Current & Future Amphibious Capability - General Discussion

[Jake1992]

Correct me if I’m wrong but isn’t the whole premise of the LSGs and the reforming of the RM to under take raiding operations ?

I think we are all working out what is the role of the FCF, “global raiding” does seem to be one of the key requirements, but that isn’t the only role if they are to remain the UK’s Artic force assigned to NATO covering Norway and to a degree the coasts of the Baltic.

To my knowlage you do not need to undertake raiding ops in friendly controlled arrears, so if said op will be done where a threat is posed do we really want one of as you surgest only 4 amphib rolling up to the beach as a big ass target ???
From what I’ve read the USMC thinking around using this type of vessel is for them to be expendable to an extent if needed, if we went with your proposal we wouldn’t be able to use them in such a way but the risk to them would be as such.

To perform the NATO role the FCF will need to be able to manoeuvre and control the Littoral region - this will be done in small groups. I see these ships more sea bases with option to land heavy stores / vehicles over the beach rather than they will always act as traditional landing craft. By having a larger number of dispersed vessels operating near shore it avoids the need for large vulnerable ships and task groups having to get close to shore.

I also do not see what they offer over dock and LCU / LCVP set other than load size.
With the proliferation of shore based AShW any amphib op large or raiding will surely need to be done from OTH, this will by its nature will in-tale the need of a large dock and fast ship to shore connectors and organic fast aviation.

To be safely operating OTH they need to be 100nm+ out - firstly I can’t see many conditions where an amphib would stop and flood its well dock that far out. Second any surface ship to shore connectors need to be larger and fast - forget LCUs and LCVPs.

My proposal would be as I said up thread of 4 x LPD/LSD hybrid style vessel and 2 Karl Doorman’s forming LSG-N and LSG-S, each could operate up to -
14 medium helos/tilt rotors
4 to 8 fast LCU ( I’d evolve the PASCAT design ) depending on dock size chosen
10 fast LCVP / CB90
900 odd troops if larger scale ops are required.

With the right ship to shore connectors and aviation chosen this set up would offer the flexibility for raiding but also for larger ops if the doctorin changes, remember these vessels would be in service in to the 2060s so things have the time to change more than once over the time frame from design to build to end of life.

I personally think LSDs/LPDs is the wrong answer for LRG(N) which is tasked to defend NATOs flank. The need to get a task group close to shore and also the fact that FCF is not about Brigade or even Cdo level ops means we need more numerous smaller ships. The fact that we are operating in allied waters means they can be forward based - very different problem to rocking up the other side of the world and launching a raid. Also, if I understand correctly Norway has changed its position on having foreign troops based in its country which makes the way we did things in the past more so out of date.

For me Global Raiding means at a low level Argus or its replacement, but anything larger is CEPP and the CVFs.

You surgest we more numerous small vessel to control the littoral zone but surgest only 4 of these. Now if these are acting as a sea base then what type of “smaller” vessels will they laurnch and how ?

Acting as a sea base how are these any better than an LPD / LSD or any less vulnerable ?

The horizon as pointed out by others depends on from what hight above sea level it is take from so will depend on what the RN defernition is.
As for LCUs / LCVPs speed can be sorted as we’ve seen with the PASCAT design that is now getting on so could be progress and evolved further.

But I don’t think we should be rebuilding our entire amphib force focused solely on the Bulkans and it doesn’t seem like the RN are thinking this was since LSG-S

[Repulse]

For me Global Raiding means at a low level Argus or its replacement…

How do you launch and recover 4x CIC from Argus?

Same way as its launches LCVPs by crane

[Repulse]

Defining 100 miles as the horizon suggests observation from 10k ft. From 350 ft it’s around 22 miles. Interesting what the definition of over the horizon is.

Not just observation, it’s effective missile range vs air defence and ability to hide in the vastness of the sea.

[SW1]

Defining 100 miles as the horizon suggests observation from 10k ft. From 350 ft it’s around 22 miles. Interesting what the definition of over the horizon is.

Not just observation, it’s effective missile range vs air defence and ability to hide in the vastness of the sea.

If you don’t observe them how do you know where to point the missile? If your facing missile threats your whole task force is there not just an amphibious ship bobbing about on its own.

The sea isnt vast.

[wargame_insomniac]

If the untied states with an embarrassment of riches in the amphibious domain have deemed they can’t support heavy armour over the beach how can we?

The idea that planning should expect a suitable port will always be available is extremely unwise.

One of the reasons why ship to shore connectors are still relevant is to ensure a force can be landed in damaged ports from slipways etc, not necessarily over the beach.

Ships with a 5m to 7m draft may not be able to access a port if ships have been scuttled in the entrances but landing craft with a 1m draft could safely dock but perhaps only at high tide.

The widest possible range of options must be maintained within reason. The most realistic scenario is never the perfect one.

It’s the only option for us. If there’s no port we don’t go. Certainly not at brigade level with mechanised forces which is probably why the statement has been made the army’s mechanised forces are for nato.

Which isn’t a problem as long as we have a mindset is of defence of territory that’s our or our allies. Not of intervention.

Anything else the only unit available is 16 air assault.

What are the UK's responsibilities under JEF?

I agree that the UK should regrain from intervention outside Europe, other than the sort of intervention we recently carried out in Sudan. Where we sent resources along with allies to temporarily secure the Khartoum airport and Port Sudan, so that along with allies we could evacuate our embassy staff and UK citizens. I agree that UK armed forces can't spare their limited resouces outside Europe in any intervention more substantial than Sudan (or defending BIOT's).

Back to Europe and our obligations under NATO, JEF and any bilateral treaties. I have said before that we should be priotorising protecting NATO's northern flank. France, Spain, Italy, Turkey and Greece should between them have enough to look after NATO's southern flank in Med and Black Sea.

So to me our first priority should be securing the North Atlantic / North Sea and working in partnership with NATO's Artic powers in covering Barents Sea. This plays into our geographic strengths and our ASW strengths.

Second prirority would then remain reinforcing Norway as we have done for the last 60-70 years.

For me our third priority is then reinforcing Estonia. We already have leadership and major UK contribution to NATO's advance deployed Battlegroup. So we would not be invading Estonia but reinforcing a NATO and JEF ally.

Can we rely on Estonian port being in good condition and likweise any rail links through Germany, Poland and the other Baltic States? I think that assumption would be naive as clearly Russia would target both.

So if Estonian ports are blocked by ships destroyed by Russian missiles, or rail link severed, how would we get our reinforcements to augment our advance deployed Battlegroup and local forces? We would still need to get our troops ashore onto our allies's territory.

[SW1]

If the untied states with an embarrassment of riches in the amphibious domain have deemed they can’t support heavy armour over the beach how can we?

The idea that planning should expect a suitable port will always be available is extremely unwise.

One of the reasons why ship to shore connectors are still relevant is to ensure a force can be landed in damaged ports from slipways etc, not necessarily over the beach.

Ships with a 5m to 7m draft may not be able to access a port if ships have been scuttled in the entrances but landing craft with a 1m draft could safely dock but perhaps only at high tide.

The widest possible range of options must be maintained within reason. The most realistic scenario is never the perfect one.

It’s the only option for us. If there’s no port we don’t go. Certainly not at brigade level with mechanised forces which is probably why the statement has been made the army’s mechanised forces are for nato.

Which isn’t a problem as long as we have a mindset is of defence of territory that’s our or our allies. Not of intervention.

Anything else the only unit available is 16 air assault.

What are the UK's responsibilities under JEF?

I agree that the UK should regrain from intervention outside Europe, other than the sort of intervention we recently carried out in Sudan. Where we sent resources along with allies to temporarily secure the Khartoum airport and Port Sudan, so that along with allies we could evacuate our embassy staff and UK citizens. I agree that UK armed forces can't spare their limited resouces outside Europe in any intervention more substantial than Sudan (or defending BIOT's).

Back to Europe and our obligations under NATO, JEF and any bilateral treaties. I have said before that we should be priotorising protecting NATO's northern flank. France, Spain, Italy, Turkey and Greece should between them have enough to look after NATO's southern flank in Med and Black Sea.

So to me our first priority should be securing the North Atlantic / North Sea and working in partnership with NATO's Artic powers in covering Barents Sea. This plays into our geographic strengths and our ASW strengths.

Second prirority would then remain reinforcing Norway as we have done for the last 60-70 years.

For me our third priority is then reinforcing Estonia. We already have leadership and major UK contribution to NATO's advance deployed Battlegroup. So we would not be invading Estonia but reinforcing a NATO and JEF ally.

Can we rely on Estonian port being in good condition and likweise any rail links through Germany, Poland and the other Baltic States? I think that assumption would be naive as clearly Russia would target both.

So if Estonian ports are blocked by ships destroyed by Russian missiles, or rail link severed, how would we get our reinforcements to augment our advance deployed Battlegroup and local forces? We would still need to get our troops ashore onto our allies's territory.

The joint expeditionary force is a collection of units selected from those held at high readiness that can be deployed to military operations. The uks role is to lead it as a framework nation.

If all german, polish, Latvian Estonia and Lithuanian ports have been knocked out, all road and rail access to the Baltic states severed then I’m afraid to say we aren’t augmenting anything because nothing will be left.

The only brigade in the uk that was designed to be supported over a beach was 3 commando brigade, that no longer exists as a brigade fighting force.

[Repulse]

Defining 100 miles as the horizon suggests observation from 10k ft. From 350 ft it’s around 22 miles. Interesting what the definition of over the horizon is.

Not just observation, it’s effective missile range vs air defence and ability to hide in the vastness of the sea.

If you don’t observe them how do you know where to point the missile? If your facing missile threats your whole task force is there not just an amphibious ship bobbing about on its own.

The sea isnt vast.

Observing at distance is exactly what MPAs and Satellites are for - though once you’ve find the task group you have to hit it and it’s a big difference being 26nms out with your back end in the sea vs being 100nms travelling at 25kts.

[new guy]

proposing SLS for MRSS is worse than FSS for MRSS.

[Jake1992]

I think we need to ask a couple of questions and once we’ve answered them then we’d have a better idea of what MRSS should be.

1 - what aviation and small surface assets are needed to preform the raids we’re likely to do ?

2 - what aviation and small surface assets are needed to control the literal zone a LSG would be acting in ?

3 - would we be expecting to conduct the raid while also controlling the literal zone or just get the boys in then move back to safety ?

4 - are we expecting to operate just in the Baltic's and NATO north or are we expecting to be able to use the LSG anywhere needed ?

5 - are we expecting to deliver vastly different operation from LSG-N compared to LSG-S in so needing them to groups to be made up of different assets ?

6 - are we expecting our amphibious doctrin to remain the same over the next 40 years the time frame from design to build to decimation of these assets ?

[SW1]

Defining 100 miles as the horizon suggests observation from 10k ft. From 350 ft it’s around 22 miles. Interesting what the definition of over the horizon is.

Not just observation, it’s effective missile range vs air defence and ability to hide in the vastness of the sea.

If you don’t observe them how do you know where to point the missile? If your facing missile threats your whole task force is there not just an amphibious ship bobbing about on its own.

The sea isnt vast.

Observing at distance is exactly what MPAs and Satellites are for - though once you’ve find the task group you have to hit it and it’s a big difference being 26nms out with your back end in the sea vs being 100nms travelling at 25kts.

Now you’re talking about combined warfare operations against an highly competent enemy so I would assume you’re sanitising as best you can an area in which to conduct operations, so in that regard operating traditional amphibious vessels would be entirely valid.

In some areas of the world you would find it difficult to operate over 100nm from a coast. Your not going to do it in the gulf or Red Sea for example.


It seems to me the marines are being configured to conduct guerrilla warfare in an enemy’s rear.

[new guy]

I think we need to ask a couple of questions and once we’ve answered them then we’d have a better idea of what MRSS should be.

1 - what aviation and small surface assets are needed to preform the raids we’re likely to do ?

2 - what aviation and small surface assets are needed to control the literal zone a LSG would be acting in ?

3 - would we be expecting to conduct the raid while also controlling the literal zone or just get the boys in then move back to safety ?

4 - are we expecting to operate just in the Baltic's and NATO north or are we expecting to be able to use the LSG anywhere needed ?

5 - are we expecting to deliver vastly different operation from LSG-N compared to LSG-S in so needing them to groups to be made up of different assets ?

4- LRG(N) / JEF AND LRG(S), east of suez, based in daqm,

5- We can't afford two classes, if we could then why did we join with the RNLN?

[Jake1992]

I think we need to ask a couple of questions and once we’ve answered them then we’d have a better idea of what MRSS should be.

1 - what aviation and small surface assets are needed to preform the raids we’re likely to do ?

2 - what aviation and small surface assets are needed to control the literal zone a LSG would be acting in ?

3 - would we be expecting to conduct the raid while also controlling the literal zone or just get the boys in then move back to safety ?

4 - are we expecting to operate just in the Baltic's and NATO north or are we expecting to be able to use the LSG anywhere needed ?

5 - are we expecting to deliver vastly different operation from LSG-N compared to LSG-S in so needing them to groups to be made up of different assets ?

4- LRG(N) / JEF AND LRG(S), east of suez, based in daqm,

5- We can't afford two classes, if we could then why did we join with the RNLN?

I’m not suggesting we can afford multiple classes all I’m saying is these are the sort of questions we need to answer to give us the frame work for what MRSS will best to be

[wargame_insomniac]

If the untied states with an embarrassment of riches in the amphibious domain have deemed they can’t support heavy armour over the beach how can we?

The idea that planning should expect a suitable port will always be available is extremely unwise.

One of the reasons why ship to shore connectors are still relevant is to ensure a force can be landed in damaged ports from slipways etc, not necessarily over the beach.

Ships with a 5m to 7m draft may not be able to access a port if ships have been scuttled in the entrances but landing craft with a 1m draft could safely dock but perhaps only at high tide.

The widest possible range of options must be maintained within reason. The most realistic scenario is never the perfect one.

It’s the only option for us. If there’s no port we don’t go. Certainly not at brigade level with mechanised forces which is probably why the statement has been made the army’s mechanised forces are for nato.

Which isn’t a problem as long as we have a mindset is of defence of territory that’s our or our allies. Not of intervention.

Anything else the only unit available is 16 air assault.

What are the UK's responsibilities under JEF?

I agree that the UK should regrain from intervention outside Europe, other than the sort of intervention we recently carried out in Sudan. Where we sent resources along with allies to temporarily secure the Khartoum airport and Port Sudan, so that along with allies we could evacuate our embassy staff and UK citizens. I agree that UK armed forces can't spare their limited resouces outside Europe in any intervention more substantial than Sudan (or defending BIOT's).

Back to Europe and our obligations under NATO, JEF and any bilateral treaties. I have said before that we should be priotorising protecting NATO's northern flank. France, Spain, Italy, Turkey and Greece should between them have enough to look after NATO's southern flank in Med and Black Sea.

So to me our first priority should be securing the North Atlantic / North Sea and working in partnership with NATO's Artic powers in covering Barents Sea. This plays into our geographic strengths and our ASW strengths.

Second prirority would then remain reinforcing Norway as we have done for the last 60-70 years.

For me our third priority is then reinforcing Estonia. We already have leadership and major UK contribution to NATO's advance deployed Battlegroup. So we would not be invading Estonia but reinforcing a NATO and JEF ally.

Can we rely on Estonian port being in good condition and likweise any rail links through Germany, Poland and the other Baltic States? I think that assumption would be naive as clearly Russia would target both.

So if Estonian ports are blocked by ships destroyed by Russian missiles, or rail link severed, how would we get our reinforcements to augment our advance deployed Battlegroup and local forces? We would still need to get our troops ashore onto our allies's territory.

The joint expeditionary force is a collection of units selected from those held at high readiness that can be deployed to military operations. The uks role is to lead it as a framework nation.

If all german, polish, Latvian Estonia and Lithuanian ports have been knocked out, all road and rail access to the Baltic states severed then I’m afraid to say we aren’t augmenting anything because nothing will be left.

The only brigade in the uk that was designed to be supported over a beach was 3 commando brigade, that no longer exists as a brigade fighting force.

That seems a touch defeatist. Oh well we have no ports or rail line left so the UK should just simply give up and let the Russians attack our allies without responding or trying to reinforce them.....

I expect if hostilities between Russia and NATO ever escalated beyond gray zone warfare, that I would expect a massed wave of Russian missiles from Kalingrad, Leningrad and ships and subs in Northern / Baltic (and maybe even Black Sea) fleets, targeting aforementioned Baltic ports and rail links. We have seen Russian missile have mixed impact in their invasion of Ukraine so far (given the strengthening of Ukrainian GBAD defenses), but their missiles have still fared better in comparison than Russian armour and infantry.

Now I agree that this may require a more substantial advance depoyment of troops and equipment in all of the NATO enhanced forward presence Battlegroups. But having seen the track record of most of Russian armed forces in Ukraine, I am more comfortable in western forcesin their holding up Russian attacks than I would have been pre-Invasion. Sure Russia will start to rebuild their armed forces once a ceasefire or truce is declared, but I think any such rebuild will be far slower than before due firstly to the extent of Russian losses of both trained troops and equipment, and secondly but this rebuilding should be slower than I personally would have imagined pre-war given the impact of western sanctions on Russian defence industry.

And add to that that the fact that NATO's northern flak is far stronger with the admission of both Finland and Sweden, and that many eastern European NATO members hace started ramping up their own defense spending, with Poland being the most obvious example. So whilst I stll expect Russias initial wave of missile attacks aganist Baltic ports and rail links, I do expect that all of the NATO countries will be abe to put up a more determined resistance than I personally would have hoped for before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and the state it revealed the Russian armed forces to be in.

So I still think it is our responsibility to lead the JEF in reinforcing our Baltic allies, even if some allies, such as Poland, would nt gain as much from our assistance given the way that Poland haven reinforced thier own defences. I am sure that UK assistance to the likes of Estomia will be warmly welcomed and I beleive we need to assume that no ports are available and that UK amphibs will need to get our army across to them to reinforce them in a timely manner.

[wargame_insomniac]

I think we need to ask a couple of questions and once we’ve answered them then we’d have a better idea of what MRSS should be.

1 - what aviation and small surface assets are needed to preform the raids we’re likely to do ?

2 - what aviation and small surface assets are needed to control the literal zone a LSG would be acting in ?

3 - would we be expecting to conduct the raid while also controlling the literal zone or just get the boys in then move back to safety ?

4 - are we expecting to operate just in the Baltic's and NATO north or are we expecting to be able to use the LSG anywhere needed ?

5 - are we expecting to deliver vastly different operation from LSG-N compared to LSG-S in so needing them to groups to be made up of different assets ?

4- LRG(N) / JEF AND LRG(S), east of suez, based in daqm,

5- We can't afford two classes, if we could then why did we join with the RNLN?

Albeit in my opinion the quantity of resources available for LRG(S) EoS is far, far smaller than for LRG(N) and JEF.

The current wave of military coups across the Sahel and west Africa has shown that incidents such as the Sudanese civil war, and the waning of French and US influence in that region at the cost of increase influnce for our foes in Russia and China, does in my mid make the likelihood of far more such incidents as Sudan happening going forward, and that LRG(S) has to be on immediate standby for carrying out more such UK interventions as what happened at Khartoum airport and Port Sudan.

But gone are the days where we can afford to make such large military interventions as in Iraq and Afghanistan post 9-11,

[SW1]

If the untied states with an embarrassment of riches in the amphibious domain have deemed they can’t support heavy armour over the beach how can we?

The idea that planning should expect a suitable port will always be available is extremely unwise.

One of the reasons why ship to shore connectors are still relevant is to ensure a force can be landed in damaged ports from slipways etc, not necessarily over the beach.

Ships with a 5m to 7m draft may not be able to access a port if ships have been scuttled in the entrances but landing craft with a 1m draft could safely dock but perhaps only at high tide.

The widest possible range of options must be maintained within reason. The most realistic scenario is never the perfect one.

It’s the only option for us. If there’s no port we don’t go. Certainly not at brigade level with mechanised forces which is probably why the statement has been made the army’s mechanised forces are for nato.

Which isn’t a problem as long as we have a mindset is of defence of territory that’s our or our allies. Not of intervention.

Anything else the only unit available is 16 air assault.

What are the UK's responsibilities under JEF?

I agree that the UK should regrain from intervention outside Europe, other than the sort of intervention we recently carried out in Sudan. Where we sent resources along with allies to temporarily secure the Khartoum airport and Port Sudan, so that along with allies we could evacuate our embassy staff and UK citizens. I agree that UK armed forces can't spare their limited resouces outside Europe in any intervention more substantial than Sudan (or defending BIOT's).

Back to Europe and our obligations under NATO, JEF and any bilateral treaties. I have said before that we should be priotorising protecting NATO's northern flank. France, Spain, Italy, Turkey and Greece should between them have enough to look after NATO's southern flank in Med and Black Sea.

So to me our first priority should be securing the North Atlantic / North Sea and working in partnership with NATO's Artic powers in covering Barents Sea. This plays into our geographic strengths and our ASW strengths.

Second prirority would then remain reinforcing Norway as we have done for the last 60-70 years.

For me our third priority is then reinforcing Estonia. We already have leadership and major UK contribution to NATO's advance deployed Battlegroup. So we would not be invading Estonia but reinforcing a NATO and JEF ally.

Can we rely on Estonian port being in good condition and likweise any rail links through Germany, Poland and the other Baltic States? I think that assumption would be naive as clearly Russia would target both.

So if Estonian ports are blocked by ships destroyed by Russian missiles, or rail link severed, how would we get our reinforcements to augment our advance deployed Battlegroup and local forces? We would still need to get our troops ashore onto our allies's territory.

The joint expeditionary force is a collection of units selected from those held at high readiness that can be deployed to military operations. The uks role is to lead it as a framework nation.

If all german, polish, Latvian Estonia and Lithuanian ports have been knocked out, all road and rail access to the Baltic states severed then I’m afraid to say we aren’t augmenting anything because nothing will be left.

The only brigade in the uk that was designed to be supported over a beach was 3 commando brigade, that no longer exists as a brigade fighting force.

That seems a touch defeatist. Oh well we have no ports or rail line left so the UK should just simply give up and let the Russians attack our allies without responding or trying to reinforce them.....

I expect if hostilities between Russia and NATO ever escalated beyond gray zone warfare, that I would expect a massed wave of Russian missiles from Kalingrad, Leningrad and ships and subs in Northern / Baltic (and maybe even Black Sea) fleets, targeting aforementioned Baltic ports and rail links. We have seen Russian missile have mixed impact in their invasion of Ukraine so far (given the strengthening of Ukrainian GBAD defenses), but their missiles have still fared better in comparison than Russian armour and infantry.

Now I agree that this may require a more substantial advance depoyment of troops and equipment in all of the NATO enhanced forward presence Battlegroups. But having seen the track record of most of Russian armed forces in Ukraine, I am more comfortable in western forcesin their holding up Russian attacks than I would have been pre-Invasion. Sure Russia will start to rebuild their armed forces once a ceasefire or truce is declared, but I think any such rebuild will be far slower than before due firstly to the extent of Russian losses of both trained troops and equipment, and secondly but this rebuilding should be slower than I personally would have imagined pre-war given the impact of western sanctions on Russian defence industry.

And add to that that the fact that NATO's northern flak is far stronger with the admission of both Finland and Sweden, and that many eastern European NATO members hace started ramping up their own defense spending, with Poland being the most obvious example. So whilst I stll expect Russias initial wave of missile attacks aganist Baltic ports and rail links, I do expect that all of the NATO countries will be abe to put up a more determined resistance than I personally would have hoped for before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and the state it revealed the Russian armed forces to be in.

So I still think it is our responsibility to lead the JEF in reinforcing our Baltic allies, even if some allies, such as Poland, would nt gain as much from our assistance given the way that Poland haven reinforced thier own defences. I am sure that UK assistance to the likes of Estomia will be warmly welcomed and I beleive we need to assume that no ports are available and that UK amphibs will need to get our army across to them to reinforce them in a timely manner.

Two things on that one do you think if we saw a build up taking place that would hint at a massive barrage of strategic locations across multiple nato nation would we still be sitting in bases in the uk or would we be moving forces to there fwd positions as deterrence?

And second if Russian missiles were raining down and troops advancing do you think we would be trading conventional missiles?

[wargame_insomniac]

You are right in that in such cicumstances the UK should be rinforcing our own advance deployed troops in NATO Enhanced Foreward Presence Battlegroups. Another commnt you have mad previously is that the UK armed forces are currently lacking in logistics support.

When we have participated in NATO exercises around these EFP Battlegroups, we have sent maybe an addition battalion of troops to reinforce our own forward deployed units, and pronoucd ourselves sugly satisfied is that we have understood and learnt from these exercises. Tis is where I claim hogwash.

We cannot be sure that UK has sufficent logistics resources required to move a complete division or brigade until the time that we actually test deploying such a division or brigade in the exercis. Which we hav NOT yet done so far.

So yes, while I share your hope that we would carry out significant reinforcing of our EFP Battlegoup in Estonia, I remain concerned that we lack sufficent logistics to actually do so in pratcice, and I fear that any such UK reinforcements would arrive in a piecemeal manner.

Re any such escalation of Russia from gray zone to conventional warfare to tactical nukes, yes that is a concern under Putin and the rest of the current Russian military and political leadership. But that takes us way beyond the scope of this topic on RN amphibs, and what amphib ship classes / designs they decide to go for given the collaboration with RNLN.

[Repulse]

proposing SLS for MRSS is worse than FSS for MRSS.

Why? Having unaffordable ships to fit a fantasy vision and budget is much much worse than having ships that meet the requirement no matter how modest.

[Repulse]

Now you’re talking about combined warfare operations against an highly competent enemy so I would assume you’re sanitising as best you can an area in which to conduct operations, so in that regard operating traditional amphibious vessels would be entirely valid.

In some areas of the world you would find it difficult to operate over 100nm from a coast. Your not going to do it in the gulf or Red Sea for example.

It seems to me the marines are being configured to conduct guerrilla warfare in an enemy’s rear.

Given the proliferation of missile, UAV, submarine and satellite technologies the selective group of “ competent enemies” is much bigger, and we get even bigger with Russia try to regain a degree of influence on the world stage.

I agree, it does require sanitising the area of operation, and that’s why the CEPP makes a lot of sense - the CSG can do this, a few T31s close to shore cannot.

I do not believe traditional LSDs/LPDs/LHDs are optimal for this especially for the scale envisaged for the FCF - there is no requirement to transport large numbers of troops, kit and supplies by boat.
JSBLs combined with CVFs and LPHs/ASS for a force primarily inserted by air is much more optimal.

I think the FCF is being configured for unconventional war fighting, behind the line guerrilla warfare / raids is part of this so is I believe things like hit-and-run attacks on advancing forces and securing/ destroying key strategic lines of comms.

[new guy]

proposing SLS for MRSS is worse than FSS for MRSS.

Why? Having unaffordable ships to fit a fantasy vision and budget is much much worse than having ships that meet the requirement no matter how modest.

OTH, endurance, vessel with proper Close in weapons protection, space for at least 24 POD's, an actual hangar for 2 merlin, better than no hanger, sustainment of H&W, other capabilities such as a role 2 maritime hospital that could be installed in Fleet Time. Additional space has been added to the port side boat bay to allow the embarkation of large RIBs for special forces. There is also a dedicated planning and command space for SF and commando operations. FSS will also have some signals intelligence gathering capabilities and will have a SIGINT office. Besides the thousands of tonnes of stores that can be held in the main hold, up to 25 TEU containers can be carried on the upper deck to allow the rapid embarkation of disaster relief supplies as well as supporting future containerised capabilities/PODS such as an autonomous mine warfare system.


Vs a slow, lesser load, more vulnerable vessel.


neither will happen

MRSS, what ever will it be, it be not this.

[Repulse]

5- We can't afford two classes, if we could then why did we join with the RNLN?

The RNLN has similar differing requirements, by joining forces two classes is more possible / affordable not less.

[Repulse]

If there are no ports left to deploy troops, then there is a much bigger problem than landing a few thousand light troops - it will be WW2 all over again where the UK could hopefully defend itself long enough as it and the US builds a force capable of invading and driving out a large Army.

[Repulse]

proposing SLS for MRSS is worse than FSS for MRSS.

Why? Having unaffordable ships to fit a fantasy vision and budget is much much worse than having ships that meet the requirement no matter how modest.

OTH, endurance, vessel with proper Close in weapons protection, space for at least 24 POD's, an actual hangar for 2 merlin, better than no hanger, sustainment of H&W, other capabilities such as a role 2 maritime hospital that could be installed in Fleet Time. Additional space has been added to the port side boat bay to allow the embarkation of large RIBs for special forces. There is also a dedicated planning and command space for SF and commando operations. FSS will also have some signals intelligence gathering capabilities and will have a SIGINT office. Besides the thousands of tonnes of stores that can be held in the main hold, up to 25 TEU containers can be carried on the upper deck to allow the rapid embarkation of disaster relief supplies as well as supporting future containerised capabilities/PODS such as an autonomous mine warfare system.


Vs a slow, lesser load, more vulnerable vessel.


neither will happen

MRSS, what ever will it be, it be not this.

Again, two requirements - one to defend NATOs northern flank another to project limited power globally. MRSS is little more than a name at the moment, no budget assigned and no validation of the design - my view MRSS will die as it is currently conceived.

For the Northern flank, backed by land or carrier based air assets and local logistics, numerous LSL style independent operating forward bases is IMO a lot more sensible than a couple of large / slow targets - “eggs and baskets” comes to mind.

[new guy]

5- We can't afford two classes, if we could then why did we join with the RNLN?

The RNLN has similar differing requirements, by joining forces two classes is more possible / affordable not less.

exactly

[Tempest414]

If the untied states with an embarrassment of riches in the amphibious domain have deemed they can’t support heavy armour over the beach how can we?

The idea that planning should expect a suitable port will always be available is extremely unwise.

One of the reasons why ship to shore connectors are still relevant is to ensure a force can be landed in damaged ports from slipways etc, not necessarily over the beach.

Ships with a 5m to 7m draft may not be able to access a port if ships have been scuttled in the entrances but landing craft with a 1m draft could safely dock but perhaps only at high tide.

The widest possible range of options must be maintained within reason. The most realistic scenario is never the perfect one.

It’s the only option for us. If there’s no port we don’t go. Certainly not at brigade level with mechanised forces which is probably why the statement has been made the army’s mechanised forces are for nato.

Which isn’t a problem as long as we have a mindset is of defence of territory that’s our or our allies. Not of intervention.

Anything else the only unit available is 16 air assault.

What are the UK's responsibilities under JEF?

I agree that the UK should regrain from intervention outside Europe, other than the sort of intervention we recently carried out in Sudan. Where we sent resources along with allies to temporarily secure the Khartoum airport and Port Sudan, so that along with allies we could evacuate our embassy staff and UK citizens. I agree that UK armed forces can't spare their limited resouces outside Europe in any intervention more substantial than Sudan (or defending BIOT's).

Back to Europe and our obligations under NATO, JEF and any bilateral treaties. I have said before that we should be priotorising protecting NATO's northern flank. France, Spain, Italy, Turkey and Greece should between them have enough to look after NATO's southern flank in Med and Black Sea.

So to me our first priority should be securing the North Atlantic / North Sea and working in partnership with NATO's Artic powers in covering Barents Sea. This plays into our geographic strengths and our ASW strengths.

Second prirority would then remain reinforcing Norway as we have done for the last 60-70 years.

For me our third priority is then reinforcing Estonia. We already have leadership and major UK contribution to NATO's advance deployed Battlegroup. So we would not be invading Estonia but reinforcing a NATO and JEF ally.

Can we rely on Estonian port being in good condition and likweise any rail links through Germany, Poland and the other Baltic States? I think that assumption would be naive as clearly Russia would target both.

So if Estonian ports are blocked by ships destroyed by Russian missiles, or rail link severed, how would we get our reinforcements to augment our advance deployed Battlegroup and local forces? We would still need to get our troops ashore onto our allies's territory.

For me things have changed with Sweden and Finland joining NATO and NATO should rethink its standing as I have said before we should be looking now at having

1st Nordic Corps = Norway , Sweden ,Finland & Canada
2nd Baltic Crorps = UK 3rd Div , Denmark , and 3 Baltic states
3rd & 4th Corps North = Germany , Poland
5th & 6th Corps Centre = France , US
7th , 8th & 9th corps South = Spain , Italy , Greece & Turkey

With this said the UK 1st division should be light and globally deployable and the RM along with the Dutch KM should be held in 2 battle groups for maneuver

We should now see 3Cdo brigade as 2 x RM Cdo's and two KM MCG's and when we look at it like so it has 4 x battalion size units with artillery , engineer , Logistics and light armoured vehicle support

[Repulse]

Interesting update on the FSS design with relevance to this thread.

https://www.navylookout.com/refining-th ... ip-design/

Adaptability

Besides the core requirement to provide solid stores to the aircraft carrier and supporting warships, the design is intended to be ‘adaptable’ for other roles and ‘sustainable’ to meet emissions reduction targets. The adaptability involves allocating space, weight and power provision to support these other capabilities such as a role 2 maritime hospital that could be installed in Fleet Time. Additional space has been added to the port side boat bay to allow the embarkation of large RIBs for special forces. There is also a dedicated planning and command space for SF and commando operations. FSS will also have some signals intelligence gathering capabilities and will have a SIGINT office. Besides the thousands of tonnes of stores that can be held in the main hold, up to 25 TEU containers can be carried on the upper deck to allow the rapid embarkation of disaster relief supplies as well as supporting future containerised capabilities/PODS such as an autonomous mine warfare system.

The large and almost square flight deck will accommodate helicopters up to Chinook size. The hangar has space for two Merlin-size helicopters plus at least one UAV. The RN would have preferred more hangar space but enlarging it further would have impacted on the size and cost of the vessel.

FSS will have a core RFA crew of 101 plus up to 57 augmentees all accommodated in comfortable single en-suite cabins. There is more austere sleeping accommodation for another 21 personnel if needed.

So a CSG could carry @600 RMs/SFs without an additional amphib and without overloading:

- 1 x CVF: 250 troops
- 1 x FSS: 57 troops
- 1 x Tide: 46 troops
- 2 x T45: 2 x 60 troops
- 2 x T26: 2 x 50 troops
- 1 x SSN: 10 troops