Poiuytrewq wrote: ↑02 Sep 2023, 23:29
wargame_insomniac wrote: ↑02 Sep 2023, 19:57
But this all stems from my "want" to have greater UK ASW capabilities restored in North Atlantic / North & Barents Seas to recover some of our capailities tht were allowed to whither since the end of the Cold War, and thereby the "need" for greater equipment to meet and fullfill these capabailities once again.
Interesting take.
As NATO identifies zones for each member nation to concentrate on it makes sense for the North Atlantic, GIUK and the High North to be the UK’s main maritime contribution along with Norway and Canada. Others disagree but IMO this should be without regular US support, meaning the UK, Norway, Denmark, Netherlands, Germany and Canada should have sovereign capabilities to cover this on a routine basis.
That would allow Sweden, Finland, Poland, Germany and the Baltic states etc to concentrate on turning the Baltic into a NATO lake. It would also allow France, Spain and Italy to concentrate on securing the Mediterranean.
Clearly the scale of the resources available to NATO would allow lots of overlap of reinforcement if required but Euro NATO needs to get organised and sort this now as US attention transfers East.
The US withdrawal from the European theatre could be gradual or abrupt depending on the next administration but for the UK it would be prudent to hope for the former and plan for the latter.
I assume the first thing to do is to list out our overall UK defence priorities, and then how to maximise our contributions to focus on our strengths. To me those priorities are:
1) Defence of UK Territory, both home and BIOTs.
2) Contribution to NATO
3) Working with allies and reginal partners to secure the global Sea Lanes of Control, so that we, as a maritime nation, have a huge dependance on maritime trade for both import and exports.
So for me any "Tilt to Indo/Pacific" means trying to work more with old allies such as Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia and Singapore, whilst also trying to build fresh relationships with new allies such as Japan. Korea, Indonesia and even India (with whom we have had a mixed relationship since independance and Partition).
In terms of defence assets in Indo-Pacific, we have army training range in Kenya and Gurkhas base in Brunei. We have naval bases we can use in Bahrain, Oman, Singapore and Australia. In terms of naval ships we have two OPV's on long deployment to area, and two T31s, one of which would be covering Operation Kipion in Persian Gulf along with MCMV, the other T31 could be based in Oman. I assume the LRG(S) will also be based in Oman which would be Argus plus hopefully a Bay.
We have BIOTs in Carribean and South Atlantic currently covered by an OPV apiece. I would like to resume APT(N) and APT(S) once we finally get back to 19 escorts, so that would be two more T31s. Other than sending a Bay or an LSV to Carribean for HADR in Hurricane season, that is probably enough naval assets to cover what are currently low-intensity. I have said before I would like a 2nd mobile SAM battery and 1-2 mobile anti-ship missile batteries to be sent to Falklands to give increased deterrance against any potential future Argentine agression.
Getting back to NATO area, I agree with you that we should nt be concentrating on either Baltic or Mediterranean given the numbers of NATO nations who should be concentrating on them. So any contribution to these areas would be mainly for RAF or RN, with RN limited to an OPV / occasional contributions to various NATO standing groups.
So that leaves us with what I regard as our core priority: the UK's home waters along with North Atlantic, North Sea and, working with alllies, The High North. Here our key relationships are with Canada, Denmark and Norway.
When we look at USN CSG, they tend to have 4 at sea with often 1 in Med, 1 in Persian Gulf, and 2 in west Pacific (typically 1 in Japan and 1 in Hawaii). Having a UK CSG covering NATO's northern flank is thus one of the key contributions we can make to NATO and US in particular as it allows US to cover other areas.
The RN was always recognised for it's ASW skills in the Cold War. I made note that our capabilities has declined in the four decades since, as multiple governments of BOTH main parties took major peace dividends and reallocated budget to other departments including Health and Welfare etc. Now we are looking at two major Superpower threats - China is too far away for us to make meaningful contribution other than freeing up most US attention to focus on the western Pacific, along with Japan, Korea, Australia and hopefully India.
Now the Russian army and air force has had some mixed results, and the Russian Black Sea Fleet has had some major setbacks, many of them caused by complacency and poorly serviced equipment. But thanks to Turkey closing the Bosphorus, no more Russian ships can enter the Black Sea, and thus Russia's Northern Fleet have been kept out of the fight.
Russia's Northern Fleet was always full of Russia's newest and most dangerous SSN and SSK back in the Cold War as it was their shield for their SSBNs, which often would sit under the Artic ice cap, as well as being an offensive weapon if they could break through the GIUK Gap. I believe that Russia's Northern Fleet remains a significant threat, having been well maintained since the Cold War, with newest SSN supposedly on par with RN Astutes and USN Virginia Class, and then augmented by the Zircon hypersonic cruise missile.
So this is why I regard reinforcing our ASW defences on NATO's Northern flank to be our key contribution we can make to NATO, one in which we are still a positive point of difference, along with our CSG. We still have great quality in the ASW field - our ageing Type 23 Frigate still excel at this in combined NATO missions. Our Astute SSNs are still regarded as amongst the world's quietest. What we starting to feel is the erosion of quantity, the loss of resilience when one of our ships or boats is out of the water in refit / repair / maintenance just pushes the rest of the Fleet straining to cover.
I did nt bother stating all of the above in my previous post as I was trying to stay (vaguely) succint. I don't regard anything I have said to be new or contreversial. I am sure others could argue it more coherently than I. This is simply my attempt to explain my "take" on why we need to regain some of the quantitative mass for what I regard as both a key contribution we can make, and one in which we have a qualitative point of difference.
I specifically referenced in my earlier posts of adding more P8s but have also said several times in RN Escort thread that I would add at least one T26 if possible, accepting that both acquisitions will require sufficent crew and stocks of munitions and spares etc and that all of these require additional annual funds over and above the up front Capital Aqcusition cost.
