SW1 wrote:“To be honest, it would be a lot easier for us to work with Britain because we share the same military culture,” the French politician said. Britain is running its own BAE Systems -backed fighter programme, Tempest, with Italy and Sweden.
Even from the anonymity of a "senior French parliamentarian", that's one loaded statement.
The reference to the Tiger upgrade programme is interesting too. If they can't get that right....
No doubt others will disagree, I'd argue welcoming France into Tempest (Tempête) could potentially make the programme a world beater, and likely kill off any serious European competition.
SW1 wrote:doubts about the project’s viability, citing political constraints including Berlin’s refusal to participate in combat operations abroad.
Have the export controls been agreed, yet?
Ever-lasting truths: Multi-year budgets/ planning by necessity have to address the painful questions; more often than not the Either-Or prevails over Both-And.
If everyone is thinking the same, then someone is not thinking (attributed to Patton)
One thing to consider in the Japanese involvement RR already work with KHI and MHI on the Trent engines. KHI would do compressor work for RR which is interesting in a way as that’s the part of the engine that the Germans make for the ej200 engine.
ArmChairCivvy wrote:
SW1 wrote:doubts about the project’s viability, citing political constraints including Berlin’s refusal to participate in combat operations abroad.
It was a bit of a 'tongue in the cheek' question
... but gvrning coalitions do change; long-held policies could change, too
Ever-lasting truths: Multi-year budgets/ planning by necessity have to address the painful questions; more often than not the Either-Or prevails over Both-And.
If everyone is thinking the same, then someone is not thinking (attributed to Patton)
Before moving ahead, Germany aims to gain concessions from France, insiders said, adding Berlin would like to be able to use technologies co-developed with Paris for its own projects.
........
“To be honest, it would be a lot easier for us to work with Britain because we share the same military culture,” the French politician said. Britain is running its own BAE Systems -backed fighter programme, Tempest, with Italy and Sweden.
Hopefully both France and Germany do this 'dance' to preserve 'EU' unity long enough that when it does eventually end in tears, there would be enough progress on Tempest that there will be no "political logic" to allowing them to join Tempest as "partners" and then proceed to ruin Tempest with the usual BS politics and posturing of either or both France and Germany...
And, the only relationship both Germany and France can have with Tempest is as customers who purchase units manufactured in the UK on a turn-key basis.......
If they fell out I think France would go it alone or possibly try partner with country like India ,but at end of the day I think France and Germany will compromise with each other for EU unity sake ,just hope tempest stays the distance also and down the line some more pro EU UK government shall we say wants to scrap programme and join with EU , which I could definitely see happening
USAF looking at a budget-conscious, clean-sheet fighter jet to replace the F-16 and suggestions elsewhere that USAF might reduce buy numbers of the F-35A from ~1.700 to ~1,000, Lockheed responded to the threat to the F-35 on 19th Feb by saying they will get the F-35A operational flying cost per hour down to $25,000 by 2025
USAF Chief of Staff Gen. Charles “CQ” Brown“I don’t know that it actually would be the F-16. Actually, I want to be able to build something new and different that’s not the F-16 — that has some of those capabilities, but gets there faster and features a digital approach” . A brand new “four-and-a half or fifth-gen minus” fighter with capabilities that fall somewhere in between the 1970s era F-16 and stealthy fifth-generation fighters like the F-22 and F-35 joint strike fighter" .
Driving the thinking of Brown who pointed to the approach the Air Force has taken with Boeing’s [& Saab] T-7A Red Hawk trainer and its secretive future fighter, known as Next Generation Air Dominance. Both aircraft have been designed using digital engineering practices, which have allowed the service to model the lifecycle of various designs and rapidly get full-scale demonstrators ready for flight tests. At the top of the list, Brown said, is an open mission systems with a computing system powerful enough that software code can be updated very quickly."
My impression that the $billions overspent/spending on the software development for the F-35 and locked into the Lockheed monopoly have not impressed the USAF Generals, why they want an "open" system. The software approach taken seems to mirror that of Saab with the Gripen E with its new distributed integrated modular avionics (DIMA) design, Saab likened to a smartphone app, DIMA will enable Saab to swiftly develop and integrate new functions on the Gripen E without touching the jet’s flight critical software, they have already proven that it can develop software, test it in the simulator and fly it the next day. Presuming if Saab onboard with Tempest they will bring their experience gained with DIMA to bear.
Do you think there are enough future requirements in Europe for two sixth-generation fighters: the UK-Italian-Swedish Tempest and French-German-Spanish FCAS consortia?
Tony Osborne, Aviation Week’s London bureau chief, responds:
Although there have been calls to merge the two proposals, that is very unlikely to happen because the systems appear to address two different markets. The UK-led Tempest is rather like the Hawker Hunter or the General Dynamics F-16, a “low-cost fighter”—which the Lockheed Martin F-35 should have been. The difference is that countries will be able to specify what they want in the fighter without being overly reliant on the lead nation.
I see the French-German-Spanish Future Combat Air System (FCAS) as a more expensive, perhaps gold-plated platform, like a Lockheed Martin F-22 Raptor, because it is going to perform the nuclear-strike mission. French versions will need to operate from an aircraft carrier, so that complexity will be built into the design.
In terms of numbers, these European nations will never be able to afford to replace their existing fleets on a one-to-one basis with the FCAS or Tempest, so exports are going to be critical for both programs. One of the early arguments between France and Germany over the FCAS was about making it exportable. (The French are understood to have won that argument.)
As for the Tempest, the Combat Air Strategy document published when the Tempest mockup was unveiled at the 2018 Farnborough Airshow makes 80 references to the need for partners or partnerships to develop the platform.
Air forces will make greater use of low-cost unmanned systems as additive capabilities to support the manned fighter, so there probably would not be enough orders among the countries to justify the huge expense of developing two different platforms. But the fighter programs would spur significant growth in technology, innovation and jobs in the partner nations—and that makes such efforts worthwhile in the eyes of the countries’ leaders. It is what the programs will bring to the export market that matters in terms of there being sufficient requirements.
The rumblings around FCAS/SCAF continue...it's a view from a think tank, nothing more, but it does tally with other views expressed recently which doesn't indicate a happy programme at present. Of course its possible that this is just the inevitable grumblings over work share, national champions etc that all joint programmes seem to meander through...but I'd not bet my house on that...
Google translate article:
"A reflection on the sustainability of bilateral Franco-German cooperation could be necessary if the fanciful demands of Berlin were to continue", estimates the think tank Mars. Because the SCAF puts to the test the solidity of the couple between Berlin and Paris. By the Mars Reflection Group.*
If France and Germany launched SCAF in the summer of 2017, it is to escape the trap represented by Lockheed Martin's F-35. Because this American system actually poses many problems. First, because it is intentionally built on a closed architecture prohibiting any interoperability with allied combat systems, which is absolutely contrary to NATO principles. Being interoperable only with itself, the F-35 requires the Allied armies to equip themselves with this device to be able to interact directly with it, unless they agree to interoperability in degraded mode based on a relay . It was therefore quite natural to Paris that Berlin turned back in spring 2017 with a view to developing a new generation European air system independent of the F-35.
With this program, the two countries have for once had together both a strategic convergence - to escape the American trap - and a capability requirement in terms of combat aviation by 2040. Thus, the Bundeswehr's need is 'expresses in two stages: in the medium term, it is a question of replacing the old Tornado, on which rests the nuclear and electronic warfare mission of NATO; in the longer term, the Eurofighter Typhoons will have to be replaced. These two planes are of European construction, with Airbus for the German part. France, for its part, needs to consider renewing its Rafales by 2040. Unlike its British and Italian partners in the Eurofighter program, Germany has so far not chosen to join “club F”. -35 ”.
SCAF, the 6th generation of combat aircraft
For communication purposes, Airbus then conceptualizes a “6th generation” of weapon planes, stealthy and above all suitable for collaborative combat, while the “5th generation” (that of the F-35) offers better stealth and above all. better connectivity. The problem is that, like drones, the European aviation industry has missed the turn of the 5th generation. Going from the 4th (that of the Rafale and the Eurofighter) to the 6th is an ambitious technological challenge, especially as Airbus has made little progress in the field of stealth, unlike Dassault and BAE Systems, which have developed each in turn, a combat drone demonstrator, constituting building blocks for the Franco-British FCAS (future combat air system) project launched within the framework of the Lancaster House treaties.
Never mind, Paris takes the acronym for the benefit of cooperation with Berlin of a completely different nature, since this time it is a question of designing a "manned" combat aircraft (and not a drone) and a whole collaborative combat system around.
German requirements
The rest of the SCAF program is known. Launched at the same time as the future MGCS earth system program entrusted to KNDS, it was first slowed down by the Bundestag which, under the influence of lobbying from Rheinmetall, imposed an advancement at the same rate of the two projects, before imposing the participation of Rheinmetall, which breaks the initial Franco-German balance between Nexter and KMW. Then, the laborious distribution of responsibilities between manufacturers on each of the “pillars” of the program stumbled over motorization.
While MTU is only an engine manufacturer specializing in maintenance, its contribution to the TP400 turbocharger program for the European transport aircraft A400M not having been a brilliant success, Germany claims for its engine manufacturer an equal charge. to that of Safran, the French champion heir to the Snecma, which rivals the best engine manufacturers in the world. A fragile agreement is finally torn off in extremis for the benefit of MTU.
Luftwaffe: from F-18 to F-35?
In the meantime, for lack of a European alternative, Berlin decides in 2020 to replace its Tornado with modernized Boeing F-18s. By favoring an off-the-shelf purchase, the Luftwaffe will obviously have no access to the technologies of the aircraft, even though it is “4th generation”. The deliveries being scheduled several years after the order, it cannot be completely excluded that in reality, Germany ends up acceding to the “F-35 club” by entrusting its mission of nuclear bombardment of the battlefield to this aircraft. "5th generation" qualified to carry the American bomb B61-12 within the framework of the nuclear plans of the NATO.
Finally, we learn at the start of 2021 that Germany wants Airbus to develop its own demonstrator on its soil based on the Eurofighter, in defiance of the initial optimization logic according to which, Dassault being the leader on this program. e, the development of a unique demonstrator was his responsibility. In addition, the Bundeswehr claims mastery of all the technologies of the program, even though at this stage of the project, there is no question of any commitment whatsoever to ordering a given number of systems in such a way as to secure the “business plan”. However, this is an essential requirement for the viability of such a very long-term program.
Catching up on aeronautics
Faced with the growing risk of Germany's self-exclusion from the SCAF program, the German side is doing "double duty" to try to capture everything it can in order to catch up with France in aeronautics. .
The failure of the SCAF program, unthinkable a few weeks ago, can no longer be completely ruled out. From the French point of view, the question of continuing the program with Spain and other partners could arise in the coming weeks. The precedents are numerous. Already in the 1980s, France finally left the single European combat aircraft program, deciding to develop the Rafale alone. This choice, widely criticized for its financial consequences until the beginning of the 2000s, finally proved to be correct: the Rafale is a more efficient and less expensive aircraft than the Eurofighter. Above all, it perfectly matches the specific needs of France, a naval and nuclear power. In addition, while each aircraft benefited from a common initial development, France delivered a combat aircraft equipped with an active antenna ten years ahead (1) compared to its European equivalent, in particular thanks to its technical and programmatic know-how.
The experience feedback from the A400M program, entrusted to Airbus, also shows that an ambitious cooperative program, when it is not based on the “best athlete” logic promoted by France, rarely keeps its costs, the manufacturer must meet the minimum requirements of each party to the program. But what can be tolerated from a transport aircraft is not admissible for a combat aircraft on which the operational credibility of an army depends.
A partner who does not keep his commitments
In addition, Germany is not a partner known to keep its commitments over time. The main reason is its political system, both federal and centrally dominated by shifting coalitions. This system of balanced and decentralized powers imposes permanent internal negotiations which make the commitments made vis-à-vis abroad a variable in perpetual adjustment. The decision-making process is so laborious in respecting internal balances that there is hardly any room for negotiation with the other party.
Thus, after making a formal commitment in 2018 to modernize the Tiger attack helicopter, designed and produced by Airbus as part of a cooperation initiated at the end of the 1980s, Berlin is on the verge of go back on his word, after a first gap in terms of the main armament intended to replace the American Hellfire missile, which equips the standard 2 of the Tiger. In this case, Germany has chosen an already proven Israeli solution in order to improve the competence of its national missile Diehl. Here we find the reproduction of an industrial policy already implemented in the optical space sector for the benefit of OHB in contradiction to the commitments made with France and Italy in terms of sharing satellite capacities.
Regarding the Tiger Mk 3 program, Berlin is probably waiting next fall (after the general elections which will undoubtedly see the formation of a new coalition) to formalize its withdrawal, but given the staffs, the decision would seem already taken to order Apache AH-64 helicopters from Boeing under FMS procedure instead of a refurbished Tiger. The concomitance of this decision with the freeze by the new Biden administration of the withdrawal from Germany of 10,000 American soldiers is undoubtedly not accidental.
For the French Army (and the DGA), it is already necessary to prepare the Tiger Standard 3 in cooperation with Spain despite budgetary difficulties. Do the tribulations of the Tiger offer a foretaste of those of the SCAF? It would be desirable for the French side to draw all the lessons from this feedback from Franco-German cooperation. As the Minister of the Armed Forces Florence Parly recently recalled on a completely different subject (deterrence): "... naivety must not be an additional threat".
The French BITD capable of leading the SCAF on its own
Indeed, in terms of technologies, the French BITD is perfectly capable of carrying out the developments required on each of the “pillars” of the program: Dassault Aviation obviously for the aeronautical platform and Safran for the engine, but also MBDA for “remote carriers” and Thales for sensors, system intelligence (the combat cloud) and data links. However, in the current state of the distribution of tasks, only Dassault has full control over the management of its “pillar”. The others are only associated equally (Safran) or as a supplier to the other pillars.
Sharing is also painful for subcontracting. The initial principle of cooperation consisting in choosing the “best athlete” to meet the common operational need has ended up shattered, with political logic becoming paramount. Consequently, the French BITD has everything to lose, relatively, in this distribution which will strengthen the European competitors, as was the case with the A400M program, whose difficulties were due in particular to the increase in skills of partners imposed by the political level.
An extraordinary tool to protect and enhance
The lesson to be drawn from this experience is not that France should move forward alone. Cooperation in industrial and technical developments is fundamental, both for financial matters and for sharing experience, knowledge and approach. But everyone must be aware that France has extraordinary technical and programmatic expertise and know-how, and that this tool must be protected and valued, both to ensure the proper conduct of programs and to defend the specific needs of defense. national (deterrence, strategic autonomy, independence of the means of production and support of defense equipment, etc.)
The corollary is that the objectives of multilateral cooperation and strategic independence are most easily met by "Mickey's Head" cooperative approaches: a core of common development - which can be NATO, European or multilateral - and ears representing the programmatic specificities of each participant in the cooperation program. By necessarily focusing common developments on the building blocks and common interests, these approaches ensure that the strategic, political, operational and industrial specificities of each are taken into account at the national level, thus avoiding the additional costs of “nationalization” being borne. by all.
These approaches also limit the risks of “grabbing” individual intellectual property and specific know-how. Shared on a voluntary basis in the sphere of common development, national expertise remains protected in specific national developments. However, this protection no longer exists in programs carried out entirely in cooperation. And in the case of SCAF, the lack of protection is indeed a risk: a “drain” of French know-how and expertise, financed by the taxpayer, by foreign companies that have not received the same level of financing and having no solid counterpart to offer.
The recent request from Airbus to benefit from a specific demonstrator, thus going against the logic of cooperation initially approved, tends to reinforce the idea that certain actors wish to develop the SCAF only to benefit at lower cost from an upgrade of their know-how by “taking” that of the partner.
France has invested heavily and heavily in sensors and connectivity of air vectors, both through studies, testing and simulation resources and through a new Rafale standard. In the “sensors” pillar, the DGA has mobilized significant resources to study and develop new types of multifunction sensors (radar, communication, electronic warfare / active & passive detection, jamming, electronic support, etc.) designed in particular thanks to powerful simulation resources made available by the French Atomic Energy Commission (CEA).
Protecting this know-how and the associated national investments is fundamental. Cooperation is essential. For SCAF, adopt a “Mickey's Head” approach, combining common funding for the building blocks of common interests and national funding; and securing French know-how, intellectual property and sovereignty, seems more necessary than ever.
France and Great Britain, natural partners
In this respect, Franco-British cooperation has often been fruitful. It is probable that as soon as the consummated SCAF fails, the British will abandon the bluff of the "Tempest" project and become again a privileged partner with a view to the development of a 6th generation European system, because the British will not replace their Eurofighters by F-35, and neither did the Italians. As for the Swedes, they also have real aeronautical capabilities, which have enabled Saab to continue developing a 4th generation combat aircraft.
*) The Mars group, made up of around thirty French personalities from different backgrounds, the public and private sectors and academia, is mobilized to produce analyzes relating to the issues concerning strategic interests relating to the defense and security and the technological and industrial choices which are the basis of France's sovereignty.
And for a bit of balance...article by Justin Bronk for RUSI.
I do share his concerns around the 'Combat Cloud'. I've seen too many iterations of 'network centric' warfare not come to pass despite lovely graphical displays from manufacturers about how everything will talk to everything seamlessly for the last 30 years to not be a little cynical.
Timmymagic wrote:France and Great Britain, natural partners
In this respect, Franco-British cooperation has often been fruitful. It is probable that as soon as the consummated SCAF fails, the British will abandon the bluff of the "Tempest" project and become again a privileged partner with a view to the development of a 6th generation European system, because the British will not replace their Eurofighters by F-35, and neither did the Italians. As for the Swedes, they also have real aeronautical capabilities, which have enabled Saab to continue developing a 4th generation combat aircraft.
Whoever the thirty experts (behind this )are, they are basically saying what every one knew from the beginning:
F-35s will be half of NATO(Europe) fighter force
The other half will be... whatever (but one, not two)
Who is to lead? I am not averse to the idea of @D (but wait for more news from Japan?)
- Turkey could have a change of gvmnt (but they won't lead)
- neither will Korea (but they could bring good heft into the prgrm. Japan wants it techno-sovereignty, and can afford it. Whether Korea can is not just a question of money... GIs hanging in there are a "going currency"
Ever-lasting truths: Multi-year budgets/ planning by necessity have to address the painful questions; more often than not the Either-Or prevails over Both-And.
If everyone is thinking the same, then someone is not thinking (attributed to Patton)
dmereifield wrote:Abandon the bluff of Tempest to be France's privileged partner? God, I hope not
France might prefer partnering with the UK from the perspective of operational requirements, but not from an industrial point of view.
If France is aghast at the prospect of their 'best athlete' methodology of making sure Dassault and Saffran lead everything being challenged by Airbus and MTU, then it's hard to see them getting an easier ride with BAE systems and Rolls Royce.
There is no political advantage to partnering with France here, and little with Germany. French demands for total leadership would not fit well with the ambitions of the UK aerospace sector. France wants a French fighter built on partner's capital: a great business model if you can get away with it. At the same time French frustrations with Germany would likely surface between the UK and Germany as well.
I think we have the right European partners here. Italy are likely to have the same requirements to replace Typhoon and complement the F35. Sweden brings excellent experience with SAAB and previous working relationships with BAE systems. Neither of course guarantee the same money input as Germany or France would, which ultimately is an issue that might be solved if the UK could get Japan on board to some degree (alongside their complementary technical skills)
France and Great Britain, natural partners
In this respect, Franco-British cooperation has often been fruitful. It is probable that as soon as the consummated SCAF fails, the British will abandon the bluff of the "Tempest" project and become again a privileged partner with a view to the development of a 6th generation European system, because the British will not replace their Eurofighters by F-35, and neither did the Italians. As for the Swedes, they also have real aeronautical capabilities, which have enabled Saab to continue developing a 4th generation combat aircraft.
What a complete joke of a statement.... unbeliveable.. "abandon the bluff Tempest".
The UK currently is far far more capable of getting Tempest to the finish line than the French or Germans. With Rollys Royce onboard, we have a much better chance of getting the engine right, that Safran can ever attempt to do. BAe has the experience in FBW, Stealth aircraft designs and is working with TFX programme that is refining many of the engineering issues, and new design workflows that can be applied to Tempest. Lets not even talk about the cooperation with Japan on their programme.
Had we gone alone on the EAP programme like we should have, we would not be having to listen to silly statements like "bluff of Tempest".. what bluff?? Tempest has had more money spent on it that FCAS, and more commited to it already for the programme.
BAe has made the tactical and stategic decisions, partnerships and technology development roadmaps to successfully complete Tempest. The only thing that can shoot it down is UK politicans and their short sighted view of the world.
I really don't have much respect for anyone who calls the Tempest programme a bluff as they have not been paying attention at all.. or are prepared to willfully ignore and reject the facts to further their sillly political narrative for their "great project (whatever that may be..)"...
Tempest is a truly original programme for the aerospace industry worldwide. The fact that any airframe will probably be the last thing developed is just for starter, the technologies being developed make my head spin. The fact that the radar, if one can call it that, will be able to process and analyse the entire internet traffic of a city like Nottingham in a second, and that the on board systems will be able to filter this and display the relevant information onto a wearable cockpit, an idea I am still trying to get my head around is just the start. And these systems are well into development, not simple ideas on a pad of paper.
But with the airframe being later/last and all of the systems designed to be airframe agnostic(ish) you can easily see how the airframe component of the programme can be dropped at some point. HMG of the day can still lay claim to a successful programme based on the systems. Thats the worry
I agree. It might make sense from a technical perspective, but politically it could be very vulnerable. If I were Team Tempest I'd build a prototype anyway just as an insurance policy / lobbying tool.
Also it's easy to say that the systems are platform agnostic, in practice it depends who owns the platform and what leeway they're prepared to give you. Israel seems to be a special case.
I also agree, but with the programme likely to cost in excess of £25Bn by the time any platform enters service, substantially more investment form additional partners is going to be needed. Mind you some of the key objectives is to use modern engineering methods as well as the new technologies developed to halt the existing curse of the next generation platform's costs always leading to ever shrinking numbers being affordable. The political stakes as massive, similar to the TSR-2 programme, but this time it is the life of our remaining aviation industry at stake, together with the jobs and skill it holds. Will any Government be prepared to sign the death knell of this industry as a manufacturer of complete platforms as against a maker of components for other nations aircraft?
Lord Jim wrote:I also agree, but with the programme likely to cost in excess of £25Bn by the time any platform enters service, substantially more investment form additional partners is going to be needed. ?
I question that. 25 billion between now and 2035, split three ways, is less than a billion a year, or not much more than Ajax will end up costing. It's probably no more significant financially over the next decade than Astute or CVF have been over the last one, and certainly less than Successor. The key thing is the Full Business Case 2025, I cannot see the government throwing Lancashire under the bus in the run up to the next election
Apologies if this has already been discussed - but if we wrote off the f35 order at 48 airframes - how much cash would that leave tempest to play with?
