The future form of the Army

[Lord Jim]

I suppose there are two trains of thought on that subject, either as said you used a faster firing weapon or one with a programable sensor fused round fired in a short burst as would be done by a CTS40 configured for such work and is what I have proposed for the LAAD platoon within the Boxer equipped Battalions. Such a platform would also have a soft kill system installed specifically to hinder UAV operations and allow a less violent means of disabling UAVs being too nosey.

[RetroSicotte]

I suppose there are two trains of thought on that subject, either as said you used a faster firing weapon or one with a programable sensor fused round fired in a short burst as would be done by a CTS40 configured for such work and is what I have proposed for the LAAD platoon within the Boxer equipped Battalions. Such a platform would also have a soft kill system installed specifically to hinder UAV operations and allow a less violent means of disabling UAVs being too nosey.

Just find land owners who get annoyed by quadcopters and inform them that they can be paid to crew a 40mm cannon shooting them down as much as they want.

AA Battalion recruitment crisis solved.

[ArmChairCivvy]

Fighting dispersed and shooting (if not by a shotgun) at UAVs trying to survey the area
... who will happen to below (esp. in the promoted case of airburst rounds)?

[Lord Jim]

Me be getting very confused by the conversation! Farmers with Shotguns firing programable rounds? Dispersed UAVs looking for pheasants on the farmer's behalf? Worry about someone being hit by a falling pheasant like UAV?

[ArmChairCivvy]

Take the company-level Raven: The plane can fly up to 6.2 miles (10.0 km) at altitudes of appx 500 feet (150 m) above ground level ,but could approach the area of interest at a lesser altitude, to go unnoticed
... now: a 40 mm AB round takes it out; what happens below the point of impact/ destruction?

[Lord Jim]

Lots of small pieces of shrapnel I guess. How dangerous this is I have no idea but friendlies wearing modern body armour should have a fair bit of protection. Then again the standard rounds of most auto cannon are going to have an effect where if the target is hot debris etc. is going to fall from the sky. Think of the 40mm AB as similar to a 40mm Grenade going off. What is the blast radius of that and does the danger zone extend out to say 150m

[Jake1992]

Iv been wondering recently with this discussion on the best route for the army, with the current talk of 2 plus 2 plus 1/2 heavy units would it not be better to scrap the heavy units ( since we’ve got such low numbers ) and got with a 3 strike plus 3 medium tracked.
Have the above 3 plus 3 centred around Boxer and Ajax respectively and incorporate a number of 120mm of each variant to partially make up for the loss of the heavy units.
Could this be seen as a more sensible route consider the size of the UK force along with its very small heavy force and the current lacking in the variants needed to really make the medium or strike forces work properly ?

If the route is taken up and we consolidate around Boxer and Ajax would it also be right to look at these platforms as the base vehicle to replace both sets of SPA and further down the line bridging and engineering platforms ?

I’d like to make clear that I do believe heavy units still have a large place to current warfare, but looking at the current budget and cock handed planing of strike and medium percurment along with current numbers of MBTs Iv started to wonder if there’s a place for them in the UK forces.

[ArmChairCivvy]

If the route is taken up and we consolidate around Boxer and Ajax would it also be right to look at these platforms as the base vehicle to replace both sets of SPA and further down the line bridging and engineering platforms ?

I’d like to make clear that I do believe heavy units still have a large place to current warfare

others hold the same belief, e.g.

[Lord Jim]

That was a very interesting series of presentations, thanks for posting. Here is one O found near by regarding how the British Army see the capabilities needed for the future.

[ArmChairCivvy]

Ohh-no, now I have to move on from 2017... lots to watch.

Anyway, I did some apportioning of artillery assets to standing formations and as Poland is sort of ' front line' their (the plan as not all ahve been delivered yet; left the kit to be replaced out, to compensate):


ARMOURED 2 bdes
STRIKE 1 bde
MECH. INF. 6 bdes,
call that nine and ours 2+2, adding some suitable formations (for manoeuvre warfare) could make it 4.5 = HALF

Embedded in units
82 Rosomak 120 mm mortars
120 Krab 155 mm SPG
75 Langusta 122 mm rocketry

Divisional fires
75 HIMARS, longer ranged & guided
... and quickly wheeled to where ever they might needed, when the actual units are already there:
111 Dana-T 152 mm GOAT

Assuming that the Rosomaks (AMVs, but with a indigenous mortar rather than a NEMO) are embedded at a lower level than a bde, then:
it is 50/50 for both tube and rocket artillery between what is in bdes and what is held at divisional level
120 Krab vs. 111 Dana
75 Langusta vs 75 HIMARS

Taking it to our (future) setup:
60 AS90s taken to Braveheart level
50-60 GOATs
37 HIMARS and 37 of the less mobile but punchier, tracked GMLRS platforms
... leaves open the question what fires will travel with Strike BGs as they fight dispersed? 120 mm have not been mentioned by the Army; Stryker-like direct fire version is not on the menu. Anyway, about 40 of them, makes for 5-10 BGs. Ten sounds high, but the targeted conceptual L(35) BG is only about 500 strong, so two Strike bdes, each of over 5k men. Well, still won't quite give you 10 all-arms BGs

Right, at least a start for this evening

[Lord Jim]

What is becoming clearer from this, with the growing understanding of what we are facing even now, is that the British Army needs additional capabilities but not at the expense of existing conventional ones, greater resilience, and substantial increases in the size of certain capabilities. Some do this can be achieved by using reserves to rapidly increase the resilience of certain capabilities but they will need the hardware immediately available upon call up as there will be little or no warning for things to go from zero to conflict.

The briefing on the capabilities of a Russian Mechanised Brigade, clarified numerous articles I had read in the past about the capabilities that they had and does highlight just how inadequate the existing plans for 3rd (UK) Division are. I do not car how much work is done by trails and research units as to the future shape of the British Army and 3rd (UK) Division in particular, current funding is woefully inadequate to bring it up to the level of capability it needs to be.

We are developing many of the capabilities needed but these are currently consolidated in 6th Division, we need these also imbedded in 3rd (UK) Division allow its component Brigades to be allocated the assets they need to both defend themselves and act offensively against a peer opponent. Areas such as Cyber should stay with 6th Division, but others such as EW need to be also allocated to 3rd (UK) Division for example.

What is also clear is that the indirect fires capabilities at both Brigade and Divisional level within the British Army is totally inadequate. Having an Artillery Regiment as part of each Brigade plus further assets held at Divisional level seems the bare minimum we would need in a future peer conflict as well as the ISTAR assets to greatly reduce the "Sensor to shooter" timeframe. In my opinion this also means that the 81mm Mortar is also no longer sufficient for both Armoured and Mechanised Infantry formation and as a mater of urgency we should be procuring 120mm mortars mounted in what ever platform is to replace the current FV432(m). As for the replacement of the AS-90, can we afford to wait until the next generation of tube artillery systems become available or should we invest now in a 52cal system?

Ground Based Air Defence (GBAD) is an area where we also need to up our game. Land Ceptor is a start but we are buying far two few, only three or four batteries to cover not just the Army's requirements but those for the RAF. We needed a true layered and integrate GBAD for the Army to provide full coverage of 3rd(UK) Division. At the top end we need a system like the US Patriot whilst at the lower end we need and rapid fire autocannon based system to compliment the existing Starstreak, with the former needing a new chassis, ideally the same as that used for the autocannon platform. These systems need to be networked, but also able to operate independently. We can at present, in theory, rely on our allies to provide the top tier capability, but these ay not be networked in 3rd (UK) Divisions GRAD so it would be better for the UK to have the capability at this level that can also be networked with similar systems.

On point that was raised and I likes was the idea of looking at the component Brigades of 3rd (UK) Division and upgrading each when new capabilities, upgrades and equipment became available. Whilst the British Army still needs to replace the vast majority of its AFV fleet as a matter of urgency, platforms like the Boxer will allow upgrades and new capabilities to be readily incorporated, thanks to its modular design, whereas platforms such as Ajax will require far more extensive and costly upgrade paths, even with a spiral development programme in place.

All of this point towards the 3+1 proposal I originally made, with the heavy Armoured Cavalry Brigade, with its Challenger 2 upgrades and Ajax now being seen more as a stop gap until new technology allows the sale role to be carried out by light and more flexible platforms, possibly in the late 2030s or early 2040s, where as the Mechanised Brigades and their Boxer's could continue to evolve well past that date.

[Lord Jim]

Looking at an article in Jane's this week, The Russian Defence Ministry has announced that the Army will receive around 800 new ASV during 2020 including 400 APCs 100 BMP-3s and 120 T-71B3M tanks, though how many of the latter are new and how many have been modernised it does not state. Also included are 35 2S19M" Msta-SM SPH and 30 new MLRS. A separate article states that within these figures the VDV will receive enough new BMD-4M IFV to equip a further two Airborne Battalions.

Now I know these figures should be taken with a pinch of salt, and you may also be asking what has this to do with the future of the British Army, but to put it simply, how man new AFVs do you think the British Army is going to receive during 2020?

[abc123]

but to put it simply, how man new AFVs do you think the British Army is going to receive during 2020?

None?

[ArmChairCivvy]

As for the above
What was the 'sighting' reported on ARRSE?

[J. Tattersall]

I guess there's good news and bad news coming.

The good news is that post - Iraq/ Afhanistan/ IS, Brexit (whether you're a leaver or remainer), Ukraine, SDSR 2010 & 15 experiences, Salisbury and Coronavirus the MoD/armed forces (including the Army) will be absolutely forced to work backwards from working out what is needed to deliver national security (incl hard power), likely being compelled to abandon orthodox legacy thinking, to work out truly what's needed and thus force structures and capabilities. Just buying a newer version of what we've bought before or organising in more or less the same way as previously is unlikely to be the starting point.

The bad news is that if you're into legacy force structures or capabilities (if you like to count the number of battalions, regiments, brigades rather than what they can do) then you're likely to be disappointed. ORBAT spotters who like symmetrical, purist line diagrammes, could be well put out.

Let's see what this results in for the future form of the Army. I suspect that many won't like it, but at the same time we'll likey end up with an Army that's better able to do the jobs the government wants it tho do.

[J. Tattersall]

A very long but interesting new read from RUSI on using (UK) land forces to deter Russia https://rusi.org/publication/occasional ... and-forces

If one accepts its analysis then reconstituting a modernised version of a die-hard armoured division is unlikely to fit the bill with the author recommending forces organised for a semi-permanent forward presence back up by rapid response with significantly less emphasis on heavy land forces.

[Tempest414]

I have no problem with the Army idea of strike brigades however for me we as in the UK still needs to keep its MBT's. How we deploy them is open to new thinking but for me they are still the big stick on the battlefield maybe we could look to have 16 AA and 3 Strike brigades making up the 3rd division and two Armoured brigades , 1 Heavy protected Mobility Infantry brigade and 1 Light infantry brigade making up the 1st Division

[Lord Jim]

Whilst many including Army Generals still wish the UK to have a "Big stick" in the form of heavy armoured formations, the question has to be asked, if they cannot get to where they are needed in time to have an impact are they still relevant? Until the British Army runs a zero notice exercise to move one of our Armoured Infantry Brigade to Poland, the argument is going to continue to rage and the UK will have spent scarce resources in areas which may not actually improve the capability of our Army to counter a threat to NATO or our other Allies.

The idea that the UK should concentrate on the "Strike" concept though in a refined form as well as greatly improved and enlarged Precision Fires seems to be a logical way forward for the UK to develop effective and relevant forces for the future. Where I do not agree is the expanding of the role of the numerous "Light" Infantry units in any significant way. I agree 16 Air Assault desperately need to be overhauled and receive greater resources, and I see it being embedded in 6th(UK) Division which should also be home to the UK's SFG as well as the SF reserves which already reside there.

The issue I have, and have mentioned repeatedly is 1st(UK) Division. As it stands it has little or no value in any peer conflict and is overmanned for other roles. It should remain the home of the majority of our Reserve units, but these should have direct ties to the units that make up 3rtd(UK) Division giving them a sustainment reserve as required. The Infantry Brigades in 1st(UK) Division should have the number of Regular units in each reduced to one or a Regular cadre of Company size being part of each Reserve Battalion. This would allow the disbanding of around eleven Infantry and two Light Cavalry Units which would produce significant personnel savings whist reinforcing the endurance and capability of 3rd(UK) Division.

So this would in my view open the way for 3rd(UK) Division to be reorganised into three "Strike" Brigades, though these would have for greater capability than what is currently envisaged along with an expanded Artillery Brigade, again with far greater capability that what currently exists. If we really must retain any Heavy units, the only ones that have real value would be the Armoured Regiments, but NATO currently has more, better equipped units nearer to a possible threat. Simply keeping these units for national prestige is simply a waste of resources. So 3rd(UK) Division supported by assets form 6th(UK) Division would be our future war fighting capability with 1st(UK) Division providing the reserve and also Garrisons and training teams on a rotational basis as required.

How would this be funded, well the starting point would be the cancellation of Ajax, the Warrior CIP and the Challenger CSP, along with the disbandment of all three existing Armoured Infantry Brigades. Many of these personnel would move to the three "Strike" Brigades being formed and ensure these formations are fully manned. The saving from these cancellations and no longer having the high running costs of the heavy equipment would be in excess of £3.5Bn. This should facilitate the standing up of the first two enhances "Strike" Brigades as well as the recapitalisation of Precision Fires as well as improvements to 16 Air Assault and other units within 6th(UK)Division. In theory after this the costs of equipping the third "Strike" Brigade should be less with the costs of developing any equipment required already accounted for with the first two.

The result will be that the UK should have a force able to deploy up to a Divisional sized formation comprised of Medium Armoured, Air Mobile units and Special Forces with sufficient rapidity to actually make a difference whether as part of a NATO operations of another deployment in support of our Allies. Hopefully the upcoming Integrated Review may get the ball rolling on this.

[bobp]

Some of our questions may shortly be answered here...

https://www.parliament.uk/business/comm ... hed-19-21/

[Tom8]

The idea that the UK should concentrate on the "Strike" concept though in a refined form as well as greatly improved and enlarged Precision Fires seems to be a logical way forward for the UK to develop effective and relevant forces for the future.

Do you think the Strike brigades should abandon the separation between light cav and mechanised infantry units and simply be made up of 4 all arms formations?

There was talk about the army testing out strike formations made up of 8 Ajax and 8 boxer. Therefore, Why not base Each of the the 4 Strike units on three companies Each made Up of 6-8 turreted boxer and 6-8 non turreted boxer with Atgm, plus 2 aa boxers, with a fire support company of long range atgm boxer and 120mm mortar boxer.

[Lord Jim]

Do you think the Strike brigades should abandon the separation between light cav and mechanised infantry units and simply be made up of 4 all arms formations?

Have a look at the very first post on this thread.

[Tom8]

Hi Jim,

Thanks for the reply. I have read your first post and do like your proposal for the mechanised brigades.

I guess I should clarify my last question. Do you think your three MGS cavalry squadrons will act as a single unit, or do you envisage each cavalry unit being attached to a mechanised infantry brigade to form a mechanised battle group? If it is latter, why don’t we give up having separate cavalry and infantry cap badges and have three battle group sized units with a single cap badge?

The fact that both “cav” and “infantry” troops in the battle groups would use the same basic vehicle, means that they only require a single type of vehicle support, unlike a situation where cav is in Ajax and inf in boxer, which could give a reason for having separate unit types.

These strike brigades are meant to be a new way of fighting, not just a new vehicle type, so why not embrace the idea of all arms units at the same time.

In your proposal, recon units are spread between the cav and infantry units, so this would not be lost with all arms units.

If I had a criticism of your mech brigade structure, it would be a lack of recon units. I guess a few more these could be attached directly to brigade HQ.

[Lord Jim]

The Cavalry Regiments are separate from the Mechanised Infantry in a similar way to how the Armoured Infantry Brigades Operate. The Idea is not to form permanent Battle Groups but to allow them to be form these as required to meet the mission profile. I see each Mechanised Regiment forming three Combined arms reinforced Company formations, each of which would then form three reinforced Platoon sized formations, containing multiple capabilities.

With the current plans to increased the capability of the Army's Precision Fires capability I would like to see more Joint Fires platforms at Company level, possibly allowing these to accompany the Platoon groupings. The Precision Fires programme is going to be the key capability that makes the whole "Strike" concept viable, but to do so it must deliver capability above the minimum set and more towards the stretch target. Support from 6th Division is also going to be integral, both in protecting the elements of the "Strike" Brigade from hostile action and aggressively reducing the capability of their opponent.

My big concern though and I keep saying this is that the Army Top Brass have now set their eyes too far into the future and the myriad of new capabilities this will bring to the detriment of what is need now and what must be delivered to he front line within the decade at the latest. Yes we should strive to develop long term capabilities, but we have too many holes in the capabilities we need urgently and these must have the priority. It is these that will form the foundation for those future capabilities.

[military]

Lots of interesting ideas on this thread. Here are some comments and questions after reading through it.

1. No Western European NATO ally is probably currently capable of beating modern Russian motor rifle and tank brigade / divisions / armies. But how are other Western European NATO countries approaching the need to equip and organize to be able to fight Russia? I am thinking France, Germany, Italy and Spain foremost. Poland for obvious geographic reasons thinks of nothing else.

2. Transportation to the front in say Poland or Ukraine is indeed a serious issue for tracked vehicles. But getting to the battlefield before Americans arrive from North America might just get the British forces annihilated. Given how scarce AFVs are in the British Army, maybe politically entire British brigades cannot be sacrificed to buy time for other forces. Maybe Poland needs to hold the line with its four mechanized divisions and its light forces for two months or if not the role of heavy NATO forces (including British ones) will be to reclaim Poland, rather than defend it. No NATO country can stop a surprise Russian invasion of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.

3. A lot of the discussion is about infantry riding around in Boxers. What is the role of APC-riding infantry in fighting Russian mechanized forces with their attached artillery? Say the goal, as mentioned in strategy documents, for 2030 or 2035 is to use sophisticated artillery to overmatch the Russian artillery (good luck!) and then start killing Russian tanks, IFVs and APCs. If artillery is the main weapon used to kill the enemy, does the infantry take up defensive positions to prevent Russian mechanized forces from getting too close to the artillery? Or is the infantry mainly driving around in the APCs scouting for the artillery?

4. The armoured infantry brigades (Warriors and Challengers) do give the British Army a seat at the table in NATO meetings and in meetings with the US Army. Dropping this capacity gives the British Army less strategic heft and political influence. I am not sure how valuable this influence is to the government.

5. The huge capability gap with Russia does indicate that using the AFV budget for the Army to buy F-35s and many more precision munitions for the RAF might help win a war with Russia more. The F-35 is an actual vehicle that does overmatch anything Russia has or will have through 2035.

6. Warrior CSP and Ajax seem underwhelming for a Russian war primarily because of the lack of turret-mounted ATGMs. The Bradley had ATGMs way back in 1982. I wonder if simply adding anti-tank missiles to Warrior and Ajax would change the common perception that these vehicle programs should be cancelled in favor of more Boxer variants?

7. Forward basing UK heavy forces (or just their equipment) in Poland without substantial US forces present to actually win the battle will result in their annihilation, as I mentioned above. It also prevents the British AFVs from being used in Middle Eastern scenarios, which is important as the UK wants influence and to export arms there (although not land vehicles any more).

8. The light infantry and Jackal riding cavalry in the 1st Division do seem like combat forces out of yesteryear. But can these forces be substantially cut? They could be the main responders to renewed trouble in Northern Ireland, to disasters in the UK including attacks with weapons of mass destruction, to riots in the UK, and so forth. These light forces also seem to have surprisingly full calendars of overseas engagements that bring political influence to the government.

9. Finally, an article in the British Army Review cited in this thread briefly mentioned Joint Force 2025 Battlegroups. The Army would go to war with Russia organized in battlegroups. While there is some operational flexibility in forming battlegroups, the use of the term Joint Force 2025 Battlegroups indicates that there is a baseline standard. Does anyone on this forum have details on what these proposed battlegroups look like?

Fun thread!

[J. Tattersall]

Lots of interesting ideas on this thread. Here are some comments and questions after reading through it.

There are of course cogent rebuttals to the nine points you summarise, and indeed rebuttals to the rebuttals, and rebuttals to those etc. etc. I would however add the following for consideration.

a) if Russia is as invincible as some would have you believe then why have its regular forces been fixed in the Donbass conflict for so many years and against a supposedly inferior Ukrainian foe?

b) internet bloggers seem to have a fixation that professional British military officers engaged in capability planning know less about tactics, operations, strategy, acquisition and military organisation than the armchair commentariat; quite possibly the same people who know more about economics than the Treasury and more about medicine than their doctor.

c) Russia follows a pattern of deniable destabilization before limited military interventions. Dealing with its destabilization its quite possibly more effective than simply ejecting its forces after an intervention. This might require rebalancing away from traditional armoured intervention capabilities towards those capabilities that can support a friendly state which its being undermined.

d) Russia spends a lot of effort trying to undermine NATO's political coherence. This suggests NATO is a major obstacle to Russia achieving its aims and suggests allies should even more strongly support the alliance.

e) The propensity for Russia showing off its latest kit such as Armata at military parades etc might suggest it its trying to goad the West into reinforcing force structures designed to thwart a traditional military threat, rather than one which counters its destabilization activities.

f) As a nation Britain's history has varied between being a continental power and being a maritime (i.e. rest of world) one. The tendency is now more towards the latter, but by no means hard over. As such any developments in its forces will need to carefully consider strategic mobility and required speed of response (e.g. light versus heavy forces), operational mobility (ability to travel around a theatre of operations), and tactical mobility (e.g. to what extent are wheeled vehicles useful on ground over which the enemy manoeuvres its tracked vehicles).

g) The balance between close, deep and rear operations. E.g. have we got enough of the right sort of artillery? What are we doing to protect UK political and societal cohesion from Russian destabilization? With a given level of resources what's the implication if we have to rebalance?

h) Over the next decade or so we'll have to think carefully about how to address China. However in the longer term in its thirst for resources it may well look with covetess eyes northward towards Siberia. The Sino-Russian alliance had always been one of convenience and carefully hidden mutual mistrust. Its continuance into the second half of the 21st century should not be taken for granted (admittedly this its likey to be an after Putin moment).