Future Littoral Strike Ships

[ArmChairCivvy]

The larger displacement of the landing craft may also facilitate the mounting of a phalanx or two the protect the landing area from mortars, shells and missiles etc

You did not like my idea of the 5o knot hovercraft that would do this, where needed, and thereby the LCUs would be kept "dirt cheap"?

What they should be is medium to small mobile sea basing platforms, but calling them such does not generate headlines or sound sexy

Sea basing, for raids.., sounds like pirates. Better

[Poiuytrewq]

What ships transfer vehicles at sea? The US require a massive platform to act as an intermediary, is that what your advocating?

If it's required, absolutely. The reason it is necessary in my opinion is due to the low number of well docks going forward. The only sustainable way to organise a large scale Amphibious Assault with a budget the size of the UK's is a modest number of LPD's acting as facilitators and a larger number of commercially derived vessels such as the Points providing the LiM's.

Otherwise horizons will have to be lowered drastically going forward in terms of Amphibious Assault capability.

[Lord Jim]

The amount of well decks we have is sufficient for the scale of amphibious landing we a planning for, in other words the Lead Commando. Even then it is not the aim to lift even a force of this size from ship to shore in one go. We still have the capability to unload further equipment to increase the size of force over the beach so to speak but we are still talking a reinforced Battalion sized Battlegroup. Anything larger comes ashore in a port, either already friendly or what the above has secured.

[Poiuytrewq]

You did not like my idea of the 5o knot hovercraft that would do this, where needed, and thereby the LCUs would be kept "dirt cheap"?

I'm open minded about what role large hovercraft could play in the future, especially if they could be operated from a vessel without a dedicated well dock.

The amount of well decks we have is sufficient for the scale of amphibious landing we a planning for, in other words the Lead Commando.

You are absolutely correct, on paper everything looks tip top but what happens if the Albion hits a mine on the way to the conflict zone for example? It's game over. We have no resilience. Even if the two Bays have an LCU each it wouldn't be enough to guarantee success.

Of course a second LPD is an alternative solution as is the multiple LHD option. One of the biggest missed opportunities could end up being the FSS vessels. A LCU sized well dock as per the original concept would have been a fantastic addition.

Personally I would look at the commercial FloFlo solution to add extra capacity, very cost effectively and only if and when it's needed.

The FLSS and the FSS vessels are a great opportunity to add some resilience to the Amphibious fleet, hopefully we take it.

[Lord Jim]

Resilience is a problem across all three services but the Royal Navy in particular. AS was mentioned in the debate highlighted on the Carrier thread, if the RN suffered similar loses to those in the Falklands conflict it would have lost over a third of its fleet. Adding two LSS is not going to change this state of affairs.

[shark bait]

Assault with a budget the size of the UK's is a modest number of LPD's acting as facilitators and a larger number of commercially derived vessels such as the Points providing the LiM's.

If the UK maintains the ambition of putting a large combat mass ashore without dedicated infrastructure it has to increase its use of civilian assets. It is clear that even the more optimistic forecasts are still putting a fiscal squeeze on the navy, so it needs to increase its share of cheaper civilian assets. Civilians don't operate carriers or submarines, but they are very good at logistics via the sea, therefore it is the marines that should pivot towards civilian assets.

Unfortunately the above suggestion is still a big expensive bespoke bit of military kit (see ESD-1). Nowhere in the world do vehicles drive between ships at sea. Only recently has it become routine for humans to transfer between ships at sea using stabilised gangways in the oil and gas industry. Vehicles is a no go.

There needs to be a better way of applying civilian platforms in a novel way, or by making smaller civilian docks (which are everywhere), more accessible for military use.

[Tempest414]

the other way is we stop messing about and set out our amphib and RM to meet the future needs as seen now. Which are ship to shore force projection both East and West of Suez this could be met by getting our heads down to replacing the 2 LPDs and the Bays with 5 new 200 meter Enforcer class LPDs and have them supported by 5 Point class and 2 Wave class have them stationed like so

1 ) Gulf
2) Singapore
3) AP-N
4 ) Home waters ready ship
5 ) Maintenance / refit

Ships 1&2 can support each other along with a Point class and a Wave Tanker able to project into the Indian Ocean & Pacific. Ships 3 & 4 can support each other along with a Point class and Wave tanker to project into the North and South Atlantic and Med. Each group should be able to deploy 1000 troops with support from 6 to 8 Helicopters and landing craft

[donald_of_tokyo]

I think there will be zero need for UK to conduct landing operation at more than two theaters at once. Keeping 5 amphibious groups is not a good idea. Even SOF strike will not take place in two locations at once. The only reason, if any, to put 2 LSG east and west of Suez is to shorten reaction time, and to perform good exercises with local allies more frequently.

[Lord Jim]

UK's naval priorities begin with NATO and that means, with regards to amphibious operations, going north. The LSSs are without true substance and will spend the majority of their time in port as there will only be one in each theatre and so needs to be available 24/7/365. They cannot afford to be at sea suffering wear and tear in case they break something and are not available when needed. This alone makes me think the idea is flawed if it is to involve anything other than constructing a mobile sea base that moves from friendly port to port to enable SF and other small scale operation against nearby hostile targets. They are not going to creep up to an enemy's coastline a launch waves of small boats carrying chaps with pointy knives.

[shark bait]

Keeping 5 amphibious groups is not a good idea.

I agree Donald, that list is devoid of any reality. There will occasionally be a single amphibious group, that will be placed wherever needed.

The Littoral strike ships are likely to be maritime security platforms that will occasionally operate as a special forces base. Donald has it spot on, forward based to shorten reaction time to better fit the special forces.

A regular littoral strike group is fantasy and stupid in equal measures, there is not enough assets to support it, and it completely voids the concept of an inconspicuous cargo ship when it's surrounded by frigates.

UK's naval priorities begin with NATO and that means, with regards to amphibious operations, going north.

How do you work that out? It's not right to focus on one narrow scenario because it possible to draw a convenient solution from it.

Hybrid actions across Africa or the Middle east to destabilise NATO are just as likely as an invasion in the Arctic. Not preparing to fight the last war ect.....

[Lord Jim]

I am not saying that we will not operate in other areas or that these mobile bases do not have a use, but the idea of replacing our two LPDs with five much smaller ones that are less capable and spreading them around the globe just does not make sense. It is recognised that we do not have enough mass across the military, why would spreading what we have so thinly be a step forward? Norway is one of our major NATO commitments. Why is that less important that committing a escort to the Atlantic as everyone says is a core priority for the RN.

Sure if we could form five proper Expeditionary Units like the USMC, each transporting a full reinforced Commando including artillery, armour and other supporting combat and logistics units we would be fine. But that is out of the question. The proposed five light amphibious groups are supposed to carry 1000 troops. How many of those would be actual combat troops? In addition have many escorts would these five units have. They would need at least one AAW Escort and one ASW Escort, so that means how many are available for the Carrier.

What about availability. We have two LPDs of which one is available and one in reserve. It has been suggest that we have five FSS/Light Amphibious Platforms, of which all five are always available. It doesn't add up. Even the announced two LSS seem to be required to be available 100% of the time.

We are stretched thin to operate both the Carrier Group and the Amphibious Group and drfinitely lack the resources to man five lighter versions of the latter even if the Army could be persuaded to have troops permenently at sea.

[Poiuytrewq]

Unfortunately the above suggestion is still a big expensive bespoke bit of military kit (see ESD-1). Nowhere in the world do vehicles drive between ships at sea. Only recently has it become routine for humans to transfer between ships at sea using stabilised gangways in the oil and gas industry. Vehicles is a no go.

I wasn't suggesting that we should make the vehicles 'walk the plank'

My suggestion is to have highly capable LPD's that act as facilitators for the rest of the Amphibious Fleet. These would be backed up by as many Points, Modified Points or commercial vessels as are required to get the job done. This keeps the Amphibious fleet modestly sized, enabling it to be constructed using high build standards to maximise the safety of the crew and any EMF.

How this is actually achieved is worthy of further debate, a modified OMAR style barge reconfigured as a sea base/facilitation hub could be an option, deployed from either a FLOFLO vessel or RollDeck type vessel.

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The commercial sector offers plenty of off the shelf alternatives such as Donald's recent post over on the Amphibious thread which is a good example of the versatility offered by these realitivly inexpensive vessels. An excellent way to increase resilience without spending a lot of money.

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Plenty of space for multiple LCU's, LCVP's, LCAC's etc.

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The vessel pictured above is one of the RollDock series of which RollDock Star is a good example.

https://www.ship-technology.com/project ... rt-vessel/



These are approximately £100m class vessels and with the reconfigurable deck arrangements, fantastically versatile.

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Each crane has a SWL of 350t, combined that's 700t. More than enough to transfer any vehicle in the British Army inventory.

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Twin lifts would increase control with awkward loads.

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Big enough to transport a Leander

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This only one example but my main point is that we should consider the opportunities that the commercial sector can provide when considering the design of the FLSS vessels and the make up of the LSG's. Personally I think adding a couple of RollDock type vessels to any future PFI when the Point contract is replaced must be worthy of serious consideration.

[Lord Jim]

How about an updated version of one of these ships. The gantry crane in the largest can move up to 1000t and launch a barge off the rear of the ship into the water. An adaptation could launch empty or pre loaded Mexi-floats, any other type of landing craft or even strike craft like the CB-90.Amphibious craft
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lighter_aboard_ship

[Tempest414]

I think there will be zero need for UK to conduct landing operation at more than two theaters at once. Keeping 5 amphibious groups

I must say I am shocked at how you and other here have got from 5 ships of a class with 3 of them forward deployed over seas to 5 Amphibious groups each with a 1000 troops . At most there would be the ability to form 2 groups one East of Suez and one in the Atlantic/ Med each supported by a Point class and a Wave class and able to land and support 1000 troops.

LPD 1 would take over duties currently undertaken by the Bay class in the Gulf
LPD 2 would undertake the East of Suez FLSS role out of Singapore with no more than re-enforced company of RM on board
LPD 3 would take over the HDRA role undertaken by the Bay class on AP-N
LPD 4 would be Home waters ready ship able to embark RM as needed for the West of Suez FLSS
LPD 5 is the ship that is in refit or Maintenance at anyone time

As said ships 1 &2 could if needed come together to form a group east of Suez and ships 3 & 4 could come together to from a group in Europe if needed

Also as I have said that a Wave class would be there to support the LPD's one ship would also be based out of Singapore and tasked as needed and ship two out of the UK

[ArmChairCivvy]

Big enough to transport a Leander

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That made me smile as years back (on TD, when he introduced the uses of a flo-flo vessel) I suggested that we put 5 Haminas sideways onto it, and in the area of Ops they simply "swim" away and straight into the action... securing a good stretch of coast.

[Poiuytrewq]

.....the ability to form 2 groups one East of Suez and one in the Atlantic/ Med each supported by a Point class and a Wave class and able to land and support 1000 troops.

Clearly at present the LSG strategy announced by the Defence Secretary at RUSI makes little sense to any of us probably because we don't have the relevant information necessary to understand the wider strategy.

I think your East/West suggestion is a sensible way forward and although it is clearly a change in strategy, it could very well be an affordable and highly effective way for RN/RM to proceed.

Could the two EAST/WEST LSG's actually be two halves of the LitM group? For example if each LSG comprised,

1x FLSS
1x Bay
1x Wave
1x FSS
1x or 2x T31's

A pretty potent force in its own right, especially if the T31's turn out to be reasonably credible escort frigates. It is at least plausible that a force such as listed above could be forward deployed east of suez.

Combined for the LitM Group that would be,

2x FLSS
2x Bay
2x FSS
(Reinforced with)
HMS PWLS
1x Albion
2x T45's
2x T26's
1x SSN
2x Points

Clearly a massively powerful and highly ambitious force. This would evidently be a maximum effort grouping but it is true that few other countries in the world could assemble such a force. RN would very clearly be back in the Premier League.

The T31's and Waves could support the LitM group if required or temporarily relieve the Bay's from APT(N) and/or Kipion.

The forward based FSS could join the CSG when it is deployed East of Suez.

The Western LSG would be a stronger force with the addition of an Albion if required, maintaining a suitable presence and capability on NATO's northern flank.

If required an LSG could rapidly form alongside a CSG if events dictated such a response.

Lots of positives and few negatives as apart from the addition of the two FLSS vessels the rest of the LSG strategy could be little more than a redistribution of existing resources, either planned or already in the water.

[Poiuytrewq]

That made me smile as years back (on TD, when he introduced the uses of a flo-flo vessel) I suggested that we put 5 Haminas sideways onto it, and in the area of Ops they simply "swim" away and straight into the action... securing a good stretch of coast.

Always happy when I make you smile

Its another good example of maximising impact and capability for a modest outlay. We need to get smarter as to how we spend what is still one the largest defence budgets in the world.

[Ron5]

I'm pretty sure all that was suggested was cheap conversion of a merchant ship to provide long term offshore support to small SF detachments like the UK has in Syria.

Not sure how this escalated to D-day Mk 2.

[Lord Jim]

Lots of positives and few negatives as apart from the addition of the two FLSS vessels the rest of the LSG strategy could be little more than a redistribution of existing resources, either planned or already in the water.

I am starting to see where you are coming from with this but to be realised it is going to take additional resources that are not there at present and will be in demand elsewhere within the MoD. I would rather see a LSG comprising of a FLSS and a up gunned B2 River which would act as security against localised threats. When I say up gunned this would probably only entail additional HMGs and possibly stabilised pedestals for Javelin and Starstreak. I would not want to see much more other then RFA support during transit.

A point I raised above is that unless you ask the Army to commit troops to be permanently at sea or increase the Marines, where is the manpower that these platforms are to carry and deploy come from?

[Poiuytrewq]

Lots of positives and few negatives as apart from the addition of the two FLSS vessels the rest of the LSG strategy could be little more than a redistribution of existing resources, either planned or already in the water.

I am starting to see where you are coming from with this but to be realised it is going to take additional resources that are not there at present and will be in demand elsewhere within the MoD. I would rather see a LSG comprising of a FLSS and a up gunned B2 River which would act as security against localised threats. When I say up gunned this would probably only entail additional HMGs and possibly stabilised pedestals for Javelin and Starstreak. I would not want to see much more other then RFA support during transit.

Firstly I have no idea if what I set out above is even remotely close to the direction the planners are proposing but I think it's at least plausible.

I have been grappling with the viability of two independent LSG's within the constraints of the current budget envelope. At first it appeared to me that whilst the FLSS concept was a practical and affordable way to introduce a littoral strike capability into the fleet, the Littoral Strike Group concept seemed like an unfunded aspiration. I no longer think the LSG is unfunded political rhetoric.

The main components of the LSG's are already in the water or are current programmes that have already been budgeted for. It also appears that the LSG's could be scalable and versatile, able to pull in additional platforms to match the threat up to the point of the full LSG listed above or even combine the LSG's and add HMS PWLS, T45's and T26's to form the LitM group. Given the scale and costs involved I wouldn't expect to see the full LitM group too often.

Most of the time the components of the LSG would conduct routine deployments. In the case of the Eastern LSG the Bay and the T31 would be forward deployed in the Gulf. Perhaps a Wave with or without a T31 could be foward deployed in Singapore. The FLSS vessel would just be wherever it needs to be, somewhere in the region. An east of Suez FSS vessel will I suspect be reliant on the budget stretching to 3 not 2 hulls. The LSG would then be formed from this list of vessels if required. It's a pretty efficient use of resources.

A point I raised above is that unless you ask the Army to commit troops to be permanently at sea or increase the Marines, where is the manpower that these platforms are to carry and deploy come from?

I don't think that there will be any more than a reinforced company on either of the FLSS vessels even when surged. Ordinarily much less. I suspect for most of the time HADR will be a big part of what the FLSS vessels do, the LSG will just be a more impressive HADR response. Where the manpower comes from for the maximum effort LitM group is a different debate.

A few observations,

The FLSS with the enhanced aviation capacity is the difference between a random group of Bays, Waves and T31's and what will form a Littoral Strike Group. I think this aviation capacity should be maximised even if it is rarely used to its full potential. For example, increasing the beam of the Prevail MRV design by 3 meters would increase the aviation capacity by 30%.

The FLSS is likely to end up being exactly what Prevail partners have called it. A Multi Role Vessel. Due to this I think ship to shore connectors should be prioritised to allow for a suitably swift and efficient HADR response. Rapid deployment of mexefloates and possibly 1 or 2 LCM's would be a great addition.

The initial MOD concept showed an aft working deck, the Prevail concept omitted this in favour of an extended superstructure. I think the MOD design is preferable in this regard especially if a stern mounted 40t crane could access the Main deck through a large deck hatch. Forward of the superstructure I think the Prevail design is better but the location of the deck crane could be improved. Maybe a hybrid of the two designs?

It would good to get some official clarity on this but overall it appears that both the FLSS and the LSG concepts are plausible and have merit. It will be interesting to see if other countries adopt a similar strategy and come up with an alternative version.

[SKB]

I 'littoral'ly hate this 'point'less fantasy ships thread....

[Tempest414]

I 'littoral'ly hate this 'point'less thread....

Once again I see you have nothing to say

[Lord Jim]

I just hope the RN doesn't get carried away with the FLSS and LSG and start moving funding for other programmes to gain this "Sexy" new capability. It is one thing to use funding from the Transformation Fund but if it starts to affect other programmes it will do more harm than good.

[Tempest414]

This is my where I am coming from I feel we could lose real capability down the line like another Bay. We already know that Argus will be going soon what else needs to go to pay for this. And This why I am saying that maybe we should be thinking about this role when we replace the amphib fleet I think it could be a nice little job for a LPD in peace time allowing us to keep a capability as we see with the Bays now if we don't use them HMG will cut them

[shark bait]

Personally I think adding a couple of RollDock type vessels to any future PFI when the Point contract is replaced must be worthy of serious consideration.

There is certainly utility in these vessels, but simply putting a couple of extra vessels on contract does not solve the issues facing the Marines. How do you apply the new equipment to make the UK amphibious logistics for Army and Navy more efficient?

I would rather see a LSG comprising of a FLSS and a up gunned B2 River which would act as security against localised threats

This completely voids the whole concept.

Its suppose to be a low key base for special forces and marines. Sticking a proper RN ship next to it removes its advantage.

We already know that Argus will be going soon what else needs to go to pay for this

It should be quite clear by now, Argus will not get a direct replacement.