Current & Future Amphibious Capability - General Discussion

[R686]

mission planning will look at all options to insert via landing craft or helicopter or a mixture of both, but also mission planning can only plan with the equipment on hand its not a TEWT it cant magically produce equipment that may not exist ( haveing seen it first hand where equipment all of a sudden appears that's not in inventory and the ex becomes unrealistic)

[PAUL MARSAY]

We have all seen the adverts for the marines , I think this sort of thing is the future as I think the amphibious role will be taken by the strike brigades. What about 300 man raiding groups going forward and equipped for this role.
To be fair the marines have been the strike brigade in recent years.

[james k]

One look at the French 9th Brigade will demonstrate that an army mechanised brigade don't fare well in amphibious warfare, the role is too specific and requires too much training from day one.

We have all seen the adverts for the marines , I think this sort of thing is the future as I think the amphibious role will be taken by the strike brigades. What about 300 man raiding groups going forward and equipped for this role.
To be fair the marines have been the strike brigade in recent years.

[ArmChairCivvy]

One look at the French 9th Brigade will demonstrate that an army mechanised brigade don't fare well in amphibious warfare

I had lots of sympathy with the posts that preceded this one; this is where I got lost in the argumentation... what does that one look tell you?
- you may remember that the French marines were pros (just like the Foreign Legion) in the days of the conscript army; which - for the painful memories from Algeria - could not be used in interventions.
- have they forgotten something already, in this short time since the changes?

[shark bait]

Any operation where the enemy has significant air defence capability ashore will limit the effectiveness of an air assault

The Royal Marines will not be landing anywhere, by sea or air, where Allied forces don't have complete air superiority.

[R686]

Any operation where the enemy has significant air defence capability ashore will limit the effectiveness of an air assault

The Royal Marines will not be landing anywhere, by sea or air, where Allied forces don't have complete air superiority.

Never say Never, you don't know what the future brings

[Gabriele]

Any operation where the enemy has significant air defence capability ashore will limit the effectiveness of an air assault

The Royal Marines will not be landing anywhere, by sea or air, where Allied forces don't have complete air superiority.

They landed At San Carlos without owning the air.

[shark bait]

And they took a thumping back in the 80's by underestimating air power. That wont happen again, they wont be going anywhere QE and F35 have not already sterilized.

[Gabriele]

They knew what they were up against, but they couldn't really do anything more than was done.

[shark bait]

And they made it work back then.

If similar events were repeated today, those losses would be unacceptable, and the campaign would fail. Neither the Marines or the Army will not be able to operate without owning the air, particularly during the maneuver phase, where an amphibious force is just too vulnerable.

[Gabriele]

Not all wars are wars of choice. What is "acceptable" will vary depending on the gravity of the situation.

And having the ability to bring more decisive airpower around is why the UK built two large carriers to replace the Invincibles.

[shark bait]

Of course, there are so many variables.

Speaking broadly, anywhere that is permissible for landing craft to operate, will also be permissible for helicopters to operate, because the RN will need to have a grip on the air in either scenario.

[Gabriele]

Speaking broadly, anywhere that is permissible for landing craft to operate, will also be permissible for helicopters to operate, because the RN will need to have a grip on the air in either scenario.

Not necessarily. Enemy fast jets are just one of many things to keep under watch. Anyway, it does not change a thing: a little infantry on helicopters on its own is not amphibious capability.

[Jake1992]

Of course, there are so many variables.

Speaking broadly, anywhere that is permissible for landing craft to operate, will also be permissible for helicopters to operate, because the RN will need to have a grip on the air in either scenario.

So is your plan to scrap any real ability to bring in any heavy equipment, stores or veichles as these cant be brought in by helo.

Another question I have to ask is where are all these helos coming from the RN is already stretch in this area beyond any reasonable point, going from 194 helos to 85 odd. The only vessel that can opperate and maintain our chinooks will be the QEs which only 1 will be avalible most of the time.

And then there's the note that even the USMC have come to the conclusion that an all air OTH op is far too expensive for miles per ton and that with their enormous vertical lift capacity

[shark bait]

Anyway, it does not change a thing: a little infantry on helicopters on its own is not amphibious capability.

This is getting cyclic. I have never suggested turning the Marines into an air mobile special forces branch deployed from the sea like you keep saying.

What I do recognize the RN Marines have to change their role, or they will become the RAF regiment of the sea.

They're not getting their vehicles rewed, they're stuck with old slow landing craft, their ships are being withdrawn, their man power reduced, and the enabling elements already belong to the Army. They are slowly being cut.

[shark bait]

So is your plan to scrap any real ability to bring in any heavy equipment, stores or veichles as these cant be brought in by helo.

No. My previous comments recognize there still has to be additional logistical solutions to sustain an operation.

What I do suggest is accepting an opposed landing is off the table, and from the 20's operations will have massive air power support, the current LPD & LCU model if far from the most efficient way to supply an army from the sea.

Another question I have to ask is where are all these helos coming from the RN is already stretch in this area beyond any reasonable point, going from 194 helos to 85 odd.

Actually helicopters is on area the UK pretty flush. Plenty of commando Merlin, and loads of Chinook. The UK has more transport helicopters than it could ever deploy at sea.

[Jake1992]

So is your plan to scrap any real ability to bring in any heavy equipment, stores or veichles as these cant be brought in by helo.

Another question I have to ask is where are all these helos coming from the RN is already stretch in this area beyond any reasonable point, going from 194 helos to 85 odd.

No. My previous comments recognize there still has to be additional logistical solutions to sustain an operation.

Actually helicopters is on area the UK pretty flush. Plenty of commando Merlin, and loads of Chinook. The UK has more transport helicopters than it could ever deploy at sea.

As I pointed out the helo compliment of the RN is massively reduced from 194 to around 85. A lot of the transport merlins will be needed on the carriers for COD and the SSS and tides, the chinooks can only be maintained on the QE and even in there massive hanger take up a lot of space. With only 1 QE active most of the time having all the helos chinooks included and F35s for air power reduced both side too much.

And like I pointed out the simple costs of OTH by helo don't add up, if it's too expensive for the USMC then it's Defo too expensive for us

[ArmChairCivvy]

particularly during the maneuver phase

"Door opening" is pre- (land) manoeuvre and its main function is to create a lodgement for the build up of (land) forces to a scale that makes manoeuvre warfare (rather than being a bit player) possible.

There can, though, be many situations where STOMP is to the final objective and the scale required does not necessitate creating a lodgement.

[ArmChairCivvy]

And having the ability to bring more decisive airpower around is why the UK built two large carriers to replace the Invincibles.

Yes. And moved from Carrier Strike to CEPP.

[ArmChairCivvy]

The only vessel that can opperate and maintain our chinooks will be the QEs

A mothership for... amph. ops Even the Bays start to look good in that light (can operate two Chinooks concurrently)... not that they wouldn't be the shiniest example of RN ships on these pages anyway

they will become the RAF regiment of the sea.

They're not getting their vehicles rewed, they're stuck with old slow landing craft, their ships are being withdrawn, their man power reduced, and the enabling elements already belong to the Army. They are slowly being cut.

You are quoting plenty of observable evidence of how a raiding force is being turned into a Force Protection element; not good (both a re of course required - it is a matter of emphasis, and then the kit to go with that emphasis).

Plenty of commando Merlin, and loads of Chinook. The UK has more transport helicopters than it could ever deploy at sea.

Aren't the Commando Merlins only coming in? A small number went through an interim conversion, to be finished later.
- yes, we are aflush with Chinooks (not a bad place to be); conversely, we are short of medium helos. Merlin, having been designed for endurance, is not exactly a medium helo - except for its payload in the troop carrying mode.

[james k]

French Marines are part of the Navy. They have two Battalions (divided into security detachments at the naval bases and overseas) and several small commando units (each approximately squadron size) they are very professional. The French 9 Marine Brigade are soldiers, they have only relatively recently become amphibious troops despite the name "Marine", that in itself isn't a problem other than having a big job of catching up to do, their problem lies in being a mechanised brigade. They don't work as closely with the French Naval Fusiliers as they might and this limits their ability to carry out anything but large scale landings. They have no specialised beach reconnaissance unit, no small raid or small boat units. Their problem lies in being a relatively heavy mechanised force, limited in it's ability to carry out small scale operations. What is wrong with that statement?

One look at the French 9th Brigade will demonstrate that an army mechanised brigade don't fare well in amphibious warfare

I had lots of sympathy with the posts that preceded this one; this is where I got lost in the argumentation... what does that one look tell you?
- you may remember that the French marines were pros (just like the Foreign Legion) in the days of the conscript army; which - for the painful memories from Algeria - could not be used in interventions.
- have they forgotten something already, in this short time since the changes?

[james k]

Are you now or have you ever been a Royal Marine? worked with them? or trained as a Commando?
Because if you had then you would realise that any comparison with the RAF Regiment is completely laughable. They have nothing in common at all, the Royal Marines are first and foremost soldiers and the RAF Regiment airmen, it is a completely different ethos and mentality. Despite the self promotion the RAF Regiment are at best low grade infantrymen trained only to carry out defensive roles, hence the predominance of support weapons in their squadrons. On the other hand Royal Marines are an offensive arm, everything they are and their whole history is about taking the battle to the enemy. Any comparison is wildly stupid.

As to your other comments, yes the Corps is being whittled away and the Brigade being cut, but they have had to adapt simply to survive and a return of emphasis to the traditional commando role does seem likely. In all probability contingency plans are already being made for this in the face of further cuts. They will be able to mitigate some reduction in numbers by taking on the role of 148 battery (the real jewel in the crown of 29 Regiment) and 24 Commando an essential engineer force in the commando role.

You have also, despite your denials, suggested that the Royal Marines become a helicopter borne unit and finally your suggestion that any landings would take place under the cover of air supremacy are laughable. Firstly that suggests a very misplaced faith in the RAF and denies the possibility of conflict against Russia, China, North Korea or a host of other well armed and exceptionally numerous potential enemies.

The age of Counter Insurgency may be drawing to and end or become part of wider, more complex conflicts.

Anyway, it does not change a thing: a little infantry on helicopters on its own is not amphibious capability.

This is getting cyclic. I have never suggested turning the Marines into an air mobile special forces branch deployed from the sea like you keep saying.

What I do recognize the RN Marines have to change their role, or they will become the RAF regiment of the sea.

They're not getting their vehicles rewed, they're stuck with old slow landing craft, their ships are being withdrawn, their man power reduced, and the enabling elements already belong to the Army. They are slowly being cut.

[james k]

Nonsense and amphibious forces need not be large scale landed at a single location. Anyway the amphibious forces themselves didn't suffer particularly large casualties, it was the naval covering force which was badly hit.

And they made it work back then.

If similar events were repeated today, those losses would be unacceptable, and the campaign would fail. Neither the Marines or the Army will not be able to operate without owning the air, particularly during the maneuver phase, where an amphibious force is just too vulnerable.

[ArmChairCivvy]

The French 9 Marine Brigade are soldiers, they have only relatively recently become amphibious troops despite the name "Marine", that in itself isn't a problem other than having a big job of catching up to do, their problem lies in being a mechanised brigade. They don't work as closely with the French Naval Fusiliers as they might and this limits their ability to carry out anything but large scale landings. They have no specialised beach reconnaissance unit, no small raid or small boat units. Their problem lies in being a relatively heavy mechanised force, limited in it's ability to carry out small scale operations. What is wrong with that statement?

It runs with complete logic, and "heavy mechanised" is indeed at odds with most missions. However, the French Marines have had armour (mainly wheeled) for decades, which (before the end of conscription) boilled down to the fact that it was going to be either them or the Foreign Legion, or the two together, doing any interventions. And, therefore, had to be self sufficient in all aspects - no need to go as far as calling it "Combined Arms" capability.

But we have Frenchie here (often), who, I am sure, can clarify

[Lord Jim]

Maybe we should equip one of the Cmdos with the MIV? They would be of more use in land warfare and more mobile than the BV210s in many areas.