Pseudo wrote: ↑05 Dec 2021, 12:40
I'd think that the Kinmen and Matsu Islands would be relatively easy to pick off given their proximity to mainland China, however do they even need to bother? Given the disparity in forces wouldn't it be easier to suppress intervention from the outlying islands and mop them up once the main island had been conquered?
It depends which sources you read. Some paint a picture that these are islands which, with suitable warning, could be heavily fortified to deal significant damage to any invasion forces or local marshalling areas. The majority of the dockyards are well within artillery range and could put forward a devastating barrage. The islands are largely granite which has been heavily tunnelled and is able to house more men when required.
Arguably from a map perspective they could be avoided, but the devastation they
could pose means they couldn't be avoided. Whatever men/equipment are used to assault those islands are resources that have to be diverted away from the main attack. Additionally, clearly the assault of those islands would indicate a more solid intention to attack Taiwan - a potentially very nasty tripwire.
Pseudo wrote: ↑05 Dec 2021, 12:40
Absolutely, that's why I think that they can only really take the chance of doing it while the US is distracted in other theatres. If US and allied forces and leaders are concentrating on Ukraine and Korea then they can only provide limited attention and deterrence in response to a Chinese build up.
Yeah, I think you're spot on here. Alone either NATO or other allies can make the resulting cost not worthwhile, but together it becomes significantly more challenging. I must admit I had contemplated maybe Britain's role in a global war might be taking over a USN carrier group's responsibilities in the Med/Gulf and allow another task force to head east. That might be more effective than a British CBG, albeit less valuable politically.
It should be noted that the US' defence position used to be to scaled to defeat two major powers simulatenously, this has since been reduced to 'defeat one while resisting another', or words to that effect.
Pseudo wrote: ↑05 Dec 2021, 12:40While I agree that there are very many overwhelmingly good reasons why it would be a terrible idea for China to invade Taiwan, I'm convinced that the current leadership is committed to reunification one way or another and sooner rather than later. Baring in mind that it looks a lot like China is heading toward social and economic difficulties in the not too distant future, I think that a great patriotic war would look pretty appealing to them, especially if they can engineer a situation where other conflicts distract Taiwan's allies.
I'm in agreement here as well, it's definitely within their strategic view as an objective. What i'm hoping to achieve in this thread is to try break the idea that a Taiwan invasion would be either sudden or able to be achieved with strategic surprise. I think the actual operational challenge of successfully invading Taiwan is a bit underestimated in certain areas. It's considered by some (from my perspective, not specifically here but many places) a fait accompli and pretty much a done deal.
In my opinion, a Taiwan invasion is likely 10+ years away while their navy expands and becomes more confident, their air forces develop into a mature 5th generation force, and their army/amphibious forces become more competent at planning and conducting an amphibious assault on such scale.
Of course as you say, it is certainly possible that some forseen or unforseen scenario forces their hand. Arguably such a move would be a mighty gamble by the PLA considering if they fail, it could cause the collapse of their system of government. Sort of what happened to Galtieri in '82.
Pseudo wrote: ↑05 Dec 2021, 12:40It's also worth remembering how vital Taiwan is to China's goal of regional strategic supremacy. Taiwan gives them direct access to the deep Pacific which means that they can have a credible second strike nuclear capability rather than one that's constantly stalked by Japanese SSK's.
It certainly does, moreover it gives them a strategic hold over Japan who relies on the straight for the vast majority of its imports. Something like 90% of her petroleum imports and 99% of her mineral imports pass through the strait, overall some 500 million tons of shipping. It's for these reasons that the PLA believe should something happen with Taiwan, it would be very difficult for Japan to sit on the sidelines if not impossible.
China similarly has a massive amount of shipping pass through the strait, so for those same reasons around strategic security that could drive Japan to become involved in a regional conflict cause China to see the benefits of securing Taiwan.
Part of their desire to secure Taiwan is drawn from their own political paranoia. Merely 100 miles from the mainland is another 'China' showcasing how a democratic version of their country
might look like. It's easy to understand how that might make the CCP uneasy having such a model prosper within spitting distance of them.