Future Littoral Strike Ships

[SW1]

Poiuytrewq

Not sure but certainly would be an appropriate term for the ship.

No idea who the author is but it’s exactly the direction of travel I would like to see happen.

[Lord Jim]

The sooner the name of these vessels is amended the better.

[ArmChairCivvy]

White-SOF Concept ofEmployment
- which the above quoted source nicely defines:
"Contributing to the military imperative, White-SOF offers more mass andmanoeuvre than Black-SOF Squadrons’ to tackle ‘high value, critical objectiveswith high risk and high payoff’[17] – either in support of orindependent of Black-SOF – which equates to tactical activity affecting thestrategic situations. [18] Largely this will focus up to Level 2SOF tasks (Military Assistance, Surveillance and Reconnaissance and DirectAction)."
[to]
"provide stability forthe local forces to regain and retain security, whilst directly counteringterrorist threats to the region and UK "

The head of French SOF put it: Often special ops cannot be done by using SF alone
- so the article is not only well written but also though provoking
- it does mention FLSS and multirole support ship separately, rather than confounding them (into one build/ conversion)

[SW1]

Ive Read the article a couple of times and think the author has got the concept spot on and perhaps more importantly the high level marketing term to define it, namely a commando task group.

I think if we consider that as opposed to the more American terms of amphibious ready group or littoral strike we maybe able to better definite what it should look like and how it’s equipped.

[Poiuytrewq]

....it does mention FLSS and multirole support ship separately, rather than confounding them (into one build/ conversion)

Same vessel, different roles?

...perhaps more importantly the high level marketing term to define it, namely a commando task group

Clearly a change of direction. Short Endurance Littoral Strike is a capability the UK really needs but it shouldn't take away from what we currently expect to achieve. It's needs to be both, not one or the other.

UK LitM Capability
The ability to conduct Joint Action through Ship to Objective Manoeuvre (110nm) of an Assault
Echelon of 1 Cdo Gp in a single cycle of darkness; the initial Assault Wave to secure identified objectives and comprising simultaneous delivery of 1 Coy Gp by air and 1 Coy Gp by surface in Protected Mobility from over the horizon in up to sea state 4, supported by effective BM, ISTAR and a range of protective and offensive Fires. The Landing Force is to be capable of sustaining combat operations, independently, for 28 days with re-supply by air and surface means from the sea base located up to a maximum range of 30nm offshore

I think if we consider that as opposed to the more American terms of amphibious ready group or littoral strike we maybe able to better definite what it should look like and how it’s equipped.

Agreed, so how does the Prevail Partners MRV stack up in your opinion?

[SW1]

Clearly a change of direction. Short Endurance Littoral Strike is a capability the UK really needs but it shouldn't take away from what we currently expect to achieve. It's needs to be both, not one or the other.

I don’t think it does need to be both, because I don’t think the legacy amphibious assualt capacity really adds that much to either a peer mission or likely uk independent operation against any sort of state unless it was much larger and didn’t involve what would amount to largely the entire combat capability of the RN eg carrier fastjets ect.

If you take the emotion out of it and stand back and ask what in essence you will use a light infantry battalion for especially when many consider even a strike brigade not heavily enough equipped then I think they would come to the same conclusion.

If you accept you need heavier weapons and armoured vehicles for any likely land operation then leave that to the appropriate army units.

Going back to being commandos is a much bigger prize and a capability we need far more, and elevates there worth far more up the defence spending table. Being able to deploy semi clandestinely and very rapidly and with minimal on shore support is something worth having.


As for the ship type I think always it’s what you put in the ship rather than the ship itself, The point class type conversion makes sense if you looking to be more inconspicuous it’s part of the same reason why people like converting business a/c into special mission a/c. But if you need to say operate against an opponent then having a escort attached to a bay or Albion type vessel that can carry more combat boats to raid a coast line or the like makes sense too.

I think the concept will need money spent on reorganisation of the soldiers, upskilling them and the purchase of unmanned systems and an overhaul of the smaller patrol craft and changing the landing craft more than the ships that carry them.

[ArmChairCivvy]

an overhaul of the smaller patrol craft and changing the landing craft more than the ships that carry them.

While the mix of shipping we have available (aside from capacity in max effort) is important, I wholly agree that the above side of things must not be forgotten... esp. as it stands for a fairly marginal expenditure in the bigger scheme of things

A nice overview of the uses of the much talked about CB-90 option https://www.defencetalk.com/cb-90-class ... aft-66512/
"The CB-90H was designed for reconnaissance and company- or battalion-level Command & Control (hence the U.S. designating it as a Command Boat), apart from its primary role as a rapid littoral troop transport."

[SW1]

an overhaul of the smaller patrol craft and changing the landing craft more than the ships that carry them.

While the mix of shipping we have available (aside from capacity in max effort) is important, I wholly agree that the above side of things must not be forgotten... esp. as it stands for a fairly marginal expenditure in the bigger scheme of things

A nice overview of the uses of the much talked about CB-90 option https://www.defencetalk.com/cb-90-class ... aft-66512/
"The CB-90H was designed for reconnaissance and company- or battalion-level Command & Control (hence the U.S. designating it as a Command Boat), apart from its primary role as a rapid littoral troop transport."

Yeah lots of options for those sort of things and key role will be riverine operations, you could tie I’m the archer patrol boats and replace them too optionally manned and may allow exploitation of force protection craft perhaps a manned vessel with two unmanned ones.

A flavour of a ideas

https://www.berthon.co.uk/wp-content/up ... CEPTOR.pdf
https://www.berthon.co.uk/wp-content/up ... ECTION.pdf
https://cnim.com/en/businesses/defense- ... x-missions
https://www.ecagroup.com/en/find-your-eca-solutions/usv
https://www.thalesgroup.com/sites/defau ... 2-2014.pdf

If we concentrated part of the national ship building strategy towards building manned/unmanned small craft and integrate sensors and capabilities from SME companies then to only could it offer to meet uk requirements but offer an excellent defence export opportunity as this is an area of growing demand. You could have concepts and trial vessels up and running for about the amount we spending on a single type31.

[Pongoglo]

White-SOF Concept ofEmployment
- which the above quoted source nicely defines:
"Contributing to the military imperative, White-SOF offers more mass andmanoeuvre than Black-SOF Squadrons’ to tackle ‘high value, critical objectiveswith high risk and high payoff’[17] – either in support of orindependent of Black-SOF – which equates to tactical activity affecting thestrategic situations. [18] Largely this will focus up to Level 2SOF tasks (Military Assistance, Surveillance and Reconnaissance and DirectAction)."
[to]
"provide stability forthe local forces to regain and retain security, whilst directly counteringterrorist threats to the region and UK "

The head of French SOF put it: Often special ops cannot be done by using SF alone
- so the article is not only well written but also though provoking
- it does mention FLSS and multirole support ship separately, rather than confounding them (into one build/ conversion)

And the reason we created SFSG.....

[Lord Jim]

And how it should be expanded to all three Parachute Battalions, transforming them into a three Battalion Ranger Regiment.

[ArmChairCivvy]

Ranger Regiment.

We could be a 'Belgium'... and have paracommandos

[Poiuytrewq]

And how it should be expanded to all three Parachute Battalions, transforming them into a three Battalion Ranger Regiment.

I was expecting this type of proposal from the Modernising Defence Programme.

What an anticlimax....

[Poiuytrewq]

Thanks,

I don’t think it does need to be both, because I don’t think the legacy amphibious assualt capacity really adds that much

We aren't going to agree here but that's fine, it isn't mandatory

If you accept you need heavier weapons and armoured vehicles for any likely land operation then leave that to the appropriate army units.

True but you still need RM to 'open the door' or the Para's to kick the door off its hinges. The Army with the heavy armour can then follow.

As for the ship type I think always it’s what you put in the ship rather than the ship itself, The point class type conversion makes sense if you looking to be more inconspicuous it’s part of the same reason why people like converting business a/c into special mission a/c. But if you need to say operate against an opponent then having a escort attached to a bay or Albion type vessel that can carry more combat boats to raid a coast line or the like makes sense too.

Agreed.

I think the concept will need money spent on reorganisation of the soldiers, upskilling them and the purchase of unmanned systems and an overhaul of the smaller patrol craft and changing the landing craft more than the ships that carry them.

Very interesting, how do you propose to change the landing craft and for what reasons?

[ArmChairCivvy]

True but you still need RM to 'open the door' or the Para's to kick the door off its hinges. The Army with the heavy armour can then follow.

Mix & match (the normal battle group idea)
- I haven't heard of more than 7 Ch2's being (planned to be) landed in the first/ second wave. Simply not just restricted by transportation capacity, but the LCUs that they would be taking up, all those round-trips being "away" from transporting anything else
- so they would clearly be for a fire support/ perimeter defence role

... not exactly a tank rgmnt. That would be the Army, to follow.

[SW1]

Poiuytrewq

I accept my view on the legacy amphibious capability is probably different to most and that’s ok, but if you look a us even recreating the equivalent of a US marine MEU and then set that against any likely force structure we will have the sustainablity becomes hard to square imo.

It depends what you define as kick the door in do you for example say the airborne and sea borne commando’s do the initial assualt and then hand over to wheeled army formation rushing in or do expect the marines and Paras to then hold ground and push the perimeter out and against what level of opposition, if you read the Al Faw attack plan and the amount of us air assets that were used to support that I doubt we have independent ability at that level against an equivalent enemy capability without expanding the force supporting assets quite a bit.


I think we’re going have to operate further away from coastlines in the initial phases and against an ever changing coastline topography, faster moving, better protected and hovercraft type versions maybe required.

[ArmChairCivvy]

in the initial phases and against an ever changing coastline topography, faster moving, better protected and hovercraft type versions maybe required.

Something like this http://www.deagel.com/library/Finnish-N ... 00006.aspx which was designed for both anti-surface and anti-air missiles, with a deep-skirt tech design that is fairly immune to mines:
Speed: 50 knots
Complement: 10
EADS ANCS 2000 combat data system

[Lord Jim]

If, and it is a big if, we still intend to kick in the door it will be the back door not the front.

[Poiuytrewq]

I accept my view on the legacy amphibious capability is probably different to most

Its no problem having a different view to most, echo chambers lead to complacency and we now what complacency can lead to.

In general I can see the wisdom of your argument, why spend so much time and resources on a capability we are unlikley to ever use to its full potential. My answer is deterrence. We never expect to use our CASD but we still maintain it. That's not to say that we can't do things better and more cost effectively. We have to move with the times.

The biggest problem with large scale over the beach Amphibious Assault in the 21st century is the politicians unwillingness to use it. The idea of assaulting a contested beach with a peer or near peer enemy is now virtually off the menu. We have to accept that. On the other hand we can't expect to have a suitable uncontested deep water port available every time the decision is taken to deploy the British Army overseas by sea.

A balance must be struck but what that balance is to look like going forward is worthy of much further debate. The Amphibious force at maximum effort laid out by the DS RUSI was truly impressive but would we design it that way with a clean sheet of paper? Absolutely not in my opinion. We now have a disjointed and inefficient although still highly effective Amphibious fleet and the current proposal is to add an additional two FLSS vessels on top. Clearly the outcome of the FSS and FLSS programmes will be vital in determining the effectiveness and potential of the LitM group and the Royal Marines.

How two independent, forward deployed Littoral Strike Groups with escorts, support ships and helicopters fit into wider strategy remains to be seen along with the funding to make it work.

[Lord Jim]

Having these so called "Littoral Strike Groups". is even worse than calling the converted civilian cargo vessel a "Littoral Strike Ship"! These are not going to be some super amphibious attack platform where the Marines storm ashore together with their artillery and Bvs. They will be for launching small scale operations either by SF or RM with the latter either for raiding or pathfinder style missions ahead of the main landing.

Of course there is nothing stopping the Government issuing orders that has the LSS ending up being used as an auxiliary amphibious assault ship, though its capabilities will fall well short of what the true platforms can provide.

Making a landing on an peer enemy's coastline in force is going to be a mission of last resort. We are simply not equipped to land a viable mobile force in territory controlled by a peer enemy, unless there the chance of being opposed is almost none existent. Against lesser foes then it is a possibility and the capability should be retained, but the RM are no the USMC, are trained to operate totally differently and to try to use them in the way the USMC operate would be the greatest folly, and ignore their true capabilities. AS for the Army, anything but light or very small heavier formations will need to be unloaded in a port in all likelihood a friendly one with the RM securing it against possible intervention by the enemy if they try to disrupt the unloading.

The more I look at the LSS I get the feeling it is more to do with a cheap exercise to show the UK still intending to have a global presence and this was the winning suggestion written on a fag packet in the Officers Mess.

[ArmChairCivvy]

We now have a disjointed and inefficient although still highly effective Amphibious fleet and the current proposal is to add an additional two FLSS vessels on top. Clearly the outcome of the FSS and FLSS programmes will be vital in determining the effectiveness and potential of the LitM group and the Royal Marines.

Agree, and out of the underlined attributes the last one is of course the one that matters most?

for launching small scale operations either by SF or RM with the latter either for raiding or pathfinder style missions ahead of the main landing.

Quite, and main landing does not need to be [initially] from ships... the Ruskies have got it wonderfully right with "desantniki" which covers all formations that "land": airborne, air-landed and their marines

the RM are no the USMC, are trained to operate totally differently and to try to use them in the way the USMC operate would be the greatest folly, and ignore their true capabilities.

... aren't you (by now) making the case for the FLSS?

[SW1]

On the other hand we can't expect to have a suitable uncontested deep water port available every time the decision is taken to deploy the British Army overseas by sea.

Maybe if this is the case and we can’t get a point into a port then we have to accept that beyond small scale operations we don’t deploy.

[shark bait]

On the other hand we can't expect to have a suitable uncontested deep water port available every time the decision is taken to deploy the British Army overseas by sea.

Isn't that why the Army;

1. are buying wheeled APC's?
2. have tank transporters?

[Poiuytrewq]

Maybe if this is the case and we can’t get a point into a port then we have to accept that beyond small scale operations we don’t deploy.

Isn't that why the Army;
are buying wheeled APC's?
have tank transporters?

My point was primarily concerning an initial entry point. Of course a suitable port would be required to sustain any long term campaign.

This is why I would like to see much greater interoperability between the various classes within the Amphibious fleet. If designed properly there is no reason why the Points (or their replacements) could not transfer the vehicles across to the LPD's to be taken ashore by the LCU's via the LPD's well dock. In more sedate sea states transfer direct to the LCU's or mexefloates via a stern ramp or steel beach is certainly possible if everything is designed to mesh together.

In my opinion, as the distances from shore increase, at least for the initial OTH Assault, the size of Landing Craft will also have to increase to ensure sea worthiness. Due to this, payload could be as important, if not more important than speed. Three times the payload at half the speed is still faster and delivering 3 CH2's or 6 Ajax at a time would get the fight started in a hurry. The larger displacement of the landing craft may also facilitate the mounting of a phalanx or two the protect the landing area from mortars, shells and missiles etc and also provide a more stable platform for MLRS type systems firing guided munitions for additional fire support.

These larger landing craft would have to be transported via FloFlo vessels which is easily achievable. This could have a major impact on the design of the next generation of LPD's and LHD's if it proved to be the way forward.

Agree, and out of the underlined attributes the last one is of course the one that matters most?

It is but if it becomes too disjointed and too inefficient it will just get cut...again. I would like to see the overarching plan as to how this is all going to fit together now with the inclusion of the new FLSS vessels. The ambition is impressive and very welcome but will the treasury fund it?

[shark bait]

no reason why the Points could not transfer the vehicles across to the LPD's

What ships transfer vehicles at sea? The US require a massive platform to act as an intermediary, is that what your advocating?

[Lord Jim]

... aren't you (by now) making the case for the FLSS?

To a certain extent yes, if it is the right sort of platform. Operating in a Norwegian Fiord as a mothership for SF and RM raids further up the coast might be a wartime role if it can be properly protected. Bar that being moored in a friendly waters as a forward base for SF to conduct operations in the wider region will probably be their more common role.

How they have been described though, paints them as some sort of light amphibious assault ship, but unless one of the FSS and/or Bays are attached it will not be able to sustain any sort of operation by a meaningful force for any real length on time. They have been pitched as there to facilitate expeditionary warfare and this is either a red herring or a grave mistake.

What they should be is medium to small mobile sea basing platforms, but calling them such does not generate headlines or sound sexy, How should they be protected, we they are not going to operate off a hostile coastline within range or shore based systems. They will operate within range of friends systems though as well as friendly air cover. They will need support for transiting from theatre to theatre, but if operating in the Far East for example, warship support should come from our allies and only then in the most extreme of situation.

Ideally these should be really RAF platforms with the crew supplemented by military personnel depending on the mission in hand. Their defensive systems should be limited to at most M2 HMGs and shoulder launched MANPADS. They should be as cheap as is possible with spots for say two Chinooks and by hanger space for a maximum of two Merlins.