mr.fred wrote:Historically, how much combined arms have been present in brigade formations? Going back to the Second World War, brigades were generally homogeneous unit types and supporting arms came from division.
It will not be the first time if I say that we are on our way of having the Matilda infantry tank (again).Lord Jim wrote:would we keep them in the Armoured Infantry Brigades to be used in Battle Groups composed of units from these formations or do we spread them even thinner by attaching squadrons
Nothing transformational in that (see other comment below)Lord Jim wrote:should have bought a Regiments worth of off the shelf wheeled 155mm platforms to re-equip one of the existing 105mm Light Gun Artillery Regiments using the much vaunted Transformational Fund
What is on its way? The drones suitable for use at that level were withdrawn.Lord Jim wrote:ISTAR needs to be deployed down to Company level as part of an overall secure network, the framework of which is on the way.
... that sounds more like a transformation funding itemLord Jim wrote: The procurement of a Sim-net, based on that operated by the US Army but being more versatile with each "Pod" being able to mimic multiple platforms, would allow units up to the size of a Battalion Battle Group to train effectively at less expanse, though this would require funding up front.
FRES was army's counterstrike to the two carriers and RAF's mega-Typhoon prgrms (with Dreadnoughts looming large on the horizon - even though they are meant to hide ) . "We will build 3000 of them"Lord Jim wrote:they are reluctant to commit to big programmes for fear of getting things wrong and not having the funds to correct the mistake.
We have a army renewal thread, some somewhere between tanks and Defence & Security 'overarching thoughts' ... with the Williamson debacle the x-pull between 'fusion' and new hardware is making a comeback ' to the fore'Lord Jim wrote: will continue my rants in the SDSR 2020 thread later.
Jake1992 wrote:most likely Hammond will be gone.
CameronPerson wrote:And for those who are interested, here’s a good thread on the findings of the investigation into the live fire exercise incident on the CR2 in 2017 at Castkemartin with the link to the official report below that
whitelancer wrote:of course he didn't have his own tank and his crew may not even have been available. in consequence the crew did not understand the condition of the L30 which led directly to the accident.
whitelancer wrote: To sum up. I would say crews not having their own dedicated tanks was an important contribtry factor in the accident. Hence the whole idea behind whole fleet managment and how its currently carried out is flawed. Icidently the report mentions technical problems I wonder if they may also at least in part be attributed to the same cause.
RunningStrong wrote:I wholeheartedly disagree. Whole Fleet Management is not the reason for sloppy drills, failure to follow authorisation procedures and failure to maintain the safe configuration of the platform. It may have hidden one of these failings, but it is not the cause of it, nor does it mitigate in anyway the other issues that conspired to a fatal incident.
whitelancer wrote: As far as the Inquiry could establish the relevant drills were carried out correctly. Their was no drill to confirm the BVA was fitted. Failure to stow the charges correctly was both stupid and unnecessary but did not cause the accident, it did of course increase its severity.
whitelancer wrote:The major contributing factor was the failure to conduct a proper Hand Over/Take Over, however as most of the previous crew were not on the range this could not have been done. Should they have therefore selected another tank, perhaps, but were the crews temporally allocated these other Challengers available to carry out a HO/TO we don't know. But remember that tank had already been used a couple of hours earlier so the assumption would have been that it was ok to use. Why was a HO/TO required at all, because crews were constantly moving between tanks, why were they constantly moving between tanks, because they only had 9 available when they should have had a full sqns worth of 18, why did they only have 9, because of Whole Fleet Management.
I should point out I am not arguing with the conclusions of the inquiry, I think from what I can tell they did a good job. Nor am I arguing that a similar accident could not have happened without Whole Fleet Management. What I am saying is that in this case Whole Fleet Management was a contributing factor and made a such an accident more likely than not having Whole Fleet Management.
mr.fred wrote:Even if WFM was not a thing, would a sub unit take all its tanks to Castlemartin ranges for training? While accountant bashing is fun, it doesn’t change the fact that a pound spent on one thing is a pound not spent on something else.
mr.fred wrote:The stand out piece for me was the fact that there was a drill to load a vent tube manually while the safety case for the gun was apparently based on the assumption that vent tubes would only ever be loaded by magazine. The disconnect between users and designers is worrying.
RunningStrong wrote:Fitment of the BVA is in the drills, the issue is that there is no system interlock that prevents firing without the BVA fitted. So it is clear that drills were not completed correctly and the system design failed to mitigate that.
RunningStrong wrote:I again disagree wholeheartedly.
whitelancer wrote:While not the main factor I am sticking to my opinion that Whole Fleet Management was a contributing factor.
Qwerty wrote:NOMEX is also available in black
Lord Jim wrote:Could the fact that crews do not train on the range as much as they used to do, also be a factor? Have drills not been kept up to date as with less training there is less cause for feedback about what could be done to avoid this, or how to do something better/safer?
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