The war in Ukraine
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Re: The war in Ukraine
Analysis of the above video - seems pretty clear that in addition to the minesweeper that Russia has admitted to the Ukrainians also managed to hit a modern frigate. No idea as to damage but obviously a strike at the waterline is a serious matter:
(Amusingly the frigate in question replaced the Moskva as the Black Sea flagship. No wonder the Russians have kept quiet! )
(Amusingly the frigate in question replaced the Moskva as the Black Sea flagship. No wonder the Russians have kept quiet! )
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Re: The war in Ukraine
Russians admit damage to the frigates radar and a hole in minesweeper. Saying Brits involved too.
UKr sources claiming the port is blocked.
RU saying terrorism and have cancelled grain agreement
UKr sources claiming the port is blocked.
RU saying terrorism and have cancelled grain agreement
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Re: The war in Ukraine
Must be one hell of an explosion at the waterline that can damage something as high up as the radar mast? I wouldn't be surprised if it has sustained USS Cole levels of damage and perhaps even greater.
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Re: The war in Ukraine
The latest tranche of $275 million US aid to Ukraine, in total $18 billion US aid committed since late February.
* additional HIMARs munitions
* 500 precision-guided 155 mm rounds
* 2,000 155 mm rounds of Remote Anti-Armor Mine (RAAM) Systems
* 125 humvees
* more than 1,300 anti-armor systems
* small arms and more than 2,750,000 rounds of small arms ammunition
* four satellite communications antennas
https://insidedefense.com/insider/dod-s ... ge-ukraine
* additional HIMARs munitions
* 500 precision-guided 155 mm rounds
* 2,000 155 mm rounds of Remote Anti-Armor Mine (RAAM) Systems
* 125 humvees
* more than 1,300 anti-armor systems
* small arms and more than 2,750,000 rounds of small arms ammunition
* four satellite communications antennas
https://insidedefense.com/insider/dod-s ... ge-ukraine
Re: The war in Ukraine
Sometimes it's easy to think of the comparisons between Afghanistan and the Ukraine in terms of commitment of weaponry and expenditure ,the U.S and allies still spent more in Afghanistan than the Ukraine ,the difference mainly is that the allies are not directly fighting ,certainly the Ukrainians seem more determined to fight the Russians than Afghans the Taliban.
That Ukraine has forced Russia to expend vast quantities of munitions in this war and Russia has shown the N.A.T.O these quantities, should be sobering .
That Ukraine has forced Russia to expend vast quantities of munitions in this war and Russia has shown the N.A.T.O these quantities, should be sobering .
Re: The war in Ukraine
There has been a lot of speculation on the Russian casualties and why Russia has not published them or even declared this conflict a war even prosecuting those who claim it is but earlier legislation may provide some answers
https://www.rt.com/russia/262785-russia ... asualties/
In Syria there were also some creative accounting in registering deaths of Russians during that conflict
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mide ... SKBN1CW1LP
https://www.rt.com/russia/262785-russia ... asualties/
In Syria there were also some creative accounting in registering deaths of Russians during that conflict
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mide ... SKBN1CW1LP
Re: The war in Ukraine
Where will they get these missiles from?
Do we have old stocks of these missiles, I am thinking of the mass launch of ASRAAMs recently as they approach the end of their life cycle, might be the same thing.
Do we have old stocks of these missiles, I am thinking of the mass launch of ASRAAMs recently as they approach the end of their life cycle, might be the same thing.
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Re: The war in Ukraine
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-63573387
>> "Special" operation continues to do well for Russia...
>> "Special" operation continues to do well for Russia...
Re: The war in Ukraine
It is still a withdraw rather than full retreat where they leave behind a lot of their equipment, I wonder if the Ukrainians will be able to force a crossing of the Dnipro River, might be a bit harder with all the forces from Kherson along it. Hopefully someone can educate me on this.
Re: The war in Ukraine
I think one of their problems is that they may be rather limited as to what they can withdraw with them. The Antonovskiy road bridge and the road/ rail track across the Kakhovka dam are allegedly both damaged and supposedly only capable of taking light traffic. Not sure what the state of the Antoniv'skyy rail bridge is, but it is only single track, so quite limited. I have seen reports that the Russians are destroying ammunition stocks, rather than let them fall into Ukrainian hands, so I suppose they may well have to destroy their heavy equipment, rather than abandon it for Ukraine to use.Jdam wrote: ↑09 Nov 2022, 20:41 It is still a withdraw rather than full retreat where they leave behind a lot of their equipment, I wonder if the Ukrainians will be able to force a crossing of the Dnipro River, might be a bit harder with all the forces from Kherson along it. Hopefully someone can educate me on this.
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The pessimist sees difficulty in every opportunity. The optimist sees the opportunity in every difficulty.
Winston Churchill
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Re: The war in Ukraine
So far as I know all bridges that would be capable of carrying heavy armoured vehicles or heavily laden lorries from the west bank across the river are damaged to the point of being unusable by that kind of traffic if any traffic at all. A combination of Ukrainian GMLRS / artillery fire and the Russians blowing bridges themselves to cover their retreat (notwithstanding that there are still a great many Russian troops left on the other side). The Russians do have quite a few ferries and barges in operation which were previously being used to ferry personnel, supplies and equipment across in one direction and are now being used to take them back in the other. However, you have to wonder how much longer that will be viable for with Ukraine presumably steadily moving artillery closer to the crossing points.
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Re: The war in Ukraine
Ukraine seems to think the withdrawl is a trap - so they are not rushing in - but will continue with their plans based on intelligence reports.
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Re: The war in Ukraine
Since the above post Ukraine seems to have become confident this is not a trap and are rapidly advancing - many settlements liberated and steadily closing in on Kherson City itself:
I would guess that every location that could be used as a ferry embarkation point (and disembarking point on the other side) is now well within effective range of many, many artillery pieces. If Ukraine plays this right the casualties and POWs could be horrendous - genuinely would not be surprised if this ends with thousands of Russian troops trying to swim the river.
I would guess that every location that could be used as a ferry embarkation point (and disembarking point on the other side) is now well within effective range of many, many artillery pieces. If Ukraine plays this right the casualties and POWs could be horrendous - genuinely would not be surprised if this ends with thousands of Russian troops trying to swim the river.
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Re: The war in Ukraine
Apparently not all the Russians got the message to pull out, it will be interesting to see what they do
Re: The war in Ukraine
https://static.rusi.org/SR-Russian-Air- ... -final.pdf
Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) conducted significantly more extensive fixed-wing strike operations during the first days of the invasion than has been previously documented, while Ukrainian ground-based air-defence (GBAD) capabilities were suppressed by initial attacks.
• During this period, Ukrainian fighter aircraft inflicted some losses on VKS aircraft but also took serious casualties due to being totally technologically outmatched and badly outnumbered.
• Russian fighters have remained highly effective and lethal against Ukrainian aircraft near the frontlines throughout the war, especially the Su-35S with the R-77-1 long-range missile and, in recent months, the Mig-31BM with the R-37 very long-range missile.
• From early March, the VKS lost the ability to operate in Ukrainian-controlled airspace except at very low altitudes due to its inability to reliably suppress or destroy increasingly effective, well-dispersed and mobile Ukrainian surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems.
• Russian GBAD has also been highly effective since March, especially the long- range S-400 SAM system supported by the 48Ya6 ‘Podlet-K1’ all-altitude long-range surveillance radar system.
• Numerous man-portable air-defence systems (MANPADS) provided to Ukrainian troops and later mobile air-defence teams meant that low-altitude Russian fixed-wing and rotary penetrating sorties beyond the frontlines proved to be prohibitively costly during March, and ceased by April 2022.
• Throughout the war, most Russian airstrikes have been against pre-designated targets with unguided bombs and rockets. The Su-34 fleet has regularly also fired standoff missiles such as the Kh-29 and Kh-59 against fixed targets, and Su-30SM and Su-35S fighters have regularly fired Kh-31P and Kh-58 anti-radiation missiles to suppress and target Ukrainian SAM radars.
• Without air superiority, Russia’s attempts at strategic air attack have been limited to expensive cruise and ballistic missile barrages at a much more limited scale. These failed to achieve strategically decisive damage during the first seven months of the invasion. However, the latest iteration is a more focused and sustainable bombardment of the Ukrainian electricity grid, blending hundreds of cheap Iranian-supplied Shahed-136 loitering munitions against substations with continued use of cruise and ballistic missiles against larger targets.
• The West must avoid complacency about the need to urgently bolster Ukrainian air- defence capacity. It is purely thanks to its failure to destroy Ukraine’s mobile SAM systems that Russia remains unable to effectively employ the potentially heavy and efficient aerial firepower of its fixed-wing bomber and multi-role fighter fleets to bombard Ukrainian strategic targets and frontline positions from medium altitude, as it did in Syria.
the medium term, Ukraine needs new fighter aircraft able to meet Russian fighters on more equal terms as soon as possible, especially if providing sufficient ammunition to maintain frontline SAM coverage proves difficult. The enduring threat from Russian long-range S-400 SAMs, especially when cued in by radars capable of tracking them at low altitudes from long ranges such as the 48Ya6 Podlet-K1, is likely to force Ukrainian fighters to operate at low level as part of standard tactics.173 The effective range of air-to-air missiles is inherently tied to launch altitude and speed of both the aircraft firing and its target.174 As such, any new fighter for the Ukrainian Air Force needs to come equipped with a missile capable of offering the greatest possible effective range under low-altitude, subsonic launch conditions. Electronic warfare capabilities to reduce the effectiveness of Russian radars at longer ranges would also be highly beneficial, as would a radar designed to be resilient against the Khibny jamming pods that Russian fighters typically fly with over Ukraine.
Aside from improved air-to-air performance, the main Ukrainian operational priority is for an aircraft capable of operating from dispersed, relatively basic airbases to prevent them being located and rapidly destroyed by Russian long-range missile strikes.175 This entails an ability to be serviced with limited personnel and heavy equipment, and to operate from relatively rough and short runway surfaces. Anti-shipping capabilities are also required.176 Any new fighters also need to be able to generate high sortie rates from both an availability and affordability perspective, since the Ukrainian economy has been devastated by the Russian invasion and new fighters are competing with a huge range of other requirements. As a long-term plan, the Ukrainian Air Force wants to operate a split fleet of a single engine light multi-role fighter and a longer-ranged twin engine fighter for greater air-defence persistence.177 However, in the short term, even a tiny number of modern Western fighters would be a huge boost to Ukraine’s ability to continue deterring the VKS from penetrating its skies.
The decision to supply a Western fighter would inherently be heavily influenced, and most likely ultimately decided, by political factors. In the long term, US-supplied aircraft are likely to form a large part of the Ukrainian Air Force inventory due to political, industrial and financial considerations. However, while Ukrainian airbases are still at high risk of Russian missile strikes, the long, high-quality runways and large hangers with extensive ground support equipment required to operate most US fighters would be difficult to build without being observed and hit. It is worth noting that of the currently available Western fighter aircraft that could possibly be suppled, the Swedish Saab Gripen C/D offers by far the most suitable candidate in terms of operational requirements. It was designed from the outset for ease of maintenance, and can be refuelled, re-armed and given basic maintenance by teams of just six ground crew using two vehicles on small airbases or highways in cold weather.
Moreover, only one of each crew needs to be a highly trained maintainer; the rest can be conscripts or even troops.Conceptually, the Swedish Air Force has always emphasised low-level air superiority tactics from dispersed bases, in a similar manner to how the Ukrainian Air Force currently operates, and so the Gripen was designed with ground support equipment and maintenance requirements compatible with that approach. The electronic warfare suite on the Gripen C/D is also optimised specifically for countering Russian fighter and SAM radars. Other factors that make Gripen particularly suited to Ukrainian operational needs are that it can fire the very long-range European Meteor missile, which, thanks to its ramjet propulsion design, is less adversely affected by being launched from low and slow than traditional rocket-powered missiles such as R-27 or AIM-120 AMRAAM, and Gripen was also designed from the outset with an anti-ship capability.
Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) conducted significantly more extensive fixed-wing strike operations during the first days of the invasion than has been previously documented, while Ukrainian ground-based air-defence (GBAD) capabilities were suppressed by initial attacks.
• During this period, Ukrainian fighter aircraft inflicted some losses on VKS aircraft but also took serious casualties due to being totally technologically outmatched and badly outnumbered.
• Russian fighters have remained highly effective and lethal against Ukrainian aircraft near the frontlines throughout the war, especially the Su-35S with the R-77-1 long-range missile and, in recent months, the Mig-31BM with the R-37 very long-range missile.
• From early March, the VKS lost the ability to operate in Ukrainian-controlled airspace except at very low altitudes due to its inability to reliably suppress or destroy increasingly effective, well-dispersed and mobile Ukrainian surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems.
• Russian GBAD has also been highly effective since March, especially the long- range S-400 SAM system supported by the 48Ya6 ‘Podlet-K1’ all-altitude long-range surveillance radar system.
• Numerous man-portable air-defence systems (MANPADS) provided to Ukrainian troops and later mobile air-defence teams meant that low-altitude Russian fixed-wing and rotary penetrating sorties beyond the frontlines proved to be prohibitively costly during March, and ceased by April 2022.
• Throughout the war, most Russian airstrikes have been against pre-designated targets with unguided bombs and rockets. The Su-34 fleet has regularly also fired standoff missiles such as the Kh-29 and Kh-59 against fixed targets, and Su-30SM and Su-35S fighters have regularly fired Kh-31P and Kh-58 anti-radiation missiles to suppress and target Ukrainian SAM radars.
• Without air superiority, Russia’s attempts at strategic air attack have been limited to expensive cruise and ballistic missile barrages at a much more limited scale. These failed to achieve strategically decisive damage during the first seven months of the invasion. However, the latest iteration is a more focused and sustainable bombardment of the Ukrainian electricity grid, blending hundreds of cheap Iranian-supplied Shahed-136 loitering munitions against substations with continued use of cruise and ballistic missiles against larger targets.
• The West must avoid complacency about the need to urgently bolster Ukrainian air- defence capacity. It is purely thanks to its failure to destroy Ukraine’s mobile SAM systems that Russia remains unable to effectively employ the potentially heavy and efficient aerial firepower of its fixed-wing bomber and multi-role fighter fleets to bombard Ukrainian strategic targets and frontline positions from medium altitude, as it did in Syria.
the medium term, Ukraine needs new fighter aircraft able to meet Russian fighters on more equal terms as soon as possible, especially if providing sufficient ammunition to maintain frontline SAM coverage proves difficult. The enduring threat from Russian long-range S-400 SAMs, especially when cued in by radars capable of tracking them at low altitudes from long ranges such as the 48Ya6 Podlet-K1, is likely to force Ukrainian fighters to operate at low level as part of standard tactics.173 The effective range of air-to-air missiles is inherently tied to launch altitude and speed of both the aircraft firing and its target.174 As such, any new fighter for the Ukrainian Air Force needs to come equipped with a missile capable of offering the greatest possible effective range under low-altitude, subsonic launch conditions. Electronic warfare capabilities to reduce the effectiveness of Russian radars at longer ranges would also be highly beneficial, as would a radar designed to be resilient against the Khibny jamming pods that Russian fighters typically fly with over Ukraine.
Aside from improved air-to-air performance, the main Ukrainian operational priority is for an aircraft capable of operating from dispersed, relatively basic airbases to prevent them being located and rapidly destroyed by Russian long-range missile strikes.175 This entails an ability to be serviced with limited personnel and heavy equipment, and to operate from relatively rough and short runway surfaces. Anti-shipping capabilities are also required.176 Any new fighters also need to be able to generate high sortie rates from both an availability and affordability perspective, since the Ukrainian economy has been devastated by the Russian invasion and new fighters are competing with a huge range of other requirements. As a long-term plan, the Ukrainian Air Force wants to operate a split fleet of a single engine light multi-role fighter and a longer-ranged twin engine fighter for greater air-defence persistence.177 However, in the short term, even a tiny number of modern Western fighters would be a huge boost to Ukraine’s ability to continue deterring the VKS from penetrating its skies.
The decision to supply a Western fighter would inherently be heavily influenced, and most likely ultimately decided, by political factors. In the long term, US-supplied aircraft are likely to form a large part of the Ukrainian Air Force inventory due to political, industrial and financial considerations. However, while Ukrainian airbases are still at high risk of Russian missile strikes, the long, high-quality runways and large hangers with extensive ground support equipment required to operate most US fighters would be difficult to build without being observed and hit. It is worth noting that of the currently available Western fighter aircraft that could possibly be suppled, the Swedish Saab Gripen C/D offers by far the most suitable candidate in terms of operational requirements. It was designed from the outset for ease of maintenance, and can be refuelled, re-armed and given basic maintenance by teams of just six ground crew using two vehicles on small airbases or highways in cold weather.
Moreover, only one of each crew needs to be a highly trained maintainer; the rest can be conscripts or even troops.Conceptually, the Swedish Air Force has always emphasised low-level air superiority tactics from dispersed bases, in a similar manner to how the Ukrainian Air Force currently operates, and so the Gripen was designed with ground support equipment and maintenance requirements compatible with that approach. The electronic warfare suite on the Gripen C/D is also optimised specifically for countering Russian fighter and SAM radars. Other factors that make Gripen particularly suited to Ukrainian operational needs are that it can fire the very long-range European Meteor missile, which, thanks to its ramjet propulsion design, is less adversely affected by being launched from low and slow than traditional rocket-powered missiles such as R-27 or AIM-120 AMRAAM, and Gripen was also designed from the outset with an anti-ship capability.
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Re: The war in Ukraine
Interms of new fighters - the best choice for ukraine would be the Gripen-E with its capabilites, and ability to operatre from Roads.
However, given the financial situation of ukraine - they will most likely be gifted F16s which can take on and beat anything that the Russians have.
Hopefully we can see Ukraine switch over to western systems which are easier to supply and maintain for them, esp the airforce.
However, given the financial situation of ukraine - they will most likely be gifted F16s which can take on and beat anything that the Russians have.
Hopefully we can see Ukraine switch over to western systems which are easier to supply and maintain for them, esp the airforce.
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Re: The war in Ukraine
My biggest concern in the air war is the Iranian ballistic missiles. The only defense Ukraine has is a rare S-300 version and wait for it... Hawks...
Re: The war in Ukraine
Polish government spokesman Piotr Muller has confirmed that there was an explosion that killed two Polish citizens, Reuters news agency reports.
Poland is raising the readiness of its military units, he says, and "verifying if we need to activate Nato Article Four".
That article says: "The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened."
From the bbc
Poland is raising the readiness of its military units, he says, and "verifying if we need to activate Nato Article Four".
That article says: "The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened."
From the bbc
Re: The war in Ukraine
It may be that this missile was in fact a Ukrainian one engaged in the targeting of a Russian device because of the range of the missile being only 150 kilometers not within range of Russian territory
- Tempest414
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Re: The war in Ukraine
what if it was fired from Belarus anyway the 2 people killed were every every unlucky as the missile hit the only tractor in a field
Re: The war in Ukraine
An interesting thread and speech by the Ukrainian president
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