Somewhat appropriate here
https://warontherocks.com/2023/01/ameri ... r-ukraine/
Even though the war will continue into next year, and perhaps beyond, it is time to begin assessing longer-term implications for modern warfare, especially in Europe. It is not too early in this age to draw inferences about how the character of warfare is changing. How can NATO and the United States adapt to best ensure Europe’s stability and advance U.S. interests?
There are two major issues in answering this question. The first is the ongoing debate about how shifts in military technology impact the balance between offense and defense. This debate has obvious implications for force structures across the West that should inform NATO’s security posture and investments. The second issue involves the overall balance of power in Europe and how NATO and the United States should be postured to best preserve stability. The implications of these shifts argue against increases in heavy tanks for the U.S. force structure and favor a posture along NATO’s frontier that is defensively oriented. This “hedgehog” approach is part of NATO’s past. An offensive posture that fails to take into account the changing character of warfare is counterproductive to regional stability and U.S. strategic priorities, which are increasingly at risk in Asia.
To be sure, the tank is not dead. U.S. forces have and will continue to employ armor. Clearly Ukraine is making good use of its tanks and could use more advanced models. But for the United States, it’s just not a priority investment for fighting sophisticated peers in high-intensity combat going forward. As Chris Dougherty has noted, the value of marginal investments in this platform over other deficiencies — secure command and control, unmanned aviation, munitions stocks, etc. — is the key question for U.S. force planning. The issue goes beyond bad Russian tactics or tank design, given the proven cost effectiveness of increasingly lethal systems designed to defeat modern armor with top-down munitions or precision fires. Despite their limitations, cuts in armor in Europe or the U.S. Army are not warranted. That said, increased numbers of heavy armor or an expanded permanent U.S. force presence in Europe are not strategically warranted either.
NATO ought to revitalize its modernization plans and reintroduce what Sean Monaghan reminds us was once known as the “hedgehog defense.” Such an approach calls for extensive investment in long-range precision strike systems — including artillery, munitions, unmanned aerial systems, and missile defenses — which favors NATO’s strengths. This should guide NATO’s transformation and the implementation of the Strategic Concept issued in Madrid in 2022, as well as how the U.S. military contributes to the alliance with its unique strengths. This may not reduce Washington’s defense expenditures on the continent much, but it will shape how these resources are allocated. It should also shape the Department of Defense’s design and development priorities beyond this theater for conflict in Asia as well.