Current & Future Amphibious Capability - General Discussion

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abc123
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Re: Current & Future Amphibious Capability - General Discussion

Post by abc123 »

Lord Jim wrote:
Pongoglo wrote:' the Governments ambitious plans to keep the UK a world leader'
Maybe in the areas of Ideas and Spin Doctoring.
But, let's be fair, the competition there is STRONK... :lol:
Fortune favors brave sir, said Carrot cheerfully.
What's her position about heavily armed, well prepared and overmanned armies?
Oh, noone's ever heard of Fortune favoring them, sir.
According to General Tacticus, it's because they favor themselves…

Lord Jim
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Re: Current & Future Amphibious Capability - General Discussion

Post by Lord Jim »

Poiuytrewq wrote:An interesting read.

https://rusi.org/publication/rusi-defen ... sault-over
Well if the USMC is rethinking its ability to conduct amphibious landing against almost any opposition it does put our capabilities under the spot light. Do we still need to land large number of troops over the beach anywhere except where there is no threat? Possibly, but in that case we need vessels that could possibly land men and equipment straight on to the Brach or austere harbour rather than requiring fleets of ship to shore connectors. Should the replacement for the Bays be a modern reincarnation of the LST?

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Re: Current & Future Amphibious Capability - General Discussion

Post by RetroSicotte »

May be a bit off of our target for amphibious requirement. The article seems to focus fully on "Overlord" style mass landing ops on a fortified shore, but that isn't the UK's aim nor use for amphibious forces. For the UK is either for raiding, creating an offshore base, or for opening up a new logistical avenue.

Normandy style things died a long time ago, even before the Falklands.

Still very important to the Royal Navy as an island nation, and for having so many overseas territories, not to mention a responsibility to Norway and the Arctic.

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Re: Current & Future Amphibious Capability - General Discussion

Post by Jake1992 »

To me it seemed like he was surgesting that the USMC need to start to look at transforming their way for doing things and need to choose one of the 2 option of either going full medium/heavy armour and become very much like the US army and only go in via established ports or go light similar to our RMs and go for just raiding style ops

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Re: Current & Future Amphibious Capability - General Discussion

Post by RetroSicotte »

Jake1992 wrote:To me it seemed like he was surgesting that the USMC need to start to look at transforming their way for doing things and need to choose one of the 2 option of either going full medium/heavy armour and become very much like the US army and only go in via established ports or go light similar to our RMs and go for just raiding style ops
Got that impression too. It sounds like the USMC is having trouble justifying.

My concern is that this makes politicians ask ridiculous questions about our own amphibs. After all, once they start asking, they refuse to stop believing it even when given a logical answer...

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Re: Current & Future Amphibious Capability - General Discussion

Post by Lord Jim »

What I find interesting here is that I have repeatedly put across my view that the role of the RM is to conduct raiding operations and to open an entry point for the disembarkation of follow on forces, after which they could also conduct operation in land. For this I listed the primary need for the UK is protected Sea Lift as our current Amphibs are sufficient for the tasks entrusted to the RM.

However what a large number here are proposing is for the RN to acquire tow or more large LHDs amongst other things. It is noticeable that the navies who are investing in these are looking to use them also as their carriers with the USN the obvious exception and France being an oddball here.

Our primary amphibious assault unit is the Ready Command which is a force based on a single RM Commando plus supporting units. This is the maximum sized force we intend to be able to land at any one time, but we are more likely to use smaller units possibly against multiple objectives.

To achieve this we need a hybrid of the Albion and Bay classes with improved aviation capability and the obvious choice would be the Dutch platforms based on the same core as our Bays. Four of these could replace our existing Albions and Bays and greatly increase the flexibility and capabilities of out amphibious lift capability, especially if joined by our four contracted Points which I would have brought into the RFA after undergoing a minor refit. These vessels would also negate the need to build the announced FLSS as they could cover the roles intended for these platforms. The Dutch have shown how flexible their platforms are during their deployment off the coast of Africa on anti-pirate operations, acting as the mothership to Swedish CB-90s. They could also act as the replacement for Argus with their in build hospital facilities. Having a core RFA crew, one could be operated full time in the with its crew supplemented by RN personnel in the ready amphibious role whist the remainder would be under RFA crew. One of these would be available for global deployment, also covering HADR operations whilst a third could be in UK waters acting as a training vessels but available for emergency deployment when needed. The forth would be undergoing maintenance and so on. This should allow the surge of two to three platforms in the event of a crisis, more than covering the needed of the Ready Commando.

The Dutch type platforms give the Ready Commando the ability to be deployed by both sea and air and are ideal for conducting raiding operations from. The Modified points would allow the transport of the follow on forces to be expedited quickly and with less risk as they would now have at least passive defences against threats.

This surely must be a more cost effective option going forward and one more in tune with what out requirements are. Those advocating the RN pursue the LHD route seem to think that it may be possible through the historical mission creep to turn these platforms into auxiliary Aircraft carriers able to operate the F-35Bs. This is a rabbit hole we need to avoid at all costa and by going down a totally different rout with the Dutch style LPDs we avoid any risk of this.

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Re: Current & Future Amphibious Capability - General Discussion

Post by Scimitar54 »

So the only nations operating or acquiring LHDs are the odd ones out are they?
United States
Australia
France
Italy

Perhaps you would rather do away with the F35B, then there would be no possibility of the suggested Albion class replacements operating fixed wing aircraft at all (unless the US, via the USMC offered to help us out that is). By the same train of thought you would probably not want our nice shiny new QEC Carriers to be used for what they were designed for would you (Strike Carriers)? Probably you would rather use them as LPH (plus) as seems to be the current Political position would you? More platforms that may offer THE POSSIBILITY of operating an F35B are a very good thing.

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Re: Current & Future Amphibious Capability - General Discussion

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AS stated the US is an very big exception having the biggest and most powerful navy going including over twelve nuclear carriers and then some. Australia and Italy have their over requirements and both use theirs as carriers though the former does not intend to operate fixed wing aircraft. As I stated France is a bit of an odd ball but they only have one carrier, but do have three LHDs but these cannot operate fixed wing aircraft, but then again their sole carrier is not tasked with operating in the amphibious role.

In most cases nations have bought LHDs to act as multirole platforms giving then an amphibious warfare capability with a possibility of operating them as small aircraft carriers. The resultant vessels are therefore jack of all trades types that excel at none of the tasks allotted to them unless you go big like the USN has, but these vessels are unaffordable to most nations. Even using small LHDs as carriers greatly increases the cost and complexity of the platform that also compromises other capabilities such as the number of troops able to be carried and landed and the amount of stores and vehicles embarked. For the UK to have an LHD that met out Amphibious requirements as well as being a worthwhile auxiliary carrier would take something almost the size and complexity of the USNs Wasp class. Anything smaller is would be a collection of compromises.

We have two very large carrier that can provide more than adequate fixed wing air support, or will when we have sufficient F-35B towards the end of the 2020s. At present there are plans to use one as a LHA but is we had three to for Rotterdam type LPDs they would give us more then sufficient helicopter capacity to meet the needs of our Lead Commando Force, as well has sufficient deck space for all the stores and vehicles they would need for their initial operations. The Points following behind would bring in the exploitation force of up to Brigade strength and a sizeable portion of their stores would already be ashore having been landed by the LPDs.

A single carrier operating in support would be carrying in excess of the equivalent four LHDs operating F-35Bs, and these in turn would not be able to carry sufficient Helicopter, troops, stores or vehicles to be able to enable the Lead Commando to be landed unless these platforms were substantially larger than those operates by other European navies, so again we are looking at platforms the size of the USN's Wasp class. And it is this sort of Capability creep we must avoid as it is unaffordable and resources are needed else where. Would it be efficient to send a large LHD to the Caribbean to act as a HADR platform? I think not.

The lack of proper aviation facilities on both the Albion and Bay class was as false economy in many ways and one that should be correct in a common replacement. This doesn't mean the resultant LPD are too costly, far from it, but the gain in capability we would realise from having four evolved Rotterdam or Johan de Witt type LPD would be a step change for our amphibious operations as well as covering other needs such as casualty evacuation, helicopter training and HADR. These type of vessels are cost effective to operate as the Dutch have shown and are probably the most versatile platforms of their type. But fir the UK they would be an affordable replacement for the Albions and Bays when the time comes for their replacement.

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Re: Current & Future Amphibious Capability - General Discussion

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Lord Jim wrote: austere harbour rather than requiring fleets of ship to shore connectors
We need both (and we maintain the capabilities for both).
Jake1992 wrote:either going full medium/heavy armour and become very much like the US army
In the days :) when the formation the USMC planned with was a full division, those divisions were heavier than US infantry divisions (US Army did not have their medium force, yet, and indeed it was the Marines who first introduced such AFVs)
- having gone through the transformation to a lighter, more aviation supported force (brigades and MEUs), the USMC was then tasked with normal battlefield ops (like Fallujah) and the joke in the US Army was that the Marines need to be escorted to battle by army tanks. Nothing wrong with that, but just goes to show that they have gone for increased specialisation (not v.v)
Lord Jim wrote:The Dutch have shown how flexible their platforms are during their deployment off the coast of Africa on anti-pirate operations, acting as the mothership to Swedish CB-90s.
Yes, but rather than build new ships (with not so orderly queues building up in the already approved build - pun intended - prgrm) why not just modify existing amphib/ logistic support fleet?
Lord Jim wrote:mission creep to turn these platforms into auxiliary Aircraft carriers able to operate the F-35Bs. This is a rabbit hole we need to avoid at all costa
Quite agree with that; the best use of budget is to leverage the assets we already have. And if they need modifications, so be it
- Tiger & Lion were quite impressive helicopter cruisers when they were tasked to be lead ships for ASW squadrons (though the crewing remained 700+... for 4 helos; what are those numbers now for the QEs again?). Next we got thru-deck cruisers (instead of real ones) which were OK for what they had been designed for, but too small to stretch into other roles
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Re: Current & Future Amphibious Capability - General Discussion

Post by Lord Jim »

ArmChairCivvy wrote:Lord Jim wrote:The Dutch have shown how flexible their platforms are during their deployment off the coast of Africa on anti-pirate operations, acting as the mothership to Swedish CB-90s. Yes, but rather than build new ships (with not so orderly queues building up in the already approved build - pun intended - prgrm) why not just modify existing amphib/ logistic support fleet?
I agree that what you have suggested would be a good place to start, and allow us to figure out exactly what the next generation of Amphibs should be like. It has been discussed here how we should look at adapting the Bays to give them aviation facilities which would greatly increase the capabilities of the already very flexible platforms. In my mind this would be a far better project to use funds form the Transformation Budget than the new idea of the FLSS.

Where I was going was the next step when we need to consider the replacement of the Albions and Bays. Taking it one step at a time adapting the Bays would be the first then replacing the Albions with the future platform type I have suggested followed later by two evolved version of the new platform with more emphasis to logistics below decks but retaining the same aviation and Hospital facilities. That would give us four platforms each able to operate and hanger between four and six merlin sized helicopters and with well decks able to operate at least two LCU type ship to shore craft, or two or more CB-90 littoral strike craft.

The idea is to get the most flexible and cost effective platforms we can afford and if the Dutch can afford to build the Rotterdam and Johan de Witt on their Defence budget we can surely build four of a more modern Damen design, to eventually replace our existing five platforms.

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Re: Current & Future Amphibious Capability - General Discussion

Post by serge750 »

Doesn't that also mean we would need less crew if we could get 4 to replace both the Albions + 3 x Bays & Argos, than we have now aswell? which would be a bonus for the treasury! sounds like a better option to me rather than a large LHD ( uss Wasp style ) that could operate F35

The 4 ship plan that has been discussed is a good plan I think ( Although I do like the smaller LHD e,g Mistral or the proposed BAE one) whatever is bought they should be dedicated helicopter carriers concentrating on rotary/amphibious ops or even MCM/ASW etc, I also think they do not need to operate the F35 as we have 2 rather large strike carriers later in the 2020's hopefully then they will be operated as originally proposed rather than a hybrid carrier with only 12 x F35 onboard...

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Re: Current & Future Amphibious Capability - General Discussion

Post by Jake1992 »

Why only 4 to replace 5 ( or in reality replace 7 ) ?

Why not 5 of the proposed ship or 4 as you say and a small LHD / LPH as the 5th

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Re: Current & Future Amphibious Capability - General Discussion

Post by serge750 »

I was just running with 4 ! 5 would be better :D

I expect it all depends on how tight the treasury is being....

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Re: Current & Future Amphibious Capability - General Discussion

Post by Jake1992 »

serge750 wrote:I was just running with 4 ! 5 would be better :D

I expect it all depends on how tight the treasury is being....
I’d think 5 is achievable as we already have 5, it’d be a different story if we were asking for more than we have. We also have to take into account that this will be 10 years away so the finances could be in a very different place to the austerity of today

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Re: Current & Future Amphibious Capability - General Discussion

Post by Tempest414 »

As I have said before buy 4 200 meter Enforcer class as these are the next gen Bays and if there is anymore money order a 200 meter Enforce LHD

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Re: Current & Future Amphibious Capability - General Discussion

Post by jedibeeftrix »

Poiuytrewq wrote:An interesting read.

https://rusi.org/publication/rusi-defen ... sault-over
Two interesting quotes in light of our evolving ambitions for 3Cdo:

"...the proliferation of zones of denial, means that landings would need to take place some distance from the fighting. The long-range mobility of Marine formations would be important in constraining the time and space with which [the adversary] could prosecute offensive operations."

"...if the USMC wishes to project power against hostile shores, it would do well to reconceptualise its role as one of raiding to secure forward support positions as part of a joint fight."

There might seem to be a tension between the two:
In that the first would require the retention of combined arms mobile formations at the scale of a battlegroup, whereas while the latter might well benefit from this level of capability the situation may require something lesser, i.e. perhaps not the mobility or the combined arms.

But I would see them as two separable, but not separate roles within the wider ambit of amphibious warfare:
The enormous utility of the specialism is to provide access to heavier high mobility forces in the army, but then also to continue on as an integrated extension of that army force. So 'access' may only require a raiding force at infantry company level via helicopters and small boats, but if a combined arms mobile battlegroup is provided/needed then you also greatly reinforce the strike brigade once it deploys.

In conclusion:
To me this seems to validate the re-roling of 42 commando, but equally the retention of 40 and 45 commando as battalion sized formations designed to fight as a fully supported mobile battlegroup.

Reading this:
Lord Jim wrote:What I find interesting here is that I have repeatedly put across my view that the role of the RM is to conduct raiding operations and to open an entry point for the disembarkation of follow on forces, after which they could also conduct operation in land.
Perhaps i'm working toward the same ends as Lord Jim, unless those "operations in land" are envisaged as infantry company level helicopter raids...?

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Re: Current & Future Amphibious Capability - General Discussion

Post by Lord Jim »

jedibeeftrix wrote:Perhaps i'm working toward the same ends as Lord Jim, unless those "operations in land" are envisaged as infantry company level helicopter raids...?
No once ashore I see the Commandos operating as Battalion level battlegroups, ideally in areas where their unique skill sets can be best utilised but not exclusively so.

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Re: Current & Future Amphibious Capability - General Discussion

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jedibeeftrix wrote:he proliferation of zones of denial, means that landings would need to take place some distance from the fighting. The long-range mobility of Marine formations would be important in constraining the time and space with which [the adversary] could prosecute offensive operations."

This likely means in US marine world at least a brigade level air ground task force and more like a marine division. Capabilities an order of magnitude beyond anything the UK has.

The uk as a whole had issues logistically getting a heavy brigade from Kuwait to Basra and we’ve hardly been investing in lots of enabling engineering and logistics since then.

It’s highly likely that beyond a serria leone type operation with that level of opposition we will solely be operating as a coalition partner.

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Re: Current & Future Amphibious Capability - General Discussion

Post by jedibeeftrix »

sure, but the 15% rule for command input is just as relevant today as it was through the blair years.

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Re: Current & Future Amphibious Capability - General Discussion

Post by ArmChairCivvy »

jedibeeftrix wrote:15% rule
We would need to translate that. If it was a division? (then), across a three division front a Bde would be 11%
- throw in extras (what?) and that would round up to 15%. A cdo, with supporting arms, and a Strike Bde with an airmob Bn + some Apaches?
- and remember to bring your own logs; don't beg & borrow, once there
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Re: Current & Future Amphibious Capability - General Discussion

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jedibeeftrix wrote:"...if the USMC wishes to project power against hostile shores, it would do well to reconceptualise its role as one of raiding to secure forward support positions as part of a joint fight."
A good read, and the authors conclusion sounds reasonable. Could we say amphibious assault is similar to employing air power to destroy strategic infrastructure, but instead employed to secure strategic infrastructure? In isolation neither action is enough to be decisive, but as part of a joint force it can be highly effective.

However is "raiding" the correct term to use? To me that sounds like a quick in and out assault which can be achieved through air power alone. The commandos have the ability to move fast and sustain a force and don't think "raiding" conveys that advantage.
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Re: Current & Future Amphibious Capability - General Discussion

Post by jedibeeftrix »

seems like a sensible description.

42Cdo:
raiding to me suggest company strength monolithic force delivered by helicopters and/or boats, with limited persistence (<1wk).

40/45Cdo:
going beyond goes up the scale to battlegroup strength combined arms force, with extended persistence (1-2 weeks).

Strike+Cdo:
this then might evolve into a supporting combat arm to a larger force, of extended duration (moving beyond amphibious warfare).

in that vein:

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Re: Current & Future Amphibious Capability - General Discussion

Post by Lord Jim »

Many including myself have used the term "Raiding" to cover small units operations and to distinguish these from larger amphibious assaults. When I think of such operations some would be the in/out style with the aim to destroy a set objective like a radar, bridge or even an individual. These would be obvious targets for airpower but circumstances may make that option non-viable.

Other types of operation would mean landing a small force, say company sized, that would move inland and conduct ambush and sabotage in the enemy's rear using their specialised abilities to manoeuvre in a clandestine manner through difficult terrain.

So maybe using the term "Small unit actions", might be a better description than "Raiding".

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Re: Current & Future Amphibious Capability - General Discussion

Post by shark bait »

By focusing on a short "ambush" or "sabotage" do we miss the main advantage of the Maritime domain?
  • Air power is fast but not persistent.
  • Land power is persistent but slow.
  • Maritime power is the only one that can be persistent and fast (particularly if forward deployed).
If the Royal Marines want to stay relevant they need to provide what air power or strike brigades cant, they should be quick to react, with the ability to set up shop and protect infrastructure for the benefit of the other forces. For example this may be securing an island in the pacific to support a naval campaign in the south china sea, or an air field in the Arctic to provide forward air support.
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Re: Current & Future Amphibious Capability - General Discussion

Post by ArmChairCivvy »

shark bait wrote:Maritime power is the only one that can be persistent and fast (particularly if forward deployed).
A great point (differentiator)!

The MoD really needs to step on the gas a bit with their PR - this "a Division scale, multi-national, force on force live exercise" would have gone unnoticed (without us here quoting an overseas source; and "us" here means that it is unlikely to travel much further).
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