Current & Future Escorts - General Discussion

[Ron5]

You can reload ASROC at sea?

Jim's a bit out of date. He's quoting when ASROC had its own 8 round dedicated launcher that could be reloaded at sea. Long gone.

[Lord Jim]

Yes I was stuck in a time warp though a few nations still have those 8 round launchers.

[benny14]

The fact there will be no stingray on board and no other mention of alternative ASW systems. The only confirmed ASW platforms are its Helicopters.

I completely misread your previous post. "they wont have any other ASW weapon after all." Some reason I thought you said other weapons as in missiles, not ASW weapons specifically.

[shark bait]

16 TLAMs would be over double what the SSNs carry, do we have that many? with 24 cells you could carry 8 SSM, 8 ASROC and 32 Sea Ceptor, a respectable arsenal for the platform.

The T26 will have the largest missile capacity of any Royal Navy platform, with a capacity for more cruise missiles than the Royal Navy has ever used in a single conflict. It's very respectable.

ASROC is not even negotiable to me

ASROC is just rocket launcher for the Mk46 Lightweight Torpedo. As the RN already has it's own Sting Ray Lightweight Torpedo in service, a T26 would have to carry 2 different munitions for itself and Merlin.

With both torpedo's being a standard size, I assume there is the possibility to rocket launch Sting Ray using the same vehicle, but then funding a bespoke solution is difficult.

Either way ASROC is not the simple solution as touted around here, for a system with questionable effectiveness because the time to target is so long it's easy to loose the sub.

The decision may depend what happens with P8.

[ArmChairCivvy]

questionable effectiveness because the time to target is so long it's easy to loose the sub.

You can't measure in absolutes; all comparisons are relative (except that the null option is a round zero).
- what if the helo is away
- how long does it take to get it airborne (if it is not)
- what if the sub is launching a heavy torp, from well outside the range of self-defence LW torps on the ship

The onion ring defence is a std phrase in AAW/ missile defence, but the logic applies here equally. A dedicated ASROC is a luxury on smaller vessels (suitable space at a premium, and required for more often used weapon systems - volume of launches also counts). However, as was pointed out it is only a matter of how many VLS to fill these days... even one might come in handy, if bad scenarios (from above) stack up

[shark bait]

No surface combatant is likely to be sub hunting alone, it will either be part of a carrier group with a handful of Merlin available, or operating with P8 in the Atlantic.

ASW engagements tend to last hours, so aircraft should always be available to assist.

[seaspear]

I could just as easily post this on site for Australian defence news but the title of course includes future escorts ,and has relevance to many considerations faced by other navies ,I have read of the considerations for sea5000 and the various contenders what started out as a need for a frigate with excellent abilities in asw has now included abm incorporating both Ceafar and Aegis . The Navantia offering has 48 vls silos compared to the type 26 24 , there has even been articles on the benefits of a split buy in other words extending the run of the Hobart class run and upgrading to Baseline nine from the baseline 7.1 that was installed , the incorporation of baseline nine would mean the adaption of sm6 for abm . Several years ago the Asia Pacific region was seen to be the range of the bulk of world submarines, requiring a strong asw ability in the R.A.N now Nth Korea has changed the nature of the threat and perhaps impacted the selection of the sea5000 frigate

[ArmChairCivvy]

ASW engagements tend to last hours, so aircraft should always be available to assist.

Lies, bloody lies... and statistics

You don't believe in ambushes, then?

We will always, 24/7, be on the hunt - and never hunted?

[Caribbean]

It seems to me that you should base your ASW strategy on the worst-case scenario - namely that the first thing that you know about an enemy sub, is when your torpedo-defence system picks up an incoming torpedo. Anything in advance of that is a bonus.

[shark bait]

Which is the complete opposite to the real practice. If your ASW tactics are purely reactive you're dead. If you have an incoming torpedo, but no sub on screen, it will be minutes until you have a good fix, during which time 8 more torpedoes are on the way and the sub has fled.

ASW is also known as Awfully Slow Warfare because first detection tends to be tens of miles away, with the sub on the slowest approach possible to minimise noise, or hide in an underwater feature, so the search as to be proactive to chase the sub away before it gets within visual range.

Of course things are very different in coastal environments, so best practice is to stay away as much as possible.

[Caribbean]

Did I say that you should be purely reactive? No - I didn't. Please read what I said, not what you think I said. My point is that, if you can handle that scenario, then you can handle pretty much anything. I.E Prepare for the worst case and everything else is a bonus. Considering the tactics available to a submarine and the difficulty of detecting them, it is, frankly, the only sensible course of action to take. That means good torpedo detection (since they are likely to be considerably less stealthy than the submarine that fired them), coupled with an effective decoy/ counter torpedo defence as the starting point. If you haven't detected a submarine by the time it's started it's attack, then you are in trouble, yes, but to not consider that as a likely scenario is, frankly, the very pinnacle of arrogance and folly

[shark bait]

You said prepare based on that scenario, which is the totally wrong approach. In that scenario there are a couple of torpedo incoming, and a sub fleeing. That is not Anti Submarine Warfare, that's an active torpedo countermeasure system, both are needed but that's now how to base your ASW strategy.

[abc123]

It seems to me that you should base your ASW strategy on the worst-case scenario - namely that the first thing that you know about an enemy sub, is when your torpedo-defence system picks up an incoming torpedo. Anything in advance of that is a bonus.

Yeah, far better to count on best-case scenario, because what could possibly go wrong?

[Caribbean]

That is not Anti Submarine Warfare, that's an active torpedo countermeasure system

Both are part of ASW. You are now trying to distort the meaning of ASW to include only the offensive component. Both offensive and defensive measures are part of ASW. Not dying is, frankly, more important than killing the other guy. If you have the capability to defeat every attack, then you have downgraded a major platform of your opponents from a deadly threat to an inconvenience (since you will still need to modify your own behaviour to manage the threat to less capable platforms)

ASW is also known as Awfully Slow Warfare because first detection tends to be tens of miles away, with the sub on the slowest approach possible to minimise noise, or hide in an underwater feature, so the search as to be proactive to chase the sub away before it gets within visual range.

Of course things are very different in coastal environments, so best practice is to stay away as much as possible.

An edit (unnoted), added after my first response to you. That's the "Anything in advance of that is a bonus" scenario

[abc123]

questionable effectiveness because the time to target is so long it's easy to loose the sub.

You can't measure in absolutes; all comparisons are relative (except that the null option is a round zero).
- what if the helo is away
- how long does it take to get it airborne (if it is not)
- what if the sub is launching a heavy torp, from well outside the range of self-defence LW torps on the ship

The onion ring defence is a std phrase in AAW/ missile defence, but the logic applies here equally. A dedicated ASROC is a luxury on smaller vessels (suitable space at a premium, and required for more often used weapon systems - volume of launches also counts). However, as was pointed out it is only a matter of how many VLS to fill these days... even one might come in handy, if bad scenarios (from above) stack up

Exactly.

[donald_of_tokyo]

You said prepare based on that scenario, which is the totally wrong approach. In that scenario there are a couple of torpedo incoming, and a sub fleeing. That is not Anti Submarine Warfare, that's an active torpedo countermeasure system, both are needed but that's now how to base your ASW strategy.

Why you are so "optimistic" on ASW? If this is true, AAW is the same. F35B with Crowsnest and T45 will kill all the air threats, and T26 do not need CAMM, let alone T31. Then, you shall say "T26 must cut CAMM to make it cheap, to enable number to be built". What is the difference?

On the other hand, "difficulty" on arming T26 with ASROC as you said is there, I agree. I think the right way to go will be to
- wait for ASROC to be equipped with Mk.54 (anyway P-8 will use Mk.54). EDIT: Corrected. VL ASROC already uses Mk.54. from 2010.
- better be with mid-course guidance (relatively easy now), to "chase" the escaping subs.
- (fantasy) RN can even adopt Japanese new ASROC (Mach 2, "twice the range of ASROC", with the most modern LWT as warhead).

As you said, we have 7 years to come. We can discuss this more in detail.

EDIT: JMSDF all escorts (other than the two Izumo-class "DDH"s) are armed with ASROC now. So, I might be biased in thinking how ASROC is useful.

[inch]

Think your right seaspear ,always thought australia pick navantia now they got the skills to build then ,can only get cheaper from here although i do relise they slightly different .there is no way in my opinion type 26 get picked it just doesn't. Make sence. And as you say 48 cell already .just my take as always hope not posyed on wrong thread again

[matt00773]

No surface combatant is likely to be sub hunting alone, it will either be part of a carrier group with a handful of Merlin available, or operating with P8 in the Atlantic.

ASW engagements tend to last hours, so aircraft should always be available to assist.

There's no way that a surface combatant would be sub hunting whilst part of a carrier group. That would be much to noisy and very easy for the sub to identify and sit still whist the group passes on. British ASW frigates have their own Merlin for this purpose in any case. I agree thought that the P8s will be critical for the end to end capability when they come online.

[matt00773]

Think your right seaspear ,always thought australia pick navantia now they got the skills to build then ,can only get cheaper from here although i do relise they slightly different .there is no way in my opinion type 26 get picked it just doesn't. Make sence. And as you say 48 cell already .just my take as always hope not posyed on wrong thread again

An appropriate time to raise the question of the Sea5000 competition in Australia as its just a few weeks to go until the decision is made - end of Q1 I believe. Not quite sure I agree with your rationale though as the primary role for the frigates is ASW, and this has been stated many times by the Australian government including very recently. The Navantia design is just not ASW focused and the 48 VLS cells has more to do with similarities with the parent design and proposition around minimal design changes from the Hobart class to save on costs - the stated Australian requirement is for 32.

[shark bait]

Why you are so "optimistic" on ASW? If this is true, AAW is the same.

No, that is totally different. Its the nature of the beast, air power is very quick and sporadic, sea power is slow and persistent. There may be under a minute between detecting a threat and taking a hit, whereas engagement with subs tend to last hours.

So, I might be biased in thinking how ASROC is useful.

To be clear, I am not suggesting ASROC is useless, I'm suggesting it's not the no brainier like some here have proposed.

There's no way that a surface combatant would be sub hunting whilst part of a carrier group. That would be much to noisy and very easy for the sub to identify and sit still whist the group passes on.

A carrier group on combat opetarions will 100% have a ASW escorts in the group. Granted they tend to operate 20 miles along the threat axis to the carrier, which is still well within range the carriers air power.

[donald_of_tokyo]

Why you are so "optimistic" on ASW? If this is true, AAW is the same.

No, that is totally different. Its the nature of the beast, air power is very quick and sporadic, sea power is slow and persistent. There may be under a minute between detecting a threat and taking a hit, whereas engagement with subs tend to last hours.

Negative. If you think ASW Merlin is always there, in AAW-wise, AEW asset will always be there coupled with a few F35B in the air for CAP, and there will be no such case as "under a minute between detecting a threat and taking a hit" in AAW.

But no, there will be a situation AEW is not working, as well as a situation ASW Merlin is not flying enough.

Assuming getting ambushed and seeing sudden attack = detecting enemy sub only after detecting the torpedo is very likely, much more than getting a sudden attack in air raids. On the other hand, as underwater sensor is very difficult (the reason why frigates see difficulty on finding enemy subs), torpedo itself will find it difficult to detect our frigate from long distance because its sonar is very small (compared to sub's TASS). So, wired guidance is critically important when attacked from a distance.

For example, if the sub is 20 km away, it takes 12 minutes for a 50 knot high-speed heavy torpedo to reach us. The frigate shall fire ASROC to the sub, forcing it to cut the wire within 1-2 minutes. Still the torpedo is at 18-19 km away. Then, the frigate can perform good anti-torpedo soft-kill maneuvers. Of course, the torpedo cannot continuously swim at 50knot, because the noise will completely disable its sensor. Without mother-ships' wire guidance, the torpedo needs to slow-down and "listen", giving another several minutes to our frigate. I think this is not "specific" case, but rather a typical case of reaction to sudden attack/ambush.

Without such reaction, T26 will be forced to handle heavy weight torpedo in highest speed, wire-guided until just before the hit.

To be clear, I am not suggesting ASROC is useless, I'm suggesting it's not the no brainier like some here have proposed.

Here I totally agree. For me, it looks as if RN is still thinking the golden era of ASW is there, that the frigate is the hunter and SSK/SSN is the game, which was possible in 1990s. But now, again, frigates are the game and SSK/SSN is the hunter, I understand, so expecting ambush and sudden attack shall be very reasonable.

On LWT, I guess RN is thinking ship-torpedo-defence (soft kill) is much more important to invest than putting almost useless stingrays onboard. This idea itself is reasonable.


PS By the way, ASROC warhead is already Mk.54, from 2010 on. So, there is no "logistic issue", if P8A carries Mk.54.

[inch]

matt00773 don't you think Australia will think that the navantia design is good enough though ,maybe not as focused as the type26 but good enough and the added commonality with their hobarts to be the best solution than going for a whole other design ,also they got their heads round building the navantia design now ?

[seaspear]

The answer may easily come down down to what are the biggest future threats to be faced ,Australia for instance will have 3 aaw destroyers and is considering 9 asw frigates consider that ratio of capabilities , certainly the the type 26 would be able to deploy unmanned vehicles in asw operations in certain littoral operations {space not used for vls }and is built for acoustic stealth , even down to the toilet arrangements, if built would have some ability here with abm capability.
Australia is currently building the third of the evolved f105,s there are concerns that once complete , many of the skilled workforce would be lost and restarting different ships two years down the track would mean rehiring and retraining of those skilled workers lost , currently costs for shipbuilding in Australia are over 20 percent higher than the U.S and higher again for European shipbuilding nations and not having a continual shipbuilding roll out is a large factor.
I would suggest a split in the sea5000 in that further Hobarts are produced before the building of a smaller mber of specialist asw ships like the type 26 also retrofit all the current Hobart,s to baseline 9 for Aegis to accommodate the sm6 for abm .
This then addresses the more direct threat of North Korea , allows continual build and maintains workplace inefficiencies improving and provides choices in the type of ships to be deployed in the theartre

[seaspear]

Are there any thoughts on the anti torpedo torpedoes {C.A.T} that the U.S.N is currently fitting on major vessels and how this may aid asw operations ?

[matt00773]

matt00773 don't you think Australia will think that the navantia design is good enough though ,maybe not as focused as the type26 but good enough and the added commonality with their hobarts to be the best solution than going for a whole other design ,also they got their heads round building the navantia design now ?

I don't think some of the advantages in the Navantia design - which are around the commonality with existing destroyers - weighs more than meeting the basic requirements and overall lifecycle capability. Australia recently selected the French Barracuda submarine design which includes a pumpjet with a diesel engine - something never done before. They selected this over existing and operational designs which would have been less risky and did so to ensure the submarines would be effective long into their lifecycle. I don't think the Australia that selected Barracuda would select the Navantia frigate.

Anyway, its up to Australia to select what they want. We'll see in a few weeks what this is.