SW1 wrote: ↑12 Apr 2023, 19:23
Is the marines future just all fwd reconnaissance and very small scale direction action and boardings? Is the high water mark now an operation Paraquet equivalent?
Problem is the supporting arms and a/c. If the “plan” really is to have both carriers in commission and JPR element with them with let’s say 4 commando Merlins assigned
that pretty much gobbles up commando helicopter force deployable strength with little left for anything else so these littoral groups live and die by the deployments of the carrier.
This is crucial and so far unexplained.
RN is asking for funding for ships (T32, MRSS) with no clear and coherent idea of how to use them.
In the last 5 years we have been bombarded with new acronyms. The FCF, FLSS, LSS, LRG, LSG, EMF, MRSS etc etc but it’s all just alphabet soup without a clear strategic direction, where is that clear strategic direction? Where is the manpower to achieve it? The future of the Royal Marines is in flux so it’s no wonder HMT is withholding funding until a coherent structure is finalised.
IMO it looks most likely that the RN manpower crisis will be fixed at the expense of RM. Why is a 6k to 7k force still required when the ambition for the Marines is now so low. This would be a disaster but RM and their shipping is first on the chopping block to pay for the CSG(s), F35 and additional SSNs. It’s a sad reality.
However the current structure is very inefficient and can be improved greatly so what are the priorities?
IMO the FCF through the LRG, LSG, EMF, structure can achieve so much more than an Op Paraquet type Assault and it’s a great example to test the theory. If configured correctly a LRG consisting of a modest LHD with the ability to launch and recover MALE drones, an inshore littoral enabler vessel plus one or two GP escorts should be able to complete the task. Doubling that force to an LSG would be better but the full CSG is completely unnecessary.
The fly in the ointment is the SSK threat and that has always been the achilles heel of the LSG concept. RN really needs to illustrate how they intend to negate a SSK threat to a LSG without dispatching the CSG. Is a couple of T26s bolted onto the LSG together with XLUUVs and MALE drones enough? Is a SSN essential? Does this show that the second MRSS in a LSG needs to assume the role of an ASW LPH? If so that again points towards a flattop MRSS design and illustrates that a LPD/ASS combination is suboptimal.
If you really wanted a hard look at such things then it would really be around much more than their single service role but instead within the armed forces as a whole. If both the marines and the paras are to have a sort of tier 2 global SF style role then there air/land and sea support and new types of delivery really need considered in the whole.
Interoperability is key however amalgamating the Marines and Paras is a step too far. It would just be used as an excuse for more cutting IMO. Conversely I think there is a strong argument to expand the size of the Marines and Paras and embed them will allied nations across the globe as rapid reaction forces. This could and should be a persistent presence and a clear ongoing commitment to global security. The Paras could attach to equivalent land based forces and the Marines could slot into other nations Amphibious setups. Much more effective than dropping in for an exercise every 5 to 10 years.
As for the helo shortage:
- Marinise the Chinook fleet and add auto folding rotors. Ensure the MRSS is capable of embarking 4 Chinook and 4 Wildcat concurrently.
- Transfer all Army Wildcats to RN and add the battlefield reconnaissance role to the Puma replacements or invest in additional drones.
Effectively doubling the number of Wildcats for RN would give all kinds of options. Could an ASW variant be developed quickly to give the T31s and the LSGs a helo capable of tackling both surface and subsurface targets? It would be a great stopgap whilst the drone tech matures.