Current & Future Amphibious Capability - General Discussion

[shark bait]

From what I understand of the ideas the USMC are looking at they would initially insert troop by air using MV-22s and then use small(ish) craft to move in fast and land troops.

Some of the future concepts coming out of the USMC look highly relevant to the Royal Marines too. There are some pushing away from the centralised 'brigade over the beach' approach and splitting it up into smaller units cooperating across a larger area. This is specifically to counter the ever-growing threat from anti-access and area denial capabilities. We can draw some similarities between this and the 'Future Commando Force' which looks as though it will create more small specialist units to support a wider operation.

If the Royal Marines future force is a scaled down version if the USMC's new vision, that would be a very positive step and would keep the Marines relevant. To enable that they need equipment to operate aircraft from over the horizon, and operate smaller boats close to shore.

[Jake1992]

The obvious concern I have about a distributed approach using many smaller platforms is will HMG and subsequence HMGs get and stick to the numbers required or well we just end up with the same amount of platforms as current but only smaller so over all reducing our capability.

It’s similar to the arguments that were made about having 4 Cavour size carriers instead of the 2 QEs people pointed out we would of ended up with just 2 Cavours.

[ArmChairCivvy]

the 'Future Commando Force' which looks as though it will create more small specialist units to support a wider operation.

Is there a doc somewhere, titled as per the quote?

It’s similar to the arguments that were made about having 4 Cavour size carriers instead of the 2 QEs

Well, not quite. The min. size for a carrier to have an airwing that can sustain relevant operations was subject to an intense study... QEs came out at the other end . The same is not true for amphibs: relevant ops (capability) mean more than one LCU or equivalent and a deck - not necessarily a hangar - of Chinook size
... no one has - yet - come back with what that would mean in tonnage

With modern airborne sensors and large ground based arrays like that in Australia

The first you chase away with F-35 CAP (ahh those sustained air ops that are also relevant: meaning CAP cover cannot be the only mission) and if the OpFor has an array of the mentioned kind, then it would take a "Normandy" and perhaps something else than an amph. assault is the way to go about it?

and then use small(ish) craft to move in fast and land troops.

Agreed, and no wonder the USMC is fond of 120 mm mortars as they are much easier to get over the beach from such craft than a LG with all that it takes to operate one in a meaningful manner... like a vehicle to tow it. A mortar is not a tall rder for an ATV, but the piccies of LGs being towed by such are for show (I presume?)

[Jake1992]

the 'Future Commando Force' which looks as though it will create more small specialist units to support a wider operation.

Is there a doc somewhere, titled as per the quote?

It’s similar to the arguments that were made about having 4 Cavour size carriers instead of the 2 QEs

Well, not quite. The min. size for a carrier to have an airwing that can sustain relevant operations was subject to an intense study... QEs came out at the other end . The same is not true for amphibs: relevant ops (capability) mean more than one LCU or equivalent and a deck - not necessarily a hangar - of Chinook size
... no one has - yet - come back with what that would mean in tonnage

With modern airborne sensors and large ground based arrays like that in Australia

The first you chase away with F-35 CAP (ahh those sustained air ops that are also relevant: meaning CAP cover cannot be the only mission) and if the OpFor has an array of the mentioned kind, then it would take a "Normandy" and perhaps something else than an amph. assault is the way to go about it?

and then use small(ish) craft to move in fast and land troops.

Agreed, and no wonder the USMC is fond of 120 mm mortars as they are much easier to get over the beach from such craft than a LG with all that it takes to operate one in a meaningful manner... like a vehicle to tow it. A mortar is not a tall rder for an ATV, but the piccies of LGs being towed by such are for show (I presume?)

What I’m getting at with my concern is not what is needed to deliver the requirement but what HMG think. We know how politicians work the arguments against 4 small over 2 larger carriers was that we would ended up with 2 small in the end as politicians see it in terms of numbers not platform capability.

So my concern is that if for example we plan to replace the 3 bays with say 6 LSTs as the sort above we end up with 3 LSTs and in doing so have cut from our current capability let alone what was planned for.

[shark bait]

It is up to Navy leadership to articulate the difference. If they can't manage that they don't deserve to be in the job.

[ArmChairCivvy]

We know how politicians work the arguments against 4 small over 2 larger carriers was that we would ended up with 2 small in the end

Stereotypes are not very useful, at least for arriving at conclusions
- how did we end up from 3 small to 2 larger?

It is up to Navy leadership to articulate the difference.

Quite. In the Forces one of the two top jobs is 'dedicated' to interfacing with the MoD/ the political side
... I hope the MoD does their bit, too. As we can see from the discussions here, defining capabilities is difficult, seeing how they overlap/ complement each other is even more difficult. Ministers in defence are setting the record for how long they (not!) stay in their jobs
- and all of this is elementary, compared to what the threats are, what are the likelihoods of them being realised - and how that keeps changing. Trump tweeting has changed the Cold War 1st derivatives that had already morphed into 2nd derivatives up a notch - shit-to; I didn't even do 3rd derivatives... can someone help out here

[Jake1992]

We know how politicians work the arguments against 4 small over 2 larger carriers was that we would ended up with 2 small in the end

Stereotypes are not very useful, at least for arriving at conclusions
- how did we end up from 3 small to 2 larger?

It is up to Navy leadership to articulate the difference.

Quite. In the Forces one of the two top jobs is 'dedicated' to interfacing with the MoD/ the political side
... I hope the MoD does their bit, too. As we can see from the discussions here, defining capabilities is difficult, seeing how they overlap/ complement each other is even more difficult. Ministers in defence are setting the record for how long they (not!) stay in their jobs
- and all of this is elementary, compared to what the threats are, what are the likelihoods of them being realised - and how that keeps changing. Trump tweeting has changed the Cold War 1st derivatives that had already morphed into 2nd derivatives up a notch - shit-to; I didn't even do 3rd derivatives... can someone help out here

There was often discussion on here arguing we should of brought 4 Cavour sized carriers instead of the 2 QEs arguing they’d offer more flexibility. One of the big counter arguments to this route was that HMG would cut them in the end to just 2 leaving us with 2 Cavour sized carriers instead of 2 QEs.

My worry when looking to move to a greater number of smaller platforms is that HMG will only look in terms of numbers and not in terms of capability. We’ve seen this with the whole frigate debacle.

[serge750]

Cuts to the military seem all to easy for the bean counters/politicians! as I said before I would like one 20-25ooot LHP/LHD (not F35 capable) as a major unit to replace both the Albions, then hopefully 4 but probably 3 bay type replacements, Enforcers? say 150-160meters ( with a hanger for 2 helicopters ) as support or smaller/multipole targeted operations/multi role ships, maybe motherships for MCM or ASW if needed,

Hopefully only having one larger LHD/LHP it would save having one in one out like with the Albions & then there would be potentially available 1 x QEC + LHP or 1 x QEC + QEC used as a LHP most of the time if the crap hit the fan !, along with 1 or 2 Enforcer types.

[Lord Jim]

I still think we would be better replacing the Albions and Bays with three or four Common design LSD/LPD modular platforms, one operated by the RN and the remainder by the RFA. Based on the Enforcer, able to house and operate 4 Merlin sized helicopters and able to be reconfigured for various tasks.

[abc123]

I still think we would be better replacing the Albions and Bays with three or four Common design LSD/LPD modular platforms, one operated by the RN and the remainder by the RFA. Based on the Enforcer, able to house and operate 4 Merlin sized helicopters and able to be reconfigured for various tasks.

Why 1 for the RN and 3 for the RFA?

[Tempest414]

If the Royal Marines future force is a scaled down version if the USMC's new vision, that would be a very positive step and would keep the Marines relevant. To enable that they need equipment to operate aircraft from over the horizon, and operate smaller boats close to shore.

For me what we need going forward is a third Flat top something like a 220 by 40 meter LPH capable of operating 25 Helicopters off of 8 spots plus able to carry 800 troops. Next we need 4 x 200 meter Enforcer's able to operate 3 Caimen-90 landing craft plus 4 CB-90 and able to carry 400 troops this could allow a first wave of some 700 troops to be put a shore from OTH across a large area by the LPH and 2 Enforcers like so.

LPH = carrying 10 x Merlin's , 4 Chinook, 8 x Apache would lift a first wave of 200 troops using 4 Merlin's + 2 Chinooks supported by 4 Apache. once this force has lifted a second force = the same would form on the deck to re-enforce as needed

2 x Enforcers = carrying 3 x Caimen-90 and 4 x CB-90 launch a fist wave of 180 troops and 6 armoured vehicles in 3 caimen-90's plus 80 troops in CB-90's each

this force could then be re-enforced and resupplied by air and sea as seen fit by the remaining troops helicopters and returning landing craft

[Repulse]

Interesting that a lot of the options reflected from a 1982 study in DK Browne’s book “Future British Surface Fleet” published in the early 90s.

[Lord Jim]

Why 1 for the RN and 3 for the RFA?

One would be full kitted out with a full suite of modules to act as the ready amphibious platform. The other three under RFA Control would operate with fewer modules and hence require fewer crew and so on. Any of these three at any one time could be operating as a aviation training vessels, hospital/HADR vessel of mothership to MCM/UUVs, but all could be rapidly reconfigured to a more conventional amphibious role if required, with the relevant RN crews assigned.

Such an idea was put forward in Nick Childs book "Britain's Future Navy, revised edition" (ISBN 978 1 47382 324 2). On P135 talking about the Royal Navy's next generation of platforms he state;

"These ships might be similar to the escort carriers built in the Second World War on merchant ship hulls, or the light fleet carrier that were built with mercantile hulls and the main machinery designed for destroyers. Perhaps they might be called Fleet support Ships, of FSS.

Crucially, the Royal Navy would also need to invest in modularized or containerised equipment for the different specialist missions that would need to be undertaken. As with the US LCS concept, the idea would be to have a number of hulls, plus a stock of modules, to be used and interchanged as requirements dictated. But the Fleet would , thus, have a class of basic ships which, at different times, could provide a wide variety of support missions such as;
- A support ASW ship with Merlin helicopters and containerised aviation facilities.
- A support LPH, with containerized aviation facilities to operate troop carrying helicopters.
- A maritime security vessel (e.g. an anti -piracy flagship), with limited containerised command, surveillance and intelligence facilities, some helicopters and perhaps UAVs, and an embarked force of troops for boarding parties.
- An aviation training ship, without military command and control, but with containerised aviation support facilities.
- A casualty evacuation/hospital ship, with some helicopter support to sustain that mission, but mainly a major containerized/modularized medical facility.
- A heavy repair/forward support ship, chiefly with containerized engineering workshops for the hanger/garage spaces. The former light fleet carrier HMS Triumph performed the heavy repair ship role in the 1960s and the early 1970s.
- A mother ship, to support other Royal Navy Units on long-term deployments, and to provide storage for other modularized equipment for their use, such as in the mine warfare role.
- A limited power-projection capability, with containerized multiple-launch rocket systems or even containerized cruise missiles.

It would be important that the equipment modules and containers would also be compatible with the Navy's existing amphibious shipping. They would , for example greatly enhance the flexibility of the Bay class ships in many of the roles which they are already undertaking beyond amphibious support."

This goes beyond what I would recommend but does show what thinking outside of the box can develop.

[jedibeeftrix]

Thinking of the Box, how about 6 to 8 small(ish) LST type platforms. Bale to move in once the initial landing site is secured and then rapidly unload men, vehicles and supplies and then head back OTH? Surly designer can come up with a 21st century version of this type if platform, I mean look at how the LCU design has evolved?

could they deploy globally as part of a task group?
if yes, perhaps.

From what I understand of the ideas the USMC are looking at they would initially insert troop by air using MV-22s and then use small(ish) craft to move in fast and land troops. They want to ay form the large LSDs and LPDs as they are seen as too vulnerable when an opponent is well equipped and able to conduct area denial style operation.

There will still be a need for larger platforms to move troops and equipment into theatre and support the smaller assault vessels, but the distances over which these new style operations will be conducted will be in the three digit realm, no the 20Km or more that we think of as OTH.

The core change seems to be the move away from the MEU as the standard element of force deployment, to a more flexible array of options. I don't believe it involves abandoning the very principle of brigade and divisional level fighting formations.

This seems to be a great argument for ditching slow and small delivery craft like the LCVP, moving exlcusively to larger platforms like Caiman 90, where you can indeed deliver real throughput at distance.

I still think we would be better replacing the Albions and Bays with three or four Common design LSD/LPD modular platforms, one operated by the RN and the remainder by the RFA. Based on the Enforcer, able to house and operate 4 Merlin sized helicopters and able to be reconfigured for various tasks.

No objection in principle. Provided we end with with at least two Caiman 90 sized docks on each...?

[jedibeeftrix]

If your primary aim is to deliver a brigade then it’s not going over a beech so the need for traditional landing craft is significant reduced.

whatever else 3Cdo has in store as part of its transformation I think we can all agree that brigade level amphibious ops are gone.

my ambition is to ensure that we can put a mobile combined-arms battle group onto a beach.
I'm all for the new raiding philosophy, but not at the expense of breadth, depth, and sustainability.

[abc123]

Why 1 for the RN and 3 for the RFA?

One would be full kitted out with a full suite of modules to act as the ready amphibious platform. The other three under RFA Control would operate with fewer modules and hence require fewer crew and so on. Any of these three at any one time could be operating as a aviation training vessels, hospital/HADR vessel of mothership to MCM/UUVs, but all could be rapidly reconfigured to a more conventional amphibious role if required, with the relevant RN crews assigned.

Such an idea was put forward in Nick Childs book "Britain's Future Navy, revised edition" (ISBN 978 1 47382 324 2). On P135 talking about the Royal Navy's next generation of platforms he state;

"These ships might be similar to the escort carriers built in the Second World War on merchant ship hulls, or the light fleet carrier that were built with mercantile hulls and the main machinery designed for destroyers. Perhaps they might be called Fleet support Ships, of FSS.

Crucially, the Royal Navy would also need to invest in modularized or containerised equipment for the different specialist missions that would need to be undertaken. As with the US LCS concept, the idea would be to have a number of hulls, plus a stock of modules, to be used and interchanged as requirements dictated. But the Fleet would , thus, have a class of basic ships which, at different times, could provide a wide variety of support missions such as;
- A support ASW ship with Merlin helicopters and containerised aviation facilities.
- A support LPH, with containerized aviation facilities to operate troop carrying helicopters.
- A maritime security vessel (e.g. an anti -piracy flagship), with limited containerised command, surveillance and intelligence facilities, some helicopters and perhaps UAVs, and an embarked force of troops for boarding parties.
- An aviation training ship, without military command and control, but with containerised aviation support facilities.
- A casualty evacuation/hospital ship, with some helicopter support to sustain that mission, but mainly a major containerized/modularized medical facility.
- A heavy repair/forward support ship, chiefly with containerized engineering workshops for the hanger/garage spaces. The former light fleet carrier HMS Triumph performed the heavy repair ship role in the 1960s and the early 1970s.
- A mother ship, to support other Royal Navy Units on long-term deployments, and to provide storage for other modularized equipment for their use, such as in the mine warfare role.
- A limited power-projection capability, with containerized multiple-launch rocket systems or even containerized cruise missiles.

It would be important that the equipment modules and containers would also be compatible with the Navy's existing amphibious shipping. They would , for example greatly enhance the flexibility of the Bay class ships in many of the roles which they are already undertaking beyond amphibious support."

This goes beyond what I would recommend but does show what thinking outside of the box can develop.

So something like current 1 Albion and 3 Points?

I don't agree. Standardisation is better. Having all four ships the same.

[SW1]

If your primary aim is to deliver a brigade then it’s not going over a beech so the need for traditional landing craft is significant reduced.

whatever else 3Cdo has in store as part of its transformation I think we can all agree that brigade level amphibious ops are gone.

my ambition is to ensure that we can put a mobile combined-arms battle group onto a beach.
I'm all for the new raiding philosophy, but not at the expense of breadth, depth, and sustainability.

I would agree it is gone.

I don’t think a light battlegroup has much breadth, depth, or sustainability certainly UK one both marine and army ones.

For me we need to reconfigure to conduct operations along the lines of the US marines maritime special purpose force eg

Direct Action
Deep Reconnaissance
Vessel Board, Search and Seizure (VBSS)
Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIO)
Gas and Oil Platform (GOPLAT) interdiction and assault
Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel (TRAP)
Demolitions
support of other special operations forces

They are around 350 people in size and would have air assets attached as required.

[Repulse]

There is a clear move away from Cdo brigade level operations, which reflects not only the financial reality and the requirement.

I’d agree with the list SW1 has above, but I would add the ability to conduct a short term (<3 day) Cdo level operation to capture and secure a lightly defended landing area until the cavalry (Army Brigade) arrives.

Lastly, I see the the equipment/ship classes required for the follow up force to be more RFA/STUFT logistics rather than assault focused.

The assault force will be much smaller than today. It will be supported OTH by RFA vessels, but not no chance getting RFA LSDs within 20 miles of any assault against a peer with decent A2D.

[Lord Jim]

So something like current 1 Albion and 3 Points?I don't agree. Standardisation is better. Having all four ships the same.

No and Yes. Four standard hull in a basic configuration, but able to be configured through the use of modules and containers to carry out a wide variety of roles. The Basic hull would be cheap and the number of modules /container dependant of funding. The big downside is we would lose the LCUs, but we seem reluctant to actually purchase a platform that can operate at the required speed and distance needed for likely future operations, and the current ones can really only be used in a benign environment. Better to augment these with four to six compact LSTs to move any heavy stuff onto the beach or sparse port facilities. Say able to carry a maximum of four MBTs and any combination of lighter vehicles.

[Tempest414]

Maybe what you are talking about is something like a Caimen-200 able to carry 3 x MBT or 30 soft skin vehicles over 2000nm with a speed of 17 knots full and 19 knots half full

[jedibeeftrix]

...put a mobile combined-arms battle group onto a beach.
...breadth, depth, and sustainability.

I don’t think a light battlegroup has much breadth, depth, or sustainability certainly UK one both marine and army ones.

but magnificently more so than a bunch commando's jumping off a speedboat into the surf holding their bergens, no?

For me we need to reconfigure to conduct operations along the lines of the US marines maritime special purpose force eg
Direct Action
Deep Reconnaissance
Vessel Board, Search and Seizure (VBSS)
Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIO)
Gas and Oil Platform (GOPLAT) interdiction and assault
Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel (TRAP)
Demolitions
support of other special operations forces
They are around 350 people in size and would have air assets attached as required.

Sure, their lovely.
The USMC is not going to do all these new things at the expense of mobile combined-arms fighting formations, and nor should we.
We have two full commando's, a demi-commando for this new USMC raiding ambition, and a special duties commando.
Nothing i suggest seems either improbable or disproportionate given the resources available.

[SW1]

but magnificently more so than a bunch commando's jumping off a speedboat into the surf holding their bergens, no?

Except one isn’t intended or wants to have breadth, depth and sustainablity, whilst the other is attempting to but can’t against a near peer or peer enemy.

Sure, their lovely.
The USMC is not going to do all these new things at the expense of mobile combined-arms fighting formations, and nor should we.
We have two full commando's, a demi-commando for this new USMC raiding ambition, and a special duties commando.
Nothing i suggest seems either improbable or disproportionate given the resources available.

Yes but the US Marine Corp is larger than the uk armed forces so can afford multiple levels. The UK holds the main heavier combined arms fighting forces in the army. The commandos should be just that commandos who raid ahead of that main force.

[abc123]

One-commando task force RMs are IMHO useless and should be disbanded. Either a proper brigade-sized force with all things that go with it, or save a few pounds.

[Repulse]

One-commando task force RMs are IMHO useless and should be disbanded. Either a proper brigade-sized force with all things that go with it, or save a few pounds.

How about a Cdo assault force quickly followed by an Army Brigade?

[abc123]

One-commando task force RMs are IMHO useless and should be disbanded. Either a proper brigade-sized force with all things that go with it, or save a few pounds.

How about a Cdo assault force quickly followed by an Army Brigade?

How many Army Brigades are ready to do so? Are the UKs amphibious capabilities large enough for that?