seen the Army and MoD conduct a series of paper exercises to support numerous restructuring schemes for the Army, often making changes before the previous one has been implemented, "Strike" Brigade to BCTs comes to mind.

Just as important will the highlighting of the time needed to carry out such a deployment and the time the Government will have to decide whether to commit UK forces or not. We almost need to return to the Cold War mentality that culminated in the Exercise in 1986 where Exercise Lionheart shown the UK deploying troops for the UK to bring the BOAR unto full fighting strength in the shortest time possible. In this case plans had existed for such an eventuality for quite some time, but today I doubt anything exists bar a few research papers.

Current exercise based deployments are far too small to bring any long term benefit to larger future deployments so lesson need ot be learned again. Also a number of capability gap are known but until they are shown up in a major exercise for all to see, funding will not be made available, and here we are talking about new money with which to do so. Logistics also need to be seriously looked at. Our years for fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan have skewed the Army's ammunition stockpiles with ammunition for weapon systems not commonly used in those conflicts held as level that will be insufficient in and high intensity peer to peer conflict. This was mainly done to save money to be spent on equipment need for those two conflicts.

In a Peer level conflict we will not be able to correct such issues by using UORs as their simply will not be time, and if we are using systems not used by our allies will will not be able to use theirs to compensate either. So we must either use weapons that are used by our Allies or have sufficient amounts of bespoke systems. This is one of the reasons I queried the donation of a large number of NLAWS to the Ukrainian Army from British Army stocks. Are we gong to order new stock to replace that donated? I have heard nothing regarding this matter.

[Lord Jim]

Having read the full paper from RUSI it appears only to emphasis what I have tried to with varying degrees of success. The British Army at present lacks many of the capabilities and certainly the capacity to meet the goals set out in the Governments recent Command Paper. With its current ten year plan, which is basically a hiatus from conducting active operation on anything but the smallest scale, the Army in edging in the right direct, but will still fall short of what is needed. Many to the capabilities needed are literally a matter of life and death for our soldiers in a future conflict, and when we do have the capabilities either in or due in service we lack the numbers for them to be able to carry out their role on the scale required. Due to the small size of the Army it needs far greater firepower from Division all the way down to section level, in order to outmatch an opponent.

Precision fire has its place but weight of fire is just as important. Looking at the armament of the Boxer as it enters service highlights this. We are arming the platform with a .50cal Machine Gun, whereas our likely opposition is arming their. AFVs with Auto Cannons ranging from 23mm up to 57mm. TO partly compensate for this we need to allocate far more anti-tank weapons to the Infantry be they weapons like NLAW or heavier weapons like Javelin. What is really needed though is greater firepower on the platform carrying the Infantry as well as a platform that can watch over these as they advance or hold defensive position. This is an argument we have been over many time on this forum.

Another key point is one I have disagreed with in the last but am starting to change my mind. This is the assumption we will always be working with Allies and so can rely on them to fill certain capabilities we may lack. This is the wrong approach. Firstly it will make us appear needy and a burden on our Allies. Secondly it will severely hamper any sovereign mission the UK may wish to under take. Having a capability that is computable with that of our Allies is where we should be aiming, increasing the capability of a multinational force rather then diluting it.

For the UK to become the Global Influencer our Government wishes requires the ability to put troop on the ground if needed. This means moving them to where to point of interest is, either by air or by sea and quickly. At present it takes the Army about two months to get a Brigade operations in an overseas theatre of operations and four for a below strength Division. This is far to slow for our troops to have any impact on a critical situation. We need to be able to get the advanced party of any deployment is country and operational within 72 hours, and the remainder of the brigade in a matter of days, not weeks or months. I would suggest that this means the MoD should have a Point Ro-Ro always immediately available, and the size of the RAF's transport fleet expanded with additional A400 regardless of its limitations. Additionally the Voyagers need to have a cargo door fitted to allow the more effective use of the aircraft beyond its main role of a tanker. Adding flexibility to the Voyagers would not just benefit the MoD is would also benefit the civilian operators who lease those aircraft not in use by the RAF.

Creating Brigade Combat Teams is the right way forward but these need to be fully self contained formation including all the support elements need in addition to the combat arms. This must include appropriate Combat, Engineering, Signal/EW units, Air Defence, Logistics and Artillery units. The size and weight of the platforms used must be appropriate to the size and weight of the Combat units. It is no use having 40ton Tracked and Armoured SPGs trying to keep up with a light formation using 4x4 or 6x6 platform to manoeuvre. This would require the tracked SPGs to be allocated HETs to allow them to travel the distances covered by the Infantry and other unit they are meant to be supporting.

At the lowest level an Infantry Section needs to be equipped in addition to its Rifles with a weapon that can accurately surprises an enemy at ranges at least equal to said Rifles but fire that is both accurate and rapid. Engaging single opponent with single shots may work against small groups of Insurgents in places like Afghanistan, but will not work again Company sized attacks by aim Opponent wearing Body Armour and massed small arms fire of his own. The fact that he will most likely be support by one or more type of AFV make the situation even more demanding. A Section equipped with 5.56mm Assault Rifles, the odd 7.62mm Marksman's Rifle and a couple of NLAWS will simply not cut it.

I'll stop there as I have already upset some people already.

[wargame_insomniac]

Completely agree that to be relevant the BCT concept needs to be trialled (worts and all) quickly and then iteratively improved. Deploying a heavy BCT will be a good litmus test on how much on paper is reality.

Personally, I would also focus creating on a 2nd Air Manoeuvre BCT (by removing an infantry BCT) and forward basing it in Cyprus. This would give the UK options in conflict prevention from the Balkans, Russia’s southern flank and North Africa.

I would also focus on three “heavy” war fighting BCTs, rather than having a third “strike” BCT, instead evolving what “heavy” means. Regular deployments to the Baltics, Nordics, Oman and either further afield of these BCTs via a dedicated sea lift capability would also increase the relevance of these units and the Army overall.

[SW1]

Adding the enabling assets to brigades to make therm more deployable is fine if you have the enabling assets to add. They have grouped units under the name of brigade combat teams to give that impression without actually giving them the enabling assets. Its fine to admit we don’t have them now but if this is a 10 year plan then you would of thought you would of said we need extra logistical, engineering, signal, artillery ect to full form these brigades and recruitment streams will change x,y,z units will form over the next few years and areas were there is over subscribed numbers of personal will stand down or asks for volunteers who would like to re role. But they don’t appear to have done that.

You would then of thought they would have looked at what other assets from the other services would be needed to achieve the deployments and support and joined it up. If you looking at supporting the nato allies along the border what are the defence planning assumptions requiring is it just a single battle group fwd deployed is it a couple in various locations is it smaller than that or is it a brigade, how many qras do u want 2,3,4 and in how many locations what strategic intelligence gathering is req or is it all whatever america gives us now. If your intending using tracked vehicles and there all now pushing 40 tonnes plus how are we strategically deploying them and is it possible in strategically relevant time frames to get where they need to go and how long could this all be sustained it could go on for years.

There plenty in Mod that know this all to well, Maybe it’s just been badly explained or communicated or they simply don’t want to make it public.

[ArmChairCivvy]

First, there is the area of the Joint Expeditionary Force straddling NATO’s eastern flank and the High North where deterring Russia is the primary concern. Second, there is an area of expeditionary operations to assist partners and deter threats to UK interests covering the Balkans and running through the Gulf to the East African Community. Here, threats against UK interests emanating from state competitors could require significant military responses, while partners in this area may seek substantial support in ensuring their security if they are to strengthen their relations with the UK. UK bases in Kenya, Oman and Cyprus provide key hubs for maintaining capability in theatre, though partnerships extend further. The third area might be described as[...]

Interesting (and enlightened) quote:
JEF in fact is non-NATO; or rather, an extension of NATO
Balkans, err, the former Yugoslavia and all that... is that basking in the sun of past successes? One of the few

But yes, as I have been saying for many years, someone will have to step in as the US is pivoting - continuous present tense - to the Pacific, and yes, we should be in the half of the Indian Ocean that is towards us
- now, have the training areas in Kenya turned into bases, all of a sudden?

[Lord Jim]

With what has begun yesterday, I unfortunately cannot see any increase in the overall defence budget. What I can see though is priorities shifting of long term to short term gains, to try to improve the state of our Armed Forces now rather then in ten years or more. The Ten year plans the Armed Services had will need to go out of the window. Program timelines will no longer be governed by the most cost efficient timeframe but rather how fast things can be done.

The Army for example cannot wait until the mid 2030s for its new Artillery platforms. Rather then wait for the M270 GMLRS to be upgrades and delivered sometime after 2030 we need to buy HIMARS now. This platform already includes all the improvements the GMLRS upgrade was to have added and as an additional benefit we will gain a platform more easily deployed with considerably reduced trained and support costs. It is easier to drive a truck than a large tracked vehicle for example. Other programmes like Boxer, Challenger 3 and Sky Sabre need to be accelerated and in some cases the number purchased increased.

We are already in the situation where our military would have great difficulty fight a Peer level conflict even with our Friends and Allies, we have just not spent wat was needed in an effective manner, as well as kidding ourselves that state on state warfare was a thing of the past even though countries like China and Russia do not follow the same rules as we do. The fact that NATO has been seen to be ineffective and unwilling to challenge said countries except through the use of large amounts of hot has set a precedent that is going to be very difficult for Western powers to counter in the near term at least.

[ArmChairCivvy]

We all know this stuff, but the article is v nicely put together, concise that is:
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2022/0 ... snt-ready/

[R686]

We all know this stuff, but the article is v nicely put together, concise that is:
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2022/0 ... snt-ready/

Pity it’s behind a paywall

[ArmChairCivvy]

https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2022/0 ... snt-ready/
Oops,didn't realise as I have paid a pittance for test use

[Lord Jim]

An interesting article and has a partner one written by Lord Dannatt, covering the same subject as well as expanding it. What is obvious is that we need to revisit the Review carried out last year. The pivot to teh far east and Global Britain's role in being a force for the greater good now needs focusing closer to home. Poor old Boris, all the plans he had post Brexit are now up in flames and he and his Government must take steps to deal with this step change in the new shape of the World.

The Treasury is going to have to find new money and key Programmes managed by the Army are going to have to be accelerated and expanded. The current ten year tome frame needs to be changed to one of getting new equipment and capabilities into service as fast as possible. WE are looking at the 21st Century equivalent of the rearming of Britain that took place in the late 1930s when the Government at the time finally realised talking would not stop what was destined to become the Second World War. We have ignored Putin's gradual and more aggressing policies to Russia's neighbours, with actions that closely match Hitler's Anschluss of Austria followed by the occupations of the Sudetenland, leading to the eventual invasion of Poland. For the above insert Georgia, Crimea and Ukraine. Unfortunately unlike last Century we have been all too willing to stick out collective heads in teh sand and refuse to accept what Putin was intending even though the clues were easily identified.

So what needs to be done? Well to start with the Boxer programme needs to be treated as a UORs as does the Challenger 3 programme. The testing that Boxer is being put through at present is only duplicating what has already been done by the manufacturer and its existing users. We need to ramp up production from Germany and start to train Infantry Units is its use ASAP. Additional Mission Modulws from those already developed by other should also be covered by a UOR, providing at least some fo the ICVs with greater firepower as well as overwatch capability with either Extractor Mk2 or Brimstone. A Mortar variant with a 120mm weapon is also a priority as would be the munitions used by it.

The Challenger 3 programme now needs to cover all existing Challenger 2s to allow a third Armoured Regiment to be so equipped. The programme also need accelerating and this will obviously require additional resources but I believe that between Rheinmetall and the Royal Armoured Corps, things can definitely move faster.

The fielding of Sky Sabre needs to be accelerated and the number on order increased to allow two Royal Artillery Regiments to be equipped with this weapon system. A UOR need to be made to work with the Italians to speed up their work on CAMM-ER and a purchase made to increase the lethality of the systems and give is both a layered and longer ranged GBAD umbrella .

A UOR purchase should be made of HIMARS tp equip a Royal Artillery Regiment. This purchase, hopefully on a MAN HX chassis will bring into service all the upgrades the planned GMLRS programme will far faster as well as giving us a far more deployable system. The HIMARS will also be able to fire the new long range precision strike missile being developed for the US Forces with a range of at least 500km. At the same time we need to decide on the replacement for the AS-90 as a matter of now great urgency. With our focus hopefully returned to Europe, I would now choose between the German Boxer 155RCH and the K9A2 from South Korea. I would also place a UOR for modern shells for both the AS-90 and its replacement including both precision and cargo rounds carrying smart submunitions.

I could go on and on but the Army's Ten Year Plan needs to now be completed far sooner or simpler more readily available options taken if existing programmes cannot lead to the rapid introduction of the hardware involved. Programmes for the other Armed Services are also going to need to be closely looked at. If they cannot be accelerated then like the Army's Equipment plans, revisions may have to be made and policies changed. For the Royal Navy, looking to have both Carriers and both Albions available and should be a priority. Plans must be made immediately to find ways to rapidly increase the number of Servicemen and Servicewomen across all three services but in the Navy and Army as a priority. As for the RAF, speeding up the delivery of the initial purchase of the F-35 should be the top priority as serious consideration should be made to the purchase of a forth Tranche of Typhoons as well as the purchase of additional A400 Atlas. The introduction of new munitions for both the Typhoon and F-35 should now come under a UOR to bring their entry into service in as short a time as possible. I would even suggest the retention of the Rapier FSC for use by the RAF Regiment. That will have to do for now but I will be back!

[SW1]

We all know this stuff, but the article is v nicely put together, concise that is:
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2022/0 ... snt-ready/

Think that will trigger the naval bods if they read it. Mind you I’m not entirely sure what the present conflict tells us are quite what is espoused in the article I think they were writing similar before and after the review.

One thing it has done is reinforce and ensure the security of euro Atlantic area is front and centre in everyone’s mind again who lives here.

[ArmChairCivvy]

Dannat's with the same date on it? Missed that one, somehow

Does he quote from his memoirs that when we had 700 MBTs, we had to scrape the bottom of the barrel to get one division 'onto the road' (rather: onto ships, in the first place)?

[inch]

Well after Putin putting his nuclear for on highest alert level ,I think this is going to be a massive wake up call and the UK defence budget must reflect this going forwards ,the review just gone is massively out of date as of now ,

[dmereifield]

Agreed, but I can see the inertia kicking back in again after things calm down. Especially if Putin is removed (big IF) - our wonderfully insightful political class will deem that the threat is gone...