Current & Future Amphibious Capability - General Discussion

[Poiuytrewq]

So the JEF should be an army concern but we should expand the RM role in JEF

In the Littoral absolutely. That is where the specialty exists.

It’s time for the Army to step up and take care of the rest.

NATO remains are principal military concern that is why we are spending so much time there.

The UKs principal military concern should be whatever it takes to protect the UK and its citizens.

If that’s NATO great, if that’s something or somewhere else in the world then that’s fine too.

An absolute focus on NATO requirements is definitely not the optimal approach for the U.K. IMO.

[SW1]

It’s the highest priority of the armed forces not the army.

Would say the highest priority for the RN is CASD. Second would be dominance of the North Atlantic, which I would make the number priority of the RAF along with supporting a BAON.

You did say outside of UK and BOT defence which would cover CASD and Air Defence.

If you secure Norway and the artic north you secure the North Atlantic because the Russian navy and airforce can’t sortie into it they are bottled up.

[Poiuytrewq]

Expansion has nothing to do with it.

Really? Because last page was advocating for a third carrier...

One LHD to replace the two LPDs.

to a 3x LCU capacity. That’s completely unacceptable.

...Lots of options are available but doing nothing isn’t one of them.

Is it? When was the last lime LCU were used? Why does having lots of LCU make the Royal Marines a modern and usable force?

The versatility of LCU sized craft are clear and have been for a long time.

How do you transport vehicles OTH without LCU sized craft?

I really don’t see how cutting LCU numbers by over 60% makes RM more modern and useable.

Unfortunately the Marines have done nothing for the last decade, they've attempted to exist as they did pre Afghanistan, which failed. Then they proposed small forward deployed units, which failed. So here 2024 is with the Royal Marines lacking purpose and direction, which makes them a very easy target for the spreadsheet warriors.

Way too early to label the FCF transition a failure.

Firm decisions taken with conviction is what is required now.

Another 5 years of procrastination won’t help.

[SW1]

So the JEF should be an army concern but we should expand the RM role in JEF

In the Littoral absolutely. That is where the specialty exists.

It’s time for the Army to step up and take care of the rest.

NATO remains are principal military concern that is why we are spending so much time there.

The UKs principal military concern should be whatever it takes to protect the UK and its citizens.

If that’s NATO great, if that’s something or somewhere else in the world then that’s fine too.

An absolute focus on NATO requirements is definitely not the optimal approach for the U.K. IMO.

There is no rest the JEF area is all about the littoral environment.

“The Ministry of Defence defines the littoral as those land areas (and their adjacent areas and associated air space) that are susceptible to engagement and influence from the sea,”


Until such times as NATO dissolves it will remain the principle military concern of the uk for no matter what else is happening in the world if the area covered by NATO is not secure then the UK is not secure.

[Repulse]

The versatility of LCU sized craft are clear and have been for a long time.

How do you transport vehicles OTH without LCU sized craft?

I really don’t see how cutting LCU numbers by over 60% makes RM more modern and useable.

It depends on what you need to move for the FCF with those LCUs - no longer vehicles as heavy as Challenger tanks, nor logistics for brigade ops. Smaller vehicles can be moved via LCVPs or in/slung under helicopters, and this looks to be the direction. This doesn’t remove the need for LCU/LCM sized landing craft, but fewer are required.

What we have seen are RMs trialing LCUs as forward operating bases - interesting, but would say these will based operated from land bases like Camp Viking and also may not be the optimal design for such operations (some of the USN / RAN designs look interesting).

The need for large landing craft (LCUs, LRCs etc) is still there, especially for Littoral manoeuvre, and this includes as I say Army units, but this is different from needing large LCU docks going forwards.

Tough decisions and clear decisions are needed, this confusion of strategy is causing significant damage and the RMs need to move on.

[Repulse]

You did say outside of UK and BOT defence which would cover CASD and Air Defence.

If you secure Norway and the artic north you secure the North Atlantic because the Russian navy and airforce can’t sortie into it they are bottled up.

If you are linking the commitment to Scandinavia and Baltics to the whole North Atlantic then yes I agree. I would say though the RNs focus for its vessels and funds needs to be the whole North Atlantic more than just the Littorals of Norway.

Yes, in the past Norway was key to securing the North Atlantic, but I’d argue that with longer ranges vessels, SSNs and places like Iceland / Greenland and the Artic itself becoming more accessible the territorial defence of Norway is only part of what is needed.

For the RN to significantly contribute and possibly lead the control of the high North and East North Atlantic, it needs to focus on SSNs, ASW Frigates and yes Carrier Groups to ensure air superiority (along with RAF MPAs). This is the primary priority for the RN in NATO. Given the hostile nature of the region the ability to disrupt and attack Russian bases via small raids makes a lot of sense.

[shark bait]

The versatility of LCU sized craft are clear and have been for a long time

Have they? It's impractical to use LCU over the horizon, and if the Royal Marines are a 'raiding party' why do they need heavy vehicles? Futhermore the last amphibious assault left the LCU at home because of the threat of mines. The next one will leave them at home for the threat of loitering munitions. The LCU looks dated from this pont of view.

Way too early to label the FCF transition a failure.

Firm decisions taken with conviction is what is required now.

Is it? How's that forward deployed high readiness littoral response group looking right now? Right at the time when one is needed?

It doesn't exist! They never committed to the plan. Leadership seems torn between massive assaults to take on Russia, or raids to take out a few terrorists. A firm decision is totally absent. The Marines need a 5 year plan to actually deliver a meaningful and usable capability.

[Poiuytrewq]

There is no rest the JEF area is all about the littoral environment.

“The Ministry of Defence defines the littoral as those land areas (and their adjacent areas and associated air space) that are susceptible to engagement and influence from the sea,”

Within reason.

Taken to its fullest extent that interpretation could be any area within range of a TLAM or ICBM.

Look at it a different way; what assistance from RM would the Army require to provide the commitment required to the JEF region?

[SW1]

[TinyTonyStark]

Would it not be possible to achieve a similar effect with Helicopters and Mexeflote systems? i.e. move in fast with Helos and secure the beach head and then follow up with heavier equipment once the immediate vicinity is secured? I imagine LCU's would be very vulnerable slowly approaching the beach.

[Poiuytrewq]

It depends on what you need to move for the FCF with those LCUs - no longer vehicles as heavy as Challenger tanks, nor logistics for brigade ops. Smaller vehicles can be moved via LCVPs or in/slung under helicopters, and this looks to be the direction. This doesn’t remove the need for LCU/LCM sized landing craft, but fewer are required.

What we have seen are RMs trialing LCUs as forward operating bases - interesting, but would say these will based operated from land bases like Camp Viking and also may not be the optimal design for such operations (some of the USN / RAN designs look interesting).

The need for large landing craft (LCUs, LRCs etc) is still there, especially for Littoral manoeuvre, and this includes as I say Army units, but this is different from needing large LCU docks going forwards.

Tough decisions and clear decisions are needed, this confusion of strategy is causing significant damage and the RMs need to move on.

Future proofing is the main argument for retaining the floodable docks even if just for future autonomous system/vessels.

Why is the rest of the worlds Amphibious vessels not drastically reducing their number of floodable docks?

The U.K. is a complete outlier here and it’s all due to with a lack of funding to properly replace an obsolescent Amphibious fleet.

Simple. There is no other credible rationale.

[jedibeeftrix]

The versatility of LCU sized craft are clear and have been for a long time.

How do you transport vehicles OTH without LCU sized craft?

I really don’t see how cutting LCU numbers by over 60% makes RM more modern and useable.

It depends on what you need to move for the FCF with those LCUs - no longer vehicles as heavy as Challenger tanks, nor logistics for brigade ops. Smaller vehicles can be moved via LCVPs or in/slung under helicopters, and this looks to be the direction. This doesn’t remove the need for LCU/LCM sized landing craft, but fewer are required.

What we have seen are RMs trialing LCUs as forward operating bases - interesting, but would say these will based operated from land bases like Camp Viking and also may not be the optimal design for such operations (some of the USN / RAN designs look interesting).

The need for large landing craft (LCUs, LRCs etc) is still there, especially for Littoral manoeuvre, and this includes as I say Army units, but this is different from needing large LCU docks going forwards.

Tough decisions and clear decisions are needed, this confusion of strategy is causing significant damage and the RMs need to move on.

i believe there is a USMC statistic on the number of Lane/metres of stores and equipment that need to be rolled over a beach per day to support a standard MEU that would strongly suggest the need for LCU's isn't at all about supporting 65tonne MBT's.

[Repulse]

Funds are limited and prioritisation is required. Also, requirements will differ from country to country. My biggest concern is to have a clear strategy that is achievable and funded, rather than bits that might be useful, but probably not as they other bits aren’t there.

[Repulse]

i believe there is a USMC statistic on the number of Lane/metres of stores and equipment that need to be rolled over a beach per day to support a standard MEU that would strongly suggest the need for LCU's isn't at all about supporting 65tonne MBT's.

As we don’t have a MEU then we need a lot less then.

[Tempest414]

The versatility of LCU sized craft are clear and have been for a long time

Have they? It's impractical to use LCU over the horizon, and if the Royal Marines are a 'raiding party' why do they need heavy vehicles? Futhermore the last amphibious assault left the LCU at home because of the threat of mines. The next one will leave them at home for the threat of loitering munitions. The LCU looks dated from this pont of view.

Way too early to label the FCF transition a failure.

Firm decisions taken with conviction is what is required now.

Is it? How's that forward deployed high readiness littoral response group looking right now? Right at the time when one is needed?

It doesn't exist! They never committed to the plan. Leadership seems torn between massive assaults to take on Russia, or raids to take out a few terrorists. A firm decision is totally absent. The Marines need a 5 year plan to actually deliver a meaningful and usable capability.

This is why they need PACSCAT fast LCU's capable of carrying 6 Jackal these along with the new unmanned MCM sweeping a path

The RM getting new landing craft like CIC and PACSCAT opens the door to OTH fast raids with vehicles like MRAZ and Jackal however this is when ships like the LPD's come able to carry 4 PACSCAT's and 4 CIC

The LSU's are the way forward as long as 4 LSU's can come together as a Battalion battle group giving the RM 8 LSU's or 2 Battle groups what they need is the ships and connectors they have the vehicles in MRAZ , Jackal and Viking they a good helicopter in Merlin what they now need is for the CIC program to deliver and for a new fast LCU like PACSCAT once these are in place then add in the LPH and 4 MRSS

[shark bait]

This is why they need PACSCAT fast LCU's capable of carrying 6 Jackal these along with the new unmanned MCM sweeping a path

Not sure that would work. Sending is MCM team in is a pretty big indicator of where the Marines are going to land, and that space will quickly be denied. On top of that it doesn't clear the surf zone.

[jedibeeftrix]

i believe there is a USMC statistic on the number of Lane/metres of stores and equipment that need to be rolled over a beach per day to support a standard MEU that would strongly suggest the need for LCU's isn't at all about supporting 65tonne MBT's.

As we don’t have a MEU then we need a lot less then.

absolutely. but that rather misses the point:
the purpose of LCU's is throughput of stores and equipment, and the requirement is enormous.
even company scale raids for a duration longer than 72hrs will need an enormous throughput, that is what the USMC statistics demonstrate. Challenger 2's in this context are a canard.
i am not convinced that LCU's are redundant, not least because the only leak we have ever seen still shows a requirment to operate at (some) scale.

[Poiuytrewq]

Very Interesting. Lots to unpick.

Firstly, the scale and ambition is larger than expected for a single LRG.

- 2x MRSS with that level of capability will not be in the 130m class.

- Albion and 1x Bay could achieve this but 1x Bay and Argus could not. Will LRG(S) be configured differently?

- 2x escorts - 1x T32 and 1x DD/FF plus SSN.

- The landing craft assumptions are interesting. 4x FFLC, 8x LCPA (L), 8x LCPA(S), 12x LLMI. Not exactly clear what they are?

- Strat Air: 12x (24x) F35, 8x/6x AH-64. Operated from land but perfect for a LHA if from sea.

- FSS supporting rather than Tide/Wave. Interesting.

- NGS from T32/DD/FF. Points towards Mk45 on the T32.

- 3x 127mm LFP. Interesting.

- Very light vehicles - MRZR, Fox, FATV, CANAM, PickUps etc

Leaving the MRSS and T32 to one side none of this appears to be outlandishly expensive.

A few notable omissions.

- Where are the Merlin’s and Wildcat and what numbers are required?

- How many landing spots are required on the MRSS?

- What are the options for reinforcement and/or rapid extraction if things go catastrophically wrong?

- How likely are today’s politicians to authorise the use of such a force?

- Why are MALE drones for ISTAR not included in Strat Air?

- Is the FSS operating directly with the MRSS? If so that’s a pretty big grouping for only two escorts to protect and simultaneously provide NGS.

Overall, a good attempt to put some flesh on the bone of the FCF concept.

[Tempest414]

This is why they need PACSCAT fast LCU's capable of carrying 6 Jackal these along with the new unmanned MCM sweeping a path

Not sure that would work. Sending is MCM team in is a pretty big indicator of where the Marines are going to land, and that space will quickly be denied. On top of that it doesn't clear the surf zone.

My thinking was one or two of these followed closely by the PACSCAT's and CIC's there is a risk I would agree

https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/20 ... tronik-uk/

However having a fleet of 8 or 9 PACSCAT's allows the movement of more vehicles and kit at speed from OTH

[donald_of_tokyo]

I do NOT think MCM mine sweepers will be supporting the landing operations. Numbers of REMUS UUV pods will be sent before the shore landing, to take a complete map of the seabed.

1: If any significant mine fields were detected, I think the LCU/CIC will not reach that shore. Mobility is essential of landing operation. Do not land on a beach where your enemy is prepared of. Find a beach which your enemy is not prepared of.

2: If that shore must be landed, a few days of mine hunting is needed to make a corridor there. Of course, the first strike shall be done with helicopters. Mine clearance is very very time consuming, and even after such hunting, it is still very risky. Sweeping is not an efficient way to clear mines.

[Tempest414]

This would mean only 4 and not 8 LSU's as each would have 2 strike companies and not 1 but it looks to be a better formation

I put the key here

CANAM – Off road vehicle , DD – Destroyer , FATV – Future All-Terrain Vehicle , FATV RRV – Future All-Terrain Vehicle
Repair and Recovery Variant , FFLC – Fast Landing Craft , LCPA – Amphibious Landing Craft , LFP – Lightweight Fires Platform , LLMI – Land and Littoral Manoeuvre Insertion Cra , LRG – Littoral Response Group
LSG – Littoral Strike Group , MRSS – Multi-Role Support Ship , MRZR – Polaris MRZR Ultra-Light Oroad Vehicle
Objs – Objectives
Pax – Personnel
SRS – Surveillance and Reconnaissance Squadron
Strike Coy – Strike Company
TAC – Tactical
Tp – Troop

[shark bait]

I do NOT think MCM mine sweepers will be supporting the landing operations

Mine sweepers will have an important purpose, just not in the opening moves. At Al Faw it took less than a week to clear the channel with almost improvised remote mine sweepers. Is it reasonable to expect a purpose built sweeper, in a less taxing geography, to clear a small channel in a couple of days?

Perhaps this is how the Royal Marines should be spec'd? A helicopter mobile force that has the mass to open the door and provide force protection while the engineers and mine clearance teams to do their business an enable others (e.g. Army) the freedom to manoeuvre.

The threats from guided weapons and mines pushes large landing craft out of the forefront, and into a supporting role later on. If this is true, it means the Royal Marines have to become a helicopter mobile force if they want to manoeuvre without landing 100 miles from their objective. Helicopter mobile force means everything, all their personnel and vehicles should be spec'd to fit inside a Merlin.

That constraint means no Armour, which is likley ok because there little opportunity for these vehicles to hide these days, and a counter is going small and fast to make sure the enemy's intel is always out of date. Some of the large all terrain vehicles (not quadbikes) could be useful for the marines to move stores and bring fire support with the likes of heavy machine guns, ATGM and 120mm mortars. This could make the Royal Marines a highly mobile well armed force.

This type of package should be suitable for the 'quick raids' often talked about in Future Commando Force, but the Royal Marines should aim for a little more persistence than this. Once they've used their fire power to suppress any local opposition LCAC can be used to resupply, as well as adding engineering and air defence capabilities to the landing force. LCAC is mentioned specifically because it would be great if a LCAC can use the ramp on a modified RORO ferry to bring in heavy vehicles not available to the Marines.

The scale has to be whatever can reasonably fit in the Bay Class, with Argus or the Carriers to support. At this scale they have a sustainable package for Raiding / diplomacy / maritime security / engagement, while not closing the door on larger 'one-off' operations by combining assets, which importantly includes parts of the British Army. One they get a working model, they can asses the shortfalls of Bay Class and Argus and design a better next gen system.

The whole thing leans heavy on air mobility so ultimately the Marines would spin-off from the Navy, and merge with the Paras under Joint Forces Command to become an elite air mobile force by Land, Sea and Air, but this is probably getting a bit ahead of thing.

[jedibeeftrix]

The whole thing leans heavy on air mobility so ultimately the Marines would spin-off from the Navy, and merge with the Paras under Joint Forces Command to become an elite air mobile force by Land, Sea and Air, but this is probably getting a bit ahead of thing.

This seems at odds with the stated intent:

The paper argues that, rather than being a capability which is used to exploit
sea control once a fleet has secured it, amphibious forces should represent a
landward extension of the fleet. This is subtly different, as it involves closely
integrating amphibious forces with two strictly naval functions: maritime strike;
and efforts to secure sea control.

This paper argues that adapting to this emerging operating environment will
be best achieved through a concept of operations that subsumes amphibious
power projection under the naval functions of strike and sea control. Distributed
amphibious forces have a key operational role to play in tackling the challenge
of enhanced anti-access capabilities through converging long-range fires
capabilities.

Shifting the emphasis of the Royal Marines towards the two priorities of strike
and sea control implies tactical specialisation.

It is the argument of this paper that amphibious forces, including the Royal Marines, need
not cede the littoral to shore-based anti-access/area denial capabilities. Such forces
have the potential to add considerable value to allied deterrence. But to be able
to do so in the future operating environment, they must integrate more closely
with fleets, both in conceptual terms and in force design.

[shark bait]

This seems at odds with the stated intent:

Perhaps the last paragraph was a bit too much of a moon-shot, it's because the UK may struggle to justify having two distinct air mobile armies.

[sol]