Current & Future Amphibious Capability - General Discussion

[Poiuytrewq]

Before that, why does the U.K. need to continue with the post-war/cold-war funding paridgm that treats the army as primary source of security, rather than an expeditionary adjunct to a broader maritime power projection?

Are you suggesting deleting the Army entirely and just rebuilding around a UKMC styled on the USMC?

[Poiuytrewq]

Sorry, but this is a completely incoherent argument - the requirement is the multitude of the requirements that we’ve discussed many many times already - they are extremely flexible floating power projection tools that can be configured in a multitude of ways. The reason for two is to ensure that this is possible 100% of the time and the ability to surge two in different configurations at the same time. Have two or none at all.

It’s totally coherent.

RN isn’t just ensuring 100% availability, (which is impossible with only two hulls) both CVFs are being used concurrently. Why is this a priority given the size of the fleet?

Routine deployments and an unusual surge deployment are two very different things. RN must find a way to provide excellent CSG availability without gutting the rest of the fleet to achieve it. A clear pathway to surging both CVFs simultaneously in unusual circumstances is good enough and if it isn’t then HMG must provide the additional funding to do more.

The Army has the funds already to have a 5 brigade structure tailored towards JEF if it stopped pissing it up the wall on bad equipment decisions and also actually focused on a strategy. Blaming the carriers is just deflection.

5 Brigades? It’s a drop in the ocean against a peer.

Where is the mass to allow for a rate of attrition?

Where is the mass to provide regular rotations?

Where is the mass to heavily deploy in two places at once?

The carriers have nothing to do with it. A more realistic operating model for the CVFs is need to stabilise RN, absolutely nothing to do with the Army.

[tomuk]

Sorry, but this is a completely incoherent argument - the requirement is the multitude of the requirements that we’ve discussed many many times already - they are extremely flexible floating power projection tools that can be configured in a multitude of ways. The reason for two is to ensure that this is possible 100% of the time and the ability to surge two in different configurations at the same time. Have two or none at all.

It’s totally coherent.

RN isn’t just ensuring 100% availability, (which is impossible with only two hulls) both CVFs are being used concurrently. Why is this a priority given the size of the fleet?

Routine deployments and an unusual surge deployment are two very different things. RN must find a way to provide excellent CSG availability without gutting the rest of the fleet to achieve it. A clear pathway to surging both CVFs simultaneously in unusual circumstances is good enough and if it isn’t then HMG must provide the additional funding to do more.

The Army has the funds already to have a 5 brigade structure tailored towards JEF if it stopped pissing it up the wall on bad equipment decisions and also actually focused on a strategy. Blaming the carriers is just deflection.

5 Brigades? It’s a drop in the ocean against a peer.

Where is the mass to allow for a rate of attrition?

Where is the mass to provide regular rotations?

Where is the mass to heavily deploy in two places at once?

The carriers have nothing to do with it. A more realistic operating model for the CVFs is need to stabilise RN, absolutely nothing to do with the Army.

Are they using both CVF concurrently? Is it not the case that due to the issues with PWLS that the cycles are out of sync. And QNLZ has had to fill in a vice versa while PWLS is brought up to FOC.

[Poiuytrewq]

Are they using both CVF concurrently? Is it not the case that due to the issues with PWLS that the cycles are out of sync. And QNLZ has had to fill in a vice versa while PWLS is brought up to FOC.

Time will tell but they are both currently fully crewed.

PWLS substituting QE at such short notice was a masterclass and this reserve capability is exactly what is needed IMO. Some QE crew transferred to PWLS to make it happen and that crew transfer ratio is what needs to be hammered out going forward.

How fast can the second carrier activate and how large of a maintenance crew needs to be regularly embarked to ensure rapid availability when required.

Also, how can a second crew be formed to operate the second carrier in a surge scenario?

It’s not ideal but considering the funding envelope and headcount I don’t RN has an option but to make it work.

[tomuk]

Are they using both CVF concurrently? Is it not the case that due to the issues with PWLS that the cycles are out of sync. And QNLZ has had to fill in a vice versa while PWLS is brought up to FOC.

Time will tell but they are both currently fully crewed.

PWLS substituting QE at such short notice was a masterclass and this reserve capability is exactly what is needed IMO. Some QE crew transferred to PWLS to make it happen and that crew transfer ratio is what needs to be hammered out going forward.

How fast can the second carrier activate and how large of a maintenance crew needs to be regularly embarked to ensure rapid availability when required.

Also, how can a second crew be formed to operate the second carrier in a surge scenario?

It’s not ideal but considering the funding envelope and headcount I don’t RN has an option but to make it work.

I think it was Navylookout that said that 80 crew transferred to PWLS to allow her to substitute.

[Poiuytrewq]

We need to be able to move mass and protect it so from this point of view we would need to get the lead elements of 3 Cdo , 16AA plus the Rangers & SF into the fight so 16AA , Rangers & SAS,SRR would go on C-17 & A400

Plus a reserve Brigade?

Also, the only thing that will stop these initial groups getting badly chewed up is extensive GBAD, Brimstone, highly mobile artillery, MLRS etc and in large quantities. All wheeled and ideally air mobile.

Massive gaps in these capabilities currently.

….we would then need a RN group with 1 x CSG plus a ARG of 3 x MRSS and then 4 Point class with the RM and SBS opening the door for a re-enforced armoured brigade and the Deep fires brigade all this under command of ARRC

However for this to work we will need both Carriers , 5 x MRSS , 6 x Point class , 30 x A-400M to allow 1 Carrier , 3 MRSS , 4 Point class , 20 A-400M & 5 C-17

Depends.

If the blocking forces stop the incursion(s) quickly then most of the runway infrastructure in Norway and Sweden can be used without the need for the CVFs or at least they could be used in a different way to secure the high north and protect the MPAs.

If the Army had previously established an Arctic/Mountain Brigade at Camp Viking along with two Battlegroups in Finland the rapid reaction Brigades could rapidly reinforce. The reserve Brigade could deploy into Camp Viking.

Whatever follows from the U.K. needs to be much heavier and there is no guarantee that the land armies in continental Europe will be available to cross the Baltic to assist. The UK will have to plan to do much of the heavy lifting until the US and Canada start to show up in quantity .

Lots of STUFT would be available to cross the North Sea to build up mass in southern Norway/Sweden so no real need for major further investment there. Much more important is considering what is needed to cross the Bothnia from Sweden to Finland. Dozens of LCU and Mexefloate would be a good start.

Unfortunately at that stage with 4x Brigades and 3x Battlegroups already committed the Army would currently have very little left to really move the dial. At least a further 3 or 4 armoured Bridges would be required with other NATO members providing the same or more to reverse any incursion. A commitment like this isn’t viable at the moment for the British Army.

It’s simply not good enough and it needs sorted asap.

[jedibeeftrix]

Before that, why does the U.K. need to continue with the post-war/cold-war funding paradigm that treats the army as primary source of security, rather than an expeditionary adjunct to a broader maritime power projection?

Are you suggesting deleting the Army entirely and just rebuilding around a UKMC styled on the USMC?

no. no more so than was true in the 19th century.
more purple if you will - at the direction of a maritime strategy, yes.

[Poiuytrewq]

no. no more so than was true in the 19th century.
more purple if you will - at the direction of a maritime strategy, yes.

The maritime strategy was historically designed to firstly contain Spain then France in the 18th/19th centuries followed by Germany in the first half of the 20th century. The rest of the maritime strategy was to protect the empire. All geopolitical irrelevances now. WW2 and the Cold War gradually dismantled Britain’s maritime first strategy.

Are you expecting a more peaceful Europe in the 21st century than was experienced in the 19th century if the U.K. pursues a unapologetically maritime strategy?

If peace and prosperity through deterrence is the goal then reestablishing a large maritime expeditionary force and keeping the SLOCs open is only part of the equation.

[Repulse]

RN isn’t just ensuring 100% availability, (which is impossible with only two hulls) both CVFs are being used concurrently. Why is this a priority given the size of the fleet?

As Tomuk correctly points out, apart from trials the two have not been deployed out side of UK waters concurrently - the principle is that one is deployed or at high readiness and the other is at a lower readiness but is absolutely not in extended readiness. Read about the issues, costs and timelines of holding the Albions in this way, which would be a hell of a lot worse given the complexity of a carrier and then you will realise how mad this is. What’s more, you need trained crew to operate two - you talk about resilience and attrition, this is a basic.

What’s the priority of the surface fleet, CEPP and carrier centric task groups. What would I cut, the T31s who are not a priority for a fleet that whose priority is to be focused on NATOs Northern flank to which they add nothing useful.

5 Brigades? It’s a drop in the ocean against a peer.

Where is the mass to allow for a rate of attrition?

Where is the mass to provide regular rotations?

Where is the mass to heavily deploy in two places at once?

We will not be fighting alone, we are never going to have the largest land force in Europe, it’s not a priority. A brigade plus the RMs at camp Viking is appropriate IMO, with the ability to surge perhaps another one via plane and Points. With focus 5 (or 7) is sufficient.

The army needs to find a clear strategy and focus and use the funds it has properly first before we play fantasy armies.

The carriers have nothing to do with it. A more realistic operating model for the CVFs is need to stabilise RN, absolutely nothing to do with the Army.

Ok, good we agree that the RN and Army need to focus on their own budgets.

There are many ways to stabilise the RN, like the army it starts with a clear focus and strategy. Finalising what the FCF is is the biggest open part of this.

[SW1]

A maritime strategy is not a naval strategy. It is largely based on the law of economic warfare. Whereby you guarantee trade for yourself and deny trade to your enemy.

In the 19th century that trade was almost exclusively at sea so denial of the sea to the enemy was considered paramount.

That holds true to an extent today as well though by value mainly electronic and pharma goes by air and the world relies on the digital world for significant services and financial transactions.

A maritime strategy specifically is not interested in projecting power on land or indeed fighting battles unless there is significant strategic gain but maintaining a presence with alliances to control the sea or in todays world the modern economic spaces. It’s very much in the mould of the French/danish/RN contribution in the Red Sea today defensive in nature rather than the offensive nature employed by the US navy.

It is more national resilience and export.

[jedibeeftrix]

no. no more so than was true in the 19th century.
more purple if you will - at the direction of a maritime strategy, yes.

The maritime strategy was historically designed to firstly contain Spain then France in the 18th/19th centuries followed by Germany in the first half of the 20th century. The rest of the maritime strategy was to protect the empire. All geopolitical irrelevances now. WW2 and the Cold War gradually dismantled Britain’s maritime first strategy.

Are you expecting a more peaceful Europe in the 21st century than was experienced in the 19th century if the U.K. pursues a unapologetically maritime strategy?

If peace and prosperity through deterrence is the goal then reestablishing a large maritime expeditionary force and keeping the SLOCs open is only part of the equation.

don't overthink it:

the question originally was whether we could afford to run two carriers on 2.2% of GDP?
my response is why would this be considered a navy problem? the implicit answer to the question above, being "yes".
and if we do raise defence to 2.5% of GDP as other european nations are starting to do then my answer would be "hell yes!"

i'm not expecting a more peaceful Europe in the 21st century, but I do work to the following:
1. the scale of the threat from russia today is an order of magnitude smaller than was the case when britain was staring down the barrel of 15 soviet shock armies.
2. in consequence, the threat that russia represents today can be hard stopped by three hyper-defensive frontier nations (finland/poland/ukraine), with Art5 support.
3. this changes the emphasis in what nato needs from the UK - especially given nato's new interest in the rise of china.

[SW1]

no. no more so than was true in the 19th century.
more purple if you will - at the direction of a maritime strategy, yes.

The maritime strategy was historically designed to firstly contain Spain then France in the 18th/19th centuries followed by Germany in the first half of the 20th century. The rest of the maritime strategy was to protect the empire. All geopolitical irrelevances now. WW2 and the Cold War gradually dismantled Britain’s maritime first strategy.

Are you expecting a more peaceful Europe in the 21st century than was experienced in the 19th century if the U.K. pursues a unapologetically maritime strategy?

If peace and prosperity through deterrence is the goal then reestablishing a large maritime expeditionary force and keeping the SLOCs open is only part of the equation.

don't overthink it:

the question originally was whether we could afford to run two carriers on 2.2% of GDP?
my response is why would this be considered a navy problem? the implicit answer to the question above, being "yes".
and if we do raise defence to 2.5% of GDP as other european nations are starting to do then my answer would be "hell yes!"

i'm not expecting a more peaceful Europe in the 21st century, but I do work to the following:
1. the scale of the threat from russia today is an order of magnitude smaller than was the case when britain was staring down the barrel of 15 soviet shock armies.
2. in consequence, the threat that russia represents today can be hard stopped by three hyper-defensive frontier nations (finland/poland/ukraine), with Art5 support.
3. this changes the emphasis in what nato needs from the UK - especially given nato's new interest in the rise of china.

The answer to your original question is No.

The vast majority are not spending 2.0% nor will they for many years yet, outside of Greece and Poland no major country in Europe is spending 2.5%

Depends what you mean by scale. In terms of troops and tank yes much much smaller. In terms of potential distribution to the accepted way of life in Europe potiential similar but in different ways.

By stopping I assume you mean in troops marching across a boarder

[jedibeeftrix]

The answer to your original question is No.

That is an opinion that i do not share.

The vast majority are not spending 2.0% nor will they for many years yet, outside of Greece and Poland no major country in Europe is spending 2.5%

Accepted - my point was more that if the UK did respond to events by going from 2.2% to 2.5% of GDP i wouldn't be spending it rebuilding BAOR.

Depends what you mean by scale. In terms of troops and tank yes much much smaller. In terms of potential disruption(?) to the accepted way of life in Europe potiential similar but in different ways.

Not big enough to justify continueing the historic 'anomaly' that was the UK response to world-war/cold-war. In my opinion.

By stopping I assume you mean in troops marching across a boarder

We've seen precisely how effective a poor medium-sized nation with no formal defensive ties has been at disrupting the plans of its 'Superpower' neighbour. Finland would be even harder. Poland would be harder still.
Now imagine poor wickle Russia having to attack all three in the event of General War, with the backing of Art5 commitments from fellow NATO nations.
Including the UK!

I just don't see that the UK's limited defensive (read: foriegn policy) resources should continue to be bent out of shape in trying to build a static heavy defensive land force for such a marginal threat that is adequately resourced much closer to the border.

We have more to offer, elsewhere.

[SW1]

The answer to your original question is No.

That is an opinion that i do not share.

The vast majority are not spending 2.0% nor will they for many years yet, outside of Greece and Poland no major country in Europe is spending 2.5%

Accepted - my point was more that if the UK did respond to events by going from 2.2% to 2.5% of GDP i wouldn't be spending it rebuilding BAOR.

Depends what you mean by scale. In terms of troops and tank yes much much smaller. In terms of potential disruption(?) to the accepted way of life in Europe potiential similar but in different ways.

Not big enough to justify continueing the historic 'anomaly' that was the UK response to world-war/cold-war. In my opinion.

By stopping I assume you mean in troops marching across a boarder

We've seen precisely how effective a poor medium-sized nation with no formal defensive ties has been at disrupting the plans of its 'Superpower' neighbour. Finland would be even harder. Poland would be harder still.
Now imagine poor wickle Russia having to attack all three in the event of General War, with the backing of Art5 commitments from fellow NATO nations.
Including the UK!

I just don't see that the UK's limited defensive (read: foriegn policy) resources should continue to be bent out of shape in trying to build a static heavy defensive land force for such a marginal threat that is adequately resourced much closer to the border.

We have more to offer, elsewhere.

I don’t know why you think the answer to not wanting aircraft carriers is the reconstitution of BOAR it would be a waste of resources. This binary argument that continually arises I find baffling.

If the UK does not secure it homeland and the area around it the rest is pointless.

Ukraine has resisted the aggression of Russia but at considerable cost with a number of areas wiped of the face of the map. It has only provided that resistance in part thanks to the considerable industrial contributions from across nato and world.

Russian aggression would likely not take the forms of a traditional invasion of nato countries.

Potential disruption could be greater think back to fuel protests of the last decade or so as an example instead disruption to money transfer or payment systems for weeks. Or attacks against infrastructure such as the Milford haven or Dover. Or even the examples we have seen in Finland of Russia pushing significant numbers of migrants across the border to inflame domestic tensions.

[Caribbean]

Russian aggression would likely not take the forms of a traditional invasion of nato countries.

Potential disruption could be greater think back to fuel protests of the last decade or so as an example instead disruption to money transfer or payment systems for weeks. Or attacks against infrastructure such as the Milford haven or Dover. Or even the examples we have seen in Finland of Russia pushing significant numbers of migrants across the border to inflame domestic tensions.

Or disinformation campaigns aimed at discrediting the UK's most valuable military assets, like the aircraft carriers and the F-35's.

[wargame_insomniac]

Russian aggression would likely not take the forms of a traditional invasion of nato countries.

Potential disruption could be greater think back to fuel protests of the last decade or so as an example instead disruption to money transfer or payment systems for weeks. Or attacks against infrastructure such as the Milford haven or Dover. Or even the examples we have seen in Finland of Russia pushing significant numbers of migrants across the border to inflame domestic tensions.

Absolutely this, which is why talking about the need for the UK to provide and sustain armoured divisions is a complete waste of resources. Also, it is at the core of what the FCF / UK expeditionary capabilities need to look like.

[SW1]

Russian aggression would likely not take the forms of a traditional invasion of nato countries.

Potential disruption could be greater think back to fuel protests of the last decade or so as an example instead disruption to money transfer or payment systems for weeks. Or attacks against infrastructure such as the Milford haven or Dover. Or even the examples we have seen in Finland of Russia pushing significant numbers of migrants across the border to inflame domestic tensions.

Absolutely this, which is why talking about the need for the UK to provide and sustain armoured divisions is a complete waste of resources. Also, it is at the core of what the FCF / UK expeditionary capabilities need to look like.

I haven’t talked about sustaining armoured divisions nor would I suggest that is a good area of investment for us.

[Repulse]

Russian aggression would likely not take the forms of a traditional invasion of nato countries.

Potential disruption could be greater think back to fuel protests of the last decade or so as an example instead disruption to money transfer or payment systems for weeks. Or attacks against infrastructure such as the Milford haven or Dover. Or even the examples we have seen in Finland of Russia pushing significant numbers of migrants across the border to inflame domestic tensions.

Absolutely this, which is why talking about the need for the UK to provide and sustain armoured divisions is a complete waste of resources. Also, it is at the core of what the FCF / UK expeditionary capabilities need to look like.

I haven’t talked about sustaining armoured divisions nor would I suggest that is a good area of investment for us.

Agree - sorry it was a wider comment not aimed at your comment / previous comments.

[Poiuytrewq]

….apart from trials the two have not been deployed out side of UK waters concurrently - the principle is that one is deployed or at high readiness and the other is at a lower readiness but is absolutely not in extended readiness.

I have never suggested putting a CVF into extended readiness. One high readiness and one low readiness unless funding increases.

The part I am sceptical about is what is the low readiness crew doing? Having 700-800 crew waiting 4-6 months to change readiness is bad news for all kinds of reasons.

This is the part that RN must use a novel crewing approach to maintain morale and achieve the best outcomes.

We will not be fighting alone, we are never going to have the largest land force in Europe, it’s not a priority. A brigade plus the RMs at camp Viking is appropriate IMO, with the ability to surge perhaps another one via plane and Points. With focus 5 (or 7) is sufficient.

The army needs to find a clear strategy and focus and use the funds it has properly first before we play fantasy armies.

If an incursion into the Nordics ever happens it will likely be only one part of a wider strategy of coordinated incursions. Therefore the JEF countries may very well have to defend the territory alone, at least for a while.

How can the JEF countries provide overmatch without constructing enormous land armies? That is the fundamental.

Norway/Sweden/Finland are very capable militaries but are all based around defence of territory. Where is the mass to eject an incursion coming from if the US doesn’t turn up?

Ok, good we agree that the RN and Army need to focus on their own budgets.

There are many ways to stabilise the RN, like the army it starts with a clear focus and strategy. Finalising what the FCF is is the biggest open part of this.

No one is seriously suggesting rebuilding BAOR. Even the Army isn’t suggesting that.

However the question must be tackled: can light, mobile, highly specialised forces with no guarantee of air supremacy eject a multi Division incursion which enjoys short supply lines?

If the answer is NO then discounting armoured Divisions because it would be nice to spend the money on something else is somewhat premature.

Exactly the same consideration for RN and the FCF. Are ARGs really not required anymore? Where is the evidence to support such a systemic change of direction, especially when a clash with a peer is a possibility?

[jedibeeftrix]

I have never suggested putting a CVF into extended readiness. One high readiness and one low readiness unless funding increases.

The part I am sceptical about is what is the low readiness crew doing? Having 700-800 crew waiting 4-6 months to change readiness is bad news for all kinds of reasons.

This is the part that RN must use a novel crewing approach to maintain morale and achieve the best outcomes.

That’s a long way of achieving extended readiness without trying to call it that. To have ships ready within less than a month to enter a conflict you need a ship that can quickly go to sea and ramp up. If you want a ship ready within six months you need a full complement of trained crew for the specialist roles required to operate a carrier. That’s costs money and crew, but that’s the priority IMO.

If an incursion into the Nordics ever happens it will likely be only one part of a wider strategy of coordinated incursions. Therefore the JEF countries may very well have to defend the territory alone, at least for a while.

How can the JEF countries provide overmatch without constructing enormous land armies? That is the fundamental.

Norway/Sweden/Finland are very capable militaries but are all based around defence of territory. Where is the mass to eject an incursion coming from if the US doesn’t turn up?

No one is seriously suggesting rebuilding BAOR. Even the Army isn’t suggesting that.

However the question must be tackled: can light, mobile, highly specialised forces with no guarantee of air supremacy eject a multi Division incursion which enjoys short supply lines?

If the answer is NO then discounting armoured Divisions because it would be nice to spend the money on something else is somewhat premature.

How do you slow and stop an invading force, part of it is defensive lines of infantry and tanks, but bombers, long ranged artillery/missiles and SFs attacking supply lines is absolutely needed and this is where the UK can add real value.

As Ukraine shows, supply lines are never too short to be prone to attack.

Exactly the same consideration for RN and the FCF. Are ARGs really not required anymore? Where is the evidence to support such a systemic change of direction, especially when a clash with a peer is a possibility?

We need to stop accepting the old ways of doing things as the default answer and start by looking at the requirement and priority. ARGs are an answer only if the problem is to attack in force from the sea, it is not a priority and as stated there are better things to spend our money on for a potential clash with a peer.

[Poiuytrewq]

i'm not expecting a more peaceful Europe in the 21st century, but I do work to the following:
1. the scale of the threat from russia today is an order of magnitude smaller than was the case when britain was staring down the barrel of 15 soviet shock armies.
2. in consequence, the threat that russia represents today can be hard stopped by three hyper-defensive frontier nations (finland/poland/ukraine), with Art5 support.
3. this changes the emphasis in what nato needs from the UK - especially given nato's new interest in the rise of china.

That sounds very reassuring but Poland and Ukraine aren’t going to be helping Finland in a multi incursion scenario.

A 200km incursion cuts Finland in half, there is little space to trade for time like there is in Ukraine and Poland.

Mobilising a quarter of a million reserves takes time and only 20,000 troops on a 1300km border can only do so much.

As the lead nation in JEF the U.K. has a major role to play in the event that the unthinkable becomes reality.

[SW1]

i'm not expecting a more peaceful Europe in the 21st century, but I do work to the following:
1. the scale of the threat from russia today is an order of magnitude smaller than was the case when britain was staring down the barrel of 15 soviet shock armies.
2. in consequence, the threat that russia represents today can be hard stopped by three hyper-defensive frontier nations (finland/poland/ukraine), with Art5 support.
3. this changes the emphasis in what nato needs from the UK - especially given nato's new interest in the rise of china.

That sounds very reassuring but Poland and Ukraine aren’t going to be helping Finland in a multi incursion scenario.

A 200km incursion cuts Finland in half, there is little space to trade for time like there is in Ukraine and Poland.

Mobilising a quarter of a million reserves takes time and only 20,000 troops on a 1300km border can only do so much.

As the lead nation in JEF the U.K. has a major role to play in the event that the unthinkable becomes reality.

To assemble a force for such an incursion would require build up and planning. If you have the intelligence assets you would see it.

We saw and called the play long before Russia invaded Ukraine. There was much commentary it was a bluff. Doubt anyone would think its a bluff if he did it somewhere else.

The answer is you don’t allow the incursion in the first place but it requires political leadership and resolve.

[Poiuytrewq]

That’s a long way of achieving extended readiness without trying to call it that.

If both are permanently crewed then they may as well be both operated concurrently.

Nothing meaningful is being saved by having one in low readiness.

How do you slow and stop an invading force, part of it is defensive lines of infantry and tanks, but bombers, long ranged artillery/missiles and SFs attacking supply lines is absolutely needed and this is where the UK can add real value.

As Ukraine shows, supply lines are never too short to be prone to attack.

Completely agree but the best way to help Finland is to block any incursion. That requires 16AAB and 3Cdo Bde with the Rangers and SF/SFSG deployed asap to reinforce the Finns and any UK Battlegroups already deployed with, ideally, a 3rd Brigade in reserve at Camp Viking.

The missing part currently is the dedicated supporting capabilities. The UK needs to invest in the mobile MRLS, artillery, GBAD and huge amounts of UAVs. This is the priority above all others in rebuilding the Army IMO.

We need to stop accepting the old ways of doing things as the default answer and start by looking at the requirement and priority. ARGs are an answer only if the problem is to attack in force from the sea, it is not a priority and as stated there are better things to spend our money on for a potential clash with a peer.

Totally disagree.

What does a 21st ARG actually look like?

Before dismissing such a group the consideration must be what can a modernised ARG actually achieve?

[Poiuytrewq]

To assemble a force for such an incursion would require build up and planning. If you have the intelligence assets you would see it.

That’s fine but the planning and contingencies still need to be in place.

What will the U.K. be contributing to blunt any incursion and then what follows and how do you get it there?

If this is the UK’s main contribution to NATO land forces then it needs to be a generously resourced capability.

[SW1]

To assemble a force for such an incursion would require build up and planning. If you have the intelligence assets you would see it.

That’s fine but the planning and contingencies still need to be in place.

What will the U.K. be contributing to blunt any incursion and then what follows and how do you get it there?

If this is the UK’s main contribution to NATO land forces then it needs to be a generously resourced capability.

I don’t disagree.

Ultimately that’s what fwd presence along natos border is about, the problem is that requires resilience in those fwd deployed forces to allow it to be maintained and resolve to maintain a fwd presence in areas of interest when the claim is its all quite is low risk and complacency sets in.

Historically the rapid deployment to reinforce has been 3 commando brigade or 16 air assault before that 24 airmobile. 24 airmobiles construct is interesting in that it was 2 infantry battalions with a heavy artillery regiment and ground based air defence regiment attached a modern equivalent maybe.