Boxer / Mechanised Infantry Vehicle (MIV)

[ArmChairCivvy]

render any protection short of an MBT kind of irrelevant

... and as we know, not all MBTs were created equal (on top, Russian tanks are getting a lot of gene mutations, from the newest models to the older ones).

[Lord Jim]

And let us not forget the Israelis put a rapid fire 76mm in a turret, put it on some Shermans and sold them to Chile , plus a variant of the gun to South Africa for their 8x8 Rooikat.

[james k]

The Germans once built huge and massively protected vehicles immune from any battlefield threat. They got destroyed by air power and their size made them very easy targets.

[Defiance]

The Germans once built huge and massively protected vehicles immune from any battlefield threat. They got destroyed by air power and their size made them very easy targets.

Popular thought, but a myth. Aircraft weapons weren't that successful at destroying tanks and rockets/bombs were extensively proven to be inaccurate; this was reflected in post-battle analysis of tank wrecks alongside air crew claims (both in the West and East). The real value came from attacking rear support elements which were significantly softer.

[RetroSicotte]

And let us not forget the Israelis put a rapid fire 76mm in a turret, put it on some Shermans and sold them to Chile , plus a variant of the gun to South Africa for their 8x8 Rooikat.

It was a 60mm gun.

http://www.army-guide.com/eng/product3609.html

The Germans once built huge and massively protected vehicles immune from any battlefield threat. They got destroyed by air power and their size made them very easy targets.

Air power accounted for very little of tank kills in WW2. Air powers real worth back then, conversely enough, was in targeting lightly or un-armoured supply lines and either hampering movement in the day or calling for artillery on grid reference. The "big cats" so to speak were defeated by a combination of gun development (APDS for the 17-Pounder, HVAP for the M1 76mm, and the larger calibre Soviet weapons), fuel shortages, factory bombardment and lack of standards due to Germany rushing production and building impractical designs.

[ArmChairCivvy]

The real value came from attacking rear support elements which were significantly softer.

targeting lightly or un-armoured supply lines and either hampering movement in the day

That's what the analysis tells us
... and the battle group concept came with it: you could not field divisions, as only elements of them had arrived.

So you took, what you had in the way of "panzers" and made the rest of it up, from the normal, fielded formations, already in the area.

[Lord Jim]

Still 60mm is big enough. Does the Italian 76mm SPAAG count then.

As for battlegroups, didn't the organisation of the American Armoured Division each include around three Regiment Headquarters which each took command of a Regiment Combat Team. Sort of taking the German Ad hoc system and formalising it. We never really got the hang of it until after the War.

[RetroSicotte]

Arguably 60mm is too big for anything that isn't a "light tank" of sorts, in some schools of thought. Depends on the role. It's never seen a lot of real use or orders outside Chile (who only needed it to hit obsolete vehicles). Same goes for the Oto Melara 76mm (on ground application anyway) on the Otomatic and B1 Draco. Interesting concepts, but they're too big for many of the roles of an autocannon, and too small to replace a tank gun. As such, they tend to always get pushed to last as a "would be nice" thing that budgets inevitably never pick up on.

The Draco I wouldn't be surprised to see getting marketed heavily soon given its essentially a counter-drone platform with some radar adjustments. The fact that it also has punch on the ground as well when not shooting down UAVs would be quite useful.

But good luck finding a buyer!

[james k]

The Jagdtiger of which I wrote suffered 20% combat losses, most of the balance broke down and were destroyed by their crew. Of that 20% destroyed the majority were to airpower and it was fear of allied airpower which restricted their use.

The Germans once built huge and massively protected vehicles immune from any battlefield threat. They got destroyed by air power and their size made them very easy targets.

Popular thought, but a myth. Aircraft weapons weren't that successful at destroying tanks and rockets/bombs were extensively proven to be inaccurate; this was reflected in post-battle analysis of tank wrecks alongside air crew claims (both in the West and East). The real value came from attacking rear support elements which were significantly softer.

[RetroSicotte]

The Jagdtiger of which I wrote suffered 20% combat losses, most of the balance broke down and were destroyed by their crew. Of that 20% destroyed the majority were to airpower and it was fear of allied airpower which restricted their use.

The Jagdtigers were all of less than 100 vehicles in a war with tens of thousands present, hardly a good spread of data to make such an ascertion on. On the greater span, aircraft did very very little against tanks directly. I have never seen any report of a Jagdtiger being knocked out by air attack.

The incidents of a handful of Jagdtigers refusing to attack out of fear of air attack was more down to them being crewed by untrained conscripts who were in the middle of losing a war in a big way. They didn't then know how effective or not aircraft were at attacking vehicles.

Allied aircraft vastly overstated their effectiveness. Only around 100 tanks in the entire Normandy campaign were knocked out by aircraft, and many of them due to strategic bombing of areas, not tactical strike.

http://www.tanks-encyclopedia.com/artic ... ng-ww2.php

Note the sources, for further reading. I particularly recommend the one listed under "Air Power at the Battlefront: Allied Close Air Support in Europe 1943-45 (Studies in Air Power) Dr. Ian Gooderson"

The attribution of heavier protected transport in the modern day being requested by major militaries such as the US, Poland, Ukraine, Russia and the UK is not comparable in the slightest to Nazi Germany's designs. It's a wholly different reasoning, and not subject to the same drawbacks.

[Lord Jim]

There is a very good book about the US Army's offensive to break the Siegfried Line around Aachen, though I cannot find my copy. In one case a single Ferdinand held up a major proportion of the American advance with infantry support. It was well sighted and couldn't easily be outflanked. It achieved a kill ratio of around 50:1 before succumbing to combined direct and indirect fire and seriously delayed the advance of the Americans.

This was also the reason the Chieftain existed, sit back and snipe the enemy, be almost immune to return fire due to thickness and shape of turret when hulled down, retire as the enemy closes covered by other tanks and repeat.

As for the survival of whatever platform is chosen for the MIV, of course it is not going to survive an encounter with an MBT, few vehicle would besides another MBT, but it has to have a reasonable chance to survive artillery, including sub munitions, auto cannon fire in its frontal arc, mines, ATGWs and other HEAT weapons. This must be achieved through a mix of passive and active protection systems. The latter is a must eve though it is an expensive addition toe cost of any platform and it must be fleet wide, not just a limited number of kits for TES platforms. Measures to reduce its heat signature are important as are other types of camouflage. The armour needs to be of a modular type, to allow replacement in the field by engineers, rather than having to return to depot. The boxers modular approach, as seen on a video I posted last year helps this as the whole rear section can be swapped out in around half an hour with basic tools, and if the hull has been damaged to such an extent this is no longer possible, the weapon will probable have made the vehicle a total write off anyhow.

As for offensive power, having a larger auto cannon such as the 40mm CTS is far more useful than an ATGW. AS has been pointed out modern ERA, composite armour and APS make these far less effective than in the past. A APFSDS round form a CTA will kill probably any light or medium AFV encountered out to a considerable range and individual rounds are far cheaper than ATGWs and your opponent get far less initial warning. That isn't to say there is not a role for an over watch platform based on the MIV carrying a heavy ATGW such a Brimstone, which is targeting data could be provided by other sources ranging from an Infantryman to a forward AFV or a UAV would provide a very potent fire support weapon system with long range. This would enable a troop of say four vehicle to cover a very large area compared to what the Army's man Javelin can at present.

Battalions will need their own ECM and ECCM capabilities in addition to those provided by Royal Signals detachments, and also access to greater and far more resilient ISTAR assets. Data from these should be able to be disseminated down to section level and up from this level as well. Our current systems are designed for COIN not high intensity warfighting and need to be toughened up. Again this is where the MIV should be chosen as the platform to which these capabilities are mounted. Armoured engineering variants of the MIV are also important to allow positions to be rapidly prepared whilst under fire, but with the platforms able to keep up with the rest of the formation. The same goes for artillery support, air defence, medical evacuation and so on. This also highlights why including the Ajax in the Brigades with the MIV is a folly. It has a considerably higher logistical footprint, and cannot redeploy as fast or as far.

Regarding Ajax, having one or two Recce Regiments with the same capabilities as the old CVR(T) Regiments, being held "Divisional" level, or even forming an Armoured Cavalry Regiment along the lines of those of the US Army combining Ajax, Challenger 2 mod, AH-64E and Wildcat would be useful. I would go as far as to say having two such formations instead of the two Armoured Infantry Brigades, and creating three to four Mechanised Regiment mounted in MIVs might be a significantly more useful order of battle, especially in Europe.

But first back to basics and the MoD needs to actually decide what platform it want and order it to be delivered sooner rather than later and in the necessary varieties.

[james k]

What experience do you have of armoured reconnaissance or armoured warfare? In the past I've been attached to 16/5 Lancers and the Household Cavalry Regiment in the Armoured Reconnaissance Role and 1st The Queens Dragoon Guards in the armoured role when it was equipped with Challenger 1.

It is no exaggeration to say that battlefield survivability is linked concealment just as it is with protection, mobility and firepower. Lumbering armoured vehicles the size of a house cannot be concealed and because they can be seen they can be killed. There is no such thing as vehicle immunity on the battlefield and as I pointed out before survival depends not on having an endless choice of vehicles, in a new arms race in which we cannot afford to keep ahead of the threats, it depends much more on our ability to intelligently use what we have in new and innovative ways. It will always be easier to destroy an object, be it an armoured vehicle or fixed structure, than attempt to make it immune. If you find my earlier example a poor one then you might like to consider something more relevant to the threat now faced. In 1972 the North Vietnamese launched a massed conventional attack on South Vietnam, it was not the ARVN which destroyed the north's offensive but US Air Power and similar lessons can be drawn from the Arab Israeli Wars. In a future conflict against Russia or China we cannot guarantee air superiority and creating ever larger vehicles (at the expense of other capabilities and training:BECAUSE HMG IS NOT WILLING TO PAY THE COST) simply creates big targets. We need training, innovation and return to service of more Challenger 2 and AS90 and better use of existing assets rather than a new vehicle.

A good link on US Airpower in the 1972 Easter Offensive -
file:///D:/Downloads/ADA471201.pdf

Some of your comments regarding ECM and ECCM do make sense but only a relatively small percentage of the Royal Signals is involved in that work. On other points I disagree automatic cannon require a vehicle to mount it, Javelin has a small footprint and can be very easily concealed, the ability to dig in to a concealed position and draw enemy armour into a trap is essential since we cannot be of a size to mount an overwhelming attack against a force with numerical superiority in every area and qualitative parity in others. In certain ways a future conflict might resemble the "rolling charge" of the Japanese in Malaya. Numerical differences aside we cannot afford to stand and fight the enemy in a fixed armour on armour battle, just as the Japanese outfought British forces in Malaya the Russians could do the same to us using sheer numbers and we can no longer rely on air superiority since the Russians have superior GBAD. What we need is the ability to fight a number of holding actions in which we inflict disproportionate casualties on the enemy before breaking contact and falling back to the next prepared positions and repeating the process until we can carry out a counter attack on ground of our choosing where we have the numerical advantage. But it isn't about having the largest possible vehicles or new ones, we can only do that with intense high quality training. Unfortunately the reality is that new vehicles are purchased at the expense of training creating a very fragile but well equipped force.

[ArmChairCivvy]

Regarding Ajax, having one or two Recce Regiments with the same capabilities as the old CVR(T) Regiments, being held "Divisional" level, or even forming an Armoured Cavalry Regiment along the lines of those of the US Army combining Ajax, Challenger 2 mod, AH-64E and Wildcat would be useful

- when did the US last have an ACR?

just as the Japanese outfought British forces in Malaya the Russians could do the same to us using sheer numbers

- heh-heh; the Brits had the tanks and the artillery (advantage)... what on earth are you talking about

[RunningStrong]

It is no exaggeration to say that battlefield survivability is linked concealment just as it is with protection, mobility and firepower. Lumbering armoured vehicles the size of a house cannot be concealed and because they can be seen they can be killed. There is no such thing as vehicle immunity on the battlefield and as I pointed out before survival depends not on having an endless choice of vehicles, in a new arms race in which we cannot afford to keep ahead of the threats, it depends much more on our ability to intelligently use what we have in new and innovative ways.

And size matters if you're using Mk1 eyeball, and whilst that will always be relevant it's not the primary Target Acquisition asset of the modern army.

Thermal, radar and EM signature management is key, and it's very difficult to manage all those factors on a vehicle that isn't designed to manage that from day 1. And sticking IR illumination on all corners doesn't help either...

AJAX is a big vehicle, but it's not a hollow box inside, it's full of the very latest in ISTAR capabilities so the user can be more intelligent in their role and can do it faster and from further away than ever before.

[james k]

The Japanese had the tanks in Malaya and we didn't (we had armoured cars and a few machine gun armed light tanks, some without guns but no battle tanks) the Japanese did and used them well to offset almost every defence that we tried to establish. We did have an artillery advantage but were still outfought at almost every engagement, many of the gun battery's being overrun, on the road preparing to withdraw, by fast moving enemy armour. If that had not been the case we wouldn't have lost! But having been soundly beaten in every defensive engagement from Jitra to the Slim Riveron the West Coast and Endau on the East, the speed of the Japanese advance (and a complete lack of British Empire preparedness) prevented us from making a successful stand anywhere.

Japanese Tanks units involved in Malaya were the 25th Army Tank Corps consisting of three regiments totalling 228 Medium tanks and the three Divisional Tank Regiments of the Imperial Guards, 18th and 56th Divisions with 37 Light Tanks each. The British Artillery advantage such as it was was balanced by the Japanese use of vehicle mounted 330mm rockets

[quote= Armchair Civvi] just as the Japanese outfought British forces in Malaya the Russians could do the same to us using sheer numbers. -
- heh-heh; the Brits had the tanks and the artillery (advantage)... what on earth are you talking about[/quote]

[ArmChairCivvy]

Thanks James, looks like it has been too long since I last read about the Malaya campaign... will need to brush up.

The two key things I remember are
- that the Japanese commander was offered a much bigger force, but declined, in order to maintain speed and minimise the logs tail
- and it did not occur to the Brits that artillery pieces can be used in direct fire mode, too. The Japanese tanks having been designed for use against Chinese infantrymen, they were not capable of taking even splinter hits

Moving from those things to today
- we are looking for vehicle that can self-deploy (as part of Strike Bdes) and will minimise the required logs trail
- and we have been so fixated on getting the balance of blast protection and kinetic protection right that we have forgotten the increasing anti-armour role of indirect fires (i.e. smart sub-munitions, penetrating through the roof0.

[james k]

I'd recommend "The Defence and Fall of Singapore 1940-42" by Brian P Farrell, his political analysis isn't one I completely agree with but the details of the campaign and individual battles is fairly good. On the subject of Japanese tanks they were no match for western tanks, indeed a few Matildas would have had the same effect on the Japanese as the Tiger did on our forces but they were never sent. They were also vulnerable to our AT and field artillery, but they were immune to small arms and the Boys AT rifle which is pretty much all most units had.

The relevance to the modern scenario is striking or at least i consider it to be. Our most senior staff officers were complacent, somewhat inept, unwilling to cooperate with other services in a combined arms battle (my biggest problem with the RAF) and fixated with what is going well whilst ignoring anything that isn't. A new factor is that the forces we have are hideously small and whilst they have some excellent equipment it isn't where it should be and available in only small numbers. There was a reluctance in 1941 that still exists today to redistribute equipment that has been replaced, preferring to dispose of it rather than utilise it to supplement the capability of ill equipped forces. The enemy had and is likely to have control of the air and our current thinking makes little allowance for this and units still train and rely heavily on air assets which might very well not be available in a future conflict. The forces in 1941 Malaya were short on AD artillery just as now our equipment is first rate but in horribly short supply. Most importantly training is in short supply and there is an imbalance between regular units and the reserve and an almost complete lack of military (not trade training) training in the sponsored reserve units.

That lack of training and equipment, especially in the reserve, is the subject of numerous excuses that don't extend to the reserves in the US, Australia and Canada and i am sure it will come back to bite us. The Japanese "rolling charge" and variants thereof "Blitzkrieg" and the invasion of Iraq depended very much on the inability of the enemy to break contact and move swiftly and largely intact to the next defensive position and do so repeatedly until the attacking force was worn down to the point of vulnerability to a counter attack. The ability of the Japanese to gather sufficient forces so that they held the numerical advantage in every battle is one that the Russians are well versed at but we never train to counter. Even when a single battalion group of Japanese attacked a British Brigade, our commanders used their assets piecemeal so that often a single British, Australian or Indian lead company fought a numerically superior enemy. The Russians still train to do that and we still don't adequately train to counter it. The paired reserve infantry battalions and few regular ones at section or if they are lucky company level, they train to attack or defend even though in a major conflict their opportunities to do so train might be severely limited. They rarely if ever train to fight a delaying action pending a break contact and quick withdrawal. Most importantly on every exercise our troops outclass the enemy numerically, tactically and in terms of equipment - but is that a likely scenario in a NATO vs Russian or Western Powers vs China conflict? No, both potential enemies having more men, more equipment, more aircraft and more of pretty much everything. In 1942 in Malaya and Singapore we relied on the "poor bloody infantry" and their supporting arms to get us out of a hole dug by the treasury, politicians and inept or complacent military leaders. That is exactly the situation we find ourselves in today.

Thanks James, looks like it has been too long since I last read about the Malaya campaign... will need to brush up.

The two key things I remember are
- that the Japanese commander was offered a much bigger force, but declined, in order to maintain speed and minimise the logs tail
- and it did not occur to the Brits that artillery pieces can be used in direct fire mode, too. The Japanese tanks having been designed for use against Chinese infantrymen, they were not capable of taking even splinter hits

Moving from those things to today
- we are looking for vehicle that can self-deploy (as part of Strike Bdes) and will minimise the required logs trail
- and we have been so fixated on getting the balance of blast protection and kinetic protection right that we have forgotten the increasing anti-armour role of indirect fires (i.e. smart sub-munitions, penetrating through the roof0.

[james k]

Great I'm very pleased to hear that. Do we have enough of them to fight a major conflict and sustain losses? Is there sufficient GBAD to protect them from air attack, since being bigger they can more easily be located? Are they mobile enough to make a difficult target for the enemy to locate and destroy?

And size matters if you're using Mk1 eyeball, and whilst that will always be relevant it's not the primary Target Acquisition asset of the modern army.

Thermal, radar and EM signature management is key, and it's very difficult to manage all those factors on a vehicle that isn't designed to manage that from day 1. And sticking IR illumination on all corners doesn't help either...

AJAX is a big vehicle, but it's not a hollow box inside, it's full of the very latest in ISTAR capabilities so the user can be more intelligent in their role and can do it faster and from further away than ever before.

[Caribbean]

...............

Why is this all I ever see of Arfah's posts?

[RetroSicotte]

He deleted all his posts.

[Caribbean]

Ah - OK. I moved too slow

[ArmChairCivvy]

the forces we have are hideously small and whilst they have some excellent equipment it isn't where it should be and available in only small numbers.

Just as we had the world's first fully mechanised army (BEF) to send to the Continent... just that the opposition had read Fuller's doctrinal pieces and our generals of (infantry/ cavalry/ artillery backgrounds) had not
- good kit, in small numbers... and not used to the best effect (the rest is history, but is it bound to repeat?)

there is an imbalance between regular units and the reserve and an almost complete lack of military (not trade training) training in the sponsored reserve units.

+

the inability of the enemy [or us?] to break contact and move swiftly and largely intact

+

on every exercise our troops outclass the enemy numerically, tactically and in terms of equipment

You've got me worried now: it's not news that we lack battle mass (required to maintain the "flow" whether the flow is forward or in reverse)
- surely the paired Rgmnts/Bns are aiming for the same std as the regular units they are paired with, so that they can be used interchangeably?

[james k]

the forces we have are hideously small and whilst they have some excellent equipment it isn't where it should be and available in only small numbers.

Just as we had the world's first fully mechanised army (BEF) to send to the Continent... just that the opposition had read Fuller's doctrinal pieces and our generals of (infantry/ cavalry/ artillery backgrounds) had not
- good kit, in small numbers... and not used to the best effect (the rest is history, but is it bound to repeat?)
Some soldiers in what were once sponsored reserve units have not been in the field since their recruit training

there is an imbalance between regular units and the reserve and an almost complete lack of military (not trade training) training in the sponsored reserve units.

+
Sorry I meant us

the inability of the enemy [or us?] to break contact and move swiftly and largely intact

+
Most units never exercise against a numerically superior enemy, often the enemy is half a dozen guys told to behave like rank amateurs

on every exercise our troops outclass the enemy numerically, tactically and in terms of equipment

I can give some examples but suffice to say that the infantry reserves are well trained in the field at personal and section level, possibly up to company but above that they have no or very little experience. Outside the infantry some units only go into the field for one weekend a year the rest of their training being trade training.1 Rifles recently had to leave behind members of 6 Rifles on an exercise in Kenya because of insufficient funds and that reserve battalion is so short of money that it's having to reduce the number of training events. That is fairly common throughout the army. It isn't right but it is a choice between new vehicles and even quite limited training and untrained soldiers fail, get captured or die but still new equipment is purchased at the expense of training
You've got me worried now: it's not news that we lack battle mass (required to maintain the "flow" whether the flow is forward or in reverse)
- surely the paired Rgmnts/Bns are aiming for the same std as the regular units they are paired with, so that they can be used interchangeably?

[Lord Jim]

I suppose I could go to the other extreme and say what are the survivability rate of very well trained troops transported in four tonners against a larger armoured or mechanise opponent who has artillery superiority and we have unreliable air support. Obviously, and I think we agree The Army needs to retain an effective training policy include large scale exercises, and also need new equipment. I would however argue that the state of our equipment is worse than that of out training. It has often been said that the British Army needs at least a decade to recover from operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and operations against IS have lengthened this. This is why I stated in another thread that priority should go to the Army if any new money is made available to the MoD, but that idea got shot down by the Navy Brigade.

As to auto cannons vs ATGW, I was mainly referring to vehicle armament. Of course a javelin team is more concealable than a Warrior or Ajax, but with the retirement of the CVR(T), that is what they are going to be transported in. But auto cannon are a far better weapon for the actual vehicle. If you can have both then fine but the CTA 40mm is a fine weapon.

I think we agree on survivability, where a combination of concealment, and other form of both passive and active protection are going to be required, but this does also affect size. Nowadays the size of a vehicle has far less effect on when it is spotted, due to the proliferation of sensors on and above the battlefield.

The British Army a way behind many nations, in its ability to fight a high intensity peer on peer war. It has not trained for such on any scale for nearly 20 years. We have our training area in Canada but how relevant is that to how things are playing out in Ukraine for example. The Warrior CSP, Ajax, MIV and MRV(P) should all have been in service a decade ago and a programme should now be ongoing to replace the Challenger 2. Sky Sabre is replacing Rapier which is an improvement, but it is being bought in small numbers compared to he number of Rapier units we had and the single Regiment will also be required to defend rear area sites and airfields as well as the front. Starstreak is another very good system that has been left to wither. It needs investment to bring it up to scratch, ideally combining the system with the LMM, and fitting the SP launchers to a new platform, preferably the MIV.

In a nutshell the British Army needs more of everything, which it will never get. The majority of the Army's legacy platforms would be death traps in a high intensity conflict. It would matter how well trained the troops are if they are taken out when their vehicles are, and without mobility they are in trouble anyway. I am not advocating halting training, but I do have faith still in individual soldiers, their NCO's and their junior Officers. They will find away to get the job done, they just need to be able to stay alive long enough and have the right support to do so.

[mr.fred]

I'm still left wondering what people think the role of an APC is, wheeled or otherwise.
My take is that it is a method to move infantry around, protected from the sort of light threats that would fix soft vehicles or dismounted vehicles in place long enough to be malleted by artillery. Things like harassing artillery fire and small arms.
What I see calls for is something different. Something that tries to be all things at once. Possibly trying to make a 'cheap' solution with fewer vehicles and fewer men?

I think that is is a good question to ask, what can an 8x8 do that something like Mastiff can't? Is it worth going for a sublime solution when something that we already have does 80% of the job at 20% of the cost? Is it better to have one battalion in MIV or two in Mastiff? They're both tin boxes on wheels, protected by appliqué armour. Should we be expecting them to be able to fight main force enemy armour?

Then there are other things to consider. As a nation we have tended to focus on using aircraft for air defence rather than ground based systems. Should that change? Do we need a slack handful of sublime AD assets or would we be better off putting that funding into more aircraft or something a little more austere that can knock down the sort of drones that aircraft can't target?