donald_of_tokyo wrote:Strategy without investment nor procurement policy is, almost nothing, I'm afraid. This is technical and industrial issues, and technology and industry is pretty much proportional to the money invested.
The strategy is completely separate from any individual investment decisions - that's how Governments work. Once a strategy or policy is formulated and adopted and until it is changed, all future investment decisions that fall within the remit of the policy have to comply with the policy. If the policy is well thought out and is still fit for purpose, then future investments that fall within it's remit will STILL have to comply with the policy, even if it's in 100 years time. The money comes with the investment, not the strategy (though someone in the Civil Serice will have to be paid to "look after" the policy, of course so there will be an expense in that respect
The NSS uses two existing requirements, the T26 and T31 as examples (though the T26 has since been excluded from the NSS). This does not mean that the NSS is limited to those two projects or that those two projects ARE the NSS.
donald_of_tokyo wrote:In general, the builder has no free license for the ship design.
I didn't say or imply that . In general, however, the person who pays for the design owns it if they want to (there is a potential cost to retaining ownership, so they may decide that they do not want to). HMG seems to have chosen that path in recent years. Hopefully, in the light of experience, that will change. Technology transfer deals are also done all the time (though usually it's more a case of "we like the technology, so lets buy the company", rather than purchasing specific designs). ARM was a good example of that - a wholly British design bought out by a Japanese company, because they wanted the technology (which ARM had no intention of selling).
donald_of_tokyo wrote:H&W or A&P, doing offshore business is good. But it does not mean they retain "good" skills on ship building. Infrastructure needed for efficient ship building and for offshore infrastructure will not be the same. Training/skill will not be the same.
I do suggest that you take a detailed look through their websites, at the sort of work that they do (it's interesting reading, regardless). I think that you will find that it requires a very skilled workforce that designs and builds extremely complex marine structures (as well as ships), and also carries out major conversion and upgrade works. Freighters and passenger ships are pretty simple compared to offshore oil and gas platforms.
Since they are not specialist volume ship builders (any more) I would agree that efficiency will not be as high as the acknowledged leaders in the field, however both A&P and Cammell Laird are capable of building both complete ships and blocks for ships and would, I'm sure, be happy to focus on improving efficiency in that area if the need were there. Harland and Wolff may have further to go in respect of shipbuilding, but building large specialised blocks is a standard part of their business and I don't think it matters greatly whether they end up attached to a ship or an oil production platform.
Tempest414 wrote:As I have said before in my book there is enough work on the MOD's books to keep 5 yards open.
In general I would agree with that. The key is to make that sustainable in the future
Poiuytrewq wrote:it will make virtually no sense to sell them cheap at the 15 year point.
That's because the NSS is about sustaining naval shipbuilding as a sovereign capability, not about building the T31. It recognises that you need to keep building to a sustainable "drum beat" in order to keep the designers in practice and the yards occupied. There is a cost to that, which needs to be recognised. This point illustrates the cost well. The French have another model, which involves selling ships off the stocks for less than cost price - this pays to keep workers busy who would otherwise stand idle, claiming benefits and gradually losing their skills.