Current & Future Escorts - General Discussion
Re: Current & Future Escorts - General Discussion
Amongst all the wailing, gnashing of teeth and rending of clothes, I just thoughtthat I'd throw n this thought - maybe the number of CAMM has been reduced to allow for a better model of 57/40mm, or to improve the fire control system to incorporate radar. As we all know, this variant of the T31 is not intended to be a major combattant, but good gunnery is likely to be a neccessity.
The pessimist sees difficulty in every opportunity. The optimist sees the opportunity in every difficulty.
Winston Churchill
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Re: Current & Future Escorts - General Discussion
From the various cgi hints and non-attributable press briefings, I think we can conclude the following options are still being debated for the T31:
A.Types and numbers of guns
B. E/O or E/O + Radar gun fire control
C. Numbers of CAMM
D. Possibility of HMS
Given that there appears to be a debate, I would guess the "top spec" is unaffordable:
A. 5" turret A, 57mm turret B & C
B. STIR EO Mk2
C 48 CAMM
D. UMS 4110 HMS
But the low spec is affordable with maybe some budget to spare:
A. 57mm turret A, 40mm turret B & C
B. Mirador Mk 2
C. 12 CAMM
D. No HMS (but fit to receive?)
So something between these two appears likely.
A.Types and numbers of guns
B. E/O or E/O + Radar gun fire control
C. Numbers of CAMM
D. Possibility of HMS
Given that there appears to be a debate, I would guess the "top spec" is unaffordable:
A. 5" turret A, 57mm turret B & C
B. STIR EO Mk2
C 48 CAMM
D. UMS 4110 HMS
But the low spec is affordable with maybe some budget to spare:
A. 57mm turret A, 40mm turret B & C
B. Mirador Mk 2
C. 12 CAMM
D. No HMS (but fit to receive?)
So something between these two appears likely.
Re: Current & Future Escorts - General Discussion
One point to note is, that if we stay with the "mushroom" launchers, we are not limited to multiples of 8, so (say) 15 or 18 CAMM is a viable alternative. Presumably there is a lower limit at which the additional control electronics make it too expensive
The pessimist sees difficulty in every opportunity. The optimist sees the opportunity in every difficulty.
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Re: Current & Future Escorts - General Discussion
The current T23 Sea Ceptor fit of 32 missiles includes 2 command and control cabinets, and also 4 launch management cabinets (one for every 8 missiles).
Across the 13 T23s, that would mean a total of 52 launch management cabinets. Eight T26s, each with 48 CAMM, would require a total of 48 launch management cabinets. In theory leaving only 4 for T31.
Maybe the T26 project has already committed to buy 18 supplemental launch management cabinets for their first 3 T26s. That would leave 22 available for T31.
That would in theory, allow 3 of the T31 to carry 32 CAMMs, and 2 with 40 CAMMs (or 3 with 24 CAMMs and 2 with 48 CAMMs).
Of course, it would be possible for the T31 project to buy extra launch management cabinets. Or it would be possible for the launch management cabinets to be upgraded so each could manage more missiles (12?).
Give all these possibilities that cross between T31, T26 and Complex Weapon projects, I can understand why such decision making takes a bit of time.
Across the 13 T23s, that would mean a total of 52 launch management cabinets. Eight T26s, each with 48 CAMM, would require a total of 48 launch management cabinets. In theory leaving only 4 for T31.
Maybe the T26 project has already committed to buy 18 supplemental launch management cabinets for their first 3 T26s. That would leave 22 available for T31.
That would in theory, allow 3 of the T31 to carry 32 CAMMs, and 2 with 40 CAMMs (or 3 with 24 CAMMs and 2 with 48 CAMMs).
Of course, it would be possible for the T31 project to buy extra launch management cabinets. Or it would be possible for the launch management cabinets to be upgraded so each could manage more missiles (12?).
Give all these possibilities that cross between T31, T26 and Complex Weapon projects, I can understand why such decision making takes a bit of time.
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Re: Current & Future Escorts - General Discussion
I understand my proposal is not as popular as other proposals, such as adding hull sonar, USV and Mk.41 VLS etc. etc to show the improvement way for T31. I am proposing ideas to improve RN. But, I agree it is just one idea/proposal.Aethulwulf wrote:There are three reasons I used the word pathetic:
A. Who do you think is listening to your proposals, apart from the other 5 or 6 people who regularly fill this forum with their own fantasy drivel? No one in the RN is paying the slightest attention. No one with decision making powers is reading this. Why do you bother?
B. You claim your proposals are cost neutral, but you have no facts or no data to input into your calculations. Rubbish in, rubbish out. Why do you bother?
C. All three bids were meticulously assessed against various survivability scenarios. Even if we assume (wrongly) the RN would then be happy to accept a reduction in the baseline survivability of some of the T31s, would not the other two bidders cry foul and insist that their proposals be reassessed against the now less capable preferred design?
More than happy to speculate about what we think the eventual T31 configuration will be, but keep it real. Keep it to what you think what the RN might choose, not what you (or I) would like to propose.
My proposal is inspired by the following fact.
Initial two hulls of the JMSDF FFM (~5000 t full load, with ~350M GBP each on average) fleet omitted the Mk.41 VLS to save money. The hull-3 and 4 have 16-cell Mk.41 VLS each. The AAW capability of the initial 2 hulls is virtually only a single SeaRAM, but they did not went with "8-cell VLS each". This is the real approach JMSDF has taken. I think this is a clear message, "hull-1 and 2 must be added with 16-cell VLS in near future".
If the five T31 hulls commission with 12 CAMM each, it means "12 is enough" for people, including Treasury. And, I bet movement for "any more CAMM" will rapidly disappear. This is my whole point.
But, as this proposal looks unpopular, anyway I will stop here.
Re: Current & Future Escorts - General Discussion
Would it not be more desirable to front load the units with a larger missile fit - buying time to cement the learning curve and find out exactly how much extra funding would be needed?donald_of_tokyo wrote:
But, as this proposal looks unpopular, anyway I will stop here.
This way the admirals can make their argument easier to the treasury.
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Re: Current & Future Escorts - General Discussion
Thanks, very informative info.Aethulwulf wrote:The current T23 Sea Ceptor fit of 32 missiles includes 2 command and control cabinets, and also 4 launch management cabinets (one for every 8 missiles).
Isn't the launch management cabinets (or Launch Management System LMS) capable to handle 12 CAMM each? Reference: https://www.lockheedmartin.com/content/ ... 042419.pdfAcross the 13 T23s, that would mean a total of 52 launch management cabinets. Eight T26s, each with 48 CAMM, would require a total of 48 launch management cabinets. In theory leaving only 4 for T31.
I think you are "estimating" that HMS Argyle's CAMM electronics, to decommission in 2023, will be handed over to T31-hull-1 which is to hit the water in 2023, and commission on ~2025? If, only one LMS each is needed for a T31 with 12 CAMM, a single T23 decommissioning can provide those for 4 hulls.Maybe the T26 project has already committed to buy 18 supplemental launch management cabinets for their first 3 T26s. That would leave 22 available for T31.
That would in theory, allow 3 of the T31 to carry 32 CAMMs, and 2 with 40 CAMMs (or 3 with 24 CAMMs and 2 with 48 CAMMs).
Of course, it would be possible for the T31 project to buy extra launch management cabinets. Or it would be possible for the launch management cabinets to be upgraded so each could manage more missiles (12?).
Give all these possibilities that cross between T31, T26 and Complex Weapon projects, I can understand why such decision making takes a bit of time.
[EDIT] Ups. "command and control cabinets" is not enough, though. And of course the SeaCeptor software itself.
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Re: Current & Future Escorts - General Discussion
Thanks. I'm just following the BMT's paper on "Flexible Design as an Acquisition Opportunity - BMT Group", which was one of the basis for National Ship Building Strategy. The basic idea is to build the earlier hull more simple, and as learning curve evolves, increase the complexity. This will "flatten" the work-loads needed for the ship building. In other words, ship builder can keep going with (relatively) fixed number of workers, not "hire and then fire".Roders96 wrote:Would it not be more desirable to front load the units with a larger missile fit - buying time to cement the learning curve and find out exactly how much extra funding would be needed?donald_of_tokyo wrote:
But, as this proposal looks unpopular, anyway I will stop here.
This way the admirals can make their argument easier to the treasury.
[EDIT] Actually, JMSDF FFM building approach is in line with this approach. Not sure it has the same origin, or just a coincidence.
See Fig.6 and 8 of the following paper.
https://www.researchgate.net/publicatio ... tunity.pdf
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Re: Current & Future Escorts - General Discussion
You might be right. But for some reason on the T23 the Sea Ceptor launch management cabinets only handle 8 missiles each.donald_of_tokyo wrote:Isn't the launch management cabinets (or Launch Management System LMS) capable to handle 12 CAMM each? Reference: https://www.lockheedmartin.com/content/ ... 042419.pdf
https://www.savetheroyalnavy.org/from-s ... ve-shield/
Re: Current & Future Escorts - General Discussion
It's an interesting idea. It is always easier to loosen the purse strings if the risk is out of the way, however.donald_of_tokyo wrote:Thanks. I'm just following the BMT's paper on "Flexible Design as an Acquisition Opportunity - BMT Group", which was one of the basis for National Ship Building Strategy. The basic idea is to build the earlier hull more simple, and as learning curve evolves, increase the complexity. This will "flatten" the work-loads needed for the ship building. In other words, ship builder can keep going with (relatively) fixed number of workers, not "hire and then fire".Roders96 wrote:Would it not be more desirable to front load the units with a larger missile fit - buying time to cement the learning curve and find out exactly how much extra funding would be needed?donald_of_tokyo wrote:
But, as this proposal looks unpopular, anyway I will stop here.
This way the admirals can make their argument easier to the treasury.
See Fig.6 and 8 of the following paper.
https://www.researchgate.net/publicatio ... tunity.pdf
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Re: Current & Future Escorts - General Discussion
May be manageable if all the hulls are included in a single contract from the beginning.Roders96 wrote:It's an interesting idea. It is always easier to loosen the purse strings if the risk is out of the way, however.
![Very Happy :D](./images/smilies/icon_e_biggrin.gif)
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Re: Current & Future Escorts - General Discussion
Very interesting. In your view, what would you prioritise from the list, and if you have to make a compromise between the two lists of specs what would it be?Aethulwulf wrote:Given that there appears to be a debate, I would guess the "top spec" is unaffordable:
A. 5" turret A, 57mm turret B & C
B. STIR EO Mk2
C 48 CAMM
D. UMS 4110 HMS
But the low spec is affordable with maybe some budget to spare:
A. 57mm turret A, 40mm turret B & C
B. Mirador Mk 2
C. 12 CAMM
D. No HMS (but fit to receive?)
So something between these two appears likely.
Re: Current & Future Escorts - General Discussion
Another option would be that the retiring Type 23's have interested buyers who wish to retain the Sea Ceptors. In which case, no hand me downs.Aethulwulf wrote:The current T23 Sea Ceptor fit of 32 missiles includes 2 command and control cabinets, and also 4 launch management cabinets (one for every 8 missiles).
Across the 13 T23s, that would mean a total of 52 launch management cabinets. Eight T26s, each with 48 CAMM, would require a total of 48 launch management cabinets. In theory leaving only 4 for T31.
Maybe the T26 project has already committed to buy 18 supplemental launch management cabinets for their first 3 T26s. That would leave 22 available for T31.
That would in theory, allow 3 of the T31 to carry 32 CAMMs, and 2 with 40 CAMMs (or 3 with 24 CAMMs and 2 with 48 CAMMs).
Of course, it would be possible for the T31 project to buy extra launch management cabinets. Or it would be possible for the launch management cabinets to be upgraded so each could manage more missiles (12?).
Give all these possibilities that cross between T31, T26 and Complex Weapon projects, I can understand why such decision making takes a bit of time.
Re: Current & Future Escorts - General Discussion
My guess is that the main radar can pick up some of the slack with an E/O only fire director.Aethulwulf wrote:From the various cgi hints and non-attributable press briefings, I think we can conclude the following options are still being debated for the T31:
A.Types and numbers of guns
B. E/O or E/O + Radar gun fire control
C. Numbers of CAMM
D. Possibility of HMS
Given that there appears to be a debate, I would guess the "top spec" is unaffordable:
A. 5" turret A, 57mm turret B & C
B. STIR EO Mk2
C 48 CAMM
D. UMS 4110 HMS
But the low spec is affordable with maybe some budget to spare:
A. 57mm turret A, 40mm turret B & C
B. Mirador Mk 2
C. 12 CAMM
D. No HMS (but fit to receive?)
So something between these two appears likely.
If so, my next guess would be that the navy would be very happy with 5" gun plus 40mm fore & aft, Mirador, 24 CAMM, and the sonar. If the budget has indeed swelled to 350 million per ship, would that be affordable?
OTOH I've read on more than one blog that the ex-submarine RN chief engineer has firmly stated no 5" gun. I have no idea why not.
Re: Current & Future Escorts - General Discussion
Well done Donald-san, that LM document is an excellent find.donald_of_tokyo wrote:Thanks, very informative info.Aethulwulf wrote:The current T23 Sea Ceptor fit of 32 missiles includes 2 command and control cabinets, and also 4 launch management cabinets (one for every 8 missiles).Isn't the launch management cabinets (or Launch Management System LMS) capable to handle 12 CAMM each? Reference: https://www.lockheedmartin.com/content/ ... 042419.pdfAcross the 13 T23s, that would mean a total of 52 launch management cabinets. Eight T26s, each with 48 CAMM, would require a total of 48 launch management cabinets. In theory leaving only 4 for T31.I think you are "estimating" that HMS Argyle's CAMM electronics, to decommission in 2023, will be handed over to T31-hull-1 which is to hit the water in 2023, and commission on ~2025? If, only one LMS each is needed for a T31 with 12 CAMM, a single T23 decommissioning can provide those for 4 hulls.Maybe the T26 project has already committed to buy 18 supplemental launch management cabinets for their first 3 T26s. That would leave 22 available for T31.
That would in theory, allow 3 of the T31 to carry 32 CAMMs, and 2 with 40 CAMMs (or 3 with 24 CAMMs and 2 with 48 CAMMs).
Of course, it would be possible for the T31 project to buy extra launch management cabinets. Or it would be possible for the launch management cabinets to be upgraded so each could manage more missiles (12?).
Give all these possibilities that cross between T31, T26 and Complex Weapon projects, I can understand why such decision making takes a bit of time.
[EDIT] Ups. "command and control cabinets" is not enough, though. And of course the SeaCeptor software itself.
Shame they forgot to add the price
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Re: Current & Future Escorts - General Discussion
For me the sweet spot for type 31 allowing it to conducted global patrol plus SNMG-1/2 to a good standard would beAethulwulf wrote:From the various cgi hints and non-attributable press briefings, I think we can conclude the following options are still being debated for the T31:
A.Types and numbers of guns
B. E/O or E/O + Radar gun fire control
C. Numbers of CAMM
D. Possibility of HMS
Given that there appears to be a debate, I would guess the "top spec" is unaffordable:
A. 5" turret A, 57mm turret B & C
B. STIR EO Mk2
C 48 CAMM
D. UMS 4110 HMS
But the low spec is affordable with maybe some budget to spare:
A. 57mm turret A, 40mm turret B & C
B. Mirador Mk 2
C. 12 CAMM
D. No HMS (but fit to receive?)
So something between these two appears likely.
A. 76mm turret A , 40mm turret B & C ( Plus FFBNW Phalanx each side of turret C )
B. Mirador Mk-2
C. 36 CAMM
D. HMS fitted
E. 8 NSM
As I have said before I think this would make type 31 a good area defence ship
Re: Current & Future Escorts - General Discussion
I believe the RN is against the 76mm based on prior experience. Could be wrong. Otherwise thumbs up!Tempest414 wrote:For me the sweet spot for type 31 allowing it to conducted global patrol plus SNMG-1/2 to a good standard would beAethulwulf wrote:From the various cgi hints and non-attributable press briefings, I think we can conclude the following options are still being debated for the T31:
A.Types and numbers of guns
B. E/O or E/O + Radar gun fire control
C. Numbers of CAMM
D. Possibility of HMS
Given that there appears to be a debate, I would guess the "top spec" is unaffordable:
A. 5" turret A, 57mm turret B & C
B. STIR EO Mk2
C 48 CAMM
D. UMS 4110 HMS
But the low spec is affordable with maybe some budget to spare:
A. 57mm turret A, 40mm turret B & C
B. Mirador Mk 2
C. 12 CAMM
D. No HMS (but fit to receive?)
So something between these two appears likely.
A. 76mm turret A , 40mm turret B & C ( Plus FFBNW Phalanx each side of turret C )
B. Mirador Mk-2
C. 36 CAMM
D. HMS fitted
E. 8 NSM
As I have said before I think this would make type 31 a good area defence ship
Re: Current & Future Escorts - General Discussion
The R N wasn't agented the 76mm. It was the possible loss of the 4.5 on the type 23 as a treasury cost reduction during planning. This also caused the removal of the 4.5 limited A.A. ability.Ron5 wrote:I believe the RN is against the 76mm based on prior experience. Could be wrong. Otherwise thumbs up!
Re: Current & Future Escorts - General Discussion
Bringing this over from the T31 News thread re: HMS Gloucester and Silkworm
The Iraqi's were in a "use it or lose it" situation, with the Silkworm launch site in danger of being overrun by ground forces advancing from the South and it's quite likely that they would have been happy with any result. Lt-Cmdr Riley, the AAW Officer on Gloucester (and the man who called "Vampire" on the track) thought that Gloucester was the target and that "he had 60 seconds to live" to quote his own words. He spotted the Silkworm on the 992 radar as soon as it flew out of the shore clutter and, on the second sweep (so within 5 seconds), decided it was a missile.
Since a USN A6 and Silkworm look identical on radar, it could have been either a Silkworm or an A6 late in turning its IFF back on (which happened frequently - A6s were also overflying the Silkworm launch site on their return runs, so Riley couldn't discount the track based purely on location). The only deciding factor available to him was the altitude of the track. Silkworms fly at 1000ft (less for a Seersucker) and A6's at 2000ft plus (usually 3000ft), so he had to turn on the 909 radar to ascertain altitude, which took around 30 seconds (a few seconds were also lost as the track number changed while it was being typed in, so it had to be re-entered) and established that it was flying below 1000 ft. Based on that, and his instictive feeling that it was a missile, he fired the Gloucester's missiles at 44 seconds into the engagement.
It's often been said that it was an "over the shoulder" shot, implying that the missile had gone past the Gloucester when she made the shot. The reality is somewhat different. At the point that the launch was detected, both Gloucester and Jarret were coming about, and heading East (the turn direction was mandated by the need to stay within the swept channel), away from the Kuwaiti coast. Gloucester made a hard turn to bring the launchers on the bow to bear, but was only part way through the turn when she fired - that's what made it an "over the shoulder" launch. The Silkworm was still heading towards Gloucester when it was shot down.
It took another four hours to ascertain that they hadn't actually shot down an A6.
As for why Riley "knew" within 5 seconds that it was a Silkworm, he couldn't explain how he "knew" that. There were a number of potential factors - he was aware that the Iraqi missile site was close to being overrun, so he anticipated a last-ditch attempt to mount an attack. He had warned his team only 5 to 10 minutes earlier to expect a Silkworm attack. It was coming from the right direction. It was the only track on the screen at the time, so he was able to focus on it, and perceived that it was accelerating (so could only be a missile). Subsequent analysis actually showed that it wasn't. In the end, analysts realised that the the only visual cue was that, because it was flying lower, the track had appeared further off the coast than an A6 would have. Riley had instinctively realised it, but rationally couldn't figure out why he had done so.
The following day, USS Jarret's Phalanx fired on USS Missouri's chaff cloud (the Iraqi Army dynamiting an oil well was mistaken for the exhaust plume of a Silkworm launch), resulting in Missouri taking slight damage and one minor injury.
It is only an assumption (and, to be fair, not an unreasonable one) that Missouri was the target. However, the Missouri's Phalanxes did not activate, implying that the incoming missiles were not heading for Missouri, whereas the Gloucester's did, though did not engage as the missile did not get close enough, being shot down at around 4 nm. It's also worth considering that the seeker on the Silkworm (some accounts say it was a Seersucker, which is a much more capable missile) doesn't activate until the missile is about 4km from the expected position of the target. The missile was around 7nm from Missouri when intercepted, having flown past it's stern (it also flew straight over HMS Cattistock on it's approach, so there is a possiblity that the seeker was defective)Ron5 wrote:the RN fired after the missile had missed its target
The Iraqi's were in a "use it or lose it" situation, with the Silkworm launch site in danger of being overrun by ground forces advancing from the South and it's quite likely that they would have been happy with any result. Lt-Cmdr Riley, the AAW Officer on Gloucester (and the man who called "Vampire" on the track) thought that Gloucester was the target and that "he had 60 seconds to live" to quote his own words. He spotted the Silkworm on the 992 radar as soon as it flew out of the shore clutter and, on the second sweep (so within 5 seconds), decided it was a missile.
Since a USN A6 and Silkworm look identical on radar, it could have been either a Silkworm or an A6 late in turning its IFF back on (which happened frequently - A6s were also overflying the Silkworm launch site on their return runs, so Riley couldn't discount the track based purely on location). The only deciding factor available to him was the altitude of the track. Silkworms fly at 1000ft (less for a Seersucker) and A6's at 2000ft plus (usually 3000ft), so he had to turn on the 909 radar to ascertain altitude, which took around 30 seconds (a few seconds were also lost as the track number changed while it was being typed in, so it had to be re-entered) and established that it was flying below 1000 ft. Based on that, and his instictive feeling that it was a missile, he fired the Gloucester's missiles at 44 seconds into the engagement.
It's often been said that it was an "over the shoulder" shot, implying that the missile had gone past the Gloucester when she made the shot. The reality is somewhat different. At the point that the launch was detected, both Gloucester and Jarret were coming about, and heading East (the turn direction was mandated by the need to stay within the swept channel), away from the Kuwaiti coast. Gloucester made a hard turn to bring the launchers on the bow to bear, but was only part way through the turn when she fired - that's what made it an "over the shoulder" launch. The Silkworm was still heading towards Gloucester when it was shot down.
It took another four hours to ascertain that they hadn't actually shot down an A6.
As for why Riley "knew" within 5 seconds that it was a Silkworm, he couldn't explain how he "knew" that. There were a number of potential factors - he was aware that the Iraqi missile site was close to being overrun, so he anticipated a last-ditch attempt to mount an attack. He had warned his team only 5 to 10 minutes earlier to expect a Silkworm attack. It was coming from the right direction. It was the only track on the screen at the time, so he was able to focus on it, and perceived that it was accelerating (so could only be a missile). Subsequent analysis actually showed that it wasn't. In the end, analysts realised that the the only visual cue was that, because it was flying lower, the track had appeared further off the coast than an A6 would have. Riley had instinctively realised it, but rationally couldn't figure out why he had done so.
The following day, USS Jarret's Phalanx fired on USS Missouri's chaff cloud (the Iraqi Army dynamiting an oil well was mistaken for the exhaust plume of a Silkworm launch), resulting in Missouri taking slight damage and one minor injury.
The pessimist sees difficulty in every opportunity. The optimist sees the opportunity in every difficulty.
Winston Churchill
Winston Churchill
Re: Current & Future Escorts - General Discussion
Re. the purported missile attacks October 2016 on USN ships by the Yemeni Houthi in the Bab-el-Mandeb strait and the Burke destroyer Mason shooting down Chinese anti-ship missiles.
Why 'purported'. The USN has never issued a report or released the results of an official investigation, it is to be noted Mason was operating with USS Nitze (DDG-94) and the USS Ponce (AFSB(I)-15 and sure the USN would have additional regional operational sensors but it was only the Mason that reported all three attacks.
October 2016 USNI quoting CNO Richardson: USS Mason ‘Appears to Have Come Under Attack’
From <https://news.usni.org/2016/10/15/cno-ri ... -off-yemen>
Why 'purported'. The USN has never issued a report or released the results of an official investigation, it is to be noted Mason was operating with USS Nitze (DDG-94) and the USS Ponce (AFSB(I)-15 and sure the USN would have additional regional operational sensors but it was only the Mason that reported all three attacks.
October 2016 USNI quoting CNO Richardson: USS Mason ‘Appears to Have Come Under Attack’
From <https://news.usni.org/2016/10/15/cno-ri ... -off-yemen>
Re: Current & Future Escorts - General Discussion
For what it is worth, I was told by a veteran that the missile flew down the length of Missouri. I was standing on her deck when he told me.Caribbean wrote:Bringing this over from the T31 News thread re: HMS Gloucester and Silkworm
It is only an assumption (and, to be fair, not an unreasonable one) that Missouri was the target. However, the Missouri's Phalanxes did not activate, implying that the incoming missiles were not heading for Missouri, whereas the Gloucester's did, though did not engage as the missile did not get close enough, being shot down at around 4 nm. It's also worth considering that the seeker on the Silkworm (some accounts say it was a Seersucker, which is a much more capable missile) doesn't activate until the missile is about 4km from the expected position of the target. The missile was around 7nm from Missouri when intercepted, having flown past it's stern (it also flew straight over HMS Cattistock on it's approach, so there is a possiblity that the seeker was defective)Ron5 wrote:the RN fired after the missile had missed its target
The Iraqi's were in a "use it or lose it" situation, with the Silkworm launch site in danger of being overrun by ground forces advancing from the South and it's quite likely that they would have been happy with any result. Lt-Cmdr Riley, the AAW Officer on Gloucester (and the man who called "Vampire" on the track) thought that Gloucester was the target and that "he had 60 seconds to live" to quote his own words. He spotted the Silkworm on the 992 radar as soon as it flew out of the shore clutter and, on the second sweep (so within 5 seconds), decided it was a missile.
Since a USN A6 and Silkworm look identical on radar, it could have been either a Silkworm or an A6 late in turning its IFF back on (which happened frequently - A6s were also overflying the Silkworm launch site on their return runs, so Riley couldn't discount the track based purely on location). The only deciding factor available to him was the altitude of the track. Silkworms fly at 1000ft (less for a Seersucker) and A6's at 2000ft plus (usually 3000ft), so he had to turn on the 909 radar to ascertain altitude, which took around 30 seconds (a few seconds were also lost as the track number changed while it was being typed in, so it had to be re-entered) and established that it was flying below 1000 ft. Based on that, and his instictive feeling that it was a missile, he fired the Gloucester's missiles at 44 seconds into the engagement.
It's often been said that it was an "over the shoulder" shot, implying that the missile had gone past the Gloucester when she made the shot. The reality is somewhat different. At the point that the launch was detected, both Gloucester and Jarret were coming about, and heading East (the turn direction was mandated by the need to stay within the swept channel), away from the Kuwaiti coast. Gloucester made a hard turn to bring the launchers on the bow to bear, but was only part way through the turn when she fired - that's what made it an "over the shoulder" launch. The Silkworm was still heading towards Gloucester when it was shot down.
It took another four hours to ascertain that they hadn't actually shot down an A6.
As for why Riley "knew" within 5 seconds that it was a Silkworm, he couldn't explain how he "knew" that. There were a number of potential factors - he was aware that the Iraqi missile site was close to being overrun, so he anticipated a last-ditch attempt to mount an attack. He had warned his team only 5 to 10 minutes earlier to expect a Silkworm attack. It was coming from the right direction. It was the only track on the screen at the time, so he was able to focus on it, and perceived that it was accelerating (so could only be a missile). Subsequent analysis actually showed that it wasn't. In the end, analysts realised that the the only visual cue was that, because it was flying lower, the track had appeared further off the coast than an A6 would have. Riley had instinctively realised it, but rationally couldn't figure out why he had done so.
The following day, USS Jarret's Phalanx fired on USS Missouri's chaff cloud (the Iraqi Army dynamiting an oil well was mistaken for the exhaust plume of a Silkworm launch), resulting in Missouri taking slight damage and one minor injury.
Re: Current & Future Escorts - General Discussion
Funny thing is that this latest discussion all started with a bit of pathetic navy smack delivered by an RAF man. It's a discussion that rears its head once every couple of years or so then fizzles away.
Re: Current & Future Escorts - General Discussion
"Eyewitnesses aboard both the battleship and USS Jarrett recall the missile veering sharply northwards seconds before its destruction, presumably distracted by the battleship’s chaff or jammers. However the tactical track aboard HMS Gloucester showed it ignoring the chaff and maintaining a steady course to the end"Ron5 wrote:For what it is worth, I was told by a veteran that the missile flew down the length of Missouri. I was standing on her deck when he told me.
It was 5am, dark and everyone was manoeuvering hard - there seems to have been some difference between what people "saw" and the recorded sensor evidence. The same sensor evidence established that it flew past the stern of the Missouri (though it could, of course, have been at an oblique angle, so that, in the dark, it looked as if it flew down the length of the ship. I haven't found anything in the public domain that shows the actual track taken by the missile) and that the closest point of approach was between 4 and 7nm (depending on whose account you listen to). If it was the closer range, then it's likely that the Missouri's Phalanxes would have activated (though not engaged), if the missile was heading towards it, rather than past it.
The pessimist sees difficulty in every opportunity. The optimist sees the opportunity in every difficulty.
Winston Churchill
Winston Churchill
Re: Current & Future Escorts - General Discussion
I've found veteran's recollections to be rather elastic at times ![Very Happy :D](./images/smilies/icon_e_biggrin.gif)
![Very Happy :D](./images/smilies/icon_e_biggrin.gif)
Re: Current & Future Escorts - General Discussion
Ron, saying things such as that I find offensive. Usually such banality is uttered by those who haven't served. Speaking for most veterans I would say elasticity would be a blessing. Most of us have the events in contact seared into our conscious as or more clearly than even the faces of friends and loved ones . I for one would love some 'elasticity', it would be a blessing to unsee or not to relive some things. Please take care in denigrating those who have seen the worst side of humanity to protect others such as yourself and your right to express such opinions .