Strike Brigades (SDSR 15)

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ArmChairCivvy
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Re: Strike Brigades (SDSR 15)

Post by ArmChairCivvy »

whitelancer wrote: Self deploying long distances is nothing new, though it has been rather neglected.
Agreed, and influenced v much by what was deemed to be the primary area for engagement: the N German Plain. Though as both Germans and Russians appreciate from history, it widens up hugely to the N. Europe Plain going eastwards... therefore one party was dead-set on forward deploying

But I am v much looking forward to your piece on Strike Bde self-deploying. The piece I linked to earlier dealt with the Baltics (i.e. that side of the sea's shores that is mainly made up of the states carrying that description). While the geography and the transport network were both a given, the scale of deployment was not. And for that reason difficulties with rapid deployment were seen through the prism of division/ corps level aspects
... would one expect anything smaller
A. for relevance of the deterrent, relative to the threat, and
B. for the fact that one of the three authors was still the Commander of US Forces, Europe at the time when Aurora 17 (in parallel to Zapad!) took place

Taking a UK-sized EU country for comparison (from my readings) takes away the fixation with a particular battle field (are they ever going to be a given, if the other side exercises strategic thought?) and what makes the comparison, or rather benchmarking, relevant is that the number of MBTs they can muster is about the same as what we are (allegedly) planning for:
- even a bde size is too unwieldy, in the face of strong x-domain opposition, to get to where they are needed in a fluid enough manner
- therefore the mech. force packets are about half the size of the equivalent UK formations (c.2700)
- now comes the important point: the fighting edge is all tracked in its make up (logs not)
- the requirement to self-deploy has been set (meaning also that on arrival the formation should be able to engage straight away)... and the calculations and exercises have come up such a distance to be 300km -ish
- having the time and luxury to utilise railways does not fall within the definition; whereas preassigned HETs do (but as we know, due to being few in number, one would expect most to be operated as a pool)
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Re: Strike Brigades (SDSR 15)

Post by Lord Jim »

If one looks at the RFI for the replacement Precision Fires platform and the requirements for it to be able to self deploy over 750Km including over 200km across country you get a fairly good baseline for what the components of a "Strike" Brigade are going to be expected to be able to do.

If we stick to the 2x Ajax, 2x Boxer configuration, we are going to need at least 100 HETS available to move a single Brigade, doubling the number for the use of METs. That by itself imposes a considerable logistical burden on the Brigade, and assuming we even ended up with that many HETs, the need to bring them back to the UK in order to begin moving parts of one of the Armoured Infantry Brigades to support the "Strike" Brigade, greatly lengthens to timescale for the former reaching the latter.

If the "Strike" Brigades were all wheeled then we would be able to concentrate our available HETs (and METs) for use in moving one, or at least part of a Armoured Infantry Brigade far quicker, and given the planned level of firepower in the "Strike" Brigades the sooner the Cavalry arrives the better.

"Strike" is a valid doctrine, but re organising the Army as well as carrying out the essential re equipment plans needed is beyond the Army's resources and the MoD and Government must realize this. More importantly the Army must truly evaluate what is needed to put theory into practice and not try to cover up capability shortfalls with paper thin "Band Aids". Basic capabilities like the Infantry Battalions having a self propelled mortar platforms have not been addressed, and I am assuming at present they would rely on dismounted Mortar sections carried in the back of a Boxer. How does this facilitate rapid manoeuvre warfare? Beyond this, the Infantry and their transports need to be able to act as a team, mutually supporting each other and providing complimentary capabilities. The current configurations planned for the Boxer mean that 95% of a section fire power rests with the dismounted infantry alone, meaning the Boxer provides little to any engagement, simply being an expensive "Battle Taxi". We could have purchased a far cheaper platform if that was all we wanted.

It is all well and good the sit back and debate the pro and cons of the "Strike" philosophy, but things have moved beyond that as part of the process of delivering the capability to match the doctrine, deciding on what equipment, training and logistics must be put in place is not of greater importance. If not, we are going to end up with formations inferior capabilities to 16 Air Assault Brigade, which at least should still have an Apache Regiment assigned to it giving it some credible hitting power.

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whitelancer
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Re: Strike Brigades (SDSR 15)

Post by whitelancer »

Some thoughts on a Strike Brigade deploying 2000km.
The first problem talking about such a deployment is a lack facts, we don't now for instances how many vehicles the Brigade will contain or exactly what they will be. However by combing some facts I've been able find with some back of the envelope calculations as well as frankly some guesswork I hope to give some idea of the challenges facing such a deployment.
At one time I actually had the figures for how much road space a Soviet Tank Division would take up if it was deploying down a single route. If I remember correctly it was something over 300km. I thought that would be a good place to start. Their are two figures we need to know the of number vehicles in the Brigade, (I'm guessing a minimum of 1000 and more likely 1500) and average distance between vehicles, for this I've used two figures 50m and more realistically 100m.

Number of vehicles 1000 Average distance between vehicles 50m Total road space 50km

Number of vehicles 1500 Average distance between vehicles 50m Total road space 75km

Number of vehicles 1000 Average distance between vehicles 100m Total road space 100km

Number of vehicles 1500 Average distance between vehicles 100m Total road space 150km

That's just to give some idea of the scale of operation.

A quick discussion of Ajax and transporters. I estimate that a Strike Brigade could have from 150-200 Ajax including variants. Their will probable be the need to transport other equipment Terrier for instance. Frankly either the Army provides sufficient transporters to deploy in one lift or they don't and multiple lifts will be required. If its two trips that means the transporters covering 6000 miles and taking at least 3 times as long.

Turning to the move itself. Given the range of some vehicles, refuelling will be needed at least every 400kms, this is very much dependent on the type of road and terrain so it could be less. This is likely to take 10 hours or more driving time, again depending on the roads and terrain. Personnel will also need feeding and rest, best done at the refuelling stops. Their will probable need to be brief halts between refuelling stops to check vehicles and swap drivers if possible. You cant have these stops anywhere they will need to be pre arranged and hopefully recced to ensure their is plenty of suitable ground (preferable hard standing) to set up a running replen and harbour area for the appropriate number of vehicles.
Where is the fuel coming from? Will the host nation or nations provide it or will we have to bring it ourselves? What about the replen facilities host nation or bring your own? In truth whether or not the host nation can provide it will probably be easier and quicker, at least for the initial deployment, to provide for ourselves.

Assuming we have to provide for ourselves their are basically two ways the move could be made. One option is for each convoy to include its own replenishment needs, basically fuel. On reaching a designated refuelling stop they simply set up a running replen. However my favoured option would be to set up permanent fuel stops with added facilities, such as a cookhouse and repair and recovery assets etc. This would mean you have effectively set up your Line Of Communications. Its not just about getting the Brigade to wherever its going you also need to keep it supplied.

So how will it work. As I see it the first ships will arrive at the port of entry hopefully loaded in the right order, by which time the route should have been planned the refuelling sites chosen and all the necessary consultations and agreements made with the host nation/s. On unloading vehicles may need to be married up with personnel, organised in packets and prepared to be despatched. The first convoys would be logistic elements to set up the refuelling points. These may need combat elements attached for protection. The balance of the Brigade would then follow in appropriate sized convoys at suitable intervals as ships are unloaded. With luck and a lot of hard work they will arrive at the RP fit and ready for combat.

How long will it all take? If we assume an average speed of 40 kph for the entire 2000km that would be 50 hrs driving time, assume 3 x 2 hour refuelling stops and 2 x 10 hr stops, including sleep time, and ignoring the intermediate stops I mentioned. That amounts to 76 hours, which if it could be achieved would be more than a little surprising. This doesn't mean the whole brigade could arrive in that time, even if you sent the entire brigade in one huge convoy (which is highly unlikely for many reasons), the tail of the convoy would arrive long after the lead vehicle. Using some very basic back of the envelope calculations, from the first vehicle leaving the port of entry to the last arriving at the RP I reckon it would take at least 5 days. This equates very roughly to one vehicle leaving the port every two minutes. If this could be achieved I would be frankly amazed.

Their is a lot I haven't covered here, route security, traffic control and communications to name a few. If you want to know more about some of the problems of reinforcing Europe's eastern states their is a PDF from the Center for European Policy Analysis on one of the threads.

I'm not a logistics expert so feel free to criticize and dispute my figures.

Just to finish off, another little calculation. I estimate to get 200 boxers 2000km will take approximately 270,000 litres of fuel.

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Re: Strike Brigades (SDSR 15)

Post by Caribbean »

I believe that one of the scenarios was that the vehicles would divide into small groups following different routes (and dispersed along the routes), with each convoy commander carrying a Gold card and purchasing food and fuel as they went. That would make use of the existing civilian infrastructure as much as possible (though presumably there would have to be some forces provision as there will be inevitable crunch points in the routes across Europe). As a useful data point, it seems (wiki/ quora references only, I'm afraid) that a standard petrol station will have a single tank of around 45-50,000 litres of diesel. Presumably the big motorway stations have considerably more, so there would be a reasonable amount of fuel already distributed along most likely routes. If co-ordinated with the major filling station networks, they could also provide considerable logistics support themselves, simply by being ready to re-supply their own facilities
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whitelancer
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Re: Strike Brigades (SDSR 15)

Post by whitelancer »

@ Caribbean
My post above was about a generic deployment rather than a strictly European one. If you look further up thread to my post on the deployment of the AMF(L) Recce Squadron in Norway, what you suggest is more or less what was done. Though they didn't make use of Norwegian filling stations and their is effectively only a single route they could take.
The problem is one of scale.
Lets take the example of French operations in Mali, in particular the deployment from Abidjan to Bamako which is often cited. This is taken from the RUSI document, Strike From Concept to Force.
It is worth noting that French forces assembled in 12 hours and managed a 1,300-km march in 72 hours from Abidjan to Bamako, in
2012, across poorer roads, in less mobile vehicles, and having already been deployed for some time.
Points to note. The force deployed consisted of 200 personnel and 60 wheeled light armoured vehicles, using Google Earth, the roads for the most part seem pretty good (they could have ben upgraded since the operation). Less mobile vehicles! Being already deployed had at least as many advantages as disadvantages. They also arrived with little logistic support.
Deploying a small light armoured force over long distances with minimal preparation is eminently doable. Deploying a much larger force, (20+ x the number of vehicles and personnel), with very large and heavy vehicles is a different ball game altogether.

Back to Europe the road network in the west is very extensive, but the further east you travel main routes become few and far between, until you reach the Poland Lithuanian border where their is effectively a single road. However you arrange the deployment that's going to be a major problem. If you do send your convoys down multiple route the size weight of your vehicles need to be taken into account, particularly Boxer and Ajax on their transporters. Frankly for them at least (and much other equipment) you will want to stick to major routes , particularly motorways.

Motorway services are an obvious place for refuelling stops, and if you can make use of their filling stations so much the better. This would really need to be pre-arranged though. Pulling up at a road side service station with a convoy of very large fuel hungry vehicles with just one or two usable diesel pumps would be interesting!

The biggest problem however would be coordination. With numerous convoys spread over the road network, looking for places to refuel or to take a break. Travelling at different speeds often coming together, particularly at choke points and arriving at their destination in any old order. Throw in the fact that the Strick Brigade is unlikely to be the only NATO force on the move. (An American General is not gong to happy if a bunch of limeys are blocking his route). As well as the normal civilian traffic. Frankly it would be a nightmare.

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Re: Strike Brigades (SDSR 15)

Post by Lord Jim »

Regarding the co ordination of troop movements, that is the responsibility of NATO and SACEUR's team. Building infrastructure has been identified by NATO as a key factor in maintaining its deterrence capability. One thing that urgently needs to be done is move a branch of the Central European Pipeline eastwards. It is NATO's main fuel artery running from Rotterdam to Marseilles and is linked into nearly all major NATO bases used by the organisation during the Cold War. It is now hundreds of miles out of place.

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Re: Strike Brigades (SDSR 15)

Post by Caribbean »

@Whitelancer
whitelancer wrote:My post above was about a generic deployment
Of course - a completely different kettle of fish to a European deployment. No question.
My point was more that there is massive civilian infrastructure in place in Europe already, that could be readily exploited. Sufficient to support hundreds of thousands of HGV movements a day (almost entirely diesel-powered) and tens of millions of smaller vehicles, many of which are also diesel-powered (driving through France in a petrol-fuelled vehicle used to be great - no queues at the pumps. Diesel - 10 to 20 vehicles queueing). As I noted, there would have to be co-ordination with the suppliers and, as you note, there would need to be significant co-ordination with civilian authorities, in order to keep routes clear of civilian vehicles.
Most motorway service stations might only be able to fill two long vehicles at a time at the retail pumps (so maybe you run the light vehicles through those pumps), but most have separate HGV facilities, capable of filling multiple 40-tonne HGVs simultaneously (I've seen many service stations with 6 or more HGV-only high-speed pumps, some with 10 or more). There are also the commercial-only stations that are focussed on supplying the long-distance trucking community and have facilities to match.
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whitelancer
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Re: Strike Brigades (SDSR 15)

Post by whitelancer »

I have no argument with what your are saying. NATO and the EU are working on the problem of deploying forces to the east, but their is a still a lot of work needed. Perhaps one day we will see a Strike Brigade deploying to eastern Poland or the Baltic States, hopefully as an exercise rather than for real.

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Re: Strike Brigades (SDSR 15)

Post by Lord Jim »

The UK and the rest of NATO need to increase their training and continue to mount exercises to ensure we are able to deploy force east in a timely manner. This must include Brigade sized formations, with a different nation deploying a Brigade as the centre of a Battle Group with other nations providing additional smaller contributions. Without the clearly shown capability to rapidly redeploy forces of this size, NATO will not have the conventional deterrence factor it needs to dissuade opportunistic advances by other nation states.

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Re: Strike Brigades (SDSR 15)

Post by mr.fred »

An interesting alternative take on the Strike Concepts.

https://ukarmedforcescommentary.blogspo ... e.html?m=1

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Re: Strike Brigades (SDSR 15)

Post by Lord Jim »

By far the best article I have seen on the subject, raising many points I agree with and have tried to make myself in the "future form of the Army" thread. What we need "Strike" to be and what we are likely to get are miles apart with the latter being non viable in any peer conflict.

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Re: Strike Brigades (SDSR 15)

Post by J. Tattersall »

Militaries are often accused of being prepared to fight the last war.

One might well ponder whether the strike versus traditional (armoured) brigades debate is an example of how societies actually prefer their militaries to stick with the comfort blanket of being able to fight the last war.

While the resources available to execute the strike concept might not be what one would ideally like, I personally find the concept cogent and the plan acceptable, particularly when viewed from a whole army perspective of modernising heavy armour (Challenger 3 with L55 gun, Warrior 2 with 40mm CTA cannon); investing in new medium capabilities (Ajax with 40mm CTA, Boxer); providing protected mobility for lighter forces (MRVP); and acquiring a 155mm replacement for AS90 etc.

Strike might be a risk, but so is all warfare, and if one doesn't do something different then we'll fade away as a nation. It is of course entirely legitimate to differ, but in doing so one might wish to consider whether the alternatives represent the comfort blanket of the status quo ante. One cannot be paralysed by the fear of criticism into the inaction of doing the same old thing. I just think one needs to finally break the cycle.

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Re: Strike Brigades (SDSR 15)

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I concur with the above. A historical parallel is an experiment, not of design, but thrown together in great haste; note lots of firepower in the hands of infantry, to help to hang onto important jump off points/ logs nodes. And lots of recce, so as to establish what to do next.

" The 5th Light Division was a makeshift division built in piecemeal fashion from available units. It was not organized like the previous light divisions used in the Polish Campaign and was called a light division because it had a regiment of tanks but lacked enough pieces to qualify as a full panzer division. The 5th Panzer Regiment was sent from the 3rd Panzer Division but only after its 37mm armed Pz III’s were traded in for 50L42 armed tanks. The infantry component was composed of two machine gun battalions put together in a provisional regiment (zbV 200). The artillery was only half a regiment. The 3rd Recon Battalion and 33rd Anti-Aircraft Regiment were also provided by the 3rd Panzer Division. "

Extracted from a piece by Greg Moore on gregpanzerblitz.com (September, 2008)
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Re: Strike Brigades (SDSR 15)

Post by Lord Jim »

As an idea, "Strike" has plenty of positive aspects, but as the article said, in fact both articles, it is the execution where the problems start to manifest. For the Brigades to act as a screening force for the remainder of 3rd (UK) Division or other NATO assets, it is starting from the wrong location, and their components are even widely dispersed within the UK, unlike how the Brigades that were part of the BOAR which were collocated in the same garrison. Even if they were to get into position, the needed to run relays with our limited number of heavy and medium transporters would cause serious delays from getting the second "Strike Brigade into theatre and getting the first of the Armoured Infantry Brigade there considerably more.

The lack of firepower in the "Strike" Brigades themselves and the total inadequacy of our Fires capabilities also make the implementation of the "Strike" idea untenable. Russian Recce formations for example will totally overmatch the Components of a "Strike" Brigade, and with their greater access to ISTAR assets could in theory isolate and neutralise the individual dispersed units before they could consolidate into a meaningful size, bring superior Fires down on them as well as engaging them directly.

To implement the "Strike" idea requires substantial resources to establish the "Strike Brigades with a viable order of battle and modernise and re equip the Armoured Infantry. The Army must as a equal or higher priority modernise its Fires capability and expand its ISTAR assets and capabilities, again requiring additional resources. But for all this to work the Army must also increase its budget for training as well as increase its stores of munitions and spares. Yet again more resources are needed.

At present there seems little chance of new money being allocated to the MoD let alone the Army and whilst the service may be able to free up resources by rejigging certain contracts and reducing existing operating costs, this will fall far short of the resources needed.

Should we look to change the focus of our land contribution to NATO? May be we should move away from aiming to ab able to reinforce its eastern Borders and look more to concentrate of supporting it Northern flank? Or should we look to move forces back into mainland Europe, stationing a full "Strike Brigade in Poland or eastern Germany together with preposition equipment for an Armoured Infantry Brigade?

At the moment the Army is trying hard to bang a square peg in a round hole whilst try to convince itself that it will fit if you keep telling yourself it will. Its senior management need to take a step back, look at what they actually need to achieve this goal and focus on developing a comprehensive argument to support a request for the necessary resources, or accept the goal in unattainable and develop a force structure that is affordable and make its limitations known to the powers that be.

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Re: Strike Brigades (SDSR 15)

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Lord Jim wrote:As an idea, "Strike" has plenty of positive aspects,.
Don't see any. Even the name is misguiding- Strike, against who? Russians? Chinese? Talibans? Armoured brigades aren't for "Strike"?
Without tanks and artillery "Strike" brigades are useless. :thumbdown:
Fortune favors brave sir, said Carrot cheerfully.
What's her position about heavily armed, well prepared and overmanned armies?
Oh, noone's ever heard of Fortune favoring them, sir.
According to General Tacticus, it's because they favor themselves…

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Re: Strike Brigades (SDSR 15)

Post by J. Tattersall »

Two fundamental questions come out of this discussion:

1) If strike its such a bad plan then why are professional army officers, supported by a world leading operational analysis capability in DSTL, and with access to American data and thinking, doing it ?

2) With exactly the same financial and human resources what other options, that would be better, are available ?

I expect that the answer to 1) is that with access to more comprehensive, and likely sensitive, information not available on the public domain that their strike plan is seen by the army as compelling and that this answer to 1) combined with a seriously hard look at detailed cost data leads them to the conclusion that 2) is either non-viable or delivers less good outcomes than strike.

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Re: Strike Brigades (SDSR 15)

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J. Tattersall wrote:1) If strike its such a bad plan then why are professional army officers, supported by a world leading operational analysis capability in DSTL, and with access to American data and thinking, doing it ?
The answer would be instructive, I’m sure. In a similar vein, and possibly with a similar answer, we could ask why a previous cohort of professional officers, operational analyst et al were so convinced by FRES?
Perhaps, some day in the future, FRES will be regarded as visionary and ahead of it‘s time. I have a different view.
J. Tattersall wrote:2) With exactly the same financial and human resources what other options, that would be better, are available ?
From which starting point?
Going back two decades, avoiding FRES and spending the money on upgrading the AFV fleet in a more incremental way.
Back 1 decade, avoiding FRES and instead building up a wheeled mech inf formation
Back five years? Look to invest in a low cost version for the mechanised infantry. Possibly using Mastiff with a modular armour fit as an interim platform? Contracting ABSV (turretless Warrior) to replace FV430 series vehicles? A cheap 8x8 ( I’ve always favoured the Patria AMV) or something like the Thales Bushmaster as a longer term solution?
From where we stand now? I think we have fewer options, but the most important thing is that we should be realistic. If we want dispersed operations supported by artillery, then we need to make sure that we have that artillery, rather than posting our hopes on “AI” and “UAS” “future ATGW” and whatever other Buzzwords we happen to have at any given moment. If we want our OODA loop to be inside the enemy’s, then we need to invest in the radios and data handling and training needed for that. We need the logistics support to make it possible. We need a realistic view of what we are going to be able to achieve.

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Re: Strike Brigades (SDSR 15)

Post by ArmChairCivvy »

mr.fred wrote:Going back two decades, avoiding FRES and spending the money on upgrading the AFV fleet in a more incremental way.
That would have been regeneration, rather than transformation. The easy option, go along with what was/ is taught in the classes to make it to the level of "HQ workings".
mr.fred wrote:Back five years? Look to invest in a low cost version for the mechanised infantry. Possibly using Mastiff with a modular armour fit as an interim platform? Contracting ABSV (turretless Warrior) to replace FV430 series vehicles? A cheap 8x8 ( I’ve always favoured the Patria AMV) or something like the Thales Bushmaster as a longer term solution?
Not a bad option, to have a working "military" while the "transformation" is being planned and experimented
... Mastiff and the support fleet, to make them work (don't know what the horizon for that was, as here we are talking mechanics , rather than doctrine) needed a £400m investment, after the net settlement with the Treasury, to take what they had paid for, as a one-off, into the 'permanent' fleet
mr.fred wrote: If we want dispersed operations supported by artillery[of any and all kinds], then we need to make sure that we have that artillery, rather than posting our hopes on “AI” and “UAS” “future ATGW” and whatever other Buzzwords we happen to have at any given moment. If we want our OODA loop to be inside the enemy’s, then we need to invest in the radios and data handling and training needed for that. We need the logistics support to make it possible. We need a realistic view
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Re: Strike Brigades (SDSR 15)

Post by mr.fred »

ArmChairCivvy wrote:That would have been regeneration, rather than transformation. The easy option, go along with what was/ is taught in the classes to make it to the level of "HQ workings".
Seeing that most of the abortive programs across the world can be attributed to trying to achieve transformation rather than regeneration, that sounds like an exceptional argument for a regenerative approach.

If, for the sake of example, we’d ended up with Stormer replacing CVR(T), Warrior 2000 in place of Warrior, some midlife updates for Challenger2 and AS90 and some kind of wheeled vehicle (probably Boxer, but even SEP), would we be in a worse place than we are now?

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Re: Strike Brigades (SDSR 15)

Post by ArmChairCivvy »

Back five years? Look to invest in a low cost version for the mechanised infantry. Possibly using Mastiff with a modular armour fit as an interim platform? Contracting ABSV (turretless Warrior) to replace FV430 series vehicles? A cheap 8x8 ( I’ve always favoured the Patria AMV) or something like the Thales Bushmaster as a longer term solution?


Not a bad option, to have a working "military" while the "transformation" is being planned and experimented
I guess I have to restate (more clearly) that
1. having got one transformation wrong, it does not remove the need to achieve "another", but
2. inevitably (because of the wasted money and years) will need a longer time horizon than what might be desired
3. therefore, to keep the formations you've got in "working condition" for that 'meanwhile'
4. one might need to make marginal investments, of which mr. fred had a good list (and I just further quantified with the £400 million, how to get between half a thousand and thousand vehicles with which to manage the obsolescense of other fleets... again in the meanwhile. Doesn't mean that the ones not fit for purpose in likely scenarios shouldn't be ruthlessly discarded - as was done.
Ever-lasting truths: Multi-year budgets/ planning by necessity have to address the painful questions; more often than not the Either-Or prevails over Both-And.
If everyone is thinking the same, then someone is not thinking (attributed to Patton)

J. Tattersall

Re: Strike Brigades (SDSR 15)

Post by J. Tattersall »

I've just had a look again at the 2015 SDSR white paper. Nowhere does it mention 2,000km self-deployment for Strike brigades.

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Re: Strike Brigades (SDSR 15)

Post by ArmChairCivvy »

A lot of the text in SDSRs is general waffle (as it is meant to stand for five years ;) )
- you'll have to go back to the printed version of the 1998 Paper, and you'll find concrete force packages in the appendices
- this was the time when the sitting Gvmnt was in the awe of McKinsey. I would seem to be able to :) recognise the 'handwriting' ... and as I expected, they turned out to be totally inadequate when the type of missions described turned up in the real world

Here the statements that seem to be bothering some have been traced:
"It is the author’s belief that the British Army has done a poor job in explaining what Strike is about. In the Chief of the General Staff’s words, it is a formation able to not just self deploy over land on distances of 2000 km, but to disperse and regroup rapidly in a vast battlespace to dominate ground and population in a new way. Elsewhere it is said that it will “enable manoeuvre at the Divisional level”, but it is hard to say what this means in practice. Considering that forming the Strike Brigade means leaving the armoured infantry brigades without reconnaissance cavalry, the suspicion is that, within the divisional construct, the Strike Brigade would be a recce and screening asset, exploiting its mobility. This is reinforced by the Army’s position that the default “warfighting division” will deploy with two armoured brigades and one strike brigade."
https://wavellroom.com/2017/11/02/strik ... a-problem/

What bothers me more than any of the above is the preceding statement:
" Strike will take away one infantry battalion; all the cavalry regiments mounted on Ajax and even one of the three remaining regular MBT regiments, leaving the remaining armoured brigades much smaller and effectively incomplete, with a large gap in the reconnaissance role."
Considering that the roll out plan (around 2015... note the year: before many things were changed) for Ajax, originally, was to get it to all regular recce rgmnts quickly, and this was to be done by one squadron having them and every two squadrons remaining light.
- for the " the default “warfighting division” will deploy with two armoured brigades and one strike brigade" option not to become the only option, two regmnts of the planned kind should be backfilled into the remaining AI bdes ASAP; 'on the double would not befit cavalry' I guess
Ever-lasting truths: Multi-year budgets/ planning by necessity have to address the painful questions; more often than not the Either-Or prevails over Both-And.
If everyone is thinking the same, then someone is not thinking (attributed to Patton)

Lord Jim
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Re: Strike Brigades (SDSR 15)

Post by Lord Jim »

In principal only establishing one "Strike" Brigade would allow each Armoured Infantry Brigade to be reinforces by both a Ajax "Recce/Cavalry" Regiment and a Boxer "Mechanised" Infantry Battalion, giving it integral recce capability and reinforcing its infantry content.

But what is essential is that the Army must get to grips with its implementation of the "Strike" concept, accept the numerous limitations its current plans have and look to rectify them, finding the resources both internally and by making the case for additional resources.

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ArmChairCivvy
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Re: Strike Brigades (SDSR 15)

Post by ArmChairCivvy »

Lord Jim wrote:only establishing one "Strike" Brigade would allow each Armoured Infantry Brigade to be reinforces by both a Ajax "Recce/Cavalry" Regiment
I would not look at this as an EITHER-OR, but rather a matter of how to set the timeline
- what I am reading from delivery schedules, we won't be seeing the 2nd Strike Bde before 2026 (if even then).
- start to run the Ajax line hot, and maintain a minimum of 3 bdes that can be rolled out as a warfighting division WHILE also fulfilling the long-standing (though by now challenged) definition of brigade being the smallest formation capable of all-arms warfare (= NET manoueuvre warfare, but certainly a precondition for effectively taking part).
Ever-lasting truths: Multi-year budgets/ planning by necessity have to address the painful questions; more often than not the Either-Or prevails over Both-And.
If everyone is thinking the same, then someone is not thinking (attributed to Patton)

J. Tattersall

Re: Strike Brigades (SDSR 15)

Post by J. Tattersall »

Hang on though, it's not so many years ago that armoured brigades had no integral formation reconnaissance regiment. Formation reconnaissance was rather held at the divisional level (indeed even artillery regiments were held at the div level). And surely although armoured cavalry (as formation recce is now called) is under the Strike brigade commander, the div GOC retains opcom and can prioritise as he sees fit, which can include re-assigning opcon/ tacon of some or all of the armoured cavalry to the armoured infantry brigade commander or using it directly as a div level collect asset.

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