UK Defence & Aerospace Industry - General News & Discussion

[bobp]

Well for me the Scorpion is low cost, by that I mean low cost to run. It has the ability to carry a weapons load. and its internal weapons bay can be used for ISTAR roles. In an ISTAR role it could be used for maritime surveillance as well as intelligence gathering. Also can be used for training fleet air defences.

[dmereifield]

Well for me the Scorpion is low cost, by that I mean low cost to run. It has the ability to carry a weapons load. and its internal weapons bay can be used for ISTAR roles. In an ISTAR role it could be used for maritime surveillance as well as intelligence gathering. Also can be used for training fleet air defences.

Thanks. Running costs for the Scorpion are easy to find, but do you have such figures for the T2 (or any Hawk class)? It seems that other variants of the Hawk, used by other operators, have weapons carrying capability (possibly ISTAR too?) - I wonder if the difference in operational costs is substantial, and worth paying in order to obtain the additional capabilities you mention. It would appear that the cost of the aircraft themselves are pretty similar.

I fully agree with you and RS on the Red Arrows thread, the Red Arrows should use a British aircraft to promote UK plc. However, it hardly helps to promote the Hawk (or any other aspect of UK plc) if we forgo new Hawk orders in favour of the Scorpion

[bobp]

I agree with what you say, also on the Red Arrows thread RS mentions the Dart. Although that is just a concept at the moment. Another problem is that there are a lot of overseas manufacturers who are capable of producing trainers. But on the whole the Hawk T2 appears to be favourite.

[dmereifield]

http://www.janes.com/article/65622/gkn- ... eovil-site

GKN closing Yeovil facility, sucks....

[bobp]

Yep that sucks, but with no UK Helicopters forthcoming, and the Apache contract going to Boeing, would not surprise me to see Westlands cutting back. Trouble is these are highly skilled jobs being lost.

[ArmChairCivvy]

Came across a research paper by an institute in Brittany that I haven't come across much.

They start by munching on the reasons why the BAE-EADS merger was scuppered (I resisted the temptation to put this under BAE as there seem to be quite entrenched opinions there; and this is wider, anyway):

" we have seen vertical integration between companies in the same country (British aerospace / GEC in the United Kingdom, Thyssen Krupp / Atlas Electronik in Germany, Dassault aviation / Thalès / DCNS in France ...). which reinforces the national identity of the entities thus created and runs counter to the creation of a genuinely European industrial base."

More specifically "Patrick Boissier, CEO of DCNS recently pointed out, that there are five frigate programs, three or four submarine programs and two torpedo programs in Europe? "

" European countries share only one-fifth of their purchases of equipment and, worse still, they realize only one-eighth of their joint R & D effort, which does not bode well for the years to come in terms of mutualisation ..."
- the 1/5 presumably also counts in joint purchases from the outside (read: USA)
- whereas the piss-poor 1/8 means that while the R&D results and the continuation of teams that would otherwise dissipate surely make great contributions to later, national programmes, it is not only the start and restart wasting financial resources, but easily a decade to the ISD realisation, too

Bottom line:
" the basis of consolidations, [ie. within borders] on a national basis, homogenisation of profile of these companies. By combining the national competencies of their field, they are more than ever similar to each other in terms of skills and trades."

So let us leave the dilemma for solving here:
"On the one hand, the industry is in danger of collapsing to the point where it will no longer be able to develop future generations of equipment. However, without a solid industrial base, there is no decision-making autonomy and action that can be envisaged.
On the other hand, it is conceivable that companies will engage in repositioning with non-European partners if negotiations or the environment prove too difficult between European partners."
... or is there a third way?
- once each piece of advanced kit is as expensive as satellites are (with their associated launch costs), may be "the success of the industrial model of the European Space Agency [is] based on a specialization around centers of excellence at European level" can be replicated?

Key question: is this approach more compatible with the sovereignty of States than not having a defence industry to speak of?

[Frenchie]

From the same institute.

Since the Lancaster House treaties in 2010, France and the United Kingdom have sought to strengthen their cooperation in order to overcome budget constraints and preserve their industrial bases of defense. This rapprochement appears quite logical. Together, our countries represent a large part of the defense effort in Europe.

According to the European Defense Agency (EDA), France and the United Kingdom together accounted for 44% of European military spending in 2012. However, they weigh heavily on capabilities. With more than € 23 billion in equipment purchases, they account for more than 52% of investments. Their weight is even greater in the preparation of the future. Indeed, they assume three quarters of the R & D effort.

It seems therefore natural that France and the United Kingdom should seek to strengthen their bilateral cooperation, especially since they share the same level of international commitment and comparable approaches to defense missions. The Lancaster House treaties are aimed at strengthening interoperability and the capacity for joint action as well as consolidating industrial bases on a bilateral basis.

However, progress is uneven. Operational cooperation has deepened considerably, which makes sense since nearly 40% of the deployed European forces are French or British. Joint efforts in Libya or British logistics support in Mali and the Central African Republic illustrate this common effort. Conversely, capacity and industrial cooperation seems to be progressing more slowly.

Bilateral studies include the air combat system of the future and a demonstrator of anti-mine drone. In April, France and the United Kingdom launched the light anti-ship missile program for 600 million euros. In the land domain, on the other hand, there is nothing concrete.

However, these projects are far from being enough to create a rationalized common industrial base based on mutual dependencies and allowing the armies to access an acceptable cost to equipment designed with a strategic autonomy. Cooperation on major systems, which is essential to meet the medium-term capacities challenges and to promote the integration of industrial bases, is still a long way off.

As soon as it is approached, hard points appear. As Laurent Collet-Billon, Director General for Armaments, pointed out in to the National Assembly, the full review of the possibilities for future collaboration on SSBN has given no results, apart from the possibility of cooperation on some equipment, it would cover only 1% of the ship.

However, it is in major systems, often the most expensive in terms of maintenance, that mutualisation gains can be significant. Advances have been made in missiles. It is now necessary to tackle the other key areas: satellites, land vehicles, ships, helicopters ... and above all to the mutualisation of support. The stakes are considerable because the support represents up to 70% of the total cost of possession of the materials.

It's unrealistic for me when I read your remarks, but in the distant future, I do not know ?

Of course I have nothing to sell.

[ArmChairCivvy]

Cooperation on major systems, which is essential to meet the medium-term capacities challenges and to promote the integration of industrial bases, is still a long way off.

- yes; and pity about PA2

Bilateral studies include the air combat system of the future and a demonstrator of anti-mine drone. In April, France and the United Kingdom launched the light anti-ship missile program for 600 million euros.

- I lost the link to the original I was quoting from, but remember that the Institute is somewhere in Brittany. This particular article I had not even seen, probably because that April above must be a few years back (considering which project has its start quoted)

Anyway, the statistics (from then) are quite impressive:

According to the European Defense Agency (EDA), France and the United Kingdom together accounted for 44% of European military spending in 2012. However, they weigh heavily on capabilities. With more than € 23 billion in equipment purchases, they account for more than 52% of investments. Their weight is even greater in the preparation of the future. Indeed, they assume three quarters of the R & D effort.

However, progress is uneven. Operational cooperation has deepened considerably, which makes sense since nearly 40% of the deployed European forces are French or British.

above all to the mutualisation of support. The stakes are considerable because the support represents up to 70% of the total cost of possession of the materials.

- that 70 might apply in a steady state (like in the US forces); whereas in the UK there are so many new & major projects on the go at the same time that the initial procurement costs have (as a snapshot, per year) been from low to high forties as a percentage of the total - support and upgrades making up the residual from the 100%. Now, we can only hope that the promises of growth margin having been designed in are true for Ajax, F-35, T-26, the QEs (and the reactors for the subs)! If things pan out the "old way" that 70% will make sure that future procurement and the mere renewal of the kit of all of our Armed Services will feel the pinch.

[ArmChairCivvy]

Here is an interesting additional angle, put by someone who works within the (US) FMS administration:

"unlike the Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) process, the FMS program has nothing to do with business, or profit. FMS is done solely to support the foreign policy objectives listed above, and generated a total of $47.09 billion in FY2015 sales alone. While it is true that U.S. taxpayer money can be injected into the sales process to further these objectives ($11.73B in FY2015), approximately 75% of the FMS sales last year helped accomplish U.S. foreign policy objectives using foreign monies - while also helping our security partners become providers, vice consumers, of regional security resources. 100% of a successful foreign policy tool using only 25% investment. That is a great return on investment. As a foreign policy tool, FMS is hard to beat."

That 25% often relates to cases where the alternative is greater direct presence by US forces - not cheap!

But what is left unmentioned is that both the 75% and the 25% significantly cut the unit prices (distributing fixed csts, R&D inclusive) that US forces themselves are paying
- so the National Champions in Europe (and the Gvmnts who saw it fit to create them) are playing more the DCS than the FMS game; hence it is akin to throwing the dice (as for long-term outcomes; export support in the UK was assigned for a few years to the MoD who know (supposedly) what they are talking about as they are buying the same stuff, but then switched away again - no one ever told the public why?)
- outcome: high unit prices for the domestic buyer and reluctance by the supliers to absorb any risks, so what do we get? Someone here stated that £1.5 bn has been spent on a ship class where the first steel is still to be cut; in the summer (allegedly; have to be careful not to spread fake news)

[Caribbean]

RRS David Attenborough seems to be coming along nicely

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-41098540

An interesting point about the main diesels being double-rafted to reduce noise (I read elsewhere that it meets the DNV Silent R standard for radiated underwater noise)

Maybe it is possible to build a quiet ship for less than £200m

[ArmChairCivvy]

- outcome: high unit prices for the domestic buyer and reluctance by the supliers to absorb any risks, so what do we get? Someone here stated that £1.5 bn has been spent on a ship class where the first steel is still to be cut

- just noticed this one again; since posting it we know about the £3.7 for three... so is it really (3.7 minus 1.5)/ 3?
- so there is the unit price (for an extended production run of T26) that the T31 will have to beat by a clear margin

"we" might be able to it, as VARD is a Fincantieri company and Babcock is well positioned to leverage their design expertise and fairly recent experiences with another class meeting many similar requirements
- Fincantieri was elbowed out from giving such design support for building the tankers i the UK (allegedly, the press articles on that not so distant history have been linked to these pages... with the vehement denials that any such bid could ever have been possible)

[Defiance]

Anybody else interested to see what comes out at DSEI?

[jonas]

Harland and Wolff prefered bidder for FIPASS upgrade:-

https://www.harland-wolff.com/news/deve ... ty-project