Mid-term review for the Strategic review?

[ArmChairCivvy]

Measuring capabilities; what to spend the money on?

The SDSR2010 was aiming for Force 2020 that realistically (without moving the goal post) would have been coming by 2023-24.

As for the latest SDSR, it can be freely admitted that the real world risks that the capabilities are/ will be protecting the UK from are morphing fast. Therefore, if we decide to lose/ gap/ put the development of a capability on a hold, the key question is: how fast can that decision be reversed?

Nuclear deterrent continuing/ going ahead; Intelligence more broadly being seen as part of defence? No objection, on my part.

Power projection still at the heart of the national strategy? No objection, on my part. RN being central to that:
- the two carriers, not only becoming the mainstay of strike, but also amphibiosity (is that a word? Ie. not only breaking windows by throwing guineas (a Parliamentary oversight phrase of long record), but also being able to get onto the shore, for more effect... and also away, if needed)
- is/ will there be everything in place to make that happen? The two obvious questions: The number (and capabilities) of the escorts, and the status/ timing for the SSS part of the maintaining capability while afloat... far from home shores.

Relative to the long lead times for these two questions, managing the numbers of F35Bs to be delivered (paid for!) looks like a "walk in the park".

The RAF: in good shape, with a clear road map (some haziness around the ISD/OSD years, but let's give that flexibility/ luxury (of keeping everyone else guessing) to the Forces, the budget managers and if any politician is involved (revolving doors and all that), to them, too).

The Army? What a question mark! What is that doing to recruiting? I don't have the numbers, and I am thinking more on the lines of the career officers/ specialists/ NCOs than in terms of hitting any short term manpower target
... a bit like what happened to the RN, when the over-zealous cuts went through

UV= MIV; when, and how many, for what purpose?
ABSV? Anything heard lately? Would be nice to have a date (and numbers) for the turreted versions, to begin with.
CLEP? Cold War relics... sure. At least the Multi-role Bdes Westminster brain-fart construct was done away with
- but how will the available funds and the force structure, now and in 10 years' time, meet? If at all...

Anyway, we will get the Ajax & cousins, and they will do everything that no other available platform can do; while we are waiting for the Big Thoughts on the force structure to emerge.
- on this, the PM & the Treasury stand in the line of the accused, the MoD and the career officers behind them (well, we do not know for sure, just my impression)

[ArmChairCivvy]

Mid-term?
-for 2010, Force 2020... err, no review, but a reset in 2015

SDSR 2015?

- to have a look , in , say 2017, if any of the 2010 objectives remain in place
- going by the record of 2010, add 20-40% to the number of years over which the changes/ enhancements would be in place

I am not talking about revising objectives, but dropping them altogether, and putting something else in their place... just to be dropped again

[bobp]

Good post would just like to add the promised equipment budget at last count 189 billion over ten years. I did say promised but have my doubts on it being spent.

[ArmChairCivvy]

The Army? What a question mark! What is that doing to recruiting? I don't have the numbers, and I am thinking more on the lines of the career officers/ specialists/ NCOs than in terms of hitting any short term manpower target
... a bit like what happened to the RN, when the over-zealous cuts went through

UV= MIV; when, and how many, for what purpose?

Fallon (a good man!) recognised the need openly. Across the services. I picked the army part of my opening shot as Deutsche Welle was reporting what other joint defence projects will be started (other than a new "eurofighter):
"The two countries are to work together on a series of defense projects. They include a long-term replacement for their current fleets of fighter planes, a joint indirect fire artillery system and a new "major ground combat system."

"The aim of this joint fighter jet project is to do research and development together... to use it together... and to coordinate on exports," Macron said as he described it as "a profound revolution."

Europe's two fighter jets are the Rafale made by Dassault and the Eurofighter, a joint project between Germany, Britain, Italy and Spain.

Some of the projects would be opened up to other European countries once they are "sufficiently developed," they said.

Speaking later in the day in a defense policy speech, Macron said French military spending would be increased from next year in order to reach a target of two percent of economic output by 2025. "It's a considerable effort, considering the current context of budgetary constraints," Macron said. Defense spending would reach 34.2 billion euros ($38.98 billion) in 2018, including 650 million euros for external operations, Macron said."

Of those in bold, the latter is clearly the new MBT already in works by KMVNexter (could explain why the Chally2 LEP ambition has been set so low?).

What's new is the indirect fire system: again could explain why the prgrm to give our Strike Bdes something more than just artillery observation and directing capabilities (ie. actual fires) was slowed down and made less specific as to its intended outcome (started with 155 mm in its name).
- when will the curtains be drawn open so that we get to see the British participation in these two? Don't hold your breath
- so.mething is cooking, though, and it need not be as fishy as the lack of news and specifics could easily suggest

[ArmChairCivvy]

the promised equipment budget at last count 189 billion over ten years.

To refine that in the spirit of bobp's comment:
(189- [31+10])/10 = 14.8 bn per year, as last year the MoD said this:

"our latest estimate is that manufacturing the 4 Dreadnought submarines is likely to cost a total of £31 billion (including inflation over the lifetime of the programme); we will also set a contingency of £10 billion"
- with better time will need to check what else is in the EP "Strategic Projects" category, at least the monies for the land nuclear establishment and the improvements to bases (boats and nukes being held in separated locations) are directly related

Of course I am taking the journo freedoms here as the EP only has a 10 year horizon, so out of the four only the first one's costs would be fully incurred over the period. However, this is balanced by the fact that when I last looked at the yearly figures, equipment depreciation and write-offs matched the new (in-year) investments... so taking £40 or so bn (or even half of it) away from a round zero is a big deal

-----------
But never fear; ACC Consulting is at the ready, to help
"ACCap - Preparation Survey - Final - Defensie
https://www.mil.be/sites/mil.../140602_ ... on_survey_-_final_v2.pdf
Belgian Defence Air Combat Capability Successor Program – Preparation Survey ..... (including the associated budget) at all levels of the decision making chain ...... just joking!

[marktigger]

as with most sdsr's its been overtaken by events and treasury interference. unless the funding with reserve is in place to carry through the concepts the whole idea of SDSR's is flawed

[ArmChairCivvy]

On another thread I made a statement about the requirement to cost all major projects for their thru-life costs before they can pass the main gate
- will need to qualify that as the 2015 Major Projects report states that it is being phased in in such a way that it applies to projects which have deliverables reaching past 2030 as for their OSDs
- that's a way for saying all new such projects (can't think of anything major that would be lifed for less than 13 years)

Why I am saying this on this thread? Because adding life stages that before were not necessarily in the costings will push up the total required across projects - and to cover this "excess" something else ( project x or y - or both!) will be crowded out altogether.

[LordJim]

The last thing the Government will want is a mini SDSR, as it will open a can of worms and they have enough of those open already. There are many holes in the implementation of the 2015 SDSR that have not been pointed out by the media who were happy to publish the PR leaflets produced in 2015 then left the subject in the cupboard under the stairs as they see the whole topic of defence as non newsworthy. The Government and MoD are more than happy with this state of affairs.

Having a mini SDSR will mean the media will begrudgingly take note of how things stand and the spotlight will show many of the holes co carefully hidden or glossed over. AS long as there are SF deployed to help fight ISIS backed up by a few jets, that satisfies the attention span of Joe Public. Throw in some film of the shiny big new carrier and everything is going quite nicely. Look we can even put troops on the streets, not in combat gear mind you but they do look good. Feeling safe are we now?

[ArmChairCivvy]

The last thing the Government will want is a mini SDSR, as it will open a can of worms and they have enough of those open already.

You are so right with the whole 1st paragraph, and the quote probably sums up what is on the PM's mind on this.

However, someone will have to carry out the cuts (remember! we only just increased the defence budget ). If that happens to be a man of integrity (a political career higher up might be beckoning, too, if Davis & Hammond neuter each other) it might be a thought to develop the rationale for those cuts (and for what is left "uncut") across abroader political base - one party or several - so that there won't be a stain "on the career" to be quoted at every suitable turn by who ever happens to be "the" opponent just then
...half of this should go under "The Conservative Party" thread, but anyway: this could be the driver for the suggestion. Surely you don't think he reads the UKDF and all those bright ideas we develop over here?

[LordJim]

The idea of creating cross party agreement on defence could be applies across all Government departments. The current system is broken. Politicians should be left to decide policy, but professionals, without any affiliation should be responsible for implementing it and more importantly deciding what is needed to carry these policies out and how much funding is needed. In theory this would stop the current situation of politicians being able to make claim after claim of what they are going to achieve, without actually funding these programmes. It would be changes in policy that are the responsibility of the Politicians, in order to balance the finances (or not).

[ArmChairCivvy]

It would be changes in policy that are the responsibility of the Politicians, in order to balance the finances (or not).

I would promote the Danish model, where the policy aims, levels of capacity for each type of (rough) military capability to go with them and finally the types of major procurements needed to be effective (efficiency also comes in - that's how we got to buy some pretty good Merlins as they were seen too big for the things to be accomplished, with the latter demanding helos that the Danish warships can take).
- the Forces act as experts and the Secreteriat in this process
- but once the Cross-party Agreement is signed, then is upto the Forces to haggle amongst themselves how any overruns and unexpected new things can be accommodated...E.g. their artillery finally ordered some guns; they had become the "buffer" over the two previous rounds and ended up with pretty much nothing to shoot with, while waiting for the next round

[LordJim]

I would actually remove the word "Capability" from the whole equation, as it seems to be used more for PR and spin that actually delivering what is needed. When we moved from Service Requirements to Capability needs, it seems the treasury was able to remove the Capacity from the debate even though this was not part of the original plan, good old Gordon Brown from doing his usual micro management once again.

We should go back to the Requirements/needs for the three services so the Challenger replacement should;

-Be a vehicle able to defeat contempory MBTs, using the RM 120mm/L55 gun as used in the Leopard 2 A6 and/or its successor together with its associated ammunition.
-Be able to withstand modern ATGWs and kinetic rounds using both improved Dorchester Armour and an Active Protection System.
-Be able to fight at night and all weathers, with advance FCS and networked information sharing.
-Have battlefield mobility at least on par with the Challenger 2, possibly sharing the same engine as the Leopard 2 A6 and/or its successor.
-Be flexible enough to be used in both conventional and asymmetric warfare.
-Be delivered before the OSD of the Challenger 2.
And importantly at current force size;
PURCHASED IN SUFFICIENT NUMBERS TO EQUIP AT LEAST TWO ARMOURED REGIMENTS AS WELL AS PROVIDE VEHICLES FOR TRAINED UNITS AND A RESERVE.

At the moment Capability is used to justify reduced numbers. If a platform is twice as capable as its predecessor then the treasury for one believe we only need half as many to do the same job. The Services have either accepted this in order to get the new equipment or have prevaricated over the capability requirement to try not to lose the numbers, but still wanting greater capability.

I have stated it many times, but the UK needs to decide on whether it wants a military of its current size or larger but not properly equipped, retaining many ancient platforms as funding is not available for their effective replacement in sufficient quantities, or a smaller military, able to do less but properly equipped and manned. Unfortunately the Army and Air Force are probably already at the bottom of the barrel, so this would entail a large reduction in the size of the Army to one division of three Armoured Infantry/Mechanised Brigades (1/2), an Airmobile Brigade, Home Defence/Public Duties Brigade and their associated support units. the Airmobile Brigade would probably comprise of two Commandoes and two Parachute Battalions and would have SF support as one of its key roles. The last Brigade mentions would be made up of the Household units but with them being reduced in size. These latter two brigades would also contain the only "Light Role" infantry formations remaining in the Army.

[ArmChairCivvy]

SUFFICIENT NUMBERS TO EQUIP AT LEAST TWO ARMOURED REGIMENTS AS WELL AS PROVIDE VEHICLES FOR TRAINED UNITS AND A RESERVE.

You are quite right to make the distinction, so your list of requirements constitutes the heavy armour capability, PRICED (=costPLUSprofit... the famous Cost+ model!) so that in can be procured in [INSERT THE QUOTE TEXT HERE].

Capability should not be ditched as a concept, though. How else do you plan for a Force Mix where capabilities are often overlapping, but you will need "this much" of x for missions of type y to be viable, say e.g. precision fired delivered at a distance, without being solely reliant on weather dependent "air" to achieve the same.
- or even design a warship. where (as we have found out lately!) you will have to apply a sharp mind and have at least a vague idea of the mission set for the cost not to balloon to double - or beyond!

[ArmChairCivvy]

size of the Army to one division of three Armoured Infantry (A)/Mechanised Brigades (B,C) (1/2), an Airmobile Brigade (D), Home Defence/Public Duties Brigade and their associated support units. the Airmobile Brigade would probably comprise of two Commandoes (D1, D2) and two Parachute Battalions (D3, D4) and would have SF support as one of its key roles. The last Brigade (E) mentions would be made up of the Household units but with them being reduced in size.

Mapping that to the structure of the Franch army (or vv.)


2.2 1re division – 1st Division

2.2.1 7e brigade blindée – 7th Armoured Brigade (A)
2.2.2 9e Brigade d'Infanterie de Marine - 9th Marine Infantry Brigade (D1, D2)
2.2.3 27e brigade d’infanterie de montagne – 27th Mountain Infantry Brigade
2.2.4 Brigade franco-allemande – Franco-German Brigade

2.3 3e division – 3rd Division

2.3.1 2e brigade blindée – 2nd Armored Brigade (B)
2.3.2 6e brigade légère blindée – 6th Light Armoured Brigade (C)
2.3.3 11e brigade parachutiste – 11th Parachute Brigade (D3, D4)

2.4 Commandement du renseignement – Intelligence Command
- our Army Bde + RM Rgmnt

3 Other Commands

3.1 Commandement de l'Aviation légère de l'Armée de terre - Army Light Aviation Command
3.1.1 4e brigade d'aérocombat - Air-Combat Brigade
- (AAC, France has more transport helos so we would need to top up with those now with the RAF)
3.2 COS
3.2.1 Commandement des forces spéciales terrestres - Army Special Forces Command
- SF + SFSG
3.3 Commandement de la Légion étrangère - Foreign Legion Command
- The Brigade of Gurkhas; maps exactly as the third rgmrnt/bn of the Foreign Legion is within the 11th Parachute Bde and our Gurkha Rifles kept at home (Kent) also wear the maroon/red headgear

What does not map (in bold)
2.2.3 27e brigade d’infanterie de montagne – 27th Mountain Infantry Brigade
- this would have to be the E, ie. the"Guards"
2.2.4 Brigade franco-allemande – Franco-German Brigade
- and here the French are getting 2 for 1 (or really, one for a half) so that would map to "any other light infantry bns remaining, like the two on Cyprus= a nice demi-brigade there)
- there is likely to be a similar formation with the Belgians in the future (just like the Dutch Mech & Air Assault bdes are now within the German 1st Panzer). Because we are not equipped to operate with the US Army heavy bdes, slotting in with the USMC with inter-operability at all levels has for long been an observable goal, at the "mini" level we have the Joint Force of RM & the Dutch Marines... I wonder if the second deployable Division HQ (used to good effect in former Yugoslavia and in A-stan) has already been deemed a luxury too expensive? And if so, how will we then handle the new JEF force if the planned maximum of 10.000 is ever mobilised?

Derived from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Structure ... rench_Army

[LordJim]

I would say that the planned maximum of 10,000 is not realistic if we want them to be properly trained and equipped with modern kit.

[ArmChairCivvy]

That JEF was the UK/NL one where all Scandi/ Baltic nations have joined
- UK acting as the framework nation
- may be some RM/ PARA, but mainly the HQ plus enablers

Tha Anglo-French one has one more letter to it - see, can't remember all these v similar acronyms - where the planned strength is 13.000 (at the "instant" deployment max), so only 2/3's of the 10k on UK's part
- despite the many exercises that have been held, what actually is earmarked is not that clear... may be some triple- quadruple "hatting" might emerge?

[LordJim]

We seem to be doing the good old new is the same as the old when it comes to allocating units to joint formations. The same units are allocated to numerous different Multi-national groupings which looks great on paper and really helps the Spin Doctors write how we are still a major power etc. Shouldn't we declare we have X number of units available for deployment on the one hand and then state we are willing to contribute these to one Multi-nations grouping at a time depending on the circumstances. The current idea of grouping individual battalions from different nations together must be a logistical nightmare. If we are going to do this surely we need far more commonality within NATO. Otherwise how effective are such formations going to be if that actually have to fight rather than a political statement of intent.

Should the UK for example declare an Brigade for deployment in Latvia with a battalion level battlegroup deployed forward and the remainder on short(ish) notice to deploy in support. The US does the same in Estonia with the follow units in Germany and the Poles do the same in Lithuania.

[Frenchie]

I do not understand what you're looking for ?

[AstuteAssassin]

(Sorry if this is abit ranty/pessimitic)

Any mid-term review or 'refreshing' would be a waste of time in my opinion. The out come would be more cuts to make military "more capable" along with alot of fingers in ears so they can't here the real problems such as, lack of proper funding, man power issues, lack of equipment and most importantly the problems abroad that require a larger military to deal with. Stuff like, Terrorism, Russia, rising China, North Korea, Iran, potentially Argentina, Spain pushing buttons, along with regional powers that are becoming less and less dependant on the West such as India, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Japan, S. Korea, which could be problematic down the road, lesser so with Japan & S. Korea.
The only way in which a mid-term review would be good in my opinion is if it actually resulted in proper rebuilding of size and capablities coupled with proper funding + reserves and less meddling from the mops in charge. It won't though as i'm sure everyone already on here knows.

[ArmChairCivvy]

Stuff like, Terrorism, Russia, rising China, North Korea, Iran, potentially Argentina, Spain pushing buttons, along with regional powers that are becoming less and less dependant on the West such as India, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Japan, S. Korea,

Extra points for defining which two of these actually could/ should be dealt/ countered/ deterred with or by military means, ie,. have any impact on the capability and capacity calculations... those both are the ones that cost money, when you don't look at just the current year: we spent this much on manpower, so much on fuel, we even expended some rounds down the range (or perhaps missiles)

[Frenchie]

2.2.3 27e brigade d’infanterie de montagne – 27th Mountain Infantry Brigade
2.2.4 Brigade franco-allemande – Franco-German Brigade

The Franco-German Brigade has only a symbolic value, it is a null operational unit, although it is composed of 5,000 men, we spend money for symbols, in short.

On the other hand, the 27th Mountain Infantry Brigade is an elite unit like the 11th Paratrooper Brigade. Its particularity is to be able to carry out all its missions in extreme climatic conditions of course.
Every day of the year, the 27th Mountain Infantry Brigade maintains this rapid projection capacity of mountain commandos that can carry out a "entry in first" on a mountain theater, for example to send men capable of helping quickly, by equipping a cliff with carabiners, for allow a non-specialized unit to cross it. As the mountainous areas remain areas where the enemy fighters find shelters, it is necessary to know how to controler them.
It is equipped with Vikings, VAB, AMX10RC, CAESAR, snowmobiles.

[ArmChairCivvy]

particularity is to be able to carry out all its missions in extreme climatic conditions of course.

The reason I recently disappeared for two months was that I bought one of their tents (for 3 men, so a palace for me) and tested it in arctic and mountain conditions.

Yes, a pity that the WW2 campaign in Norway was so late in the spring. Otherwise, against the infanterie de montagne the road-bound German formations would not have got anywhere.

[AstuteAssassin]

Stuff like, Terrorism, Russia, rising China, North Korea, Iran, potentially Argentina, Spain pushing buttons, along with regional powers that are becoming less and less dependant on the West such as India, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Japan, S. Korea,

Extra points for defining which two of these actually could/ should be dealt/ countered/ deterred with or by military means, ie,. have any impact on the capability and capacity calculations... those both are the ones that cost money, when you don't look at just the current year: we spent this much on manpower, so much on fuel, we even expended some rounds down the range (or perhaps missiles)

Why only 2?
For me a military that could actually fulfill the "Global Britain" ambition of the government should be able to have a hand in dealing with most of if not all of those problems.

[ArmChairCivvy]

potentially Argentina, Spain pushing buttons, along with regional powers that are becoming less and less dependant on the West such as India, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Japan, S. Korea,

OK, if we cut this tail off the list, may be 3 on the rest of it.

The next thing is to grade them
- on-going but (militarily) minor
- expected probability v low, but too major to handle (on our own)
And! anything in-between. Here one can see how supporting alliances (NATO to begin with) are monies well spent.

[AstuteAssassin]

OK, if we cut this tail off the list, may be 3 on the rest of it.

The next thing is to grade them
- on-going but (militarily) minor
- expected probability v low, but too major to handle (on our own)
And! anything in-between. Here one can see how supporting alliances (NATO to begin with) are monies well spent.

My 3 (4) would be this then

#1 Terrorism, ofc is on-going and major threat home and abroad. If dealt with early it shouldn't really develop into another Afghan size conflict. Take France in the Sahel region as a decent-ish example of dealing with it early enough so it can be contained without tens of thousands of troops. I wonder how big ISIS would have become in Iraq if we stepped in we they first arrived on the edges on Mosul in 2014?

#2 Russia, low probability of any real conflict, not impossible though especially if they wanna play the 'little green men' game again but in a Baltic state. Working with NATO is vital with Russia.

#3 North Korea, may or may be a not surprise. I think the possibilty for conflict here is real even though there is little i'd expect us to do military. Soon the U.S will need to decide do they just live with a nuclear North Korea able to hit the 48 or do they launch military strikes to prevent that. But this would cause huge distruption to trade in region and have affects on the world economy along with causing more tension (maybe war some say) with China & Russia.

I'd also add Iran in 4th (for now), particular after Syria has ended. I think whilst Syria is going on they're happy to sit relatively quietly and play with their toys in Syria. However i think the plans (on paper at least) with the naval base in Bahrain, Army base rumoured for Oman or Jordan and facilities being built in Duqm to support the Carriers, means we will being in a decent to position to counter/deter Iran along with the U.S. Could do with post-ISIS basing a dozen jets in the region, particularly when a carrier isn't deployed.

I don't think huge increases would be needes to deal with those 4 (3 if you exclude N.K) somewhere in between planned 2025 numbers and 2010 numbers. All require working with Allies/Alliances, i think the Falklands is the only thing we should plan to have work solo on.