Current & Future Escorts - General Discussion

[shark bait]

Absurd to think such a tiny set of escorts could protect a carrier taskforce and its RFA support

Why?

[shark bait]

Sharkbait, I know you are not actually saying this but protecting the carrier groups (if indeed that is possible with such few numbers in a hostile environment) is a bit like the army saying we have enough soldiers to protect the queen and PM.

Following the rule of three, the RN should be able to sustain 6 escorts deployed, assuming the manning crisis is fixed. That's 4 escorts with the carrier, and 2 monitoring other interests along the way.

With only 2 carriers the RN breaks the rule of three, so could manage 6 escorts with each carrier in a major SHTF situation.

That is adequate for any operation the UK would take on independently.

[Pongoglo]

With 6 we should be able to sustain 2 at sea, which is about the correct amount.

For carrier maybe but what about defending our territories, merchant shipping, supplies and replacing lost assets. I believe we probably already don't have enough AAD assets for the seas, and I haven't even thought about whether due to lack of land assets these might be needed to cover that angle too (like during the Olympics). There is no sign of planning for the worst case scenarios is there.... if we are honest

Thats why for me it is essential that we push the development of CAAM-ER. With a 40 km reach should enable our more numerous CAAM equipped assets to make up for some of the gap in having so few T45's. Does anyone know if the silo's are the same or will it need extended canisters ? Probably and sadly a no go for the T23's but should'nt be an issue with the T26 or T31, even if initially fitted for 'for not with' ?

[NickC]

Have seen the CAMM quoted as 166 mm dia and 3.2 m in length whereas CAMM-ER 190 mm dia and 4 m in length.
The Italians are said to be using Sylver VLS cells for the CAMM-ER and will be using it to replace the ASTER 15 when reaches EOL.

Italy Joins CAMM Air-Defense Missile Program
http://www.defense-aerospace.com/articl ... ssile.html

[Ron5]

CAMM VLS cell dimensions are governed by the missile width over its fins and not the diameter of the missile body. In other words, the cell diagonal width has to be such that the fin tip to fin tip distance will fit.

Both CAMM and CAMM-ER have the same fin tip to fin tip dimension (remembering that the tail fins are folded in the cell).

So from a width point of view, both missiles will fit the same cell. In fact the CAMM-ER container/launcher is just a longer version of the standard CAMM container. About a meter longer.

As for the original observation that CAMM-ER is superior so should be fitted. Well yes and no. The CAMM missile system key requirement is to destroy anti-ship missiles which may be first detected at very short ranges. So quick response, high agility and a short minimum engagement distance is vital.

CAMM-ER has roughly double the minimum engagement distance. Not good.

[benny14]

So currently all 6 Type 45s and 12 out of 13 Type 23s are in port, with the exception of St Albions as fleet ready escort.

There are apparently 13 RN vessels deployed not including Trident.

RFA Cardigan Bay, HMS Bangor, HMS Blyth, HMS Ledbury and HMS Middleton in the gulf as part of the mine countermeasure group, HMS Protector and HMS Clyde in Falklands, RFA Mounts Bay in the Caribbean, HMS Echo in the Mediterranean, HMS Enterprise in the Mediterranean as part of NATO SNMCMG2, and HMS St Albans in UK waters. That is 11 vessels, not sure where the other two are. One OPV and a submarine maybe?

[Digger22]

Doesn't this highlight the need for a proper reserve force? Older yet still useful ships can be found all over the world. For what little we get back when we sell them we should surely keep 6 or so. I understand all the down sides, cost, maintaining additional 'obsolete' weapon systems etc, but to have a plan B is better than the current situation. I think we have expended more reliable ships as targets!

[KyleG]

So currently all 6 Type 45s and 12 out of 13 Type 23s are in port, with the exception of St Albions as fleet ready escort.

There are apparently 13 RN vessels deployed not including Trident.

RFA Cardigan Bay, HMS Bangor, HMS Blyth, HMS Ledbury and HMS Middleton in the gulf as part of the mine countermeasure group, HMS Protector and HMS Clyde in Falklands, RFA Mounts Bay in the Caribbean, HMS Echo in the Mediterranean, HMS Enterprise in the Mediterranean as part of NATO SNMCMG2, and HMS St Albans in UK waters. That is 11 vessels, not sure where the other two are. One OPV and a submarine maybe?

RFA Fort Austin is also deployed to the Gulf with Normandy Flight of 849 NAS embarked.

[Gabriele]

Fort Rosalie, i think, not Austin.

[KyleG]

^Yep it would be. Mistype on my part.

[Opinion3]

The idea that two lightly protected task groups can win in a hot war seems akin to starting a game of chess with a few high value pieces. You will be hunted down and nearly always on the back foot.

[Repulse]

The idea that two lightly protected task groups can win in a hot war seems akin to starting a game of chess with a few high value pieces. You will be hunted down and nearly always on the back foot.

Completely agree, the current force structure has as much to do with political grandstanding than real war fighting, however it’s still probably the best structure with the given budget / balance between the 3 services, as long as the T31e/OPV fleet focuses on getting numbers into the fleet. Unless the UK budget increases significantly we should make a choice to focus on UK/BOT defence and maritime based expeditionary capability.

[inch]

Talking about t31 was just wondering what would happen if all parties concerned with bidding decided that they couldn't or wouldn't bid with the money guv allocating for project ,is couldn't do it for the £250m each bit ,would that force the guv /mod 1) to increase the cash 2) scrap the program 3) look to other countries to bid or what?. I think maybe we should go in partnership with say for example the Italians on the ppl programs or maybe the French ,hell even the south Koreans ,ie get into a bigger program and reduce the costs for a lot more capable ship .as always folks just my thought's

[Repulse]

Warship building for a maritime nation such as ours should be a strategic industry. Previous similar joint ship building projects with our European friends has very well, primarily because they want a larger share of the work than they invest and differing requirements.

[Opinion3]

Protecting Submarine cables is a whole new area for defence. They are only really vulnerable on the continental shelves and the responsibility for this is going to be a multinational task. The Russians and NATO have both tried to tap under sea communications in the past to varying degrees of success. Tapping these cables is a more likely scenario than actually cutting them.

Submarine Telecommunications Cables are at risk because

1) their location is known
2) They are armoured and can be ploughed quite deep near the shore and in shallow waters, but once the threat of damage (usually by trawlers and anchors) has reduced they are usually ploughed only one meter deep.
3) Ploughing deeper would put at risk the ability to repair a cable. For repair they are usually hooked and pulled back up to the surface, For those of us who have ever pulled up a cable or rope under a bit of soil or sand you will understand that the tensile strength required to withstand this sort of abuse is absolutely enormous. The pressures are equally enormous.
4) As pointed out in the various articles the vital role the internet plays in our economy and lives would make a shutdown a very damaging prospect.

I do agree that tapping is more likely however and usually that bit of the "operation" would be in shallower waters, probably via a repeater (but just guessing here).

We seem to lack the ability to combat this, yes we have some submarines (but they are greatly reduced in numbers and if Russia has 60 big ones we need to step up our game), I believe the Astute isn't a particularly deep diver (150m) unlike some of the Russian submarines which can hit 500m. I am inclined to believe that the Astute is a good effort but not necessarily covering all the bases / up there with the best of the Russian's. We are going lack numbers of T26s and the Poisedens aren't with us yet and will lack numbers too.

Once again our defence seems to rely on the US of A.

We need to up the budget and get the means to handle the threat

[Repulse]

I think you are confusing the typical operational diving depth of an Astute to the maximum depth. Both are closely guarded secrets of course so don’t believe everything you read.

[Lord Jim]

Cables were tapped in the Cold War by both sides using submarines and remote vehicles and this is probably still going on. Cutting a cable could be seen as an act of war considering how vital they are to the economy of a country but tapping avoids this whist gaining massive amounts of intel. Given how deep submersibles can go now, and using civilian registered research vessels as cover, the areas where cables are vulnerable at now far greater than in the past.

[albedo]

I'm still slightly curious as to just how you tap a fibre-optic cable (which presumably most intercontinental cables must be these days), especially if it's using one of the more recent full-spectrum, many-wavelength technologies to maximise bandwidth. Or are eg transatlantic distances still too far for fibre-optic to be used without powered repeaters en route? But presumably you can have repeaters with very long-life batteries, good for eg 10-20 years?

I don't doubt that there are ways of tapping fibre cables in theory, but they must be an order of magnitude more tricky than with a copper cable AND at the bottom of the ocean AND without alerting the operator??

[ArmChairCivvy]

WW2 to IP-based comms ... a light year in between.

As in all new techniques, a general rehearsal has been held already:
How China swallowed 15% of 'Net traffic for 18 minutes | Ars Technica
https://arstechnica.com/.../how-china-s ... inutes.ars

Nov 17, 2010 - In April 2010, 15 percent of all Internet traffic was suddenly diverted … ... Although the Commission has no way to determine what, if anything, Chinese telecommunications firms did to the hijacked data, incidents of this nature could have a number of serious implications.
- another incident covered in the story is how Pakistan redirected all utube requests (globally) down a Black Hole... to nowhere

[NickC]

I'm still slightly curious as to just how you tap a fibre-optic cable (which presumably most intercontinental cables must be these days), especially if it's using one of the more recent full-spectrum, many-wavelength technologies to maximise bandwidth. Or are eg transatlantic distances still too far for fibre-optic to be used without powered repeaters en route? But presumably you can have repeaters with very long-life batteries, good for eg 10-20 years?

I don't doubt that there are ways of tapping fibre cables in theory, but they must be an order of magnitude more tricky than with a copper cable AND at the bottom of the ocean AND without alerting the operator??

I would be very surprised if US/UK and other governments do not make it mandoratory that cable operarators enable tapping of fibre cables by NSA/GCHQ etc and so by inference China and Russian equivalents.

[albedo]

WW2 to IP-based comms ... a light year in between.

Yes, indeed. But the sort of incident you've quoted is surely akin to land-based cyber warfare, eg hacking (deliberately or inadvertently) Internet boundary routers and not tapping into sub-sea fibre cables? So countering it is not primarily (or even at all) a Navy role.

Edit: Though of course protecting against possible physical damage to the cable obviously is an RN role.

I would be very surprised if US/UK and other governments do not make it mandoratory that cable operarators enable tapping of fibre cables by NSA/GCHQ etc and so by inference China and Russian equivalents.

Same point really: Certainly there are ways of intercepting cable signals, but they are land-based and don't involve the RN.

[Lord Jim]

Where there is a will there is a way, and given how much both China and Russia are investing in these areas, as they see them as one of the West's greatest vulnerabilities, and given the number of out of work Russian subs, if it far from inconceivable for the Russians to put a server farm inside a Typhoon hull, equip it with remote submersibles, park alongside/over an undersea cable, uncover it and use some sort of gadget to splice into the cable whist causing the minimum of disruption to the flow of data. Very Tom Clancy but stranger things have happened, just read about how the CIA contracted Howard Hughes to retrieve a sunken Russian submarine in the deep ocean, covertly.

[albedo]

Again, I'm not suggesting that it's inconceivable, just implausible. Doing it must be one, if not 2 or 3 or more, orders of magnitude more difficult than with copper. Transmission is photonic so there's no magnetic field around the cable to sniff; nor AFAICS can you splice anything into the fibre/fiber without being detected - you can't use a jumper before you cut into the fibre and as soon as you make that first cut the operator will detect it. And then there's the highly complex multiplexing of many signals on the same fibre. Trying to access the land-based ends (eg the terminal equipment) of the cable strikes me as substantially easier as an option. For basic details see eg:

https://sites.google.com/site/bit4554fi ... w-it-works

Quite content to be proved wrong, but I do seriously wonder if it still isn't in the realm of 007 in practice.

[Ron5]

If they tap the same rubbish that makes its way to my laptop, they're welcome to it and more.

[Lord Jim]

Who really knows what GCHQ and other are doing regarding the Internet etc. I do get the feeling though that this was another of those "Here's another threat we need extra funding and equipment to deal with", press releases which seems to be part of an on going campaign for the RN and I wish them luck.