Key take-aways.
Politics:
The idea makes sense from the RN’s perspective and is good politics because MRSS is not yet a funded programme. By involving another nation it makes it more likely it will become a programme of record. Withdrawal from a bilateral endeavour is more politically embarrassing than it would be to quietly cancel a UK-only project. The politicians currently running defence are unlikely to be around when the tough decisions have to be made and it looks good for now to be signing up for more cooperation with one of our closest NATO partners, whatever happens in future.
. Gives security to the RN.
. Politically irrelevant to the conservative party, as the likelihood is that they won't be around to pay the bill.
Both the Royal Marines and the Dutch Korps Mariniers are reconfiguring their commando forces to operate in smaller, more agile, dispersed and highly networked teams.
As the two nations are both at a similar stage in considering how to replace amphibious vessels ....
Putting the cynicism about political motives aside, this is also a sensible and practical idea that could benefit both nations.
. The deal makes sense.
It should be noted this is only a letter of intent to explore the options and there is not yet any binding commitment to detailed design work or joint procurement.
. Not the full 5 miles yet.
Something of a complication is the RNLN desire for the programme to encompass the replacement for their 4 large OPVs of the Holland class, built 2010-11. There does not seem to be a great deal of synergy between the very different capabilities and size of an OPV and an LPD, other than possibly cost-savings derived from a common hull. The project is known as LPX in the Netherlands and, like the UK, their requirement is for a total of 6 ships.
. Problems with the RNLN direction.
. LPX method may be perverse of logic.
Joint development of warships with the UK’s European partners does not have a good track record. The last attempt was the Common New Generation Frigate (CNGF) programme which the UK abandoned in 1999 to design the Type 45 destroyers alone as Italian and French requirements proved to be too divergent from RN needs. Developing a ship together from scratch is quite a different scenario to selling an existing platform design to another nation for customisation as in the case of the Type 26 and Type 31 frigates.
. Woes from history.
[/quote]The advantages of cooperation would be to spread the design cost and the economies of scale when using the same components such as propulsion machinery for potentially up to 12 ships. It is important to note that there cannot be too much deviation in outfitting a common hull otherwise the costs start to rise and the advantages are lost. [/quote]
The longer-term benefit of a common platform would be shared operating experience, logistic support and ships familiar to two forces that are already used to operating closely and embarking on each other’s amphibious vessels.
Provided this core remains the same, then it should not be too difficult to customise the sensors and light self-defence armament to national requirements.
. Logistical support.
. EOS is valuable .
. Needs to retain strong commonality
At the start of the process, there would need to be firm agreement on the Key User Requirements (KUR) that drive the overall design. This needs to be followed by a very disciplined approach to the detailed design avoiding significant changes being demanded by either party.
There will be a balance to be struck between size, expense and capability. It may be possible to go for a smaller LPD depending on the total force projection requirement. The aim is to have the KURs agreed by both parties by the end of this year.
These will dictate space for troop accommodation, lane-meters for vehicles, hangar capacity and the ship’s displacement.
. KUR hopefully by the end of the year.
The ever-increasing vulnerability of a stationary vessel positioned close to the shore suggests troops, weapons, vehicles and their logistic support will have to travel longer distances from the main assault platform. This in turn suggests greater reliance on helicopters. Albion and Bulwark’s lack of hangar facilities has long been regretted as a major weakness.
Assuming the ambition for Littoral Strike extends beyond light raiding, then heavy equipment and stores will still have to come ashore by boat. A helicopter carrier (LPH) is not the solution and a well dock will remain a key part of the design.
The Landing craft (LCU) will also need to be faster, capable of independent operation over longer ranges and in higher sea states than the slow craft Royal Marines make do with today. Good aviation facilities and a well dock for capable LCUs appears to demand a large ship.
Is is pretty obvious that far more firepower will be needed by any force attempting landing operations than is available to the Royal Marines today. Whether this includes GLMRS / HIMARS type rocket or missile launchers or the facility to launch swarming drones and loitering munitions, some novel approaches will be needed if MRSS and its ship-to-shore connectors are going to be more than warmed-over versions of what is currently in service.
Naval Gunfire Support is likely to decline in importance and is not a role for the LPD anyway but other ways of giving fire support to the troops must be found.
. Increased range for ship-to-shore connectors.
. Need for Strong helicopter handling facilities.
. Well decks are crucial, and will remain a key part of the ships design
. LPH will not be a realistic option
. LCU's will need to evolve.
. large Well deck + large aviation facilities denotes a larger ship
. The need for naval GLMRS or equivalent is abundantly clear.
. Some new stuff is to be needed if we truly want a new methodology.
. NGS is indeed dying.
Provided this core remains the same, then it should not be too difficult to customise the sensors and light self-defence armament to national requirements.
In an ideal world, Sea Ceptor air defence missiles would be fitted but are probably well outside the budget envelope. The BAES/Bofors 40mm Mk 4 shown on the ELLIDA mock-ups and fitted to the Type 31 frigates would seem like an optimum self-defence solution.
It is interesting to note the Thales NS100 4D radar, also the primary and fire-control radar for Type 31, has recently been fitted to HMNLS Rotterdam and Johan De Witt.
. Bofors 40mm for the win.
. NS100 could have strong commonality options.
[/quote]RFA Argus has a Role 3 medical facility with 100 patient beds; comprised of 10 Intensive Therapy beds, 20 High Dependency and 70 general beds. The MoD has stated that future Maritime Deployed Hospital Care (MDHC) capability may not replicate the Argus/PCRS model, rather it may be disaggregated between several MRSS, with an option to re-aggregate into a single ship in time of crisis. Essentially all MRSS will have space allocated for medical facilities that can be reconfigured as needed.[/quote]
. Distributed MDHC system.
In the UK it is more complicated to predict where the ships could be built. The construction of 6 ships displacing anything between 10-25,000 tonnes will demand considerable shipyard capacity and it may involve an industrial consortium. Assuming the FSS project remains on track, then the regenerated Harland & Wolff shipyard at Belfast could be an ideal assembly site for such large vessels.
. Harland & wolff / bacock both are likely contenders.
The official Out of Service Dates (as of 2016) were RFA Mounts Bay (2031), Cardigan Bay (2031) RFA Lyme Bay (2032), HMS Albion (2033) and Bulwark (2034). The precise retirement date for Argus is unclear but she has been extended in service “beyond 2030”.
. OSD's approaching fast.
HMS Bulwark can be expected to serve for a maximum of six years after she emerges from refit in 2024. If she is not decommissioned prematurely, HMS Albion may need another substantial, and potentially expensive refit in order to serve for a few years until MRSS is ready to take over from the LPDs.
Completion of the first ships within 6-7 years to replace the Bay class is possible but modest extensions of service for at least one or two ships of the class may be needed.
. Many ships will need to have LIFEX
The aim is to have the KURs agreed by both parties by the end of this year.
In order to replace these vessels on a timely one-for-one basis then the MRSS project needs to proceed quickly and deliver more than one ship per year. A decision on this multi £billion project is unlikely to be made before the post-election defence review which will probably take place in 2025.
2023-2024 and 2025 key moments that are too soon for comfort.
