Army 2020 Refine

[ArmChairCivvy]

Picking up from the last half year,

Updated infantry manpower stats.

Requirement for 14,670. Currently at 12,850

Saving some of the 'Cold War dinosaurs' for a rainy day (3rd tank rgmnt, in the form of Yeomanry; do the same with GMLRS and SPGs).

Put the two together (manpower as a fact and indirect fire assets as a proposal) and that might somehow relate to the future battlefield as played out in Ukraine since 2014: namely, Russia shortened to mere minutes the time between when their spotter drones first detect Ukrainian forces and when their precision rocket artillery wipes those forces off the map.

And our answer? Strike Bdes, of course, capable of dispersed operations and deriving from the long line of thinking as in
-U.S. Department of Defense first warned of a coming “military-technical revolution” in 1992.
- the then-Soviet military planners had been "at it" already and coined the term “the reconnaissance-strike complex” in the 1980s
- it became to be called “network-centric warfare” during the 1990s, and convinced by this “transformation” U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld thought ( ) that his first transformed division (4th if I remember correctly) was enough to keep all of Iraq in check, after the initial shock-and-awe... Shinseki balked at that kind of thinking as he thought 300k soldiers were the right answer to that question... and resigned

Well, here we are in 2019 (two experiments in BATUS completed), but the basic idea has remained the same all through:
- emerging technologies will enable new battle networks of sensors and shooters to rapidly accelerate the process of detecting, targeting, and striking threats, AKA the “kill chain.”
- sensors all very well, but without air supremacy (a tad more than superiority), on the 'shooters' side of things we seem to be a bit thin:

we have/ will have regular rgmnts/ bns
4 with Ajax (500+),
2 with CR2 (100-200),
4 WR (you could go from establishment strengths and get 200-ish; the rest of them as ABSVs), and
4 MIV (300-500)

and even fielding that force (quickly) might only be possible with external assistance as the

pressure on the existing logistics and support force, which is structured to sustain two ‘strike’ brigades"

might be so much as to reach a breaking point. "Sustain" of course has a time dimension which goes well beyond initial deployment.

And from 2019 to 2023 it is some way to go, whereas news on the concept solidifying (based on the mentioned trials) seem to be sparse and indirect fires not multiplying anytime soon.

Calls for another cup of coffee (and a different topic, to avoid getting depressed )

[ArmChairCivvy]

That should be about the latest before fast jets enter the picture/ discussion:

aligning the sharp edge of army aviation with the higher readiness units:
" 4 Regiment [AAC] is assigned permanently to support of 16 Air Assault Brigade and 3 Commando, with 664 Sqn specializing in Land Air Assault and 656 Sqn in Maritime operations.

3 Regiment [AAC], on the other hand, will align with 3rd UK Division. Details are still to come, but it seems reasonable to assume that its two frontline Apache squadrons will be required to align to the Armoured and Strike Brigade that will hold Readiness every year."

[Lord Jim]

Don't forget how small the ACC Squadrons are, with as few as eight platform on strength at any one time.

[ArmChairCivvy]

how small the ACC Squadrons are

I don't have a single helo but 'we' have 50 on order (vs. 4 x 8)... I assume they won't be hangar queens. The fact that they had to be rotated to and from A-stan, I think was a special case. Though the French are dealing with fairly similar conditions in Sahel (is it Barkhan they call the Op?)

[Lord Jim]

The AAQC Regiments used to each have three Squadrons of eight helicopters but since the reduction to two there has not been any publicized increase in the number of platforms per Squadron. Saying that with the need for fleet sustainment reserves and those going through deep maintenance, having thirty two on the flight line seems reasonable.

[abc123]

What concerns me at the moment is that too many people have too much invest in the current Army 2020 Refine, for it to be amended in any appreciable manner.

No one seems to be ready to accept that for agile forces to work, they have to be obviously agile, but also have to hit like a tonne of bricks when they do engage. At present the "Strike Brigades are in a situation where half the formation lacks mobility over distance and so is not as agile as the other half. This means either the Infantry have to be tied to the Recce, reducing their agility or the formations split. In both cases all units concerned have a severe lack of fire power density. In high intensity warfare I see the formation as a recipe for disaster AKA "Speed Bump" that will be able to get in position to throw themselves in front of the Enemy, lack the agility to get out of the way again and well we know what happens then. Of course if they have been deployed ahead of the AI brigade, they will also lack Artillery support except that provided by allies.

Whilst all this is going on the two AI Brigades are at beat unloading in theatre, at worst still embarking in the UK, and by the time they are battle ready they are the sole formations left from the UK's only Division. Of course the two "Strike" Brigades could be held back until the AI Brigades are ready, but that again defeats their reason for being, but it would increase their survivability quite a bit.

The best we can hope for I am afraid is for nothing to happen before 2025, have the planned programmes deliver what is planned including a decent CR2 CSP, and then sit down at look at what hole still exist and try to fix them. At least with having Boxer, this will be a relatively easy affair as we will only be looking at extra modules in the main, that provide additional capabilities, though looking to have some commonality with the Ajax fleet would be a bonus.

So in theory by the end of the 2020s we could actually have a true warfighting Division as long as other hard decisions have been made to free up funding, like disbanding at least half of the Light Role and training Infantry Battalions for example, as well as disbanding the two Tranche one Typhoon Squadrons as of 2020 being another.

I suppose those who advocate a Global Role for the UK will point out that It is the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force that are our primary tools backed up by the Royal Marines but after the Defence of the UK and its territories, the UK's next highest defence commitment is to NATO and that included, on paper at least, a sizeable ground component. As unglamorous as it may be they UK has got to increase its spending on the Army, as what is has already committed to is the bare minimum needed to undo years of neglect whilst fighting wars we never planned for.

Agreed, but for two things:

a) bare minimum seems to be the norm in all the UK military services, you can't tell me that 100+ Typhoons or handful of F-35 is enough, or 8 Type 26 or 6-7 SSNs etc.

b) what's so wrong with two Tr1 squadrons doing the airpolicing of the UK/Falklands? Not so glamorous task, I agree, but necesarry one, and better to use these aircrafts ( allready bought ) than divert other, allready scarce expeditionary/ more modern/multirole squadrons to do that.

[Lord Jim]

I agree with your points. I have a faint hope that eventually we may get a SDSR that actually realises we need to match our resources to the aspirations we have regarding defence.

I mentioned the removal of the Tr1 Typhoon squadrons not because they do not do a valuable job but because something has to go of funding is to be found to equip the Army as it needs to be, and this is an urgent need. As it stands the Army is a paper tiger if required to operate in anything by small scale operations if we even get involved in a high intensity conflict. Our lack or logistical assets makes even this difficult as we lack the required levels of spares and munitions to conduct a persistent campaign at that level. We are doing our service men and women a severe dis service not providing them with the equipment they really need let alone that which is desirable.

Someone needs to make a stand, draw up an effective order of battle for the Army, list the equipment needed and then find the funding. This may mean the Army is even smaller than it is now, but then again how may units do we have that are actually combat effective. The shape of the remaining units may have to be different from what we traditionally have deployed. But we cannot keep reshuffling the deck with the Army. having the "Strike" Brigades held up as the pinnacle of our warfighting doctrine shows how far the serve chiefs have fallen. To have the formations of two badly thought out, poorly equipped formations be heralded as the future is a very sad situation. The possibility was there to develop a truly effective medium weight force, but instead a mish-mash of units has been thrown together, lacking many basic capabilities. The use of the Ajax in these formations just shows how directionless the Army and MoD have become. Realising the original role the programme was aimed at has become less clear a new role has be given to them. Yet in this grand plan, they have stripped the Armoured Infantry Brigades of their Recce capability. The cancellation of the stage three FRES(SV) has led these formations to lack the firepower they need to carry out the roles they are now expected to do.

I would have been far happier if the Army had given up on its Heavy formations and instead deployed both Tracked and Wheeled medium weight formations. Both these would use all the required variants of the platforms they chose, ideally the Ajax and Boxer. Their aim would be to deliver the maximum firepower with the maximum mobility, dominating the ISTAR battle. They would not go head to head with a heavier opponent when possible but engage him on our terms using our ability to take and hold the initiative. But our forces will also have to be able to operate and co-ordinate with the traditional armoured forces of our allies. I suppose I could sum it up in the UK would provide NATO with its eyes and ears on the battlefield, providing three or four Cavalry Brigades able to scout and mountain contact with the opposition, providing our allies with the data they need to counter the threats and also provide the tip of the spear on any offensive actions and so on.

Of course the medium formations would be very effective against lesser opposition in other areas around the world. Though not being the vaunted air mobile formations put forward in the 1990s and 2000s they would still be able to be deployed more rapidly than traditional forces also having a smaller logistical footprint, but also have greater firepower and protections levels than those proposed back then.

This may start to look like what the US Army is developing to succeed its Stryker Brigades and compliment its heavy formations. This is not a bad thing and maybe we should look to join some of these programmes to gain some of the benefits if scale and interoperability this would bring.

Army 2020 Refine should be torn up, an interim order of battle based around three Heavy/Medium Brigades, a singe Medium Brigade and an Air Assault formations should be drawn up. The Medium Brigade should be the melting pot for eh next evolution, developing the platforms and technology necessary and these would be used to evolve the Armoured Infantry formations into their new form. I would like to believe we could have the first step achieved by the middle of the 2020s and the first new "Medium" Brigade operational by 2030. Wishful thinking, probably, but it is better than where we are going at the moment.

Rant over

[abc123]

I agree with your points. I have a faint hope that eventually we may get a SDSR that actually realises we need to match our resources to the aspirations we have regarding defence.

I mentioned the removal of the Tr1 Typhoon squadrons not because they do not do a valuable job but because something has to go of funding is to be found to equip the Army as it needs to be, and this is an urgent need. As it stands the Army is a paper tiger if required to operate in anything by small scale operations if we even get involved in a high intensity conflict. Our lack or logistical assets makes even this difficult as we lack the required levels of spares and munitions to conduct a persistent campaign at that level. We are doing our service men and women a severe dis service not providing them with the equipment they really need let alone that which is desirable.

Someone needs to make a stand, draw up an effective order of battle for the Army, list the equipment needed and then find the funding. This may mean the Army is even smaller than it is now, but then again how may units do we have that are actually combat effective. The shape of the remaining units may have to be different from what we traditionally have deployed. But we cannot keep reshuffling the deck with the Army. having the "Strike" Brigades held up as the pinnacle of our warfighting doctrine shows how far the serve chiefs have fallen. To have the formations of two badly thought out, poorly equipped formations be heralded as the future is a very sad situation. The possibility was there to develop a truly effective medium weight force, but instead a mish-mash of units has been thrown together, lacking many basic capabilities. The use of the Ajax in these formations just shows how directionless the Army and MoD have become. Realising the original role the programme was aimed at has become less clear a new role has be given to them. Yet in this grand plan, they have stripped the Armoured Infantry Brigades of their Recce capability. The cancellation of the stage three FRES(SV) has led these formations to lack the firepower they need to carry out the roles they are now expected to do.

I would have been far happier if the Army had given up on its Heavy formations and instead deployed both Tracked and Wheeled medium weight formations. Both these would use all the required variants of the platforms they chose, ideally the Ajax and Boxer. Their aim would be to deliver the maximum firepower with the maximum mobility, dominating the ISTAR battle. They would not go head to head with a heavier opponent when possible but engage him on our terms using our ability to take and hold the initiative. But our forces will also have to be able to operate and co-ordinate with the traditional armoured forces of our allies. I suppose I could sum it up in the UK would provide NATO with its eyes and ears on the battlefield, providing three or four Cavalry Brigades able to scout and mountain contact with the opposition, providing our allies with the data they need to counter the threats and also provide the tip of the spear on any offensive actions and so on.

Of course the medium formations would be very effective against lesser opposition in other areas around the world. Though not being the vaunted air mobile formations put forward in the 1990s and 2000s they would still be able to be deployed more rapidly than traditional forces also having a smaller logistical footprint, but also have greater firepower and protections levels than those proposed back then.

This may start to look like what the US Army is developing to succeed its Stryker Brigades and compliment its heavy formations. This is not a bad thing and maybe we should look to join some of these programmes to gain some of the benefits if scale and interoperability this would bring.

Army 2020 Refine should be torn up, an interim order of battle based around three Heavy/Medium Brigades, a singe Medium Brigade and an Air Assault formations should be drawn up. The Medium Brigade should be the melting pot for eh next evolution, developing the platforms and technology necessary and these would be used to evolve the Armoured Infantry formations into their new form. I would like to believe we could have the first step achieved by the middle of the 2020s and the first new "Medium" Brigade operational by 2030. Wishful thinking, probably, but it is better than where we are going at the moment.

Rant over

I have to say that I really don't see the need/use for any "medium" brigade at all. They lack the firepower for stronger peer opponents and are overkill for low-end operations like Afghanistan and similar. They lack enablers ( artillery, logistics, engineering ) for just about any possible situation, except for sitting in Cyprus.
IMHO Medium Brigades= British Army Blunder of the 21th Century.

And BTW, Armoured Brigades with 2 light infantry battalions (AR) each are also a nonsense.

[ArmChairCivvy]

we could have the first step achieved by the middle of the 2020s and the first new "Medium" Brigade operational by 2030.

that would add 7 years to the current 'marching plan' which in itself is not the quickest transformation ever seen.

IMHO Medium Brigades= British Army Blunder of the 21th Century.

Perhaps you weren't around "here" when MRBs were all the craze?

[Lord Jim]

that would add 7 years to the current 'marching plan' which in itself is not the quickest transformation ever seen.

I accept that, but before that the Army would end up with three Brigades each with;
1 Armoured Regiment. (Challenger 2) incl. Recce Company.
2 Armoured Infantry Battalions. (Warrior) incl. Recce Company.
1 Recce Regiment. (Ajax)
1 Artillery Regiment. (AS-90)

A Medium Brigade with;
4 Mechanised Infantry Regiments. (Boxer)
1 Light Artillery Regiment. (105mm Light Gun)

And finally an Air Assault Brigade with;
3 Airborne/Air Mobile Infantry Battalions.
1 Army Air Corps Regiment (AH-64E)
1 Air Mobile Artillery Regiment. (105mm Light Gun)

Held at Divisional Level would be;
2 Air Defence Regiment's. (Land Ceptor/Star Streak)
1 Artillery Regiment. (GMLRS)
1 Recce Regiment (Ajax)
1 Army Air Corps Regiment (AH-64E)
Plus the necessary support units such a Logistics, Signals, ISTAR etc.

Obviously with the above the announced reduction in the Challenger 2 fleet would be abandoned and two Light Role Infantry Battalions would be converted to Mechanised instead of two Armoured Infantry which would remain in that role. This will Give the Army a traditional Heavy Division, with two further Brigades to supplement this or operate independently.

The BASV programme would finally be laid to rest with variants of the Boxer and Ajax fulfilling these roles and more controversial would be the cancellation of the Warrior Upgrade and the Challenger 2 CSP being only the minimum necessary to keep the platform operational. Additional Javelin launchers and missiles would be procured and pintle mounts to allow them to be mounted on AFV would also be procured, increasing the anti-tank firepower of Infantry units.

The key formation would be the Mechanised Brigade which would be tasked with developing a doctrine for the use of such units, drawing on the experience of American, Italian and French formations and this would also look at what capabilities would be needed to make such a Brigade far more combat effective moving forward. The current US Army programme into Medium weight platforms would be closely followed.

The aim would be for the UK to be able to deploy a niche formation by the beginning of the 2030, that being four 21st Century Armoured Cavalry Brigade, that would provide NATO or our other allies with a vanguard formation able to locate, maintain contact with and when required engage any opponent up to peer level. They would be able to dominate the ISTAR battle space and both denying the initiative to the opposition whilst enabling ourselves and our allies. These brigades would be designed to work seamlessly with more traditional Armoured forces of our allies as well as those formation which have been developed along similar lines and light rapid reaction formations.

A number of additional variants of the medium weight platforms would be needed including.;
Direct Fire Support (120mm Smoothbore with intelligent munitions)
Indirect Fire Support - Gun (155mm mobile platform with intelligent munitions)
Indirect Fire Support - Rocket (GMLRS&NLRGM*)
Over watch Platform (NLOS type weapon system)
AVLB
Close Fire Support (turreted 120mm Mortar)
Joint Fires (Boxer)
Recce (Boxer)
IFV
UAV/UCAV Ground Station
UAV Launch Vehicle
and probably others.

Many of the above have already been developed, some up to demonstrators being built. This proposal is just then, a possible way forward. Alternatively the initial structure could be fully invested in with the Challenger 2 and Warrior being upgraded and new platform being brought into service to replace existing ones such as the AS-90 and 105mm Light Gun or moving the Starstreak launchers form the current Stormer to a new platform using either the Ajax or Boxer as its base. With this option the Mechanised Brigade would be disbanded and each of the three Armoured Infantry Brigade would get an enlarged Mechanised Battalion added to its order of battle. This would also give the UK an Army that was able to be effective in a future conflict be it. However all option going forward are gong to need additional funding made available to the Army and this may require programme under the other two services being reduced, slowed down or dropped, but as the bulk of the funding is going to be needed during the next ten Year Equipment plan there should be some room to manoeuvre.

(*New Long Range Guided Missile as being developed by the US Army)

[abc123]

IMHO Medium Brigades= British Army Blunder of the 21th Century.

Perhaps you weren't around "here" when MRBs were all the craze?

I know what you want to say with MRBs, but I don't consider them as a good idea. IMHO, such brigades would be more administrative organisations for force generation ( 1 of 3 or 1 of 5 ) than actual combat formations. At least at brigade level.
Anyway, I don't consider any brigade as a good idea if they are without enablers for that role.

[abc123]

[

A Medium Brigade with;
4 Mechanised Infantry Regiments. (Boxer)
1 Light Artillery Regiment. (105mm Light Gun)

IMHO, no sense to buy Boxer to operate just one brigade.

[ArmChairCivvy]

UAV/UCAV Ground Station
UAV Launch Vehicle

Warhogs were briefly earmarked for this role, but then instead sold for a song.

I don't consider them as a good idea.

Neither do I; they would have been "the" blunder - or another one, and only narrowly missed.

[Lord Jim]

IMHO, no sense to buy Boxer to operate just one brigade.

Well that is the number of Battalions w are planning to buy at present, four, with two per "Strike" Brigade. In this proposal this Brigade, as described is also tasked with trialling and developing what is needed for effective formations of this type which if pursued would lead to substantial follow on orders for Boxer and possible also Ajax, depending on whether we focus the wheeled or tracked route.

[Lord Jim]

Warhogs were briefly earmarked for this role, but then instead sold for a song.

Do we have an alternative platform in service such as a large 4x4 or truck? Units are going to need this capability far further forward than we currently do, with Battalions at least having a substantial ISTAR capability to counter that of the enemy and co-ordinate its own assets and pass the data up the chain but more importantly out to the units of the Battalion.

[RunningStrong]

Warhogs were briefly earmarked for this role, but then instead sold for a song.

Do we have an alternative platform in service such as a large 4x4 or truck? Units are going to need this capability far further forward than we currently do, with Battalions at least having a substantial ISTAR capability to counter that of the enemy and co-ordinate its own assets and pass the data up the chain but more importantly out to the units of the Battalion.

DH3 operators that I know spent most of their time in Huskys.

DH3 in particular doesn't require a specialist vehicle of any sort, and Watchkeeper does its own thing with command and control.

[Lord Jim]

I suppose I am think more along the lines of the Battalion having its own assets, most of which we probably don't have at the moment. What caused my concern was the level of ISTAR available to the Russian troops operating in Ukraine, where troops down to company level have access to a larger variety of assets form UAVs to jamming equipment as well as access to data form higher level assets. They are developing these systems under battlefield conditions and adapting their doctrine to make the most of what can be achieved. This applies to both their conventional tactics as well as the more creative ways they are conducing operations.

I do not know how far we have gone along this path, but I fear most of our experience has been gained in Afghanistan and Syria against an opponent poorly equipped to deal with our technology, but has not prepared us to deal with peer level opposition equipped to contest the battlefield on many levels, hence why I see the urgent need for us to increase our capabilities in these areas.

The Platforms I am proposing would be utilised to manage the battlespace to counter the opponents ISTAR assets and utilise ours to the best of their capabilities whilst passing the necessary information on to those who need it. They would be able to directly override higher level assets if a situation required it. They would work closely with the Joint Fires Platforms and Signals platforms to provide a comprehensive battlespace picture as well as engaging in offensive and defensive operations.

[RunningStrong]

The Platforms I am proposing would be utilised to manage the battlespace to counter the opponents ISTAR assets and utilise ours to the best of their capabilities whilst passing the necessary information on to those who need it. They would be able to directly override higher level assets if a situation required it. They would work closely with the Joint Fires Platforms and Signals platforms to provide a comprehensive battlespace picture as well as engaging in offensive and defensive operations.

Sounds like what 5RA, 32RA and 47RA currently do. The issue being that the capability is only small at this time.

[Lord Jim]

Thanks for that bit of info, I was worried we were keeping these capabilities in the "Nice to have", box. So we have a core to build on, makes a change to have some good news.

[whitelancer]

As Lord Jim has put forward his ideas of a an alternative orbat I thought I'd give it a go.

First the current Infantry battalion organisation is inefficient. it lacks mass. I would add another rifle platoon to each company and add a fourth company to each battalion, giving a total of 16 rifle platoons rather than the current 9 in each battalion. This will require some increase in both Support and HQ companies. Two such battalions would require roughly the manpower of three current battalions. Similarly with the Armoured Regiments I would add 2 tanks to each Sqn HQ add a fourth Sqn to each Regiment, adding 2 tanks to RHQ, for a total of 84 tanks per Regiment. Similarly with the Armoured Cavalry Regiments I would add an additional Sqn.
Now turning to putting these units into formations,

2 x Armoured Division would have:-

Div Troops 1 x Armoured Cavalry Regiment. Ajax.
1 x ISTAR Regiment. Watchkeeper, EW, Artillery locating radar.
1 x Signals Regiment.
1 x Engineer Regiment. Trojan, Titan, Terrier, Bridging.

Brigade 1 x Armoured Regiment. Challenger 2.
1 x Armoured Infantry Battalion. Warrior.

Brigade 2 x Mounted Infantry Battalions. Boxer.

Artillery 2 x Close Support Regiments. AS 90.
1 x Depth Fire Regiment. GMLRS, Exactor.
1 x Air defence Regiment. CAMM, Starstreak.

In addition their would be Logistic, REME and Medical units.


1 x Airborne Division
Div Troops 1 x Light Armd Cav Regiment. CVR(T)?
1 x ISTAR Regiment. Watchkeeper, EW, Artillery locating radar.
1 x Signals Regiment.
1 x Engineer Regiment.

Brigade 2 x Parachute Battalion. MRVP.

Brigade 2 x Air Landing Inf Battalions. MVRP, Jackal, Coyote

Artillery 2 x Close Support Regiments. Light gun, M777?
1 x Depth Fire Regiment. Himars, Exactor.
1 x Air defence Regiment. CAMM, Starstreak.

In addition their would be Logistic, REME and Medical units.

Division would allocate resources to the Brigades as required. The arrangements shown above are for administrative purposes only.


To sum up, rather than basing the organisation on Brigades its based on Divisions. If only a brigade sized force is required it is created by one of the Divisions with a mix of forces best suited to the situation. For instance it could consist of a mix of MBTs, Armoured Infantry and Mounted Infantry along with Recce, ISTAR, Engineer, Artillery and Logistic elements.

[Lord Jim]

Pretty good suggestion. I put forward a similar ides, where we canned the Strike Brigades and kept the current three Armoured infantry Brigades, backed up by a Ranger type Brigade in the form of a much changes 16 Air Assault.

[ArmChairCivvy]

Division would allocate resources to the Brigades as required. The arrangements shown above are for administrative purposes only.


To sum up, rather than basing the organisation on Brigades its based on Divisions.

Interesting stuff here about 6th D, in addition to the infantry-centric 1st and 'heavy metal' 3rd:
- surely none of these would be fielded 'as is' but they would help to 'round up' bdes to be fit for the kind of conflict that they would be sent to

[Lord Jim]

I think you are right, 6th Division is mainly an admin formations with its components being allocated to operational units as and when needed.

The General (ret) did give a pretty good over view of where the Army is, where it wants to go and the obstacles in its way, the biggest being funding. The shame is the Army can probably get the most out of any funding increase compared to the other two services because in the grand scheme of things the money required is relatively small, but it is still being starved and forced to drag out programmes that should have delivered actual resources to the front line.

[Gabriele]

The Equipment Budget for Land in the 10 year plan is larger than the combat air one and just a billion or two short of the ships one, actually.

And i believe CAMM and Apache expenditure is outside that (Complex Weapons and Helicopters respectively), while most of the LeTacCis is also under another budget.

I'm not sure i'm ready to subscribe the "army is not getting its share" story. I'm very much puzzled by what the hell is wrong about Army procurement, but i'm not sure lack of money is more of a problem for them than for the others.
Unless the figures in the documents are false.

[abc123]

I'm not sure i'm ready to subscribe the "army is not getting its share" story. I'm very much puzzled by what the hell is wrong about Army procurement, but i'm not sure lack of money is more of a problem for them than for the others.
Unless the figures in the documents are false.

Lack of good ideas and common sense?

IMHO all three services should get a say 30% ( with a 10% for nuclear deterrent ) of the procurement money and be able to do whatever they want with that, but be aware that they will not get not a penny more than that.