Current & Future Amphibious Capability - General Discussion

[ArmChairCivvy]

some capabilities I hadn't even dreamed of like the XLUUVs.

I left those to an avid reader to research... An SSGN that we can afford

systems with recoil dampeners that would fit on the rear section of the Viking as one option

The photo with NEMO on the back looks cool; but unfortunately it has been photo-shopped (only)

[Repulse]

A lot to digest in the RUSI document, most of which I agree with and aligned to the general thrust of what we have been discussing.

Interesting that the LSG and ASG would not have manned helicopter assets deployed on board, only supported by assets from escorts or the CVFs - not sure I’d agree with this.

The magazine ship is an interesting addition, not aware any other country has the same. Personally would say a multi role support auxiliary would be a better partner to the LPD.

Not sure on the Littoral Operations Vessel (LOV) name, would personally go for a Raiding Platform Dock (RPD)

Lastly, the paper suggests the LOV(RPD) has davit launches landing craft of deploying 12 RMs or 6 RMs + and ultra light vehicle at a speed of 40-50kts. Not sure what’s on the market that matches that spec?

[ArmChairCivvy]

The magazine ship is an interesting addition, not aware any other country has the same. Personally would say a multi role support auxiliary would be a better partner to the LPD.

I think that is just a play on words, not to pre-empt the scenario where the FLS might turn out to be a modified Bay - LSD(A) or a logistics support ship by designation, before modifications.

craft of deploying 12 RMs or 6 RMs + and ultra light vehicle at a speed of 40-50kts. Not sure what’s on the market that matches that spec?

Forget about the vehicle, but this one carries two RIBs and their outboards, to make the final approach sneaky-beaky, after a stealthy hi-speed transit with low radar and thermal signature: http://www.hisutton.com/images/VT_enforcer.jpg

The same source lists a Turkish design with a work deck big enough for a light vehicle (how does that go to shore?), whereas a go-faster CB-90 look-alike from North Sea Boats does 65 knots for 14 PAX and let's them jump off CB-90 style, without the boat having to twist and turn in the shallow: http://www.hisutton.com/images/X19_1.jpg

[ArmChairCivvy]

Checked back (what the RUSI article elaborates) against the policy speech in Sept. and the priorities 3 & 4 are really the two sides of the same coin:
"Adm Radakin’s third priority is the Future Commando Force.

‘‘We will build on the amazing cachet and specialness of our Royal Marines, blend them with technology, and have fifth-generation Commando warriors.

We plan to have more Royal Marines deployed forward and ready to respond.’’

Next is forward presence. ‘‘This is about being able to demonstrate a global navy, project influence, and respond to threats far more quickly,’’ Adm Radakin explained.

‘‘I intend to have a high percentage of the navy at sea and stationed abroad.

‘‘We’ve already seen the success of forward basing in Bahrain. Now I want to have a conversation about whether we could have ships forward based in other areas"
bearing in mind that after N:o 1 (N Atlantic, ref Article V), N:o 2 is CTF... there to steam to the aid of forward presence, if deterrence fails
- RUSI coined a 'bite&hold' strategy by OpFor as what could be expected after hybrid, deniable and below-the-threshold activities
- and this is exactly what persistent forward presence in needed for, as a deterrent and counter

[jedibeeftrix]

https://www.rusi.org/sites/default/file ... ng_web.pdf

About three fifths in, and the two trends I am picking up so far that seem to inform the future structure so far:

1. That the raiding component is there to suppress the A2AD bubble that enables the the insertion of larger more-structured amphibious forces. i.e. there appears to be a healthy future for larger scale activity the commando function itself (albeit it a smaller component of 3Cdo overall - and in smaller scale).
2. That the commando function is explicitly a bridge between native forces / persistent UK engagement [and] the follow on divisional 'Joint' force. i.e. it is the [constrain] force than enables the entry into theater of the force that will [fight] (imo it also makes the Strike threat credible at medium scale).

Quote in support of #1 above:
"If the force is to leverage access it must therefore exploit the disruption enabled by strikes. This demands a continued ability to move mass from ship to shore quickly. The maintenance of a clear amphibious capability is the core of the concept, and if anything there is a need to move combat troops ashore faster, with tempo and firepower compensating for what must realistically be a reduction from current levels of mass."

Quote in support of #2 above:
"A second requirement is for the amphibious force to enable theatre entry by the Joint Force, which can deliver sufficient mass to seize politically relevant objectives. Thus, there is the need for engineering capabilities to enable access for military roll-on/roll-off (RORO), port management expertise to allow disembarkation as a tactical manoeuvre, and the capacity to create a window of opportunity to protect the approach and offloading area for disembarkation and marshalling of the Joint Force"

In reference to the Raiding function in LSS/LOV:
"Given the vulnerability of vertical lift in most high-end scenarios, however, this capacity might best be dedicated to additional UAVs and fast attack craft"

In reference to the follow on ASG:
"The assault ship would host three Commando assault companies. As they would be operating outside of the brigade structure, however, its reduced mass necessitates an ability to concentrate quickly on land. The landing craft vehicle personnel (LCVP) and landing craft utility (LCU) would therefore need to be replaced by rapid landing craft able to deliver up to four lightweight vehicles, or groups of up to 60 personnel, to the beach at 25 knots. Ideally, each amphibious assault ship could carry six such vessels"

[ArmChairCivvy]

be replaced by rapid landing craft able to deliver up to four lightweight vehicles, or groups of up to 60 personnel, to the beach at 25 knots. Ideally, each amphibious assault ship could carry six such vessels"

The two statements make it incoherent when taken together... or perhaps we will get San Antonios?

Close to the spec (600 km max reach) are the Russian Navy Dyugon-class Air Cavity Landing Craft


Loaded displacement – 280 tons

Length – 45 meters (147.6 ft); Beam – 8.6 meters (28.2 ft)

Full speed – 35 knots; Propulsion – 2 x 9,000 shp diesels M507A-2DBTR

Carrying capacity – 140 tons of cargo or 2 main battle tanks or 5 armoured personnel carriers

Crew – 6; Armament – 2 x 14.5 mm MTPU-1 heavy machine guns,

but carrying any more than one of similar characteristics? Even going down to the 90t displacement predecessor class - these are all of air-cavity design for the high transit speed - would not get us anywhere near 6

[Repulse]

jedibeeftrix, ArmChairCivvy, It’s a big document and I could be wrong, but the proposal to me seems that the RM/Strike element makes a gap in any defences allowing the Joint Force to be delivered via a port (permanent or temporary) rather than mass OTH deployment at speed?

[ArmChairCivvy]

allowing the Joint Force to be delivered via a port (permanent or temporary)

Yes, but without referring back to the doc now, I seem to remember a mention of the cumulative build-up, to that point, as
- 1 recce Coy from the fwrd presence force
- rest of that commando(, and possibly another one)
- plus an 'infantry' Bn from a carrier, vertically inserted
... that's 3 bns and supporting units, cumulatively. Talking about being able to concentrate quickly, for just one cdo to have its vehicles - that (alone) takes a Bay

Will have to check back for the exact page ref

The hi-speed, over the horizon in the early stages is obviously v limited as for numbers involved

[jedibeeftrix]

jedibeeftrix, ArmChairCivvy, It’s a big document and I could be wrong, but the proposal to me seems that the RM/Strike element makes a gap in any defences allowing the Joint Force to be delivered via a port (permanent or temporary) rather than mass OTH deployment at speed?

breach the a2ad bubble, break the bubble and take a port, then the joint force follows on in Points.

stage 2 above seems to be the combined arms maneuver warfare given were talking about:
three companies (a commando, no?)
a nine gun battery (what is that as a unit?)
and presumably all the necessary:
engineers, loggies, and signals chaps.

would someone please tot me up a total...?

[ArmChairCivvy]

breach the a2ad bubble, break the bubble

Breaching and degrading is a distributed Op, probably from distance, as we are talking about 'blinding the eyes' and degrading C2 of a network, the nodes of which potentially have 100s of km reach
- the breaking part then becomes v much a joint Op, airpower likely being the decider

[ArmChairCivvy]

Repulse wrote:
allowing the Joint Force to be delivered via a port (permanent or temporary)


Yes, but without referring back to the doc now, I seem to remember a mention of the cumulative build-up, to that point

which was on p.39, even though what is being said about sequencing (and contributions from allies) has probably been left a bit hazy 'by design':
"Breaking up the JSG and ASG in deploying would allow this escalation to be staggered, so that the LSG had time to conduct sufficient preparatory reconnaissance. However, on station, the ASG and JSG would likely sail as one naval package, giving the aircraft carrier its required escort of two Type 45s and two Type 26s. The doctrine, however, should be that the breaking down of adversary A2AD systems would enable the JSG to not only bring the carrier closer to the shore, but also enable the Army to exploit the access created by the ASG by sending a Point-class RORO vessel, noting that this would require the capture of a port. Alternatively, additional units could be brought to theatre by a Bay-class LSD, or in the context of a coalition mission – for example, involving the Combined Joint Expeditionary Force – the heavy amphibious lift assets of partners such as the French Mistral class. Ideally, the force would deploy a mechanised infantry battlegroup to the theatre, bringing both mobility and firepower to operations on land, while the carrier could bring a light infantry battlegroup to conduct urban assault and to reinforce the Commando already ashore. The Bay-class could – for certain operations – bring a second Commando to the fight."

[jedibeeftrix]

The biggest curio in this paper that I see is that there is great weight and focus placed on indirect fires in enabling 3x independent three mortar batteries (to shoot-n-scoot as part of rolling fire suppression) + a similar sized deep strike capability based on a battery of himars (to flip the a2ad equation):

"The CONOPS outlined above would allow three independent troops to each deliver up to 36 rounds within a minute to achieve a high-intensity strike, or a rolling fire of up to 12 rounds per minute from three separate firing locations, moving every two minutes. The total battery would adjust from having 16 vehicles and six towed guns, to 18 vehicles, with three additional barrels and the elimination of two chassis types from the Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers’ burden. "
+
" It would need to hold six HIMARS trucks on a deck from which they could be moved by crane into landing craft or lifted by CH-47. Most importantly, the deck would be modified to support the firing of the HIMARS while afloat, needing channels to vent the back blast. The HIMARS battery would require several kinds of ammunition. First, it would need a guided multiple launch rocket system (GMLRS) munition to deliver precision strikes in support of amphibious forces from afloat. Second, it would require sensor-fused or equivalent anti-armour area-effect munitions for breaking up concentrations of adversary armour moving towards the beach.131 This would be a critical requirement to protect the Commando ashore." Jbt - presumably at least another 18 heavy vehicles, no?

And yet the discussion around the infantry capability has this strange fixation on describing "three companies" rather than "one commando" - a sleight of hand that allows the author to deploy them as lightweight 'Company' based raiding force with not a worry in the world for persistence or support or mobility:

"The Future Commando would comprise 500 personnel. These would be divided into three assault companies, a recon company and headquarters. Each assault company would comprise two assault troops and a fire-support troop. The assault troop would be organised into three 12-man sections. The section would be armed with two general purpose machine guns (GPMGs), two designated marksmen rifles and eight rifles. The section would also carry two loitering munitions such as the Switchblade or HERO70.136 Each troop would have a four-man command team made up of a lieutenant, signaller, sergeant and medic. The fire support troops would comprise a 12-man anti-tank section, with three four-man anti-tank guided weapon teams, a 12-man machine-gun section, with three four-man GPMG teams, and a 12-man pioneer section. Thus, the three assault companies, based on HMS Albion or HMS Bulwark, could deploy on six of the fast assault craft outlined above."

So we have this comical scenario where 36 vulnerable heavy vehicles are tearing around a hundred square kilometres of unsanitised space on a non-stop merry-go-around of deploy-n-fire...
... and somehow these "three companies" of commandos are expected to gamely shoulder there Bergen's every fifteen minutes to do another 30 minutes forced march after the deporting mortar batteries!

I dunno, maybe they have Landrovers, so that makes it alright on the poor Commandos tender feet...
... but it's still okay for this 800 strong force (lol, really?) to exist in the field without: Engineers, Logistics, etc!

Why go to all this pretence of "three companys" when we could all be honest with ourselves and call it a commando combined-arms maneuver battlegroup?

That [is] what it is, if it's going to involve a commando and the best part of a regiment in artillery. It might be a bit smaller than what we think off as the 1800 strong ATFG (and more disaggregated as the recce company and himars battery technically sits as part of the forward force), but this is a battlegroup of ~1200 people ashore at full tilt.

[ArmChairCivvy]

And yet the discussion around the infantry capability has this strange fixation on describing "three companies" rather than "one commando" - a sleight of hand that allows the author to deploy them as lightweight 'Company' based raiding force

+

Why go to all this pretence of "three companys" when we could all be honest with ourselves and call it a commando combined-arms maneuver battlegroup?

Perhaps you are being a bit harsh as all variations for deployment have not been hashed out and the answer might lie in the 'shipping illustration' on p.33:
- the "persistently present" recce Coy would be rounded by the three others of the Cdo arriving... this is not the 2+2 Coy set up as it stands today, however
- the role of the Bay, or 'the magazine ship' is left a bit unclear. Were the existing Cdo config to be deployed, then the vehicles for the mobile 2 Coys would leave nothing to anything else (but would create one company's worth of space for supporting elements to be carried on the Albion)... Of course the magazine ship being a Bay is not firmed up on in the text

But the 1-2-3 thinking as in calibrated escalation/ staggered arrivals (p.33 again) is quite good as a framework for thinking about what can be achieved "with what" and when 'something else' could realistically arrive, to up the ante.

[Repulse]

I think that is just a play on words, not to pre-empt the scenario where the FLS might turn out to be a modified Bay - LSD(A) or a logistics support ship by designation, before modifications.

Might do, but the following on page 49 suggests it should be a civilian design.

The requirements for the magazine ship would be a cheap civilian freighter with some specialised modifications. It would need to hold six HIMARS trucks on a deck from which they could be moved by crane into landing craft or lifted by CH-47. Most importantly, the deck would be modified to support the firing of the HIMARS while afloat, needing channels to vent the back blast.

As far as I can see it the Bay LSDs have been put in the same category as the Point RoRos carrying in follow up forces, not part of any strike group.

[jedibeeftrix]

re: page 33 - i did mention the recce company being "disaggregated" from the 'Constrain' amphibious element.

yes, this might explain their determination to describe the amphibious element as three companys, but it does not answer why they discuss the force package in terms of:
500 commandos
+
300 (?) artillery package

rather than a ~1200 strong force package composed of:
500 commandos
+
300 (?) artillery package
+
~400 supporting elements (that provide the persistence support and mobility).

I do think it is an excellent concept - and the right way forward - i'm just bemused by the glaring lacuna in 70 pages of text and infographics.

[Lord Jim]

To achieve what is aspired to both in the RUSI paper and what we have been talking about earlier is going to take some significant investment both in the Royal Marines and in the various platforms of all sizes needed to move and support them. It does sort of curtail the idea of a cheap and cheerful FLSS platform though, but build one sooner via conversion of a civilian vessel would give us a means to test out the theory and identify where we need to go with the final design.

I still think we need to replace the Albions and Bays with a Bay 2.0, able to carry out the tasks highlighted as well as other tasks such as HADR etc. Again having a modular design would allow for one or two higher spec variants being operated by the RN whilst two or three more basic configurations could be used in roles already covered by the existing Bays. One could be used as a aviation train platform in UK waters as a replacement Argus if configured as such. This way we gat more for our money and have a number of highly flexible platforms expanding on the excellent work carrier out by the current Bays.

The eventual design for the LOV/LSS if the RUSI guidelines are followed is going to be quite a balancing act. It needs to be a capable amphibious platform able to launch numerous small(ish) assault craft, have some in built stealth characteristics, but appear relatively benign and non threatening. How do we achieve this. Do we have a disguised raider, looking like anything between a Cargo vessel and RFA Training ship? I cannot see how other countries will soon twig what they are and what capabilities they have. Their benign appearance may make it inconvenient to engage for the opposition, such an action being hard to spin to the world media but some nations will not be concerned about this and realise sinking such a vessel would stall any UK intervention short of a full scale conflict.

Maybe some of our ship design experts could look into this and come up with some ideas. Will they have a well deck or simply numerous davits for assault craft? regarding these are we talking RHIBs like those currently operated by 1 Assault Group or something larger like the CB-90? Are these craft to be stored out of sight or on the deck of the LOV? The questions seem to go on and on. The solution is going to be a new category of ship whatever appears, that is for certain.

The biggest challenge though is going to be the XLUUV. What is aspired to is a platform that could be ahead of even the USN is currently looking into and could be very expensive. Would it be better to use versions of the SPEAR munition rather than the suggested SDB-II? Would a sub launched variant of the planned FCASW cover the requirement, with the last two or three Astutes having a missile compartment added, like in the latest USN Virginia class. Having one of those in the area would also provide additional stealth capabilities to any of the various Strike Groups, but the limited number of hulls available would be an issue. Maybe we should build one or two lore Astutes to this modified configuration? Such boats would also facilitate to covert landing of SF and Recce Commandoes in high threat scenarios.

But as I said at the beginning money will be need to achieve all this, either by diverting money from existing programmes of from additional new money ring fenced for this large and complex programme, if we decide to pursue such capabilities.

PS. According to Jane's the Royal Marines intend to complete their reorganisation by the end of 2023
https://www.janes.com/article/92801/uk- ... nd-of-2023

[ArmChairCivvy]

~400 supporting elements (that provide the persistence support and mobility).

Not sexy enough? But does have a major impact on what shipping to use (and at what stage).

[ArmChairCivvy]

From Janes "Particularly, “the goal is, by end 2023, for the Future Commando Force to be a reality”.
- which incidentally was the date given (for the first vessel) when the FLS concept was rolled out

[SW1]

The rusi is the usual let’s talk about change provided we don’t change article that attempts to appease all cause minimal fuss and continue on and hope the magic money tree saves the day.

If the plan is to ensure more small detachments of marines are assigned to ships like historically was the case and that the carriers have assigned a larger marine detachment for downed pilot recovery and to have 2 permanently fwd deployed littoral strike groups with up to company strength marine presence for sf support/roles then were way past numbers available before we do anything else.


This repeated mantra about a a light battle having persistence and mobility is questionable unles we’re talking about relatively benign opposition. The closet equivalent would be a US MEU which has significantly heavier armour and significantly more helicopter assets assigned, its about equivalent to a UK army armoured battlegroup and even then the US marines are concerned it’s to small and vulnerable to a peer enemy that can find fix and engage with both air and long range heavy artillery systems. A light relatively immobile battlegroup is an accident waiting to happen.

In such cases better to have a small footprint that is hard to detect that is in out and away a force not intending to persist or hold group but raid and harass until or to distract from the arrival of heavier matched forces that for the uk will not be held with the navy.

[ArmChairCivvy]

Would it be better to use versions of the SPEAR munition rather than the suggested SDB-II? Would a sub launched variant of the planned FCASW cover the requirement

Ground launching in itself was a big step
, but in this context we are talking about substituting for artillery and Apache (150 km reach; also onto the reverse sides of mountains) support, so not a pin prick but a rather bigger 'salvo' and hence unit cost becomes an overriding factor
- that said, the launch platform itself can't be allowed to break the bank
- but it can be launched in the area, from a mothership, which is not true for an SGSN (and just one of those will break ' the bank' on its own)

[ArmChairCivvy]

article that attempts to appease all cause minimal fuss and continue on and hope the magic money tree saves the day.

While expecting the 2023 outcome (and shipping orders, if any, to operationalise it) to be as far removed from this paper's outline as the T31 turned out to be from the Black Swan, let's remember that we are talking about a concept paper, pushing the envelope in all directions
... "all" as the operative word alone meaning that the package will not be 100% feasible and/or fund-able

Very respectable effort; just look at the lengths they go to collect all relevant things said on the topic in the last decade or so. As a preamble, before diving into the concept (development) itself.

[Repulse]

I still think we need to replace the Albions and Bays with a Bay 2.0, able to carry out the tasks highlighted as well as other tasks such as HADR etc.

Given the new planned force structure, this is the last thing we should do. It’s clear that the suggestion is to have 2 “LOV”s (RPDs) and two LPDs (plus commercial Munition Ships) - given the threat level then they should be RN manned.

Whether the Bays fit into the follow up force or whether the current Points (or new chartered enhanced points) is another debate.

What’s clear we need to focus funds and not scrap existing ships that will fit- the ability to operate helicopters seem to be important but not necessarily permanently.

Reading the front page of the Times today, it looks like there will be a fight for limited funds so whilst all ships can be used for HADR, perhaps it cannot be a focus as it is now.

[jedibeeftrix]

If the plan is to ensure more small detachments of marines are assigned to ships like historically was the case and that the carriers have assigned a larger marine detachment for downed pilot recovery and to have 2 permanently fwd deployed littoral strike groups with up to company strength marine presence for sf support/roles then were way past numbers available before we do anything else.

This repeated mantra about a a light battle having persistence and mobility is questionable unles we’re talking about relatively benign opposition. The closet equivalent would be a US MEU which has significantly heavier armour and significantly more helicopter assets assigned

i recognise the weakness you highlight in pointing out the limitations of a light infantry battlegroup, and i'm not qualified to argue otherwise.
but it does have real strategic utility - if used as envisaged in this paper.

whereas pennypackets of marines on boats plus pilot rescue and 2nd tier special forces support seems a poor allocation of resources given the enormous cost of maintaining a 6,000+ Commando structure.
compounding this lack of utility in its own right, it also leaves the Army high and dry in building their 21c power projection capability on the Strike model whose threat to an adversary lives and dies at the mercy of Host Nation supPort.

[SW1]

whereas pennypackets of marines on boats plus pilot rescue and 2nd tier special forces support seems a poor allocation of resources given the enormous cost of maintaining a 6,000+ Commando structure.

Which is probably why its unlikely they will be maintaining such a force structure. Reducing marine numbers to increase sailor numbers has been mentioned before.

compounding this lack of utility in its own right, it also leaves the Army high and dry in building their 21c power projection capability on the Strike model whose threat to an adversary lives and dies at the mercy of Host Nation supPort.

Which is how we have deployed armoured forces for about the last half century if not longer. Via a port of a host nation.

[jedibeeftrix]

Which is probably why its unlikely they will be maintaining such a force structure. Reducing marine numbers to increase sailor numbers has been mentioned before.

Well this does get to the heart of the matter, agreed. If they have no utility then I imagine they will be greatly shrunk. If they do have real strategic utility then someone else will have to pay the piper.

Which is how we have deployed armoured forces for about the last half century if not longer. Via a port of a host nation.

We did this when our adversary was the USSR and the main interface was with was twenty odd allied nations sat in the middle, or in areas of the world where we had stong post colonial links. Looks a bit different now where the interface isn't a discrete collection of allied nation states, and most of the developing world is in-hock to chinese development spending.