Strike Brigades (SDSR 15)

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RetroSicotte
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Re: Strike Brigades (SDSR 15)

Post by RetroSicotte »

Once British troops saw the currency conversion for Polish drinks, I'm certain the entire Army would apply for a base over there. :lol:

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Re: Strike Brigades (SDSR 15)

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"Experimentation Strike Brigade".

This reminds too closely of the 1920's. The "Experimental Mechanized Brigade", a concept that brought lessons about how you need a brigade to be, and what it must be able to fight. Lessons that were wholly ignored, and resulted in horrific losses, one of the biggest routs in British Army history, and utter defeat on land from a peer foe in 1940.

Lessons being forgotten all over again...

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Re: Strike Brigades (SDSR 15)

Post by ArmChairCivvy »

RetroSicotte wrote: Lessons [that] were wholly ignored, and resulted in horrific losses, one of the biggest routs in British Army history, and utter defeat on land from a peer foe in 1940
Fuller was Guderian's favourite author... so experimentation did bear fruit. :eh: Funnily enough, Zhukov's and Guderians (not immediate) offspring have ended up in the same private school... here. Does not help much with our brigade optimisation, though.
- and as we have so few left, optimised they must be
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Re: Strike Brigades (SDSR 15)

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ArmChairCivvy wrote:Fuller was Guderian's favourite author
Not sure this is true at all. Unfortunately I cant remember who pointed out that it was expedient for Guderian to give Fuller some credit, and their was no real proof that Fuller had any real effect on the development of the Panzer Division. Not to mention that Fuller didn't get things right himself with his over emphasis on Tanks, though this in part may have been in response to the opposition he received to his ideas.

What I found interesting was the talk about operating as a Division, which follows on from what the CGS has said. What I would point out is that we don't have any Divisions. What we do have is a supposedly deployable Divisional HQ, some force troops and a small number of disparate independent Brigades. If the desire is to be able to deploy a Division they need to create a proper one (or more).

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Re: Strike Brigades (SDSR 15)

Post by ArmChairCivvy »

whitelancer wrote: no real proof that Fuller had any real effect on the development of the Panzer Division
through Guderian?

Started experimentation of jointness (training) in 1921 (town; Goslar). Got moved to logistics & motorisation, and decided to follow the British Tank Corps (formed in 1923) closely. - started to make maximum use of the Treaty of Rapallo, lifting some of the most restrictive Versailles limitations - with the Ruskies keen to help (and learn).

ISBN 0-304-35679-4, p.119 is very specific about the later tank training being much based on the official British manual for the same [except that Guderian with his signals background, added a much stronger element of coordination (of command)].
- in 1934 became the Chief of Staff - Panzertruppe (when it was established as a separate branch)
Ever-lasting truths: Multi-year budgets/ planning by necessity have to address the painful questions; more often than not the Either-Or prevails over Both-And.
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Re: Strike Brigades (SDSR 15)

Post by whitelancer »

ISBN 0-304-35679-4 gets me to Orde Wingate? I assume you were referring to Panzer Leader, unfortunately my copy is not readily at hand, but he certainly mentions inter war developments in Britain but was that out of expedience! I shall try and find a reference for the comments I made up thread, could take me a while though.

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Re: Strike Brigades (SDSR 15)

Post by Lord Jim »

Looking at the video, it shows clearly what the Army aspires to but you can have the best trained troops and most highly developed doctrine, but if you kit isn't up to scratch you are going to be fighting with a losing hand from the start.

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Re: Strike Brigades (SDSR 15)

Post by ArmChairCivvy »

whitelancer wrote:Panzer Leader
Not that one, not his own (1937) Achtung - Panzer! or not even Rommel's Infanterie Greifft An! (derived from his notes and experiences in WW1; I have his WW2 in manuscript, which is more to the point we are discussing but for reasons we know has been edited by his son into a readable format, though not published as a "finished article").

Actually that book is by David Rooney (he has a book on Wingate, too) in Cassell Military Paperbacks (1999). Gives the biographies and evolution in the thinking of 12 military mavericks: from Alexander the Great and Stonewall Jackson, through Garibaldi and Lawrence of Arabia to WW2 Heinz Guderian and George S. Patton.
Ever-lasting truths: Multi-year budgets/ planning by necessity have to address the painful questions; more often than not the Either-Or prevails over Both-And.
If everyone is thinking the same, then someone is not thinking (attributed to Patton)

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Re: Strike Brigades (SDSR 15)

Post by Caribbean »

RetroSicotte wrote:Lessons being forgotten all over again...
Jumping ahead a bit aren't we? First we have to re-learn them, THEN we we can forget them again
The pessimist sees difficulty in every opportunity. The optimist sees the opportunity in every difficulty.
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Re: Strike Brigades (SDSR 15)

Post by Lord Jim »

It depends what we are trying to actually re-learn. We haven't the kit we had in the days of BOAR or even GW1 and there were few lessons to be learned in GW2 regarding the Armoured Infantry. They first have to re-learn simply how to operate as a Brigade once more and realise some of the capabilities they lack or are in need of improvement so an informed case can be put forward for more resources. As for the "Strike" side, until be actually get their hands on a wheeled platform it is going to be pretty much a paper exercise. The MRAVs brought on charge will not do through their lack of off road mobility. What they should do is beg/borrow a number from one of a "Friends" until we get the initial deliveries of the MIV and start at company level and then work upwards.

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Re: Strike Brigades (SDSR 15)

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Lord Jim wrote: As for the "Strike" side, until be actually get their hands on a wheeled platform it is going to be pretty much a paper exercise. The MRAVs brought on charge will not do through their lack of off road mobility.
As for off-roading (and filling the gap that is called 'artillery') the SADF/ Denel choice for their T-5 wheeled 155mm is the same Tatra 8x8 that the danes bought. By the looks of first reports
"
Multiple rounds (up to four) can be fired to impact simultaneously on the same target by means of the T5-52's advanced on-board Gun Command and Control System (GCCS). The T5-52 can stop and fire three accurate rounds at full charge within 90 seconds and move to a new position within 40 seconds of the last round. It can repeat this exercise up to eight times with the on-board ammunition."
the handling of rounds seems to be a slicker affair (better suited to shoot&scoot) than what the vid posted about the French/ Czech in operation would suggest on its part.
Ever-lasting truths: Multi-year budgets/ planning by necessity have to address the painful questions; more often than not the Either-Or prevails over Both-And.
If everyone is thinking the same, then someone is not thinking (attributed to Patton)

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Re: Strike Brigades (SDSR 15)

Post by mr.fred »

https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/20 ... ke_web.pdf
Seems at first glance to consider many points that concerns me about the broad idea, though I’m not sure that I agree with their solutions.

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Re: Strike Brigades (SDSR 15)

Post by mr.fred »

The authors do seem quite ignorant regarding some of the weapons choices, particularly the SHORAD variant proposed. I don’t believe that the weapons proposed would be at all effective against the type of UAVs expected. The CT40 armed with shrapnel or time fused HE would be more effective and also able to pull double duty.
Plus the way they are penny packeting the vehicles out is evocative of the FRES-style “expecting the enemy to cooperate in the creation of your dream engagement”

Then they don’t mention Ceptor missiles as an option for longer range AAD, but instead SeaSparrow. Colour me confused?

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Re: Strike Brigades (SDSR 15)

Post by Lord Jim »

On the whole I find the paper pretty much on the money regarding my concerns about the planned "Strike"/Mechanised Brigades and show the huge difference between what should be procured to create combat effective formations and what has been announced, especially regarding the variants of the MIV currently planned. I agree the SHROAD options are a little strange with both the CTA40 and Starstreak/LMM not being mentioned. Surely a CTA40 turret that replaces the Javelin launchers with ones for Starstreak/LMM and the appropriate target acquisition systems would be more appropriate and would be needed not just in the Mechanised Brigades but also the Armoured Infantry.

All of the suggests are going to require increased investment in these formations and goes to highlight something I have mentioned in the past, that being can the UK afford to both update the Armoured infantry and create the Mechanised Brigades? With current funding I fear the answer is no if we want these formations to be combat effective.

The current organisation of the Mechanised Brigades should be altered in my opinion. I believe they should comprise of only one Ajax equipped Regiment but three MIV equipped battalions, with the two remaining Ajax Regiments going to the two planned Armoured Infantry Brigades. I also strongly believe that one of the latter should be forward deployed in Germany or even further east.

Regarding indirect fire, the combination of 120mm SP mortars and a HIMARS style MLRS seems a good solution, with the possible addition of a lorry based 155mm SPG. I was a fan of the MIV based 155mm but was unaware of the restraint this module placed on the Boxer chassis and the resulting limitation.

The increase need for logistics support to work with the dispersed deployment of the Mechanised units is a very important point. I would go as far as to say we will need a logistics variant of the MIV to help resupply units that are far forward and also we need the Brigade to have sufficient troops, possible reserves mounted in MRV(P) or Jackals to provide security to the Logistics and other support units with the brigade.

As for Brigade level AD I am not sure if Land Ceptor has the range to manage this. The Ground based AIM-120 systems used by Norway nay be a better option. We only have one Regiment of Land Ceptor planned and maybe this would better be employed defending fixed locations such as Airfields and/or ports. We are not alone in needing a ad capability. Many NATO countries have SHORADS such as the Stinger and then nothing until you reach systems such as Patriot. One solution for the UK may be to introduce the Land Ceptor ER as adopted by Italy and for a second regiment to support the Mechanised Brigades.

SO I agree with most of the paper but I see a large gulf between what is needed for the Mechanised Brigades and what is currently planned. There appears to be little money for additional procurement until after 2025, and so this will delay the creation for the Mechanised Brigades somewhat, though the use for funding form say the Transformation fund to start the development of the mission module for the MIV could speed thing up. What is obvious tough is that the Army needs more investment sooner rather than later. For me the £1.25B earmarked for the T-31e would be a good starting though I doubt many will agree.

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Re: Strike Brigades (SDSR 15)

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mr.fred wrote:https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/20 ... ke_web.pdf Seems at first glance to consider many points that concerns me about the broad idea, though I’m not sure that I agree with their solutions.
An interesting article. Couple of snippets about Ajax contained within. First, Ajax can't recover another. Damage to the rear of Ajax is mentioned as the reason. I'm assuming that means Ajax cannot tow another, or anything else for that matter! Bit of a problem if their is no recovery vehicle to hand.
Second they report a projected failure rate of 38 per 400km for a 2000km deployment while not very helpful if we assume they are referring to a brigades compliment of Ajax including variants say around 200 that works out at approximately 2100km mean time between failures, which doesn't seem that good for a modern tracked vehicle.

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Re: Strike Brigades (SDSR 15)

Post by J. Tattersall »

For those who haven't seen it yet an absolutely stonkin' and authoritative article has recently appeared about Strike on the UK Land Power website https://uklandpower.com/2020/05/06/brit ... side-view/

It really is a must read.

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Re: Strike Brigades (SDSR 15)

Post by ArmChairCivvy »

Thank you for alerting to the great new article. Now that I have commented there, where the input was - and it takes time and bother to put the input together - I feel that I can also share some thoughts on the topic (as it is the same topic) on these pages... so here goes:

Giving a UK Division and/or Allied Corps a Screening and Exploitation Force is clearly something valuable, but it somehow harks back to what German motorcycle bns did in the early years of the war - with great success. But then started taking casualties at a scale that saw them put inside tanks and the forerunners of today's 6x6/ 8x8 vehicles.

For it to be possible to enable Fires, Aviation, Air and a whole range of joint effects to destroy, defeat, and inflict attrition on enemy formations within a Division’s or Corps’ battle space one is brought to wonder why the number of vehicles for Joint-fires control is so small in the overall 'Ajax' order?

I will plaud anyone who sets out a force structure within which armoured infantry brigades, as a component, can stay competitive for the cost. It would be too much to ask (upfront) for how long this could/ will hold (get the AFV upgrade prgrms rolling first; ask the question (again) next :!: ).

All in all, moving away from being too kit-centred in thinking can only be a good thing. A transformation that then can only be realised through a new (but not necessarily all-new) force mix is not really that different from transitioning a business: https://ceopedia.org/images/thumb/d/d0/ ... matrix.png
Ever-lasting truths: Multi-year budgets/ planning by necessity have to address the painful questions; more often than not the Either-Or prevails over Both-And.
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Re: Strike Brigades (SDSR 15)

Post by whitelancer »

Some initial thoughts on the above article.
To quote
Explicitly one of the raisons d’être of the Strike Brigade was, at its inception, to “redefine how the British Army fights.[1]” Thus, the Brigade spans both an operational requirement and a force development concept predicated on that requirement. The applications start point for this journey was “enabling better divisional-level manoeuvre.”
What does this mean? In the simplest possible terms, it means giving a UK Division and/or Allied Corps a Screening and Exploitation Force.[2] This has been publicly stated by the Army. If you know what a screening and exploitation force does, then this will be well-trodden ground. For those of us who grew up in 1 BR Corps, the conduct of the “screening force battle” was something we all lived and died by – at least potentially. In its most basic form, the Corps Covering force was 2 x Formation Recce Regiments, but with Corps assets like Fires and Aviation attached. Note, these were attached and not organic.
While he is correct in pointing out the Formation Recce Regiments provided the Corps screening force, each of the forward Armoured Divisions also deployed an Armoured Brigade forward to act as a covering force. The primary focus of the recce regiments being to determine the main axis of advance of the enemy while preventing their recce elements from gaining information. The covering force however was there to delay and disrupt the advance to give time for the bulk of the forces to prepare. Hence the use of tank heavy Brigades. It's worth noting that the US Army used Armoured Cavalry Regiments (Brigade equivalent) in that role. So the question is whether the Strike Brigades are just a screening force or a covering force as well? It sounds as though its both, but its not altogether clear from the quote above.

This does make it clearer I think.
Strike is looking to add as much friction and uncertainty to the enemy formation as possible by enabling Fires, Aviation, Air and a whole range of joint effects to destroy, defeat, and inflict attrition on enemy formations within a Division’s or Corps’ battlespace. Ultimately, this allows Armoured Infantry Brigades and/or coalition armoured formations to conduct counterattacks and counter strokes under considerably better conditions than if Strike Brigades were not present.
Strike doesn’t aim to “win.” It helps others win at less cost.
Well to do the above Strike needs fire(power), whether that's integral to Strike or not.
Thus, lots of people talk about the 40mm cannon on Ajax. Almost no one talks about the Thermal Imager, which is actually the key capability. The strike concept of operation clearly puts primacy on sensors and communications. To paraphrase Wavell: “Amateurs talk 30mm cannons. Professionals talk communications and sensors”.


Which is fine if you are talking about a Screening Force. For a covering force you need something more.
As previously stated, lethality is clearly both important and required, but as the current Strike Brigade Commander has pointed out, what experience has shown is that for Strike to succeed it merely needs to be competitive with the enemy, as opposed to superior to the enemy. You just need to win the fight rather than the whole battle. Consequently, the plan has always been to resource Strike units with both mounted and dismounted ATGM and anti-armour weapons, which are obviously high pay-off in terms of cost versus effect/ flexibility.
True a covering force doesn't need to win the battle. But is Strike even competitive? Do ATGW even things up? Their has been little sign so far of mounted ATGW. Using a picture of Mk 5 Ferret rather sums up the current state as far as vehicle mounted ATGW is concerned.
The other odd claim is that “wheels and tracks don’t mix,” which is clearly a reference to Ajax being tracked, and Boxer being wheeled. Again, this can only be a lack of experience and/or understanding.
Well the stated requirement for the Strike Brigade to be self deployable over a distance of 2000km has a lot to do with that.
This has been much longer than I intended and its late so I will finish off tomorrow.

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Re: Strike Brigades (SDSR 15)

Post by J. Tattersall »

I've never actually seen any MOD or Army documenting saying that it's a requirement for Strike brigades 'to be self deployable over a distance of 2000km'. Where does this come from?

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Re: Strike Brigades (SDSR 15)

Post by ArmChairCivvy »

Perhaps that exercise when they drove a good way further up from Oslo?
- Oslo is like a halfway post if you want to get to where Norway's JHQ is, in Bodo (the last letter in that name being a scandi one): If you want to go by car, the driving distance between Bodo and Oslo is 1199.66 km.
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Re: Strike Brigades (SDSR 15)

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J. Tattersall wrote:I've never actually seen any MOD or Army documenting saying that it's a requirement for Strike brigades 'to be self deployable over a distance of 2000km'. Where does this come from?
One scenario for the use of the new "Strike" Brigades put out by the MoD was a rapid deployment to north eastern Bulgaria to deter Russian Intervention into a region I believe is call Wallachia or something like that. This involved the Brigade rapidly self deploying from the UK to arrive in theatre within 72hrs, moving in dispersed groupings and without using main transportation routes in order to reduce the chances of detection.

Like Whitelancer I see many Red Flags raised by the above article. Whilst the author is very clear when talking in broad brush strokes about the Role of the new "Strike" Brigades, once he starts going into detail I feel things start to come apart. At the beginning he states that the Brigade would be used to provide UK Divisional or Allied Corps screening force, but regarding the latter the two "Strike" Brigades are integral in 3rd (UK) Division. If we just wanted a screening force we only needed to re equip one or more the existing Recce Regiments with Ajax as retained the three Armoured Infantry Brigades, using the money saved from purchasing far fewer Ajax and Boxer to also re equip the third Armoured Infantry Brigade as we are intending to do with the two that currently remain.

This is but the first issue I have. Other points have been pointed out by Whitelancer, including one of the biggest, back in the day units of BOAR only had to leave their Barracks, turn east and drive for 25 to 30 miles and they were at the Inner German Border. Today our Screening/Covering Forces has to travel over 1000 miles to the eastern border of NATO and do it vary fast. Not only does this necessity make the inclusion of tracked vehicles problematic, but to be able to carry out such a deployment both rapidly and smoothly requires training that includes carrying out such a deployment on a regular basis, and a level of readiness that would have to be at least equal to out current high readiness units such a 3 Commando Brigade, and not seen by other Army formations since the end of the Cold War.

I have talked at length about the numerous capability gaps in the Army's current procurement plans and how these leave both the planned "Strike" Brigades but also the Armoured Infantry barely fit for the roles assigned to them, and that is being generous. The Author states that the main weapons of the "Strike" Brigades will be their sensors and comms equipment! If that were the main driver then we would be buying a fleet of proven 4x4s equipped with decent thermal optics and good radios instead of very expensive tracked and wheeled AFVs.

I also find that the roles of Screen Force and Covering Force require substantial different resources, doctrine and organisation. Why, for example dues a Screening force required two mechanised Infantry Battalions? As a Covering Force the "Strike" Brigades themselves that the lethality to carry out the role and the Army lacks the precision fire capability to effectively engage an enemy identified by the Brigade.

I could keep going on but I will let Whitelancer follow up his original remarks later today as he seems far more eloquent than myself.

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Re: Strike Brigades (SDSR 15)

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Lord Jim wrote:I could keep going on but I will let Whitelancer follow up his original remarks later today as he seems far more eloquent than myself.
"Eloquent" That's a first for me. You would be surprised by the time and effort it takes for me to write posts on here. Its one thing to compose them in your head another matter to get them down on 'paper'. So thanks for that.
J. Tattersall wrote:I've never actually seen any MOD or Army documenting saying that it's a requirement for Strike brigades 'to be self deployable over a distance of 2000km'. Where does this come from?

If you look towards the bottom of page 2 of this thread you will see a post of General Nick Carter giving a talk at RUSI, I think that will answer your question.
ArmChairCivvy wrote:Perhaps that exercise when they drove a good way further up from Oslo?- Oslo is like a halfway post if you want to get to where Norway's JHQ is, in Bodo (the last letter in that name being a scandi one): If you want to go by car, the driving distance between Bodo and Oslo is 1199.66 km.
The distance by road from Calais to Vilnius (approximately 2000km), or Bremerhaven to Viljandi, Estonia (1980km) may have been a more important consideration.

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Re: Strike Brigades (SDSR 15)

Post by ArmChairCivvy »

whitelancer wrote:The distance by road from Calais to Vilnius (approximately 2000km), or Bremerhaven to Viljandi, Estonia (1980km) may have been a more important consideration.
Not disagreeing at all but wanted to quote an exercise where a force simulating the road march was put together, to be as much alike a strike bde as (without the actual kit) was possible
- and when I say simulate, they actually did drive it (but without shipping stocks, fuel etc ahead... which wouldn't be the case in a quick alert situation either)
- the exercise from here to Estonia was done to coincide with a normal rotation cycle, so the force doing it was not trying to "look like" a strike bde
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Re: Strike Brigades (SDSR 15)

Post by whitelancer »

@ACC
I take your point.
I have been meaning to do a post on the logistics of self deploying a Stick Brigade 2000 km but haven't got round to it yet.
Just as a point of interest, back in the day when the AMF(L) was a thing, the attached Armoured Recce Squadron self deployed from Levanger, just north of Trondheim to Bardufoss in Norway, a distance of just under 1000km. (Normally it would have travelled by sea from Trondheim). It did so in winter using only its own resources. Self deploying long distances is nothing new, though it has been rather neglected.
It should be pointed out however that an Armd Recce Sqn is not very big and being independent it had a larger logistics set up than would normally be found in a Sqn. Once in Bardufoos it was able to plug into the normal AMF(L) logistics so it didn't have to take along everything required to sustain operations, which would be the case with a Strike Brigade. Unsurprisingly it all hinges on logistics.

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Re: Strike Brigades (SDSR 15)

Post by whitelancer »

To continue my post from yesterday.
Since the introduction of tracked vehicles in the First World War armies have always used a mix of tracked and wheeled AFVs. This has been done partly on cost grounds and partly for operational reasons, some tasks being more suited to tracks others being more suited to wheels. If self deployment is a thing wheels would be the obvious option.
To give it more context than mere assertion, ask any former Formation or even Unit Commander from the 1980s if he could have fought 2 x CVR-T Regiments and 2 x FV-432 Regiments with an uplift of Milan ATGW as a Corps screening force? What about 2 x Saladin Regiments and 2 x Saracen Battalions? If you want to play tunes on that mix, then make it 2 x CVR-T Regiments and 2 x Saracen Battalions. It doesn’t really matter, and you can almost guarantee none of the officers concerned would be debating equipment. They’d be chewing on C2, groupings, battlespace, and logistics, not 30mm cannons, and wheels or tracks.
The point the author is making here is I believe, that its the concept of strike not the equipment that is important, be it wheeled or tracked. (Though he does keep emphasising the need for ATGW). Well all would work, but which would be best? In a BOAR context an all tracked solution, but if you need to deploy long distances first all wheeled would be preferable, but more on that a bit later.
Coming to the mix of two Recce, (I thought one was meant to be medium armour!) and two infantry battalions, I have no problem with that. I always thought that the Armd Recce Regts suffered from a lack of dismounts. The idea of combining Light Cavalry and Mounted Infantry to make a Light Armd Brigade seems eminently sensible to me, and probably what the Strike Brigade should be.
Unless I missed it the role of the Infantry Battalions isn't actually explained. My take on it is that as part of an exploitation force they will be used to seize and hold important objectives, bridges for instance or in order to create a blocking position cutting off an enemy withdraw. While as part of the covering force it will be more a matter of setting up temporary positions in order to delay, harass and attrite the enemy without becoming decisively engaged.
If I had to choose from the above options to create a vintage Strike Brigade I would go for 2 x CVR(T) and 2 x Saracen. For preference however I would go 2 x CVR(T) and 2 x CVR(T), that's not a misprint. I would mount the 2 Infantry Battalions on CVR(T). With 6 Spartan per Platoon two with Milan teams plus MCT at either company or battalion level. The key reasons for going all CVR(T), mobility and logistics. Its very easy to deploy by land sea or air, is perfectly capable of self deploying over long distances, (see my post up thread) and is comparatively frugal when it comes to logistics support particularly by using a single vehicle family.. For its time it also had a reasonable level of firepower with 30mm, 76mm swingfire and milan.
Having gone a bit off piste I better get back to my critique.
The Strike Concept, like any concept, is an idea. It’s not about a set of equipment.
Their is certainly too much obsessing over equipment on this and other forums rather than discussions of ideas. While the concept may not require a particular set of equipment the equipment you have very much determines how it is put into practice. People wanting the best equipment possible or at least the best that is affordable is hardly surprising.

The key to war is the combination of Fire and Manoeuvre, Strike places emphasis on this which is a good thing. Unfortunately, in my opinion at least, it is over reliant on what is referred to as Joint Fires. When available they can be extremely effective and should be the first choice, but that doesn't negate the need for the Strike Brigades to posses a high level of firepower.
As for the choice of the two primary platforms I'm far from convinced. Its not that they will not work but that they will not work as effectively as a different choice could have.

To conclude.
Strick as a concept is not new and I have no problem with it. It's the execution I have problems with.

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