Sorry for the delay in responding, life has a habit of getting in the way. I am not saying that I am a leading authority on this, but I have some relevant experience. Most of my comments allude to the operational usage of infantry portable ATGM in a contested environment. In many ways, ATGM have been utilized as a ‘Swiss Army Knife’ in western militaries; being used to remove stubborn militants in hard to reach places, material denial, and also AFV. If you look at the usage globally since 2010, whilst there is no official published data, the trend (from a casual Google search Boolean “ATGM+Missile+Fired+Target+2010-“) would suggest that until the recent conflict in Ukraine, ATGM were not used in their primary role, with many of the systems being recently developed have been framed in this context of multipurpose munitions, and have deviated from the original purpose of denying enemy AFV the control of the battlefield. In any complex evolutionary environment, there is an equilibrium within the operational paradigm (Delaney, 2020), where complexity does add effect, but also risk for both impinging forces. Furthermore, Ukraine has taught us that infantry tactics are more aligned to previous theatres such as Germany 1945 and the operational doctrines of NATO and CCCP rather the recent experiences in the Middle East or the COIN operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria. As such, dismounted infantry on a contested field must rely on stealth (in the face overwhelming tactical ISTAR), speed, and directed rapid lethality. Operating in fixed positions is now suicide. Fire and manouver does still offer significant protection, and firing first and rapid relocation is the key mechanism for this.
My previous observations did not directly address the actual weapon systems themselves. Allow me to correct that from an operational perspective:
-both Javelin F/G (previously described as ER) and Akeron MMP are so called 5th generation ATGM. The former builds on the hugely successful and combat proven FGM-148, the latter from the lessons learned from the successful MILAN-2ER and less successful TRIGAT MR. For clarity, the MBDA catalogue itself is massively successful and recently has produced globally leading technologies. The MMP program does leverage this success. Further examination of the systems, in my opinion, renders the following germane:
-Guidance: both Javelin and MMP are autonomous IR seekers with a tandem low light TV sensor in CLU, MMP has a fibre optic man-in- the-loop reversion/supplemental system with in-flight CCTV datalink via the fibre optic trail. On first inspection, the MMP would appear to be a clear winner, however, this is not technically the case. Firstly, the CCCP long ago identified the fragility of NATO ATGM which in the 1970-2005 period were largely wire guided. Most CCCP or Warpac doctrine called for use of high intensity supporting barrages in both VT and impact settings (SMP, 1986, 1988, 1990), this caused significant concern for NATO ATGM crews due to the high chance of wire breaks due to shrapnel. In this fact, even if you were well emplaced or firing from behind FLOT (who themselves were under indirect fire), this was often of more concern than the artillery itself. In addition, most AFV would have wire mesh screens on the front of the emplacement or in screens arrayed in front of fixed positions to entangle both wires and in the case of subsonic munitions, the round itself. When in service, I had the chance to discuss tactics from newly joined NATO members from the old Soviet bloc. They were amazed that the West did not really appreciate how the Warpac had developed such tactics, and this was the driving force for the command guidance links on the 9M133. I had the opportunity to train on this system and found the wireless link and the speed of the projectile was impressive, being simple to use, and intuitive, negating the need for complex training that many western ATGM crews underwent. Furthermore, obscurant such as the 902 A/B Tucha smoke grenade launchers which were fitted to most CCCP AFV would render LLTV ineffective. The remote defilade option with a supersonic round is on face value an attractive option, but in the age of modern IIR surveillance, UAV/UGV, and autocued fire control, I feel that this is significant risk to all but firing from inside armour or stage 3 fortification. The standard Warpac response to located ATGM was battery level fires on the grid square, any delay in leaving the firing position could/would be fatal.
Using this doctrine as a prism, the primary usage is direct fire on a preselected target or immediate fire-to-effect emergent targets of opportunity using the IR sensor. In this, there are significant differences; Javelin F/G having a cooled CLU sight (Sterling cycle) and IIR seeker (Argon canister) within the round, whilst the MMP uses as an uncooled IIR array. The original concerns of cycling the weapon coolant for acquisition (as seen in the FIM-192 where the engagement cycle could not exceed 45 seconds) are negated by the super rapid chill of the sensor and lock on in the last 2 seconds of the engagement cycle. This may seem somewhat unimportant due to both having exceptional accuracy and reliability; this is not the case. Cooled IIR sensors have significant advantages in ambient temperatures where emitted background radiation is in the 8-14um wavebands; this is further more significant when targets are using smoke and IR obscurants which often work in 5-22um wavebands, and those using thermal blanketing to obscure higher wavelength IR radiation. Most cooled IIR arrays have an NETD of <20 whereas, uncooled usually have NETD of approximately 60. In a first shot, first kill situation, even if the CLU can acquire the target in obscurants, the missile also needs to lock on, the AFV has no such limitation due to high quality IIR being standard, and as such can fire down the threat channel with a supersonic gun projectile. Due to the aforementioned supporting arms, and obscurants, the LLTV and wire guidance is of little value even in the LOAL modes. This is further compounded by the need for the CLU to auto-refresh following the motor ignition when using man-in-the-loop. This was and remains a problem for IR (S)ACLOS systems, limiting the minimum firing range. This is mitigated if you have a good close range system such NLAW or AT-4 however. Due to the complexity of the seeker software, both are unlikely to be seduced by cruder IR jamming systems such as the Shtora series emitters, but both remain vulnerable to directed energy systems fitted to some of the more modern western vehicles and in limited number to T-90BVM2 or the new T-14. These can be hard kill systems but often are distractive, cooled seekers are more likely to be able to counteract this.
-range: again on paper MMP is a marginal winner by a up to a claimed 1000m, but this is a technical point. Range is dictated by the ability to use operational intelligence, surveillance, and direct observation. Using a 200000 Euro round for fire and see operation is unlikely, and almost certain to attract unwelcome attention. That said, if used by embedded mico-UAV operations it might be marginally better, using the UAV to fix a target and then allow the round to LOAL on a defiladed target. That said, such operations are time intensive and in reality rare. The ability of a fire team to prosecute such a mission under intense fire is in my opinion unlikely, unless they are under armour. Here MMP might be more comparable to Exactor or Brimstone, and could useful in the medium indirect anti-armour role. That said, guided indirect fires (such as Bonus or the Rafael anti-armour mortar round) fill this role, are easier to bring in mass, and are somewhat cheaper.
Given the majority if not totality of engagements for dismounted ATGM teams are going to be ambush/linear regressionary engagements, or targets of opportunity, any engagement range over 2Km is likely to be sufficient, especially Eurasian theatre. Occasionally, in ideal desert or arctic conditions, longer range engagements might be possible, but this works both ways. Certainly western doctrine was, and I believe still is to have defence in depth with overlapping linear and arcal fields of fire allowing a shoot’n’scoot type engagement. To do this, the first rounds are fired well within the no-escape zone of the system, making long range less important. The consensus is to hold as many vehicles in the field of fire, rather than allowing contact to be broken, reorganisation of the enemy, and the application of enemy indirect fire. As such, often the rear team is the range collimator in the engagement. In the case of older wire guided systems, often the rear team was at 1800m, the front teams firing at 1000m, the rounds often hitting the first vehicles at 800m due to flight times.
In some ways, speed is a more important factor. Here there appears to be a neglible advantage to Javelin (Mach 2+) vs MMP (no published source, but hinted to be Mach 1.5). This is important especially in a ballistic arc. The time for the engagement is shorter, there is more Ek in the terminal MIF, therefore less time for any APS to react. Currently our understanding of the APS on Russian and Chinese systems is poor, but they are thought to be more tailored for direct overflight or direct aim point engagements (Delaney, 2020). A ballistic attack might therefore be a better approach rather overly top-attack such as Bill-2/NLAW. However, the latter system seems to have done well in Ukraine defeating upgraded T72, T80, and T90 variants as confirmed by Oryx. Here Javelin with a higher speed is perhaps a better option.
Further to this, most tanks tend to carry a APFSDS round chambered, this is not a significant concern to an ATGM team. Therefore, a shorter MIF would allow the vehicle to be hit before the autoloader could cycle the round or if to be fired and a new HE round chambered (in the case of the 2A46, 6.5 seconds per cycle).
-warhead: this was interesting comparing the claimed effects. MMP makes comparable claims to Javelin with respect to penetration of RHA and hardened structures despite being 1.2 kg lighter than the new multipurpose effects warhead of Javelin, both using a tandem HEAT arrangement. That said, having examined a couple of videos in slow motion, MMP looks very similar to the Milan-2, producing a stable focused primary plasma jet and then a very controlled secondary, albeit better collateral distribution of fragmentation. The target is neutralized efficiently. The Javelin in my experience is unlike anything I have fired (with the exception of the LAW-80), simply devastating an armoured target, especially when hitting the top of the turret. I admit, there is very little data available online, but as a user I would take the big boy in this case.
-utility: MMP is fully 3.7 kg heavier for the launcher and round, but the rounds themselves are slightly lighter at 15kg, vs 15.9 for Javelin. Given that a 2 man fire team will likely carry a maximum of 3 rounds, this evens out. The real difference is in the utilization of the system. MMP is a tripod mounted system and cannot be shoulder fired. The set up time is marginal but not insignificant. A Javelin can be shouldered, initiated, target locked, and the round away in less than 7 seconds by an experienced operator. Tripod units are needed for ACLOS type engagements due to the increased need for stability, this takes time. Using MILAN-2, on average my ginners could get set up in 25 seconds from leaving a vehicle. I would assume this is similar to MMP. If the CLU is active in Javelin, there could be a second round fired before the MMP gets a shot away. I know to some, this might seem an insignificant factor, but in my experience, it is the most important. The ability to emerge from cover, get a round away and relocate is the only defence an ATGM team has. The enemy is likely to counter fire any firing point unless the tank or AFV is operating unsupported by infantry or indirect fires. Here Javelin is the clear winner.
Finally we come to future development and logistics. At the risk of sounding a Luddite, if it works, why change it (cue the SLR posse). Any new system requires a totally new training package, logistics footprint, and in the case of MoD, a new through life costing assessment. The latter is becoming increasingly important when the defence budget is shrinking and HM Treasury insisting this be followed. New lines mean less weapons. This is before we consider the long history of rolling upgrades the US programs follow. NIche European products often are world leading but fail to follow incremental upgrade pathways similar to US systems (for example the SM series of weapons, Tomahawk, and B52!). They are world leaders for a short period of time. In my opinion for such a utility weapon needed in large numbers, I would license produce Javelin here to protect UK jobs if you must but ideally buy off the shelf.
The experiences of Ukraine have showed, even in relatively untrained hands, Javelin can be used effectively with limited initial operational experience. More complex systems such as MMP do take time to train, integrate into ORBAT, and field effectively. In UK hands, there are numerous accounts of the Javelin being used in Herrick by troops untrained on the system to significant effect whilst under heavy fire, being a totally intuitive system. Whilst I acknowledge things have moved on considerably, using (S)ACLOS systems requires considerable training, limiting one of the key benefits claimed by MMP.
I appreciate I often am quite brief in my comments in the forum, but it does come from some level of experience, and even though I have had a complete career change, I still try to keep current on the salient systems and tactics (as evidenced above). I find some the comments levied a little distasteful and I would like to address them directly:
If you have to resort to "because I said so" and "don't you know who I am?", it's usually a sign that you don't have a very strong argument.
You don’t and won’t know who I am. Suffice it to say, I have some significant experience of the systems discussed above, their utilisation, and the practicalities of ATGM operations in contested environments.
“I fought a substantially weaker opponent with obsolete equipment twenty-odd year’s ago” doesn’t automatically give you the final word on more modern technology.
You are correct, I was a much younger man. That said, the opponents I trained to fight was the Second Guards Shock Army (or subsequent analogues), I would argue they were not weaker or obsolete. The opponents who I did fight were as well if not better equipped than us, in 2 cases considerably more numerous, and very highly motivated. The exact details are not relevant to this forum and are likely to be obscured for several years to come. That said, I am still here (as are my team), and they are not. Call that good judgement, training, or (most likely) luck if you will, personally I do not care.
“But everything takes a different shape when we pass from abstractions to reality. In the former, everything must be subject to optimism, and we must imagine the one side as well as the other striving after perfection and even attaining it. Will this ever take place in reality?”
Delaney V;
https://mwi.westpoint.edu/on-killing-tanks/
Sen, V, et.al.;
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles,/PMC6308595/
SMP 1985,1986, 1988, 1990;
https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/AD1120503
