Current & Future Amphibious Capability - General Discussion

[ArmChairCivvy]

I wonder when that "moment of truth" i.e. the first carrier mid-life crisis will come?

What I've read is that a mini-refit in dock every 7 years has been planned for, exactly to avert such an availability crisis.

[donald_of_tokyo]

...What I've read is that a mini-refit in dock every 7 years has been planned for, exactly to avert such an availability crisis.

Hoping it goes well. And I agree it may work “for a while”. But we all remember T45’s ambitious plan to keep 5 out of 6 T45 “ready” which quickly failed.

We will see it around 2030-35, in other words, good match with Albion and Bay replacements program.

[Lord Jim]

Great so we will have a CVL whilst one of the Carriers is in refit, operating what, half a dozen F-35s and maybe eight or so Merlins? And what does it do the rest of the time, oh yes it can act a the son of HMS Ocean and duplicate the capability of the Carrier now out of dock. To make matters worse it hasn't got a well deck so cannot really help move equipment around the seas, but hey we have a third carrier so everything is great.

We are not going to be going over the beach where the environment is not totally benign, except in small raids. Some may aspire to such operations but that is not what the RM are for. Primarily they have always been a raiding force as well as a rapid response brigade, with specialisations in hostile climates and terrain. The latter involves moving a formation of Commando size or greater by sea, disembarking them in a friendly or benign port and then have them move inland to fight, not storm the beaches. They do not require mass air transportation by helicopter, sure helicopters are needed to support them as they manoeuvre inland, but the need is to lift company sized formations at the most. this can be done by half a dozen Merlins or even fewer Chinooks.

Two Bay 2.0s with prefab hangers would be able to carry out such a mission with others being used for other roles. I just wish the Carrier mafia would stop wishing to deprive the RN of scarce resources by demanding a third flat top of what ever size. The RN is going to be fighting to have enough F-35s available to operate even one carrier as an actual carrier and not some bastardised hybrid like currently planned.

[donald_of_tokyo]

The 3rd flat top must not, and will not have (because of lack of F35b), any F35 to be carried. No need, RN has two CVF, that is enough.

The point of LPH is to keep the air asset far beyond the horizon. A ship with well dock must be located near the shore, which is totally not needed for LPH. As PoW is to be used as “back up”; can be Strike carrier when QNLZ is in refit, and can be LPH for most of the time. The LPH can be THE LPH, when PoW is not available.

LPH do not need expensive F35 support assets, nor ski jump, nor comprehensive Air Defense CIC, but a landing force Command Asset is needed. These two are different assets.

[ArmChairCivvy]

sure helicopters are needed to support them as they manoeuvre inland, but the need is to lift company sized formations at the most. this can be done by half a dozen Merlins or even fewer Chinooks.

Two Bay 2.0s with prefab hangers would be able to carry out such a mission with others being used for other roles. I just wish the Carrier mafia would stop wishing to deprive the RN of scarce resources by demanding a third flat top of what ever size. The RN is going to be fighting to have enough F-35s available to operate even one carrier as an actual carrier and not some bastardised hybrid like currently planned.

Quite agree.

Liken the two (ehrrm: according to what we can afford to pay for) to the sea-basing element, i.e. to sustain distributed ops on land.
- the helos for repositioning units would be part of such support, when not simply just sustaining them
- and the third Bay could be in dock/ in the Gulf/ on HADR duty...

What's missing from this picture, though, is supporting, flanking ops by sea. Hopefully there is enough warning to have the two Albions, rather than just one, for that
... you know: all eggs in one basket (for that particular Op)

[shark bait]

We are not going to be going over the beach where the environment is not totally benign, except in small raids

Would you class the 2003 Iraq in invasion as a small raid? I'd say is was a large combined force manoeuvre, and is indicative of future operations.

Obviously we'll try and avoid planning for the last war, so would we say the most likely action for the Royal Marines is to secure a specific assets ahead of , and as part of a much larger combat mass?

[ArmChairCivvy]

We are not going to be going over the beach where the environment is not totally benign, except in small raids

Would you class the 2003 Iraq in invasion as a small raid? I'd say is was a large combined force manoeuvre, and is indicative of future operations.
[...], so would we say the most likely action for the Royal Marines is to secure a specific assets ahead of , and as part of a much larger combat mass?

The only certainty about the future is that it is uncertain. A year before Inchon became a necessity, testifying before the House Armed Services Committee in October 1949,
the then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Omar Bradley stated:
"Large-scale amphibious operations such as those in Sicily and Normandy will never occur again."

[Pongoglo]

We are not going to be going over the beach where the environment is not totally benign, except in small raids

Would you class the 2003 Iraq in invasion as a small raid? I'd say is was a large combined force manoeuvre, and is indicative of future operations.

Obviously we'll try and avoid planning for the last war, so would we say the most likely action for the Royal Marines is to secure a specific assets ahead of , and as part of a much larger combat mass?

Having taken part in that 'small raid' in 2003 (and having served there more than the one time since) I can assure you it most certainly was not !

[R686]

We are not going to be going over the beach where the environment is not totally benign, except in small raids

Would you class the 2003 Iraq in invasion as a small raid? I'd say is was a large combined force manoeuvre, and is indicative of future operations.

Obviously we'll try and avoid planning for the last war, so would we say the most likely action for the Royal Marines is to secure a specific assets ahead of , and as part of a much larger combat mass?

Having taken part in that 'small raid' in 2003 (and having served there more than the one time since) I can assure you it most certainly was not !

For all purpose and intent of shark baits post, I believe that is what's known as sarcasm

[Lord Jim]

I would also class the action in GW11 to be an operation to disembark land forces in a benign location as to the best of my knowledge the port was not heavily defended if at all. The Marines were able to secure the port swiftly. This was not a major over the beach assault. The again the landing in the Falklands were basically unopposed except for air power so that doesn't count as a beach assault. It was austere to say the least and required landing craft but it was basically the same as GWII an exercise is getting troops ashore so that they could move in land and engage the enemy. Now if we had gone straight for Stanley that would have been a true amphibious assault but we didn't because we were not equipped to do so nor was it what we were trained for on such a scale.

As previously discussed amphibious operations covers many areas, but only a few require highly specialised platforms to be carried out. With the exception of raiding by the RM we carry out amphibious landings not assault. We need the ability to get troops ashore but not usually across a beach which again requires highly specialised platforms, but rather through a port. When was the last time we actually carried out an exercise where a full Commando with supporting units carried out a practise landing across a beach that was truly defended? When was the last time we had the capability or practiced landing large formations ashore that were anything but light infantry? When was the last time we landed a Mechanised or Armoured Infantry Battalion on a beach?

[ArmChairCivvy]

if we had gone straight for Stanley that would have been a true amphibious assault

Anyone tried that sort of thing since Dieppe?
- even that was classed as an experiment " the British Chief of Combined Operations, Rear Admiral Louis Mountbatten, was agitating for a practical trial beach landing, against real opposition"
- most lessons learnt are quickly forgotten; this one hardly can be

[Lord Jim]

I was trying to give an example of assaulting a defended beach aka Normandy, which was the last time we did it. I was not inferring actually landing in Port Stanley harbour but on one or more of the near by beaches like the Argentinians did when they arrived.

My argument is that we do not need to invest in highly specialised Amphibious shipping but rather need to ensure sufficient sea lift via the Points (under charter) and a modular successor to the Bays (RFA). We do not need LPDs or LHAs and such like. If we want to lift a company+ sized formation in one go we can use the Carrier that is available, as well as the Bay 2.0 platforms.

[seaspear]

I am not an expert in this but is there a guideline on what the differences are in what can be delivered and accomplished by sea-lift as compared to large aircraft with the pros and cons ,

[ArmChairCivvy]

sea-lift as compared to large aircraft

Time scale (initial, and then ongoing) would have to be set for such a comparison. We have the recent experience from an on-going Op with the air bridge to A-stan.

As for quick first entry, the indicative upper limit
"largest U.S.-U.K. bilateral airborne training operation to take place on Fort Bragg in the last 20 years. It will feature paratroopers from the 82nd Airborne Division's 2nd Brigade Combat Team and about 900 paratroopers from the United Kingdom's 3rd Battalion, The Parachute Regiment, 16 Air Assault Brigade.

The soldiers will jump from American C-17s and C-130s and Royal Air Force aircraft "
where they also dropped British kit from American planes.
- have not seen a report on the more capable (=bigger) drop frame for the A-400M having been certified, whereas for parachuting troops has had the certification for some years now
- we don't have enough Hercs for a bn-sized drop anymore, so a good thing (the above)

[shark bait]

Now if we had gone straight for Stanley that would have been a true amphibious assault

I hope you were in the pop last night, that is utter shite!

The whole point of an amphibious assault is to use the mobility of the sea to enable a manoeuvre where the enemy is not.

[R686]

Now if we had gone straight for Stanley that would have been a true amphibious assault

I hope you were in the pop last night, that is utter shite!

The whole point of an amphibious assault is to use the mobility if the sea to enable a manoeuvre where the enemy is not.

Correct I doubt will ever sea another landing on that scale of D Day and the Atlantic wall, nothing else compares except maybe the Inchon landing in Korea. But I have been told that the invasion of Japan was going to be larger than D Day if it happened.

[Poiuytrewq]

Correct I doubt will ever sea another landing on that scale of D Day and the Atlantic wall, nothing else compares except maybe the Inchon landing in Korea.

A opposed landing of that scale is now politically unthinkable, hence the reason why the LPD's were the first thing on the chopping block...

[SW1]

Didn’t think there was any uk lpds for the operation in al faw and the majority of troops were airlifted or drove from Kuwait?

[Gabriele]

The old ones had left and the new ones weren't quite there yet. Ark Royal and Ocean did the honors, with the rest traveling on US ships. The armoured vehicles were to disembark via american LCAC but since the beach was mined and there was no urgency, they ended up taking an indirect route and swinging in overland.

From that to saying that LPDs are not needed, for me there is a whole ocean in the middle. Thankfully nobody is sold on the idea that runs here and in some other circles of pretending that a few blokes on helicopters are "amphibious capability". The USMC briefly messed up with the first two ships of the America class, then went right back to the drawing board.

[ArmChairCivvy]

The whole point of an amphibious assault is to use the mobility [if]? the sea to enable a manoeuvre where the enemy is not.

The discussion is drifting, drifting
Must be a different piece to catch those exact words:

The old ones had left and the new ones weren't quite there yet. Ark Royal and Ocean did the honors, with the rest traveling on US ships. The armoured vehicles were to disembark via american LCAC but since the beach was mined and there was no urgency, they ended up taking an indirect route and swinging in overland.

From that to saying that LPDs are not needed, for me there is a whole ocean in the middle. Thankfully nobody is sold on the idea that runs here and in some other circles of pretending that a few blokes on helicopters are "amphibious capability".

[~UNiOnJaCk~]

From that to saying that LPDs are not needed, for me there is a whole ocean in the middle. Thankfully nobody is sold on the idea that runs here and in some other circles of pretending that a few blokes on helicopters are "amphibious capability". The USMC briefly messed up with the first two ships of the America class, then went right back to the drawing board.

Precisely. If anything, the whole "assault from OTH" concept has been taking back to the drawing board in recent years as has the belief that "mass" delivered by sea would become increasingly irrelevant going forward.

Much of the thinking on this board regarding how to deliver amphibious capability is at least 2-3 years out of date within military circles.

[ArmChairCivvy]

Much of the thinking on this board regarding how to deliver amphibious capability is at least 2-3 years out of date within military circles.

You are being kind.

[Lord Jim]

To do any of the above we do not need specialised Amphibious Assault Vessels though, we need flexible and multi-function platforms that can cover many roles and a modular Bay 2.0 would do just that. These combined with the chartered Points would give use t ability to secure a point of entry and disembark a full Brigade with supporting units and logistics in one lift.

I fully agree that except for raiding, we will try to land where the enemy isn't, but anything larger than a reinforced company will try to disembark at a friendly port, using ship to shore platforms to augment the on shore facilities.

AS for my Port Stanley quote, please read my follow post in response to AAC's reply and engage ones brain before typing.

[Repulse]

No doubt things are changing but with A2/AD equipment being supplied by Russia & China to potential adversaries, then previous thinking doesn’t work either.

What you need is a force like the SFs / RMs to operate far off shore in conjunction with air assets to neutralise as much as possible before the “mass” is off loaded closer to shore. That is where IMO the U.K. amphibious force needs to be optimised, leave logistics to the Points. What is absolutely clear putting a Strike Carrier close to shore or tying it to an amphibious force is madness.

[SW1]

Rather fortunate then we have neither an OTH capability, nor any sort of “mass” to speak of let alone anything beyond limited manoeuvre against a light opposition one we get there.