Current & Future Escorts - General Discussion

[Poiuytrewq]

…..before talking about more weapons and/or more hulls…..UK need good amount of ammo and logistics/spare-parts…..

Completely agree.

Low stocking levels of missiles, consumables and spare parts have been a perennial problem which to be fair was tackled to a certain extent in the Integrated Review. This is without doubt the absolute priority. It’s not sexy but it’s essential nonetheless.

The manpower issue is indeed another critical issue. Terms and conditions improvements to aid retention is another principal issue. It must be properly funded.

It should also be remembered that a lot of the extra cash in the integrated review has now been swallowed by rampant inflation. If HMG doesn’t boost defence spending further more cuts are now unfortunately virtually assured.

[wargame_insomniac]

https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/ministe ... re-lethal/

Combined with this article, it gives us interesting suggetions.
https://www.navylookout.com/hms-echo-re ... apability/

For me, it is
- resource is limited, not only money but also skilled man-power (non-skilled man power shortage looks like relaxed a bit).
- but minister wants to add offensive weapons on RN ships (which needs money (purchase and maintenance/logistics) and skilled man-power)

Mixing these two items, one answer comes into my mind.

Why not LESS number of hulls but fully armed with offensive weapons in addition to defensive ones ?

1: Putting HMS Echo in "reserve" provides precious 72 crews to be used in other assets. It also clearly exemplifies that RN lacks resources. Although bad thing, I think it is a right selection within current limited resource.

2: In future, do we really need FIVE T31? Why not four or even THREE? Three T31, with simple armament and new/fresh hull may be able to provide sea-going days as long as those provided from 5 T23GPs they ought to replace.

Exporting two of them in build (Poland, Indonesia, Chilli, Brazil, or even NZ), to make up a 3-hull T31 fleet? On paper, this will free-up £800M (2/5 of the total £2Bn cost), but export sales does not include developnmnt cost in general (see French export sales), then it will be £500-600 (so-called "£200M each" (excluding SeaCeptor) + SeaCeptor for 2 hulls). At the same time, it free-ups more than 200 crew. If with this £500-800M and 200 crew, many can be done:

2a: increase T26's CAMM by a factor of 4 by adopting ExLS, from 48 to 196 (may even include CAMM-ER). Of course it takes money and additional man-power, but at least the latter won't be large because it is just increasing the number of existing system.

2b: Pay for the T45 "24 CAMM" (or even increase it) and even enable adapting Mk.41 VLS. Of course it takes money and additional man-power. If including BMD, I'm afraid this "plan-2b" only exceeds the "£500-800M", but 100-150 of the crew will remain. They can provide HMS Echo (or its successor) back at sea, enable River B1 replacements, and MCM mother ships.

2c: Obviously, I-SSGW can happen, even 10-15 systems? (needs money and man-power, of course)

2d: All the T31 up-arming and River B2 up-arming discussions can take place.

Just a proposal ...

So in the last year the RN has retired two Trafalgar class SSN (Trenchant and Talent), two T23 GP Frigates (Monmouth already and Montrose shortly) and now Echo). It makes me realise quite how short-staffed the RN is becoming. That is really sad.

For years I have seen articles and discussions as to how 13 Frigates was the absolute minimum that the RN needed. So we have quietly dropped to 12 Frigates (and soon to 11), admitedly partly made up by the River B2's covering overseas deployments. With 4 T23 Frigates until recently being in LIFEX (Somerset just having finished), that means we only have enough crews for 8 or 9 Frigates. Plus just FIVE SSN.....

I know there is a timelag between recuitment and having crew with sufficient qualifications / training / experience, but we need the RN to rectify this ASAP. As the Frigates finish LIFEX and the Destroyers finish PHP, this constraint on crew staffing is otherwise going to prevent the RN being able to field their ships in active service.

[Poiuytrewq]

For years I have seen articles and discussions as to how 13 Frigates was the absolute minimum that the RN needed. So we have quietly dropped to 12 Frigates (and soon to 11), admitedly partly made up by the River B2's covering overseas deployments. With 4 T23 Frigates until recently being in LIFEX (Somerset just having finished), that means we only have enough crews for 8 or 9 Frigates. Plus just FIVE SSN.....

It all stems from a conscious decision to keep both CVF’s active and reduce other assets. If PWLS entered low readiness crew availability would soar.

The calculation that has been made is that other NATO members can fill the escort gap.

Personally I think the policy is shortsighted and dangerous.

[Lord Jim]

WE have to invest so that we get the most out of what we have before we start expanding the fleet. I would suggest that any money planned for the T-32 should be used to achieve this, ensuring sufficient personnel, holdings levels of consumables to allow for high usage in a general conflict and maximising the capabilities of individual Warships, from the Carriers to the B2 Rivers. Additional new money is also going to be required as neither of the two other services can afford to lose funding. I also think keeping both carriers operational is a mistake under current funding levels. The Navy should have put their proverbial foot down and say it was not possible to do so in a viable way without new money.

[Scimitar54]

Poiuytrewq Wrote:-

It all stems from a conscious decision to keep both CVF’s active and reduce other assets. If PWLS entered low readiness crew availability would soar.

The calculation that has been made is that other NATO members can fill the escort gap.

Personally I think the policy is shortsighted and dangerous.

Totally wrong! The fact is that whilst a minor proportion of the crew for R09 might have come from “shipless” (temporarily surplus) crew, by far the majority came from the early disposal of HMS Ocean. Other sources of Crew came from redeployment of Royal Marines “Headcount” and the exchange of Officers “Headcount” for additional Ratings.

Following on from the unjustified rundown of the Royal Navy during the ‘Nineties and Noughties, The “Dangerous and Shortsighted” policy (of insufficient crew) is a fact, but it was caused by the large reduction in numbers of RN personnel under the 2010 SDR “Cuts”.

I also understand the need for “Double Crewing” for vital vessels (CASD), but ANY attempt to extend it beyond that (MCMV, OPV and Forward Deployed Frigates to name a few) is short sighted and a faulty objective as it is depriving other vessels in the fleet of their crews. I even understand why it is being done …… to improve individual ship availability. However when puts comes to shove (Hostilities or a time of International tension), it is the number of vessels that can be deployed that will be important. If the RN Fleet becomes sized by the ships it can Crew (due to double crewing it’s Warships) then, because it will have to fight with what it has,,it will have insufficient vessels. This fact reduces the deterrent effect that an RN of any given size can have on a potential enemy. This policy is a “Double Whammy”.to both the RN (and to our National Defences.

The inability to recruit and retain Crew is undoubtedly, IMHO a direct consequence of the “employer” (The Government) demonstrating a lack of commitment to the enterprise.
It is very likely to take a considerable time (and continually demonstrated Government commitment to provide the necessary resources that will lead to an RN that is both adequately sized and funded (and to restore the necessary Critical Mass) for sufficient confidence to return once more.

[donald_of_tokyo]

For years I have seen articles and discussions as to how 13 Frigates was the absolute minimum that the RN needed. So we have quietly dropped to 12 Frigates (and soon to 11), admitedly partly made up by the River B2's covering overseas deployments. With 4 T23 Frigates until recently being in LIFEX (Somerset just having finished), that means we only have enough crews for 8 or 9 Frigates. Plus just FIVE SSN.....

It all stems from a conscious decision to keep both CVF’s active and reduce other assets. If PWLS entered low readiness crew availability would soar.

The calculation that has been made is that other NATO members can fill the escort gap.

Personally I think the policy is shortsighted and dangerous.

Uhmm, I think the opposite.

If considering confronting 1st-tier enemy (like Russia and/or China), UK acting alone is NOT an option. NATO must. Then, RN must focus on assets "strong" in RN, which will be SSBN, SSN, CV, T45, and T26. All the other 2nd-tier tasks can be covered by other NATO nations. Of course, LRG-east in not an option. Let USA do it, and focus on Norway operation.

It is when UK think of confronting 2nd-tier enemy, like Argentina in 1980s, Iran, or alike (not easy to point out), when "UK-alone" operation becomes a high priority. In this case, "more hull" is needed, because 6 T45 and 8 T26 can barely provide escort for a single CVTF, while keeping TAPS. T31 is needed to support the 2ndary-theater (like South Georgia Island) and/or logistic lanes.

RN is thinking of mixing these two requirements, which is good I think. So, it is a matter of balance. As the 1st-tier threat getting larger (Russia), LESS hull with better equipment is my vote. This is my opinion.

[wargame_insomniac]

For a navy planning to operate its surface war fighting capabilities around CBGs, then keeping both carriers active is essential. Technically, whilst it’s tight a force of 15 AAW & ASW escorts can do this. Logistics (Tankers and Solid Support Ships) are also required of course.

This issue is what else can be done and what are their priorities.

Defence of UK waters and CASD support is probably a higher priority but the CBGs support this role and can probably be done with another 3 ASW frigates. BOTs can be patrolled by OPVs.

Everything else IMO is a lower priority, and that’s where the real debate is - what is required / can be afforded. This includes amphibious ops and NATO/other singleton deployments.

[NickC]

For a navy planning to operate its surface war fighting capabilities around CBGs, then keeping both carriers active is essential. Technically, whilst it’s tight a force of 15 AAW & ASW escorts can do this. Logistics (Tankers and Solid Support Ships) are also required of course.

This issue is what else can be done and what are their priorities.

Defence of UK waters and CASD support is probably a higher priority but the CBGs support this role and can probably be done with another 3 ASW frigates. BOTs can be patrolled by OPVs.

Everything else IMO is a lower priority, and that’s where the real debate is - what is required / can be afforded. This includes amphibious ops and NATO/other singleton deployments.

No rush, GAO reported Block IV F-35 capabilities [including Spear 3] likely delayed to 2029

Navy Lookout

"UK Carrier Strike Full Operating Capability is due to be declared in 2023 but this will come with a big caveat. Despite the vast investment in ships and aircraft, at the very tip of the spear, the variety of strike weapons that can be delivered by F-35 will remain limited for some time. SPEAR integration (2025-27?) cannot come soon enough. Paveway IV is effectively a gliding bomb and requires the aircraft, even if willing to fly at medium altitude to be within about 25km of the target. Despite the stealth capabilities of F-35, this creates much more risk to pilot and aircraft sitting well within the envelope of most medium and long-range naval radars and SAM systems. The risks are similar when operating against land targets and over time, developments in radar and software can only reduce the effectiveness of stealth measures applied to aircraft. SPEAR and the EW variant may become an increasingly critical tool in disabling air defence systems prior to an attack with more conventional weapons."

https://www.navylookout.com/putting-the ... ff-weapon/

[donald_of_tokyo]

For a navy planning to operate its surface war fighting capabilities around CBGs, then keeping both carriers active is essential. Technically, whilst it’s tight a force of 15 AAW & ASW escorts can do this. Logistics (Tankers and Solid Support Ships) are also required of course.

This issue is what else can be done and what are their priorities.

Defence of UK waters and CASD support is probably a higher priority but the CBGs support this role and can probably be done with another 3 ASW frigates. BOTs can be patrolled by OPVs.

Everything else IMO is a lower priority, and that’s where the real debate is - what is required / can be afforded. This includes amphibious ops and NATO/other singleton deployments.

Thanks. Overall, I agree to your point.

I think RN is thinking that:
- "operate its surface war fighting capabilities around CBGs, then keeping both carriers active" shall be done with 12 esocrts (6 T45 and 6 T26/T23ASW)
- "Defence of UK waters and CASD support" shall be done with 2 T26/T23ASW

- "BOTs can be patrolled by OPVs", hmm, I think it applies only for Forth and Medway.
- Also, 2 River B1 are used for UK EEZ/Fishing patrol (another River B1 is used for training), and sometimes chasing Russian/Chinese warship around UK water. Good.

- The other 3 River B2s are tasked to show UK presence, which is actually very important in the world-wide geo-political game.
- KIPION, now covered by 1 GP frigate, 4 MCMVs and 1 LSD is another important presence in the world-wide geo-political game.

[Lord Jim]

After years of declining numbers all three services should now be funded in full to meet the commitments the UK Government is making regarding the security of the UK and it BOTs as well as NATO. East of Suez should remain a flag waving exercise until it is affordable to utilise more fleet units, especially escorts. I would go as far as to say the T-31 should be used for the first two tasks freeing up the RN's more capable assets to cover the third. The one exception should be escorting the UK's CASD into and out of port as it begins and ends patrols, all done in conjunction with the RAF's P-8s and Protector UAS. Politicians need to put their money where their collective mouths are, the latter being something I do not really want to think about!.

[wargame_insomniac]

For a navy planning to operate its surface war fighting capabilities around CBGs, then keeping both carriers active is essential. Technically, whilst it’s tight a force of 15 AAW & ASW escorts can do this. Logistics (Tankers and Solid Support Ships) are also required of course.

This issue is what else can be done and what are their priorities.

Defence of UK waters and CASD support is probably a higher priority but the CBGs support this role and can probably be done with another 3 ASW frigates. BOTs can be patrolled by OPVs.

Everything else IMO is a lower priority, and that’s where the real debate is - what is required / can be afforded. This includes amphibious ops and NATO/other singleton deployments.

The one thing I disagree with you on is the importance of LRG(N), with primary purpose being to reinforce NATO's Northern flank by deploying RM to Norway, and secondary purpose being to reinforce rest of Scandinavia / Baltics / Poland.

But because I feel that primary purpose of RN CBG is to ignore Mediterranean and EOS and instead focus purely on North Atlantic / GIUK Gap / Barents Sea (relying on French and Italian fleets to secure NATO's southern flank in Med, and allowing USN CBG's to focus on Pacific / South China Seas vs China), then I am envisaging LRG(N) and RN CBG to be operating more or less in parallel.

My concern is that Government will not realise how thin the RN has been spread by the 30 years of cuts and thus try to focus on too many areas. Whereas to me it seems obvious that we have to concentrate our RN warfighting capabilities in just this one geographic area.

Anywhere else around the globe will have to rely on initially River B2's, eventually T31's, and a single Bay class for LRG(S).

[Scimitar54]

Unfortunately this falls well short of the mark. Unless we do help (and are capable of helping) the US, wherever in the world they need our help, then you must ask yourself why should they help us ?
Your scenario suggests that we have enough to defend ourselves without US help.
We may be punching above our weight in an exhibition match, but do we have enough of what it takes to succeed in a grudge match ?
Our defence interests (at sea) stretch far from our shores and the whole point of Carrier Strike is to deter a potential adversary from gaining advantages that may harm our defence, either today or in the foreseeable future. Interruption of trade routes (at a distance) affects our ability to finance UKPLC and thence our ability to afford sufficient crewing and materiel to provide adequate defence.

In recognition of this and to keep potential contests (or “battles”) as far away as possible, the RN needs to be larger. Not a little larger, but in comparison with its current emaciated state, VERY MUCH LARGER. The numbers of maids of all work, the Frigates, by the time non-availability through dockyard work and also potential damage from hostile action are taken into account are
woefully inadequate. Destroyer numbers are also inadequate. I will not comment re any other classes of Ship except to say that the same pattern exists right across the board.
It is even being suggested (by some) that the RB2’s should be defending BOTs virtually alone.
Wake-up people, smell the coffee ! Complacency is the anathema of adequate defence.

[Tempest414]

If we the UK really want push out and use naval power then we need to have two Commands Atlantic Command and East of Suez Command going forward

Atlantic Command

2 x Carriers
4 x SSN
1 x LPD ( replaced by LHD )
6 x Destroyers
8 x Type 26
2 x Type 31
2 x Type 32
2 x LSD ( replaced by MRSS
3 x Tankers
2 x SSS
6 x River class
40 Commando ( backed up by a Army battalion battle group )

East of Suez Command

1 x LPD ( replaced by LHD
2 x SSN
RFA Argus ( replaced by MRSS )
1 x LSD ( replaced by MRSS )
3 x Type 31
3 x type 32
2 x River class
1 x Tanker
45 Commando ( backed up by the Gurkha battalion battle group )

[wargame_insomniac]

Unfortunately this falls well short of the mark. Unless we do help (and are capable of helping) the US, wherever in the world they need our help, then you must ask yourself why should they help us ?
Your scenario suggests that we have enough to defend ourselves without US help.
We may be punching above our weight in an exhibition match, but do we have enough of what it takes to succeed in a grudge match ?
Our defence interests (at sea) stretch far from our shores and the whole point of Carrier Strike is to deter a potential adversary from gaining advantages that may harm our defence, either today or in the foreseeable future. Interruption of trade routes (at a distance) affects our ability to finance UKPLC and thence our ability to afford sufficient crewing and materiel to provide adequate defence.

In recognition of this and to keep potential contests (or “battles”) as far away as possible, the RN needs to be larger. Not a little larger, but in comparison with its current emaciated state, VERY MUCH LARGER. The numbers of maids of all work, the Frigates, by the time non-availability through dockyard work and also potential damage from hostile action are taken into account are
woefully inadequate. Destroyer numbers are also inadequate. I will not comment re any other classes of Ship except to say that the same pattern exists right across the board.
It is even being suggested (by some) that the RB2’s should be defending BOTs virtually alone.
Wake-up people, smell the coffee ! Complacency is the anathema of adequate defence.

I 100% agree that the number of warfighting escorts and SSN, allowing for T23 LIFEX and T45 PIP affecting availability for active service not to mention lack of crew, is currently inadequate.

I have consistently said that i believe the RN needs additional funding. In the short term to reverse or postpone the cuts from Integrated Review. In the medium term to recruit and train more crew and purchase sufficient ammunition and missiles. In the long term to acquire more ships. So I am not disagreeing with what you were saying.

I just believe that until such additional investment in RN crystallises, that the RN is stretched so thin that they need to prioritise and focus our imminent commitments on what we can realistically accomplish with our CURRENT resources.

[Lord Jim]

HAs anyone got the details of the size of the Royal Navy planned in the 1997/98 Defence Review? I think it would be interesting to compare this to what people believe we should be aiming to grow the current Navy to.

[SW1]

It is entirely of the RN own decisions despite being warned repeatedly they went onward they got what they wanted. They sacrificed escort numbers on the alter of carrier strike because as they repeated it was about task group operations not individual ship deployments anymore, they wanted exquisite ships not numerous ships right up until the reality of what they wanted dawned on them and now they are where they are sailing round in circles.

[Jake1992]

It is entirely of the RN own decisions despite being warned repeatedly they went onward they got what they wanted. They sacrificed escort numbers on the alter of carrier strike because as they repeated it was about task group operations not individual ship deployments anymore, they wanted exquisite ships not numerous ships right up until the reality of what they wanted dawned on them and now they are where they are sailing round in circles.

I don’t buy that one bit, over the course of the carrier project from 98 to now the budget has been repeatedly cut add in the fact that the contracts around the carriers were written so it’d cost more to scrap than to carry on and the RN is left in a position where they are damned if they do damned if they don’t.

Just look at the expected and planned fleet that was meant to accompany the carriers when first set out.

12 T45s
20 T26 / T27
12 SSNs
2 LPHs
2 LPDs
5 LSDs
16 MCMs
6 Tankers
3 SSS
Possible amphibious support ships

And we can’t say the cuts are due to RN “gold plating” as when we compare the T45, T26, Astute are all comparable and not out and out better than other western navy’s.
It’s all about the fact that over the time period the defence budget has been cut from 3% plus of GDP to around 1.8% of GDP when measured the same way.

[Tempest414]

HAs anyone got the details of the size of the Royal Navy planned in the 1997/98 Defence Review? I think it would be interesting to compare this to what people believe we should be aiming to grow the current Navy to.

What we know is what we had and what we got we also what was decommissioned

So in 1997 we had 11 x T-42 , 10 x T-22 , 13 x T-23 we also had 3 Light carriers and Ocean was fitting out between 1997 and 2002 we lost 6 T-22's and got 3 more T-23's so by the end of 2002 we had 31 escorts and 4 flat tops

[SW1]

It is entirely of the RN own decisions despite being warned repeatedly they went onward they got what they wanted. They sacrificed escort numbers on the alter of carrier strike because as they repeated it was about task group operations not individual ship deployments anymore, they wanted exquisite ships not numerous ships right up until the reality of what they wanted dawned on them and now they are where they are sailing round in circles.

I don’t buy that one bit, over the course of the carrier project from 98 to now the budget has been repeatedly cut add in the fact that the contracts around the carriers were written so it’d cost more to scrap than to carry on and the RN is left in a position where they are damned if they do damned if they don’t.

Just look at the expected and planned fleet that was meant to accompany the carriers when first set out.

12 T45s
20 T26 / T27
12 SSNs
2 LPHs
2 LPDs
5 LSDs
16 MCMs
6 Tankers
3 SSS
Possible amphibious support ships

And we can’t say the cuts are due to RN “gold plating” as when we compare the T45, T26, Astute are all comparable and not out and out better than other western navy’s.
It’s all about the fact that over the time period the defence budget has been cut from 3% plus of GDP to around 1.8% of GDP when measured the same way.

When the carriers first set out they were they were 2.75b and 30-40k tonnes with a standard air group of 6 fixed wing a/c (and I believe was still the air group requirement until 2010). It is all on record by both by parliamentary and nao reports lord west is on record of saying he sacrificed escort numbers to pay for the growth in size and cost of the carriers. Zambellas and Stanhope on record of quality over quantity and on a shift to a task group navy not singular deployments. So buy what you like.

After multiple studies Type 26 was to be the £250m frigate with export potential ect ect ect.
Between aircraft carrier, type 45 and type26, 23 billion quid will of been spent just buying the 16 ships. If they wanted more or different ships they should of spent it differently no point crying about it now much like the other two they made there bed.

Measuring things by gdp it is entirely predictable that such things will occur, it’s not unique the US DoD includes such things as pensions/nuclear weapons in its calculations of spend. If you wanted capability then instead of the soap box calls for percentages of gdp, they should set out what is required to be a readiness and what is required to be deployed to x number of locations each year (defence planning assumptions of old for what they were worth). Following by what is to be bought in each year in what quantities over a 10 year horizon to meet said requirements others like France and the US do it, they state what has been purchased each year what there fleet readiness is each year to there parliament, but then that would require accountability of the higher ups in the services and MoD as they could be held to account for failure to deliver each year not 10 years later when everyone’s long gone and memory becomes fuzzy and that would never do.

[Jake1992]

It is entirely of the RN own decisions despite being warned repeatedly they went onward they got what they wanted. They sacrificed escort numbers on the alter of carrier strike because as they repeated it was about task group operations not individual ship deployments anymore, they wanted exquisite ships not numerous ships right up until the reality of what they wanted dawned on them and now they are where they are sailing round in circles.

I don’t buy that one bit, over the course of the carrier project from 98 to now the budget has been repeatedly cut add in the fact that the contracts around the carriers were written so it’d cost more to scrap than to carry on and the RN is left in a position where they are damned if they do damned if they don’t.

Just look at the expected and planned fleet that was meant to accompany the carriers when first set out.

12 T45s
20 T26 / T27
12 SSNs
2 LPHs
2 LPDs
5 LSDs
16 MCMs
6 Tankers
3 SSS
Possible amphibious support ships

And we can’t say the cuts are due to RN “gold plating” as when we compare the T45, T26, Astute are all comparable and not out and out better than other western navy’s.
It’s all about the fact that over the time period the defence budget has been cut from 3% plus of GDP to around 1.8% of GDP when measured the same way.

When the carriers first set out they were they were 2.75b and 30-40k tonnes with a standard air group of 6 fixed wing a/c (and I believe was still the air group requirement until 2010). It is all on record by both by parliamentary and nao reports lord west is on record of saying he sacrificed escort numbers to pay for the growth in size and cost of the carriers. Zambellas and Stanhope on record of quality over quantity and on a shift to a task group navy not singular deployments. So buy what you like.

After multiple studies Type 26 was to be the £250m frigate with export potential ect ect ect.
Between aircraft carrier, type 45 and type26, 23 billion quid will of been spent just buying the 16 ships. If they wanted more or different ships they should of spent it differently no point crying about it now much like the other two they made there bed.

Measuring things by gdp it is entirely predictable that such things will occur, it’s not unique the US DoD includes such things as pensions/nuclear weapons in its calculations of spend. If you wanted capability then instead of the soap box calls for percentages of gdp, they should set out what is required to be a readiness and what is required to be deployed to x number of locations each year (defence planning assumptions of old for what they were worth). Following by what is to be bought in each year in what quantities over a 10 year horizon to meet said requirements others like France and the US do it, they state what has been purchased each year what there fleet readiness is each year to there parliament, but then that would require accountability of the higher ups in the services and MoD as they could be held to account for failure to deliver each year not 10 years later when everyone’s long gone and memory becomes fuzzy and that would never do.

While I agree change in requirements during designing ships over the years has contrabuted to the decrees in the fleet it’s not the sole reason by a long way.

The growth in carrier size ( had to be before 2010 as that’s when building started ) would cost it wasn’t the only cost, government imposed slow build a flip flopping on STOVL added £1bn to the over all cost.

The slow build of Astutes cost enough for an 8th

The slow build of the T26 is costing a 9th

Government promises cost T45 7 and 8

The cut in defence by 35% of what it would of been is what caused more damage than anything, it doesn’t matter what other nations include in defence spending the fact is that we didn’t include such things until 2010 as a trick to cut the defence budget.

If the above had not happened we could be looking at a fleet over 35% larger, we could be looking at

12 T26
8 T45
11 Astute
Both albions
Kept the 4th bay
Both waves
The planed T31s

It’s not what was expected back in 98 but a damn sight better than what we have now. There’s plenty of blame to go around but it not solely on the RN a great deal lyes with HMG of both colours.

[SW1]

It is entirely of the RN own decisions despite being warned repeatedly they went onward they got what they wanted. They sacrificed escort numbers on the alter of carrier strike because as they repeated it was about task group operations not individual ship deployments anymore, they wanted exquisite ships not numerous ships right up until the reality of what they wanted dawned on them and now they are where they are sailing round in circles.

I don’t buy that one bit, over the course of the carrier project from 98 to now the budget has been repeatedly cut add in the fact that the contracts around the carriers were written so it’d cost more to scrap than to carry on and the RN is left in a position where they are damned if they do damned if they don’t.

Just look at the expected and planned fleet that was meant to accompany the carriers when first set out.

12 T45s
20 T26 / T27
12 SSNs
2 LPHs
2 LPDs
5 LSDs
16 MCMs
6 Tankers
3 SSS
Possible amphibious support ships

And we can’t say the cuts are due to RN “gold plating” as when we compare the T45, T26, Astute are all comparable and not out and out better than other western navy’s.
It’s all about the fact that over the time period the defence budget has been cut from 3% plus of GDP to around 1.8% of GDP when measured the same way.

When the carriers first set out they were they were 2.75b and 30-40k tonnes with a standard air group of 6 fixed wing a/c (and I believe was still the air group requirement until 2010). It is all on record by both by parliamentary and nao reports lord west is on record of saying he sacrificed escort numbers to pay for the growth in size and cost of the carriers. Zambellas and Stanhope on record of quality over quantity and on a shift to a task group navy not singular deployments. So buy what you like.

After multiple studies Type 26 was to be the £250m frigate with export potential ect ect ect.
Between aircraft carrier, type 45 and type26, 23 billion quid will of been spent just buying the 16 ships. If they wanted more or different ships they should of spent it differently no point crying about it now much like the other two they made there bed.

Measuring things by gdp it is entirely predictable that such things will occur, it’s not unique the US DoD includes such things as pensions/nuclear weapons in its calculations of spend. If you wanted capability then instead of the soap box calls for percentages of gdp, they should set out what is required to be a readiness and what is required to be deployed to x number of locations each year (defence planning assumptions of old for what they were worth). Following by what is to be bought in each year in what quantities over a 10 year horizon to meet said requirements others like France and the US do it, they state what has been purchased each year what there fleet readiness is each year to there parliament, but then that would require accountability of the higher ups in the services and MoD as they could be held to account for failure to deliver each year not 10 years later when everyone’s long gone and memory becomes fuzzy and that would never do.

While I agree change in requirements during designing ships over the years has contrabuted to the decrees in the fleet it’s not the sole reason by a long way.

The growth in carrier size ( had to be before 2010 as that’s when building started ) would cost it wasn’t the only cost, government imposed slow build a flip flopping on STOVL added £1bn to the over all cost.

The slow build of Astutes cost enough for an 8th

The slow build of the T26 is costing a 9th

Government promises cost T45 7 and 8

The cut in defence by 35% of what it would of been is what caused more damage than anything, it doesn’t matter what other nations include in defence spending the fact is that we didn’t include such things until 2010 as a trick to cut the defence budget.

If the above had not happened we could be looking at a fleet over 35% larger, we could be looking at

12 T26
8 T45
11 Astute
Both albions
Kept the 4th bay
Both waves
The planed T31s

It’s not what was expected back in 98 but a damn sight better than what we have now. There’s plenty of blame to go around but it not solely on the RN a great deal lyes with HMG of both colours.

If you ram a whole host of programs you don’t have budget for into build when u know costs will explode but do it anyway because you think you’ve been a clever dick by getting them started knowing that to do so you can claim they’ve started so you have to finish your left with only two options either delay them until you hope you have budget next year or cancel and we know what MoDs favourite option is we’ve had 30 plus years of it!

The scaling up of the carrier size started in early 00s there was however no scaling up in what was considered the “regular” fixed wing element until 2010.

You can only fix it when you admit you have a problem and they haven’t admitted it so far.

[SD67]

It is entirely of the RN own decisions despite being warned repeatedly they went onward they got what they wanted. They sacrificed escort numbers on the alter of carrier strike because as they repeated it was about task group operations not individual ship deployments anymore, they wanted exquisite ships not numerous ships right up until the reality of what they wanted dawned on them and now they are where they are sailing round in circles.

I don’t buy that one bit, over the course of the carrier project from 98 to now the budget has been repeatedly cut add in the fact that the contracts around the carriers were written so it’d cost more to scrap than to carry on and the RN is left in a position where they are damned if they do damned if they don’t.

Just look at the expected and planned fleet that was meant to accompany the carriers when first set out.

12 T45s
20 T26 / T27
12 SSNs
2 LPHs
2 LPDs
5 LSDs
16 MCMs
6 Tankers
3 SSS
Possible amphibious support ships

And we can’t say the cuts are due to RN “gold plating” as when we compare the T45, T26, Astute are all comparable and not out and out better than other western navy’s.
It’s all about the fact that over the time period the defence budget has been cut from 3% plus of GDP to around 1.8% of GDP when measured the same way.

The CVFs were turned into a job creation / save the union scheme for Brown’s back yard and the rest of the fleet was gutted to pay for Blair’s middle eastern adventures. This was then compounded by a 30 billion GBP stealth cut when Cameron took Successor into the main defence budget. And the 5000+ RN manpower cut in 2919 SDSR. These were all political impositions not RN choices

[Lord Jim]

Wasn't the size of the two Carriers as result of the sortie rate desired by the MoD and hence the number of aircraft carried by each one.

[NickC]

Entering a new era of naval ships electric power, Damen have contracted with Swiss giant ABB for their OnBoard DC Grid for the new German F126 frigates, brings advantages over AC (the first naval electric ship, HMS Adventure also used DC generators and DC motors for its propulsion in 1922).

My understanding with an AC grid system both voltage and frequency are required to be monitored and controlled for surges to maintain the power stability, with DC grid system there are no reactive power interactions and the system stability control is kept with voltage only so synchronization of DC generators is much simpler whereas with the AC grid its necessary to synchronize the voltage, frequency, phase angle to bring online additional gensets which could take a minute or so, DC can deliver power in seconds depending on time to fire up the genset.

Fuel efficiency, with the AC-grid system the ship genset has to run at the given fixed frequency of 50 or 60 Hz, whereas with DC able to run the genset at variable speeds depending on load, ABB claim up to 20% in fuel savings. DC also eliminates the need for main switchboards and drive transformers.

The big drawback historically with DC system is the current has to be forced to zero for interrupting a fault current and the electromechanical circuit breakers were not adequate, whereas with the AC system the current naturally zeros twice in each period making it easier for the circuit breaker. The new ultra fast solid state DC circuit breakers up to 1000 times faster than the old electromechanical circuit breakers and so able to interrupt high DC currents during a fault.

IIRC MoD has funded research for DC grid with GE Marine, presume very unlikely but possible for future T26 batches.

From <https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/20 ... -frigates/>

[tomuk]

IIRC MoD has funded research for DC grid with GE Marine, presume very unlikely but possible for future T26 batches.

Lots of research has been done by MOD, GE and Rolls Royce. DC or at least a a hybrid DC/AC configuration was considered for T45 but the technology wasn't mature. Unfortunately due to the problems with T45 the MOD has gone back to basics with T26 and we have ended up with a simplified T23 arrangement.

It would be highly unlikely for such a large change to made to any future T26 batches. Now T83 would be a different matter and it would fitting for the T45 replacement to have a DC IEP system as postulated in concepts years prior to T45.

In the case of the F126 frigates I don't believe it is a full IEP system anyway and they will retain a gearbox with direct drive for high speed cruising.