Current & Future Amphibious Capability - General Discussion
Re: Current & Future Amphibious Capability - General Discussion
Or maybe we’ll just fly out a company of commandos to operate of an Australian lhd.
- Tempest414
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Re: Current & Future Amphibious Capability - General Discussion
And this is a very good opposite end of table and a good place to be in able to go from sending a company of RM all the way to a full joint battle group
Re: Current & Future Amphibious Capability - General Discussion
See what transpires with this new pact and implications I quess
Re: Current & Future Amphibious Capability - General Discussion
What about the Australian Army sending its Commandos to support us in Europe. Does this alliance go both ways or is ti aimed solely at the Indo/Pacific theatre?
Re: Current & Future Amphibious Capability - General Discussion
The only theatres I've seen Australians involved in were in the UK during Pantomime season.
Re: Current & Future Amphibious Capability - General Discussion
News Alert from ABC NewsSKB wrote:The only theatres I've seen Australians involved in were in the UK at Pantomime season.
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Re: Current & Future Amphibious Capability - General Discussion
The ADF has been player in the Middle East since the 1st Gulf war and over the last few years it has had a frigate based full time in the Gulf a flight of 6 Hornets plus C-130 , AEW and P-3 ASW flying ops in the region right now gunner's from 4 regiment are embedded with 29 commando RA
Re: Current & Future Amphibious Capability - General Discussion
Yes the ADF has been quite heavily involved in the Gulf for a force its size, I was wondering more if we would see any of the Australian Army's "Commando" Regiments or Special Forces, operating with the Royal Marines off Norway.
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Re: Current & Future Amphibious Capability - General Discussion
For me I think it more important that we work with them EoS using the RM , Ranger & SF units than them working with us here
Re: Current & Future Amphibious Capability - General Discussion
Sorry forgot to put a "Smiley", face after my post. YEs I am sure we will try to conduct joint exercises with both the ADF and USN /USMC amongst others EoS in the future, funding permitting.
Re: Current & Future Amphibious Capability - General Discussion
Yes we could even use elements of the acclimatise Far East theatre reserve battalion….
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Re: Current & Future Amphibious Capability - General Discussion
2 RGR is not a reserve unit however there is a Brunei GRU made up of 500 ex British army a Singapore police Gurkha'sSW1 wrote:Yes we could even use elements of the acclimatise Far East theatre reserve battalion….
Re: Current & Future Amphibious Capability - General Discussion
I don’t mean there reserves ie TA. But like one of the battalions in Cyprus that are theatre reserve Mid East so the Gurkhas are the on call battalion for Far East deployment and have been for decades.Tempest414 wrote:2 GRG is not a reserve unit however there is a Brunei GRU made up of 500 ex British army a Singapore police Gurkha'sSW1 wrote:Yes we could even use elements of the acclimatise Far East theatre reserve battalion….
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Re: Current & Future Amphibious Capability - General Discussion
OK however elements of 2 RGR could be used as well I am sure that the ADF would not mind some Gurkha support
Re: Current & Future Amphibious Capability - General Discussion
On exercise if acting as OPFOF, they would scare even the ADF.
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Re: Current & Future Amphibious Capability - General Discussion
Moved across...
Where is the reserve if anything goes wrong?
This whole small scale raiding force concept simply isn’t proven yet to have any credible strategic value compared to the capability it will replace.
IMO the LSG’s should be comprised of widely distributed vessels coming together to form a viable force which is scaleable and self sustaining but if the entire aviation element of an LSG comprises 3-4 Merlins a single Chinook would take up the full hanger space without rotors removed.
A Karel Doorman sized hanger must surely be considered a bare minimum baseline with the rest of the LSG adding additional hanger space to increase the total helo capacity to around 9 Merlin equivalent. Would a UK optimised and built KD really be cheaper than an Ocean Mk2? I really don’t think so and an LPH has lots of advantages over a KD style option.
To achieve what?Repulse wrote:Much more likely that the RMs will be based on a larger number of smaller vessels with a hanger for 3-4 helicopters than a new Ocean.
Where is the reserve if anything goes wrong?
This whole small scale raiding force concept simply isn’t proven yet to have any credible strategic value compared to the capability it will replace.
IMO the LSG’s should be comprised of widely distributed vessels coming together to form a viable force which is scaleable and self sustaining but if the entire aviation element of an LSG comprises 3-4 Merlins a single Chinook would take up the full hanger space without rotors removed.
A Karel Doorman sized hanger must surely be considered a bare minimum baseline with the rest of the LSG adding additional hanger space to increase the total helo capacity to around 9 Merlin equivalent. Would a UK optimised and built KD really be cheaper than an Ocean Mk2? I really don’t think so and an LPH has lots of advantages over a KD style option.
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Re: Current & Future Amphibious Capability - General Discussion
Adding rotor folding capability to Chinook is much more important than scaling the whole Amphibious force's hangar size on "Chinook with rotor unfolded".
But, if a large size amphibious operation takes place, there will surely be a CV nearby. If not, UK must not try amphibious landing, I think. (small raid is OK). In this case, Chinook can be sent from CV, I guess?
But, if a large size amphibious operation takes place, there will surely be a CV nearby. If not, UK must not try amphibious landing, I think. (small raid is OK). In this case, Chinook can be sent from CV, I guess?
Re: Current & Future Amphibious Capability - General Discussion
It is clear that the FCF is being positioned for two primary operations.Poiuytrewq wrote:To achieve what?
The first is small scale / limited duration SF operations, the principal is to nip a situation in the bud or contain its impact quickly through a forward based rapid response. We are talking single company operations or smaller.
The second is to neutralise A2/AD capabilities to allow a strike task force to get closer to the shore. Again, we are talking about small groups distributed to avoid annihilation before they reach their target.
Putting large Cdo formations on large LHDs does not align to this strategy. 3-4 helicopters is sufficient for a Company sized force.
It is possible that multiple units (with a CVF) could join to seize a landing ground - but from all I’ve read it doesn’t seem a top priority, and I would agree with that position. What is needed is the ability to transport an Army Brigade to a secured (friendly) port - this means logistical transport ships and an escort force to protect it during transit.
Design studies have shown that 6 is probably the maximum that can be effectively operated from a non-flat top ship.Poiuytrewq wrote: A Karel Doorman sized hanger must surely be considered a bare minimum baseline with the rest of the LSG adding additional hanger space to increase the total helo capacity to around 9 Merlin equivalent.
”We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow." - Lord Palmerston
Re: Current & Future Amphibious Capability - General Discussion
I think three landing spots is the practical limiting factor in a hangar-forward design (due to the restrictions it places on deck movements), from which a maximum of six cabs follows.Repulse wrote:Design studies have shown that 6 is probably the maximum that can be effectively operated from a non-flat top ship.
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- Tempest414
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Re: Current & Future Amphibious Capability - General Discussion
For me whatever happens with the FCF its primary role will and should always be as the rapid reaction force for the Northern flank and it is all well and good having a Company floating here and there but we still have to have the means to move the RM on mass and get them on the ground fast. And for that means having at least 1 if not 2 LHA's/ LPH's as well as the carriers what is needed is 2 x Ocean 2's and 4 new Enforcers with hangar's for 3 Merlin's
Re: Current & Future Amphibious Capability - General Discussion
Tempest414, I completely agree the RMs have a role in defending the Northern flank and more broadly allied (and therefore UK) interests in the Artic.
However, by far the most likely form of conflict will be low level incursions and harassment of naval forces. That is exactly where the FCF seems aimed at.
If it does turn into WW3, then the RMs should be focused on slowing down any advance by securing key points of communication and disrupting advancing forces and their logistics - basically buying time until the Army turns up.
None of this requires large aviation platforms beyond the two CVFs. What is of more value are SSNs and smaller Littoral platforms that can better hide in the Fjords.
However, by far the most likely form of conflict will be low level incursions and harassment of naval forces. That is exactly where the FCF seems aimed at.
If it does turn into WW3, then the RMs should be focused on slowing down any advance by securing key points of communication and disrupting advancing forces and their logistics - basically buying time until the Army turns up.
None of this requires large aviation platforms beyond the two CVFs. What is of more value are SSNs and smaller Littoral platforms that can better hide in the Fjords.
”We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow." - Lord Palmerston
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Re: Current & Future Amphibious Capability - General Discussion
Firstly, thanks for your reply. I am not arguing with you, I simply have issues with the concept.
Without this backup force the whole concept looks like a disaster waiting to happen.
What goes before is still part of the LSG.
It’s also a strategy based around a chronic lack of helicopters. Marinise 10 Chinooks and that problem disappears also. These bottlenecks really need cleared now to allow strategic planning enough latitude to make sensible, logical decisions.
Based on the concept outlined above the UK is going to have its Amphibious capability totally gutted if the MRSS gets the go ahead with an Ellida style vessel.
It’s worth reflecting that the Amphibious fleet that is being replaced had a medium helicopter capacity of around 30 helos split between Ocean, Argus and the 4 Bays.
Six MRSS vessels would need a hanger capable of embarking at least 5 Medium helicopters to match it. That’s effectively six Karel Doorman’s costing somewhere in the region of £2.5bn to construct.
Replacing the Albions with two modest LPD’s (8 helo, 2 LCU capacity) and 4 MRSS (4 helo, 2 LCU capacity) all based on a common Enforcer design would likely cost around £2bn.
I suspect that ultimately, one or two LPH/LHD’s will form part of the mix when all the kinks are worked out of the FCF concept.
I don’t have a problem with this as long as an identical force is available to enable the extraction of the original force if things go bad.Repulse wrote:The first is small scale / limited duration SF operations, the principal is to nip a situation in the bud or contain its impact quickly through a forward based rapid response. We are talking single company operations or smaller.
Without this backup force the whole concept looks like a disaster waiting to happen.
The strike force is the LSG possibly operating in conjunction with the CSG.Repulse wrote: The second is to neutralise A2/AD capabilities to allow a strike task force to get closer to the shore.
What goes before is still part of the LSG.
It’s a strategy based around retaining PWLS as a replacement for Ocean. No justification is needed to operate PWLS as a CVF. Surely we can move on from that now.Repulse wrote: Putting large Cdo formations on large LHDs does not align to this strategy. 3-4 helicopters is sufficient for a Company sized force.
It’s also a strategy based around a chronic lack of helicopters. Marinise 10 Chinooks and that problem disappears also. These bottlenecks really need cleared now to allow strategic planning enough latitude to make sensible, logical decisions.
Based on the concept outlined above the UK is going to have its Amphibious capability totally gutted if the MRSS gets the go ahead with an Ellida style vessel.
It’s worth reflecting that the Amphibious fleet that is being replaced had a medium helicopter capacity of around 30 helos split between Ocean, Argus and the 4 Bays.
Six MRSS vessels would need a hanger capable of embarking at least 5 Medium helicopters to match it. That’s effectively six Karel Doorman’s costing somewhere in the region of £2.5bn to construct.
Replacing the Albions with two modest LPD’s (8 helo, 2 LCU capacity) and 4 MRSS (4 helo, 2 LCU capacity) all based on a common Enforcer design would likely cost around £2bn.
I suspect that ultimately, one or two LPH/LHD’s will form part of the mix when all the kinks are worked out of the FCF concept.
Re: Current & Future Amphibious Capability - General Discussion
I have the impression the Navy's future Amphibious force is waiting for the final form of the Future Commando Force to mature. Only then will serious consideration be given to what type of vessels will be needed and how many.
Re: Current & Future Amphibious Capability - General Discussion
I would like to see one Mistral type LHD for bigger missions & a 2 or 3 smaller ( 10k tonnes ) LPD bit like the Albions but a lot smaller for minor insertions that all could team up for major operations whilst keeping both QEC as strike carriers
Re: Current & Future Amphibious Capability - General Discussion
What if the RM are destined to operate in nothing larger than Company strength units in the future, and more often less that that? What if as a result the future Amphibious vessels are designed to accommodate nothing more that two platoons of RM, operating in groups to deliver a force of Company strength? Such vessels would only need two or three Merlin sized helicopters, and a small number of armed RHIBs or a couple of CB-90 style boats.
Larger operations could involve the movement of an Army formation using Ro-Ro vessels supported by RM using one or more Littoral Ships to secure the landing site, most likely a port of some kind. This would be more a sealift class amphibious operation rather than an over the beach assault, though the capability to compensate for poor port facilities should still be required to aid in unloading the Ro-Ro vessels.
Larger operations could involve the movement of an Army formation using Ro-Ro vessels supported by RM using one or more Littoral Ships to secure the landing site, most likely a port of some kind. This would be more a sealift class amphibious operation rather than an over the beach assault, though the capability to compensate for poor port facilities should still be required to aid in unloading the Ro-Ro vessels.