Ajax Armoured Vehicles (British Army)

[~UNiOnJaCk~]

AJAX, CR2 LEP, WCSP, MIV, MRV-P (1 and 2), Sky Sabre, SA80A3, Apache E...

If, big if, that all happens then the core will be pretty good.

In the past you might have had a point, but today what i see when you list those programmes is a lot of disjointed, half baked acquisition programmes which have lost much of the potential they might once have had due to a lack of cohesive planning directly brought about by a lack of money (the strike brigades, Army 2020, Army 2020 refine etc etc - all responses to funding issues rather than capability led decisions, IMO, which have had major repercussions for procurement).

[~UNiOnJaCk~]

From an equipment standpoint, even if everything planned right now goes ahead, they are still not getting several things to match peer formations.

Though this is a dicussion for another thread, in my honest, and potentially highly misugided, opinion, much of where we are going wrong in our thinking is precisely because we insist on trying to much our peers in a symetrical fashion.

Carter was on to something a few years back, to my mind. It's high time we had a revolutionary step change in the way we think about what we expect the army to do and the frustrating thing is, through one of two programmes currently on offer (MIV, MRV-P etc), we already have a few of the necessary building blocks in place to make such a change yet it seems it will be yet another opportunity missed.

[RunningStrong]

In the past you might have had a point, but today what i see when you list those programmes is a lot of disjointed, half baked acquisition programmes which have lost much of the potential they might once have had due to a lack of cohesive planning directly brought about by a lack of money (the strike brigades, Army 2020, Army 2020 refine etc etc - all responses to funding issues rather than capability led decisions, IMO, which have had major repercussions for procurement).

I don't disagree, but in relation to the original comment you could easily say the same thing about the RAF and RN equipment plans.

[RetroSicotte]

Though this is a dicussion for another thread, in my honest, and potentially highly misugided, opinion, much of where we are going wrong in our thinking is precisely because we insist on trying to much our peers in a symetrical fashion.

Just keeping things focused on Ajax, the reason I feel it's an issue isn't because we're trying to "play their game" and that we think to think radical...but because there are known core requirements and capabilities that in every single military must be considered and supported. These are not currently being so.

My worry equally is that heads may be pushed into the sand trying to pursue some unknown "innovative" method that doesn't really exist, as a mask for cuts, and not simply doing what works and what the Army always wanted anyway.

[ArmChairCivvy]

the glaring unforgivable omission. Artillery.

All that... done with 2680 (reg) and 1580 (reserves)

"Army’s Close Support Artillery Regiments
and provide special-to-arm oversight for
the two Very High Readiness regiments
in the Air Assault and Commando Brigades.
It will integrate Joint Fires through the
provision of Targeting, Battle-space
Management, and Air/Land integration.
The Brigade Headquarters will also provide
a deployable Joint Fires Cell as part of a
deployed divisional headquarters."
... no need to mention the hardware; been done to death (i.e. the lack of it, and of the rounds that could enhance the "few" numbers)

[~UNiOnJaCk~]

Just keeping things focused on Ajax, the reason I feel it's an issue isn't because we're trying to "play their game" and that we think to think radical...but because there are known core requirements and capabilities that in every single military must be considered and supported. These are not currently being so.

My worry equally is that heads may be pushed into the sand trying to pursue some unknown "innovative" method that doesn't really exist, as a mask for cuts, and not simply doing what works and what the Army always wanted anyway.

There are core requirements absolutely, but i don't think they are universally shared. That's kind of my point, i think we have severely misunderstood our own requirements.

Of course, much of this lack of understanding stems from the political class dictating to the Army not only what they feel it should be doing - be that supporting the continent in the face of Russian aggression or fighting insurgent groups in far flung corners of the globe - but also how they think it should be doing it (their influence existing in the form of their hands on the purse strings and their desire to provide a "tick box" military to satisfy the public gaze). I really don't think there has been an honest, open review of our national military requirements in decades.

[RetroSicotte]

There are core requirements absolutely, but i don't think they are universally shared. That's kind of my point, i think we have severely misunderstood our own requirements.

I can't really see any way in which "be able to engage a foe with vehicle-armed armoured units" would not be a core requirement for the British forces, personally, in regards to how Ajax is set to operate without Challenger support (the only anti-armour vehicle in the entire British inventory, which itself has issues, not to mention low numbers).

But I do agree, on a broad scale. So long as they are trying to appease this "budget army to fight men with AKs" while also throwing out rhetoric about "countering Russian conventional thrusts" then nothing will occur. Platforms like Ajax can do both, if only properly supported.

[ArmChairCivvy]

lack of understanding stems from the political class dictating to the Army
not only what they feel it should be doing - be that supporting the continent in the face of Russian aggression or fighting insurgent groups in far flung corners of the globe
- but also how they think it should be doing it

Agreed: Just one word... MRB! (where is the moticon, for the one brought to vomiting: ADD HERE)

[~UNiOnJaCk~]

I can't really see any way in which "be able to engage a foe with vehicle-armed armoured units" would not be a core requirement for the British forces, personally, in regards to how Ajax is set to operate without Challenger support (the only anti-armour vehicle in the entire British inventory, which itself has issues, not to mention low numbers).

But I do agree, on a broad scale. So long as they are trying to appease this "budget army to fight men with AKs" while also throwing out rhetoric about "countering Russian conventional thrusts" then nothing will occur. Platforms like Ajax can do both, if only properly supported.

There's more than one way to skin a cat, as they say - but yeah, i absolutely agree, as a basic requirement we would need a capability to engage and defeat enemy heavy armour.

The real question is, what would our version of that capability look like (hint, does Challenger, or heavy armour of any sort, have a continued place in the British Army)? As i mentioned, Carter had some very interesting ideas on how to answer that, it would seem, but they were ultimately put aside what with all the faffing around that has taken place since 2015.

Personally i think Ajax is now too far gone to be the answer. As you might know, i once swore by it, but with every decision it has become a less and less credible answer to the Army's many problems - the biggest loss, since the decision to cut most of the additional variants, has been p*ss poor effort to shoe horn Ajax into the role of a medium tank for appearances sake. That move alone has tarnished the most significant achievement of the entire SV programme from a technical standpoint - the Ajax variant itself.

The MIV offers some hope that it could still be what the Ajax might have been, as it has not yet progressed as far, but sadly it looks to be going the same way as well. Plus, to be truly revolutionary with the MIV, it would require a an uptick in funding that sadly looks all too distant.

[RetroSicotte]

The real question is, what would our version of that capability look like (hint, does Challenger, or heavy armour of any sort, have a continued place in the British Army)?

Objectively yes.

Personally i think Ajax is now too far gone to be the answer. As you might know, i once swore by it, but with every decision it has become a less and less credible answer to the Army's many problems - the biggest loss, since the decision to cut most of the additional variants, has been p*ss poor effort to shoe horn Ajax into the role of a medium tank for appearances sake. That move alone has tarnished the most significant achievement of the entire SV programme from a technical standpoint.

The MIV offers some hope that it could still be what the Ajax might have been, as it has not yet progressed as far, but sadly it looks to be going the same way as well. Plus, to be truly revolutionary with the MIV, it would require a an uptick in funding that sadly looks all too distant.

If MIV can get ATGMs, direct fire, artillery support and the like to make up for Ajax's shortcomings, then yeah it would help make up for the horrific gutting that the Ajax program had. Ideally I think those abilities should be on a platform like Ajax instead, but it is what it is.

Unfortunately, MIV is basically set to be "APC with a GPMG and heavily armed for Parlimentry soundbites" and that's about it. Hence my enormous concern.

[~UNiOnJaCk~]

Objectively yes.

Honestly, why?

Personally, i'm no longer convinced and, for me, it is part of where we are going wrong, by subscirbing wholly to convention in an effort to match our peers like for like. My opinion isn't going to be shared by many, i admit, and could well be hugely misguided (i.e complete clap trap) but who knows.

We are not a continental power, we never have been and yet, ever since the end of the Cold War and the disbanding of the BAOR, we have seemingly tried to insist otherwise - and we have the relics to prove it. It's an unnatural posture for us, and one that doesn't match our true strategic requirements, to my mind.

If MIV can get ATGMs, direct fire, artillery support and the like to make up for Ajax's shortcomings, then yeah it would help make up for the horrific gutting that the Ajax program had. Ideally I think those abilities should be on a platform like Ajax instead, but it is what it is.

Unfortunately, MIV is basically set to be "APC with a GPMG and heavily armed for Parlimentry soundbites" and that's about it. Hence my enormous concern.

In an ideal world i, personally, would bin Ajax, along with WCSP and pretty much any other major vehicle programme currently running that isn't either MIV or MRV-P. I would then plough every available resource into those two programmes. The other major vehicle programmes we have now are in such a state that i truly believe there is no fixing them.

[benny14]

What the British Army has is excellent platforms. They have the potential to be the best in the world. They have the space, the means, the options and the fitting

I agree.

Ajax remains only a gun vehicle, for example. And having lost the direct fire and overwatch variants, Ajax routes absolutely require external support to handle encounters that other nations would simply deal with and move on, saving the CAS/Artillery for things that truly need it.

Ajax and Boxer will be equipped with a protector RWS. This gives it the means to fairly easily equip an ATGM if the requirement is there.

[mr.fred]

In an ideal world i, personally, would bin Ajax, along with WCSP and pretty much any other major vehicle programme currently running that isn't either MIV or MRV-P. I would then plough every available resource into those two programmes. The other major vehicle programmes we have now are in such a state that i truly believe there is no fixing them.

If I might inquire:
1) what, in your ideal world, are MIV and MRV-P supposed to do?
2) What makes you think that the current programmes are so broken?

[RetroSicotte]

Honestly, why?

Multiple nations have tried replacing conventional tanks with platforms more focused on infantry support and ATGMS. Every single time it has resulted in a catastrophic failure of a concept. The four leading tank nations in the world right now, US, Russia, France and Germany, all attempted it and found the concept to be hopelessly incapable at operating in ways MBTs do with conventional design. They even tried it a DIRECT replacement with the MBT/Kpz-70, XM803, AMX-30 ACRA, M60A2, M551, IT-1 and several others. All programs ended up being considered failures for several reasons (some for more than just this one, but thats unrelated.) ATGMS alone are not a solution, because ATGMS are horrifically bad at offensive action.

Simply put, you cannot dominate a space with vehicles that fall over at the slightest sign of incoming and have to constantly go beyond the acceptable limit of risk to counter anybody who brings even a few MBTs to the table. It forces such a formation to need to make risky mobility choices, make delaying actions to go around or prepare new ambushes, to keep moving when you perhaps don't want to and generally have to constantly be reacting to the enemy with their heavy, very mobile, armour that can only be hurt by specific things. It means they need to constantly be calling helicopters, CAS or artillery to help them out, dragging resources into the same encounter, all of which carry their own risks. Constant use of artillery opens up to counter-battery, CAS and helos need to be able to operate safely in the skies, a very risky prospect against a peer foe. Or deploying infantry who need to go into unacceptable risk facing down armoured thrusts.

Meanwhile a force that actually has an MBT just turns the turret and pulls the trigger. Job done.

There is no force structure in the world that can match the aggressive pace, the rate of heavy fire, and the staying power of proper heavy armour.

Case in point, the British Army could not have made the fastest armoured thrust in history in the Gulf War without Challengers. The British Army could not have taken Basra with such few casualties without the Challengers. Nothing can linebreak like an MBT, which is the reason every single major nation in the entire world is maintaining, developing and upgrading their tank forces still.

Even the Netherlands, which lost its tank, almost immediately turned around and went, "Uh, yeah, that was a really friggin bad idea!" and has started trying to get them back in ANY way that they can through joint operation.

[~UNiOnJaCk~]

If I might inquire:
1) what, in your ideal world, are MIV and MRV-P supposed to do?

I personally see them as the ideal starting points for the development of a true "medium" weight force. I had toyed with the idea of Ajax (and MRV-P) serving as the basis for such a force, which would have certain benefits of its own, but my personal preference would be for something centered on the MIV, primarily for reasons of deployability and coherency.

2) What makes you think that the current programmes are so broken?

As ever it is principally an issue of money. If we are to retain heavy armour, then CLEP does not go far enough towards ensuring that the Challenger remains viable. In its current form it seems to be something of a dead end and yet to implement the kind of changes that would be needed to properly ensure that Challenger keeps pace with the times, you might as well ditch the whole fleet and purchase an OTS solution from one of our allies. At the end of the day you also have to question whether the size of the fleet would justify such a radical purchase. I simply advocate going one step further and potentially ditching heavy armour altogether.

Ajax/FRES SV is more simple to fix from a technical POV yet it has been compromised by extremely poor decision making to the extent that it has somewhat lost is purpose. The roles for which it was originally envisaged have either changed (Ajax becoming a "medium tank") or have been gapped in perpetuity (loss of intended variants). The programme could gain better clarity through a step change in opertional thinking towards the family of vehicles and through a massive injection of funding to resurrect lost elements of the programme but such things seem unlikley. To my mind, it would be a more realistic prospect to alter the scope and shape of the MIV what with it still being at a formative stage rather than trying to quickly patch what used to be the FRES SV requirement back together.

WCSP is something i've struggled to understand from the start and the crucial second element to the programme, that of the "support" variants doesn't look to be making too much headway from what we have seen, or rather haven't seen. As ever, the funding doesn't seem to be in place to fully realise the plans, at least not to the extent that will furnish the Army with the end capability it actually requires by the look of things, so, to my mind, it would be better, if possible, to bin the programme and rationalise the requirement under the MIV programme as was actually intended a little while back when we looked at Boxer for the first time, IIRC.

[RetroSicotte]

Ajax and Boxer will be equipped with a protector RWS. This gives it the means to fairly easily equip an ATGM if the requirement is there.

Entire capabilities cannot be done reactively.

"Okay everyone, rotate the entire army's main armoured vehicle back to the UK for a few months, we need to add a new weapon to it, and retrain the armoured units in its operation, maintenance and tactics. Wait, what do you mean the war's already over?"

Modern war at a level where it is over in days. You fight with what you have.

Look at how long it took the MRAPs to get out there, and they weren't even new vehicles. Men were dying in that timeframe until they did, and thats just an insurgency, not a conventional war.

[~UNiOnJaCk~]

Multiple nations have tried replacing conventional tanks with platforms more focused on infantry support and ATGMS. Every single time it has resulted in a catastrophic failure of a concept. The four leading tank nations in the world right now, US, Russia, France and Germany, all attempted it and found the concept to be hopelessly incapable at operating in ways MBTs do with conventional design. They even tried it a DIRECT replacement with the MBT/Kpz-70, XM803, AMX-30 ACRA, M60A2, M551, IT-1 and several others. All programs ended up being considered failures for several reasons (some for more than just this one, but thats unrelated.) ATGMS alone are not a solution, because ATGMS are horrifically bad at offensive action.

Simply put, you cannot dominate a space with vehicles that fall over at the slightest sign of incoming and have to constantly go beyond the acceptable limit of risk to counter anybody who brings even a few MBTs to the table. It forces such a formation to need to make risky mobility choices, make delaying actions to go around or prepare new ambushes, to keep moving when you perhaps don't want to and generally have to constantly be reacting to the enemy with their heavy, very mobile, armour that can only be hurt by specific things. It means they need to constantly be calling helicopters, CAS or artillery to help them out, dragging resources into the same encounter, all of which carry their own risks. Constant use of artillery opens up to counter-battery, CAS and helos need to be able to operate safely in the skies, a very risky prospect against a peer foe. Or deploying infantry who need to go into unacceptable risk facing down armoured thrusts.

Meanwhile a force that actually has an MBT just turns the turret and pulls the trigger. Job done.

There is no force structure in the world that can match the aggressive pace, the rate of heavy fire, and the staying power of proper heavy armour.

Case in point, the British Army could not have made the fastest armoured thrust in history in the Gulf War without Challengers. The British Army could not have taken Basra with such few casualties without the Challengers. Nothing can linebreak like an MBT, which is the reason every single major nation in the entire world is maintaining, developing and upgrading their tank forces still.

Even the Netherlands, which lost its tank, almost immediately turned around and went, "Uh, yeah, that was a really friggin bad idea!" and has started trying to get them back in ANY way that they can through joint operation.

Firstly, i appreciate the reply - my question really was an academic/open one.

In our specific context, given our many limitations, you can also argue their many drawbacks when taken as part of a system. For instance, with the exception of the US (which is a special case anyway) the nations of France, Germany and Russia are all traditional (European) continental military powers. Assuming that the continent is still a possible future battlefield, these nations have fewer concerns than we would in terms of mobilising and deploying armour. Does the UK realistically retain the means to deploy meaningful quantities of armour to the continent in this day and age? I doubt it. Moreover, even if we had the physical logistical capacity to move heavy substantial quantities of heavy armour at distance and speed, with the fleet as small as it is today, what difference could we realistically make with them? Could the resources swallowed up by our heavy assets not be better utilised elsewhere?

Additionally, with nations like Russia, France and Germany, given their larger landmasses and land border areas, having access to assets like heavy armour arguably makes infinitely greater sense for them than it does for the UK in the context national defence. Any nation hypothetically wishing to use armour on UK soil would be faced with the same, timeless difificulties that have confronted all would be aggressors against this island and moving armies across the Channel is no less daunting a prospect today as it was 70, 200 or 1000 years ago. In fact, you may well argue that this particular challenge is far more difficult today than it was in the past with given that almost all national militaries, with the possible exception of the US alone, suffer from crippling logistical deficiencies of one form or another (Russia: little to no viable sealift capablity, France: a modest sealift capability but very little strategic air lift capability, Germany: none of the above!). Consider also the battlespaces of the future, the prevelance of urban environments in particular - no less dangerous to tanks today than they were 70 years ago. These sorts of engagements are only going to become more common place and as infantry continue to become more and more lethal against almost the entire range of battlefield assets (as seems to have been the trend in recent decades) the tank may not be able to survive in such conditions, both physically and philosophically speaking. I know its been predicted before, but it may well still come to pass - we just might have jumped the gun last time round.

What of our contributions to NATO? Where does British heavy armour sit in that particular equation? The BAOR is gone and even that was a force that brought many problems/complications with it. As i said, historically, our natural posture has not been to sit on the continent and behave as a land power might. It's not where our strengths nor our natural strategic inclinations lie. In returning to a posture where our expeditionary capability, and our ability to defend our own territory, is emphasised above all else i personally feel as if we would finally be better matching our actual national requirement and to my mind, assets such as heavy armour, in our specific national context, potentially stand in the way of making that change. I feel that if we recast ourselves as such within the NATO alliance, our standing might well be enhanced, not diminished, and that our potential contributions be of far greater use. Basically, im advocating playing to our strengths and im not convinced that, these days, our strengths lie in "heavy". I'm not claiming i am correct on this, it is simply my opinion, for whatever it is worth.

[mr.fred]

personally see them as the ideal starting points for the development of a true "medium" weight force. I had toyed with the idea of Ajax (and MRV-P) serving as the basis for such a force, which would have certain benefits of its own, but my personal preference would be for something centered on the MIV, primarily for reasons of deployability and coherency.

What does a medium force do and what makes a force “true” medium rather than (presumably) “false” medium?

I fear that a formation based on a wheeled 20-30t vehicle would be very quick into action and equally quick out, on the basis of being distributed across the battlefield in irregular pieces. If they lack combat power and logistics support, as seems likely, they will be limited in what they can achieve and you’d have to accept their limitations.

[benny14]

Entire capabilities cannot be done reactively.

"Okay everyone, rotate the entire army's main armoured vehicle back to the UK for a few months, we need to add a new weapon to it, and retrain the armoured units in its operation, maintenance and tactics. Wait, what do you mean the war's already over?"

Modern war at a level where it is over in days. You fight with what you have.

Look at how long it took the MRAPs to get out there, and they weren't even new vehicles. Men were dying in that timeframe until they did, and thats just an insurgency, not a conventional war.

We know the vehicles will have Protector RWS, which is capable of been equipped with a Javelin. We dont know if it will or wont have ATGM fitted, we wont know until we start seeing Ajax and Boxer operational.

[Ron5]

Entire capabilities cannot be done reactively.

"Okay everyone, rotate the entire army's main armoured vehicle back to the UK for a few months, we need to add a new weapon to it, and retrain the armoured units in its operation, maintenance and tactics. Wait, what do you mean the war's already over?"

Modern war at a level where it is over in days. You fight with what you have.

Look at how long it took the MRAPs to get out there, and they weren't even new vehicles. Men were dying in that timeframe until they did, and thats just an insurgency, not a conventional war.

We know the vehicles will have Protector RWS, which is capable of been equipped with a Javelin. We dont know if it will or wont have ATGM fitted, we wont know until we start seeing Ajax and Boxer operational.

I think Protector is only part of the Ajax peace keeping configuration. For war it is replaced with an EO sight. If so you need to look elsewhere for your ATGM mount.

58dfbc8d.jpg

[Ron5]

Isn't the whole idea of "binning" programs to do something else what gave birth to the awful FRES saga?

I think we'd better off debating how best to use Ajax, JLTV, CL2 & Boxer, not how can billions can be thrown away again leaving the army with nothing.

[benny14]

I think Protector is only part of the Ajax peace keeping configuration. For war it is replaced with an EO sight. If so you need to look elsewhere for your ATGM mount.

Fair enough. The supporting variants will be equipped with it though, so there is a possibility.

[ArmChairCivvy]

Ajax and Boxer will be equipped with a protector RWS. This gives it the means to fairly easily equip an ATGM if the requirement is there.

While a state of the art solution, this brings a single launch weapon to the vehicles that are the mainstay of 2 out of 4 bdes (OK, add airmobile, which does not bring a bde strength to the party, though) meant to be our contribution to any manoeuvre warfare
- I consider such arrangement (without supporting direct fire vehicles... or flying tanks) to be the means to get out of desperate trouble

[ArmChairCivvy]

WCSP [is something i've struggled to understand from the start and] the crucial second element to the programme, that of the "support" variants doesn't look to be making too much headway from what we have seen, or rather haven't seen.

Quite agree, talk about rounded formations when some key functions are on antiquated platforms.

Modern war at a level where it is over in days. You fight with what you have.

Sadly gets overlooked all the time (not just by us)

replacing conventional tanks with platforms more focused on infantry support and ATGMS. Every single time it has resulted in a catastrophic failure of a concept.

+

ATGMS alone are not a solution, because ATGMS are horrifically bad at offensive action.

and slow in flight... and prone to being defeated by the various APSs emerging fast (even top attack might be a fading remedy)

need to constantly be calling helicopters, CAS or artillery to help them out, dragging resources into the same encounter, all of which carry their own risks.

of which assets we have too few of and

against a peer foe

would be risking losing too many in just one encounter (even if they could be brought to bear in time and in numbers that would make a difference)

even if we had the physical logistical capacity to move heavy substantial quantities of heavy armour

- luckily our "garage" is already there (near to "there"), would still need to move a whole bde (plus any called up reserves) to man them; not an insignificant challenge

[Lord Jim]

Right been trying to catch up with the conversation here and there are a number of opinions that seem to oppose one another. I will try to keep this focused on Ajax but I will deviate so heads up in advance.

One of the key arguments I tried to make a while back was that the British Army, with its current funding could not afford to do everything and had a choice to make. Putting aside the rapidly deployable formations, I believe the Army can either reconstitute its Heavy formations or develop a true Medium capability but not both.

If the Army decided to do the former it would have to basically roll back it plans for the MIV and MRV(P) to a great extent. The MIV would in essence become a replacement for the FV430 series in the two Armoured Brigades, with the MRV(P) filling the role of a support platform, often replacing the Land Rover and its variants. The Ajax would form both a Recce Regiment for each Armoured Infantry Brigade and form close Recce units within the Armoured and Armoured Infantry Regiments. The numbers required though would be considerable less than currently planned, unless variants were uses to take the roles current envisaged for the Warrior support variants. The WCSP would need to be accelerated, not saying much considering the pace it is currently progressing at and the Challenger 2s upgrades as planned, again faster than planned at present. The above would give us two effective formations, but that would be all the Army has to offer besides 16 Air Assault and numerous Infantry Brigades comprising of "Light" role units.

If the Army went down the Medium route then the WCSP and Challenger Programmes would have to be cancelled. In addition, the UK would have to look seriously at where it intended to operate these formations in any future conflict. For the medium formations to work however, both Ajax and the MIV will need the development ant procurement plans seriously revised to add capabilities to both platforms. But where and how they will operate is as important as how they are equipped. At present the political focus is on the Baltics. These medium formations could be deployed far more easily than the heavier formations it is true but against a peer opponent they sound be very fragile. The idea of them operating in a dispersed manner seems to simply allow an opponent to take them apart piece by piece. The ITAR assets deployed by Russia for example would mean individual units could be located and identified far more easily than in the past and persecuted far more rapidly than was historically possible. This raises the issue of how these formation would be used. The British Army has never had a Medium weight force and simply does not currently know how to use one. On the plus side this could mean the Army is starting with a clean slate and write its own rule book, taking advice form nations that already use such forces. Btu more likely it will try to adapt existing doctrine resulting in a mishmash ideas from the infantry and armoured schools, that may appear good on paper but actually be unworkable once the bullets start to fly.

Of the two options the first is the easiest to implement, as it uses and adapts the existing equipment programme and the doctrine behind the operations of such formations is well known. The second is far more a gamble and will take far longer to implement, in additional to requiring additional resources. It could however provide the army with a far more flexible capability with formations far more compatible with the UK's two rapid deployment formations. this in turn opens up the idea of utilising them not in the Baltics or central Europe but possible on the flanks, and also provides increased capability in operations outside the European theatre.


So which route should the Army take it will have to choose one or the other to retain any true viability in the future.