Albion Class Amphibious Assault Ships (LPD) (RN)

[jja]

Which of the GP type 23s are yet to be be modified?

[Jake1992]

So as you see it's the politics behind it not a military desission by the RN and the politics admits they got it wrong.

And that's clearly not stopping current politicians to repeat the same mistake again...

Unfortunately that is true, from what I read camoran has even advised may not to make the same mistakes with the Albions but it seems she is too weak

[andrew98]

I feel that any escorts cut will never be replaced, Treasury will just say you can obviously manage with 17 as you spared 2 for scrapping.
Better to have the political shock and awe in that sorry Mr/Mrs Politician, but you can't do that, you cut the funding thus capability does not exist any more, thus politician looses face internationally.

[Digger22]

I think we have been played. All this talk of selling the Albions, just a way of Management speak to get you to come up with the solution they wanted in the first place, reducing the escort fleet! Very very predictable and very very Sad!

[R686]

I think we have been played. All this talk of selling the Albions, just a way of Management speak to get you to come up with the solution they wanted in the first place, reducing the escort fleet! Very very predictable and very very Sad!

do you really think those in high power think like that, come-on they are not that smart or predictable.

They just take redline through stuff that will make the quickest saving without thinking of the outcome, in this case Amphibious warfare ships and RM, they will look stupid gutting more escorts when they are about to commission the biggest aircraft carrier in RN history

[Gabriele]

I feel that any escorts cut will never be replaced, Treasury will just say you can obviously manage with 17 as you spared 2 for scrapping.
Better to have the political shock and awe in that sorry Mr/Mrs Politician, but you can't do that, you cut the funding thus capability does not exist any more, thus politician looses face internationally.

While it might prove to be true, there is at least a programme for Type 31 and a piece of paper the government has wanted and has very much tied itself to, which would be harder to backtrack upon than the SDSR itself in some ways.

If the LPDs go, instead, you are 100% certain that there is nothing to fill the hole. So i'd still go on the frigates.

Which of the GP type 23s are yet to be be modified?

Iron Duke, Monmouth. HMS Lancaster should be in refit now although the state of the works is questionable. Argyll and Montrose have received CAMM (and some elements of the wider CSP package, but not all of them).

[SKB]

What can the Albion's do that the Bay's cannot? And vice-versa?

[james k]

As has been said before command and control of the Amphibious Battle Group. The Bays have no capacity, or space for it to be added, for the extensive command facilities on the Albion/Bulwark.

What can the Albion's do that the Bay's cannot? And vice-versa?

[Gabriele]

An Albion can operate 2 Merlin or even 2 Chinooks at the same time, but without hangar; On a Bay you can land one Merlin. I'm not sure if they ever tried landing a Chinook on one.

It carries 4 LCU versus 1 and has four times more well dock space, enabling two lanes operations and keeping up operational tempo to enable the delivery of more waves during one night period;

It carries 4 LCVP versus zero on the Bay, unless they are carried as deck cargo, stealing further space for stores. Keep in mind that at least one of the Bay would also need to carry at least one of the army workboats to aid Mexeflote ops (towing, tugging etcetera) and dracone ops for delivering fuel ashore;

It delivers command and control for the amphibious operation.

The Bay has more lane meters for vehicles and more or less the same number of troops. You'll tipically read 305 for an Albion and 356 for a Bay, but the crew of the LPD includes 40 or more men of the Beach Tactical Party, so the difference is actually much smaller.

Losing the LPD means losing the dedicate amphibious C2 centre; some aviation capability; most of the group's landing craft; the tactical beach party (HIPPO, trackway, excavator, communications team); a good share of the capacity for stores within the group and a Company-group worth of accommodations for Marines and support elements.

That is before considering that one third of the Bay class is Gulf-bound and another ship of the class ends up spending Hurricane season in the Caribbean.

[dmereifield]

I feel that any escorts cut will never be replaced, Treasury will just say you can obviously manage with 17 as you spared 2 for scrapping.
Better to have the political shock and awe in that sorry Mr/Mrs Politician, but you can't do that, you cut the funding thus capability does not exist any more, thus politician looses face internationally.

While it might prove to be true, there is at least a programme for Type 31 and a piece of paper the government has wanted and has very much tied itself to, which would be harder to backtrack upon than the SDSR itself in some ways.

If the LPDs go, instead, you are 100% certain that there is nothing to fill the hole. So i'd still go on the frigates.

Which of the GP type 23s are yet to be be modified?

Iron Duke, Monmouth. HMS Lancaster should be in refit now although the state of the works is questionable. Argyll and Montrose have received CAMM (and some elements of the wider CSP package, but not all of them).

I agree that the T31 programme seems pretty safe, and given the low unit cost, cuts here wouldn't be significant. I'm more worried about the batch 2 T26. If the costa are not significantly cheaper than the first batch then it could be very easy to reduce the second batch from 5 to 3, saving in the order of £1.5-2 billion. This is even.more tempting if the escort numbers are dropped to 17....if we maintain 19 escorts then at least if (or when, as the case may be) the second batch of T26 is reduced we may at least get additional T31s to offset the lost hulls....maintaining 19 "escorts" (on paper at least)

[shark bait]

Scrapping an Albion looses;

• 10% of lane meters
• 50% of landing craft
• 100% of C2

Add landing craft to the SSS, and switch C2 over to the carrier, and the loss is almost offset.

[ArmChairCivvy]

Add landing craft to the SSS, and switch C2 over to the carrier, and the loss is almost offset.

I follow your logic, but
- how do you add LCUs to the SSSs without putting a huge dock into them, eating up a good chunk of their primary functionality?
- one of the lessons from the Falklands was that the commander of the (to be) landed force needs to be with the main body of his force (i.e. his sub-commanders). Fearless & Co did not provide for this option, the nxt-gen design was changed and now we want to go back to where we started?

[james k]

Whilst the LPD can operate just over the horizon it would be prudent to keep the CV's even further away from the enemy coast and that would prohibit or limit their being used for amphibious warfare

[shark bait]

Is over the horizon important/achievable for the Royal Marines? They're not equipped for an opposed landing, and its a 4 hour round trip over the horizon with an LCU so I assume the RN will be sticking within throwing distance of the shore.

[abc123]

That is before considering that one third of the Bay class is Gulf-bound and another ship of the class ends up spending Hurricane season in the Caribbean.

And if we see it that way, we could actually say: And nothing of value was lost. If the RN can do with just 1 LSL and 1 LPD permanently available- it can do then without that one LPD too. Scrap them all, it's obvious that the HMG doesn't count on them anyway.

[ArmChairCivvy]

limit their being used for amphibious warfare

I think james was referring just to the CVF part of the op, them being OTH
- as for the landed force that would be about 270 (until we get the 2nd, specially kitted-out unit on-stream... no one knows what that special kitting out involves; camp beds in the hangar space?
- delivered by JHF Cdo element, whose helicopters are actually strong on range/ endurance

[Lord Jim]

Retaining the LPDs by scrapping the two GP T-23s would be a huge win for the RN, especially if RM numbers are retained as well. The T-31e gives the RN hope of maintaining or even increasing escort numbers and future batches of this platform could be more capable. Having capability holidays might be the Treasury's preferred option to save money short term but it has been shown to cost more over time and there is a growing backlash the Treasury cannot ignore indefinitely.

[james k]

Yes, over the horizon is desperately important to the Royal Marines. Most of the troops landed will be by ORC then LCVP, both of which have a good turn of speed. The LCU follow up landing once the undefended beachead is secure.
If the LCU escorted by LCVP is acting as a mobile base in a covert location then speed is far less important than a tactical approach from over the horizon.
If enemy forces on shore can see the amphibious ships they can, potentially, kill it and this is significantly harder to do with a target over the horizon. The CV's don't want to get involved in that, as the most valuable assets they should be far out to sea with space to manoeuvre and where early warning can work unimpeded by "clutter" from shore and that is the main reason why, I believe that they are unsuitable for amphibious warfare other than landing troops by air. Landing troops by air is fast but it cannot be covert, unless someone develops large capacity stealth helicopters and that's a completely different subject

Is over the horizon important/achievable for the Royal Marines? They're not equipped for an opposed landing, and its a 4 hour round trip over the horizon with an LCU so I assume the RN will be sticking within throwing distance of the shore.

[marktigger]

landing troops is only part of the operation!

sustaining them is the next big problem

[marktigger]

limit their being used for amphibious warfare

I think james was referring just to the CVF part of the op, them being OTH
- as for the landed force that would be about 270 (until we get the 2nd, specially kitted-out unit on-stream... no one knows what that special kitting out involves; camp beds in the hangar space?
- delivered by JHF Cdo element, whose helicopters are actually strong on range/ endurance

Look at the conditions on board when Argus was deployed of Bosnia as an LPH the visit from the defence select comittee led to the order for ocean. are the passageways on the cvf's wide enough for fully equiped troops to move round the ship?

[R686]

Look at the conditions on board when Argus was deployed of Bosnia as an LPH the visit from the defence select comittee led to the order for ocean. are the passageways on the cvf's wide enough for fully equiped troops to move round the ship?

Apparently that is part of the alterations of POW and changes made to QE when in for next refit

[james k]

But the POW is still far too valuable as an asset to risk in the amphibious role, she needs to be way out at sea with distance (and warning time) from shore based threats. The carriers are the make or break of the operation, loose one and it comes close to being "game over" loose two or put the second at risk after loosing one and again, we've lost.

We have to have LPD's that can operate over the horizon, landing forces at will anywhere along the enemy coastline and providing command and control over the amphibious group (ships and landing craft of all types).

There is no helicopter or aviation asset that can be sent from a base offshore and land troops tactically and if required operate as a mobile covert base. For that you need landing craft and for those you need the LPD.

Look at the conditions on board when Argus was deployed of Bosnia as an LPH the visit from the defence select comittee led to the order for ocean. are the passageways on the cvf's wide enough for fully equiped troops to move round the ship?

Apparently that is part of the alterations of POW and changes made to QE when in for next refit

[R686]

But the POW is still far too valuable as an asset to risk in the amphibious role, she needs to be way out at sea with distance (and warning time) from shore based threats. The carriers are the make or break of the operation, loose one and it comes close to being "game over" loose two or put the second at risk after loosing one and again, we've lost.

We have to have LPD's that can operate over the horizon, landing forces at will anywhere along the enemy coastline and providing command and control over the amphibious group (ships and landing craft of all types).

There is no helicopter or aviation asset that can be sent from a base offshore and land troops tactically and if required operate as a mobile covert base. For that you need landing craft and for those you need the LPD.

Look at the conditions on board when Argus was deployed of Bosnia as an LPH the visit from the defence select comittee led to the order for ocean. are the passageways on the cvf's wide enough for fully equiped troops to move round the ship?

Apparently that is part of the alterations of POW and changes made to QE when in for next refit

Agree there are major trade-offs with using the CV as LPH's, its just the reverse of those advocating the RAN turn the LHD into strike carriers

[james k]

Having a capable Marine Commando capability with specialist equipment and shipping, like the LPD, immediately puts the enemy on the defensive. It forces them to tie down thousands upon thousands of troops and specialist equipment that might otherwise be used in an offensive role against you. The best part is that the enemy is compromised simply by your having those assets even if you have no intention of using them against a specific target. They are the ultimate force multiplier.

[Adam]

If cuts are unavoidable, this should be a no-brainer. Cut two GP T23's, save the upgrade costs and endure a capability gap until all five T31's are commissioned. Hopefully by then recruitment has improved to man the whole fleet of T31's and maybe just maybe get an improved spec approved for the T31's with a £0,5 billion capital increase to raise the T31 budget to £1,8 billion.