I agree that we need to ensure sufficient logistics support for the artillery, and this is even more important in the planned "Strike" Brigades because of the operational doctrine they are likely to follow. One of the reasons it has been suggested that any 155mm guns used with these Brigades should be mounted on a platform that shares the same chassis as the majority of 6x6 or 8x8 logistics vehicles used to support the formation, so in the British Army's case these would be based on the current MAN series, many equipped with the successor to DROPS. I also think there needs to be a logistics variant of the Boxer to operate within the Mechanised Battalions providing support to the entire formation. This should be a relatively simple task as I am pretty sure there are designs for a logistics module already in existence. In the RUSI paper the three 120mm Mortars in each company replace the Mortars held at Battalion Level, but the Brigade gains at least one GMLRS Battery, which gives the Brigade the ability to effectively strike at enemy concentration identified by units form the Brigade as well as providing a capably counter battery capability, especially with the planned long range munitions being developed.
Looking more carefully at the type of 155mm SP Gun that could be used, whatever is chosen must be able to operate at the tempo of the Boxer units, be simple to maintain and operate, and not be restricted by its weight and dimensions in what infrastructure it can use, such as bridges and tunnels. It must be able to self deploy over large distances, operate in a widely dispersed manner even down to batter level, yet be pat of a joined up ISTAR network to allow for rapid target identification and fire mission execution. Platforms like the G-6 Rhino, Archer and even the SP 155mm version of the Boxer are really too large for this role, though many will disagree with my opinion here. They will also, with the exception of the Boxer variant, increase the logistics burden on the Brigade which needed to be kept as streamlined as possible. Moving the Ajax Regiments is already going to be a heavy burden on these. A possible doctrine for these Artillery Batteries might be to have them each be comprised of four, two gun sections. during any engagement, these sections would be, whilst widely dispersed be coming into action, firing, coming out of action and relocating, minimising the batteries vulnerability to counter battery fire. Opposition ISTAR capabilities would be a prime target for the Brigades own ISTAR units to limit the opposition ability to identify target easily, again reducing the vulnerability of the Brigades assets including the Artillery. As mentioned above the GMLSR attached to the Brigade would also be looking to reduce the opposition artillery capability at the same time. As will all units that comprise the "Strike" Brigade, the way they manoeuvre and operate is going to be far different from how the British Army has traditionally carried out combined arms operations. But all of the above will be for naught if the MoD does not purchase the right platforms in sufficient numbers to allow the Brigades to operate as they will have to if they are to be effective in the worst case scenarios as well as those more likely.