Current & Future Amphibious Capability - General Discussion

[ArmChairCivvy]

without heavy kit, that would be the upper limit of a raid (you can get out as quick as you can enter)

Is that "a Cdo" as in a Commando21 of 591 pairs of boots, stood in their boots with little else to hand but their bergens. Or, is this a Commando with vehicles and CS/CSS support formations?

Not sure the "21" survives at rgmnt level (stand-off Coy number in them was upped to 2, with heavy weapons) as the current emphasis seems to be for those Coys having vehicles for mobility - as opposed to their "bergens only" close-combat Coy brethren
- the emphasis making the company level units more autonomous, for longer, I believe has been retained

So to answer your question, it would be more like one of the remaining two "std" Cdo rgmnts rather than the ARG - even though in the latter the CS/ CSS support available straight away is quite limited, too.
- the fine line between a "raid" and preparing for something more sustainable

[jedibeeftrix]

without heavy kit, that would be the upper limit of a raid (you can get out as quick as you can enter)

Is that "a Cdo" as in a Commando21 of 591 pairs of boots, stood in their boots with little else to hand but their bergens. Or, is this a Commando with vehicles and CS/CSS support formations?

Not sure the "21" survives at rgmnt level (stand-off Coy number in them was upped to 2, with heavy weapons) as the current emphasis seems to be for those Coys having vehicles for mobility - as opposed to their "bergens only" close-combat Coy brethren
- the emphasis making the company level units more autonomous, for longer, I believe has been retained

So to answer your question, it would be more like one of the remaining two "std" Cdo rgmnts rather than the ARG - even though in the latter the CS/ CSS support available straight away is quite limited, too.
- the fine line between a "raid" and preparing for something more sustainable

which is fine to define what PoW+LSD can achieve, but it is not enough in and of itself (when defining max capability ambition).
as I believe you will agree?

[Lord Jim]

es we will still need to be able to ensure that the point of entry for say one of the Army's "Strike" Brigades is secure, but a reinforced Commando is adequate for that at most.

After watching the evidence cession in front of the Defence Sub-committee, I actually purchased "Battle for the Fiords", by Eric Grove, and it is a very good read outlining NATO policy regarding NATO's forward maritime strategy and Norway and the large scale NATO exercises in the late 1980s. I strongly recommend it.

Are we talking about:
1. Lead Commando Landing Force A lead Cdo (e.g 40 Cdo or 45 Cdo) plus attachments A Logistics Task Group from Commando Logistics Regiment 1 battery plus coord centre from 29 Cdo RA 1 eng sqn plus planning cell from 24 Cdo RE Approx Totals: 1200 personnel & 500 vehicles
Or:
2. Lead Commando Group (LCG)
As above but with full support personnel.
Approx Totals: 1900 personnel & 800 vehicles
Or:
3. Something less than this, i.e. just the 591 sets of boots, and not a combined-arms formation?

Thank you, I will keep an eye out for it.

What is the point in having a commandos as a light infantry battlegroup operating against whom? Any overt formation deploying against anyone be it a none state actor to a peer enemy has to take into consideration what we have seen over the last decades with the employment of ieds against any part of the deployed force driving protection across the board.

The commandos need to return not to some fantasy but to there roots as commandos. Deployed across the world in small groups as an extension of special forces support group, to provide targeted strikes against high value targets be they against non state actors or peer enemies and to provide strategic intel. This is an area of ever growing importance and demand.

At least this light infantry battlegroup comes with its own vehicles, its own method of strategic deployment, and its own unique military purpose. Same can't be said of the dozen light role infantry battalions...

There is nothing fanciful about their current role, to suggest as much is absurd. As noted by ACC, the UK is now well stocked with underwater-knife-fighters and their support formations.

Well put. And we have opposing views coming up. I would just add that we have SF and SFSG, so it would be false economy to build a copy of that setup by pruning the RM further.
As for capacity measures, a Bay can take a Coy with their vehicles ( Close Combat Coys have been kept light so that whole formations can be mover around by helicopters)
- so, a basic metric (before the PoW modifications become fully understood) is that a Cdo can be put ashore by a carrier and two Bays (originally designated Aux Logistics ships)
- without heavy kit, that would be the upper limit of a raid (you can get out as quick as you can enter)

Thank you.

Is that "a Cdo" as in a Commando21 of 591 pairs of boots, stood in their boots with little else to hand but their bergens. Or, is this a Commando with vehicles and CS/CSS support formations?

Agreed, this capability must be maintained.

This has been raised here many times by myself and others. The UK's Amphibious and Air Assault forces's strength should maintained at current levels or even enhanced at the expense of the Light Infantry. If modernising is to take place, this would seem like a very good place to start.

Thanks.

But to be clear: I'm not quite sure from that statement above whether you're merely advocating the continued existance of 3Cdo as a brigade comprised principally of 3x Commando Regiments, or, whether you are explicitly referring to the capability to deploy, fight, sustain amphibious forces as a combined-arms formation?

From where I am coming from, it would not be an all sing and dancing combined force that is allocated to provide security at the point of entry for another Brigade, so more along the lines of 591 boots on the ground but with light support such as Pedestal Starstreak etc and basic logistics. Of course once the Brigade and landed and passed through there is no reason if circumstance require it, for additional RM units to be landed and an all arms battle group be formed. Alternatively this initial force would secure the point of entry for the remainder of the RM force to be unloaded and move in land and so on.

What I am try, probably badly to get across is that although I believe the idea of landing 3 Commando in all its glory across the beach has past into history and resources should not be expended trying to revive it, the RM are an inherently flexible formations and have many valid and important roles both as an enabler and with its intrinsic capabilities.

[Poiuytrewq]

The budget for the LHP is as you say on the high side however I would start with stand point that it would have a limited F-35 capability but operating f-35s would not be its role. my vision is of a 30,000 ton ship capable of operating 30 helicopters from 8 spots embarking 900 Marines + 40 light armoured vehicles and 4 landing craft plus have full C&C for the Amphib group

I agree this would be a good option if HMG commits the extra funding required to build and operate a vessel such as this in addition to QE and PoW as well the escorts required to protect it. Time will tell.

The the 4 new 200 meter bays as you say have a lot of scope however the enlarged well dock will take some of the extra space as will the 100 extra troops as you know I have always liked your option 1 on page 44 of this thread and in a full landing operation I would embark 3 battle field Wildcats on each Bay class plus I feel anything past option 1 would ramp up costs

If the Well Dock is redesigned and the LCU's are placed side by side, little extra space will be required although a slight change to the beam dimensions may be required. The 24m stretch will easily accommodate the increased EMF capacity to 450.

I will mock this up and post it over in Fantasy.

At this time I would keep the Points simple maybe at most fit them for but with a Phalanx on the bow

I think they could offer a lot more without becoming cost prohibitive especially as a surge capability. As ever it all comes down to what finance is available.

I'm not quite sure from that statement above whether you're merely advocating the continued existance of 3Cdo as a brigade comprised principally of 3x Commando Regiments, or, whether you are explicitly referring to the capability to deploy, fight, sustain amphibious forces as a combined-arms formation?

Apologies for not being clear.

I am not advocating any alterations to 3 Commando.

I am advocating adding to RM's capabilities a properly funded, short endurance littoral strike capability.

To enable this I expect RM numbers would have to increase beyond 9000.

This would be at the expense of the Light Infantry.

What I proposing to alter is how the UK's Amphibious force is delivered along with what platforms are required to enable the short endurance littoral strike capability to work effectively. This is crucial and that is why I see the T31 programme as a massive missed opportunity in its current form.

[Repulse]

The crux of the issue is that currently the RMs come out of the RN budget - cuts to RN manning were far too deep back in SDSR2010 precisely to protect the RMs who were basically acting as an extension to the Army in Afghanistan.

I am biased, I do not see the priority to have a “fur and no knickers” globally deployable army division - I’d be ok if there is still a good argument for a RM battle group level capability, but what can’t continue is ships tied up due to lack of sailors and I’d happily cut 1,000 soldiers to get the RN sorted.

[ArmChairCivvy]

I believe you will agree?

Yes, not max, but was just trying to set out where a "raid" ends and a "propper" joint op starts.

I am advocating adding to RM's capabilities a properly funded, short endurance littoral strike capability

- sounds good, I think there is less need for a headcount increase and more for enabling kit (and formations being agile enough to be able to make max. use of them, as and when required)

[SW1]

Jedi

I wouldn’t in any way have a different view on the light role units left in the army. There is no room for overt light role forces on a future battlefield imo. The army units would go as well in favour of a 3rd wheeled strike brigade.

[ArmChairCivvy]

I am not advocating anything of the like (seems more like creating a modern-day SS, answerable directly and only the Fuehrer). An interesting parallel, though, as to what our Strike bdes, as a second echelon, will be for (no integration of the first echelons into a single command - the use and choice of them depends on the situation, and "jointness" in planning and execution is [?] by now a given):

"2013 decision to form a new major command, the VDV which incorporates all airborne, special operations, and marine troops. All these will operate under one VDV commander and VDV staff. The air force and navy will supply transportation in addition to vehicles each unit has and access to the national railroads. The air force and navy will also provide fire support as needed. The VDV staff will prepare and maintain lists of potential trouble spots and come up with a plan for which VDV units can most quickly respond and exactly how they will do that.

VDV will have control of about ten percent of Russian military personnel. This is also the most skilled lethal personnel in the Russian military. They are a diverse group. Russia has ten Spetsnaz special operations brigades with about 12,000 of these elite troops in service. The Spetsnaz brigades contain about 1,600 troops, at full strength, and the army is still having a hard time getting volunteers for these units. Airborne forces consist of four divisions and four separate brigades of airborne (parachute and air landing) troops with a total strength of 35,000 troops. There will also be several support brigades, including a training brigade. There are about 9,000 marines, which include several hundred naval commandos. VDV will also have some support troops based with their fighting units. In 2016 a further expansion of the VDV was announced, to include more contract troops as well as special VDV support (logistics, communications, transportation and so on) that would eventually add another 20,000 personnel."

[Lord Jim]

We have all been referring to the Army's planned "Strike" Brigades over the past few days, but these formations are far from satisfactory at the moment and need revision if there are to become spearhead formations, the same also goes for the Royal Marines. This is why I am unhappy with the whole MDP thingy. With the re-emergence of a serious threat in the European theatre, there needs to be a full and open review of the Country's military capabilities. Europe (including Scandinavia) first must be the keystone of such a review unless substantial additional funding is forthcoming. WE cannot go back in tome to he late 1980s but we to recapitalise our armed forces and especially the Army and Royal Marines to fighting high intensity land combat and away from the expeditionary/COIN type operations.

For the Army's part this is going to require the loss of the majority of the current "Light" role regiments, retain two at most and these will contain a very high proportion of Territorial units. For the Royal Marines they will come to the fore and be equipped for both raiding and operations as £ Commando Brigade, two roles that are not mutually exclusive by any means but rather an extension of the former by the latter. The Army's "Strike" brigades need to be semi-permanently organised into battalion level battlegroups, each able to operate independently with their own support and logistics units. They should also routinely deploy one of these battlegroups to Norway to gain experience in fighting in arctic conditions and learn how to work closely with both the Royal Marines and Norwegian formations. The Boxers must be equipped to handle these conditions as must much of the standard Army equipment and obviously specialised personal equipment will be required. Just as important additional variants of both the Boxer and Ajax families will need developing

These together with 3 Commando and 16 Air Assault should for the UKs rapid reactions force. As already mentioned, all three formation types will require substantial investment and should be the Army's top priority. The improvements to the two remaining heavy formations should be slowed and pushed into the next ten year equipment plan to help facilitate this. The T-31e programme should be halted and the funding diverted to other areas. These are just two examples but any review is going to have to make very stark choices as to where we need to invest and we have to abandon historical aspirations.

It has been said that "Light" formations have no role in high end warfare, well that is far from a black and white argument. Elite formations like the Royal Marines most certainly have a role but need increased firepower at all levels, a historical deficiency for the UK's land forces. We cannot rely on UORs as we have done in both Gulf Wars and Afghanistan to fill hole in capability as things are likely to move very fast if they do kick of, thick of the timeline for Russia's annexation of Crimea as a base line. The UK having the ability to contribute highly trained, mobile and well equipped formations, both light and medium should be what we aspire to. In Norway the Norwegians, and USMC will bring along the heavy metal on land. Will would also contribute at sea with our Carrier Task Force and provide additional air assets. If a future conflict continues longer than I believe it will then of course we could deploy heavier formations but the investment needed to bring these fully up to the task in hand will not be affordable if we are to make the formations already mentioned full capable.

It may have been noticed but I have made few references to the Baltic States. In my opinion once things start to boil over what we have in place it what there will be. Other NATO nations with land borders will have the responsibility for supporting the NATO forces already in place. Moving a major convoy through the Baltic once the shooting starts is as close to suicide as I can think of. Hence my concentration on Norway and NATO's northern flank.

Norway has bcome more agreeable for equipment to be prepositioned on their soil. I would suggest that equipments for a full Commando be placed their, to allow MArines to be flown in and marry up with it very rapidly. This would allow such a formation to be up and running within 48hrs at most and allow the allocated disembarkation point for sea borne forces to be secured. This equipmet would include sufficent Bv210 Viking 2 to give it tha abilty to maneuver in the arctice terrain at any time of year. This formation woul dbe sqifty joined by lead elements of 16 Air Assault and soon after the lead Battalion Battlegroup from one of the Army's "Strike" Brigades forming and combined arms Brigade.

To achive this the Military will need to train for such a deployment at least once every tow years if not yearly. We also ned to have sufficient sea lift of the appropriate type to carry out both this initial lift and bring in the remaining formations and logistics to allow them to operate to the necessary tempo. Whether chartered civilian vessels are adequate for such a rapid movement of substantial numbers of troops and amounts of equipment in a possible hostile environment is up for debate. My opinion is that the sea lift of the RFA needs expanding at the expense of traditional amphibious warfare vessels.

In addition to ehte benefits such training traditionally brings it would also show a clear intnent on hte UK's behalf to support our NATO allies and a clear deterent to any would be aggressors. Feel free to digest and discuss amongst yourselves.

[ArmChairCivvy]

It has been said that "Light" formations have no role in high end warfare, well that is far from a black and white argument. Elite formations like the Royal Marines most certainly have a role but need increased firepower at all levels, a historical deficiency for the UK's land forces. We cannot rely on UORs as we have done in both Gulf Wars and Afghanistan to fill hole in capability as things are likely to move very fast if they do kick of, thick of the timeline for Russia's annexation of Crimea as a base line. The UK having the ability to contribute highly trained, mobile and well equipped formations, both light and medium should be what we aspire to.

+

be sqifty joined by lead elements of 16 Air Assault and soon after the lead Battalion Battlegroup from one of the Army's "Strike" Brigades forming and combined arms Brigade.

It is a pity that the public consultation period for the MDP is already over; the points above would have been worthwhile and are in a more condensed form than most.
- Gaby got his input in; not sure what was in it, though

Whether chartered civilian vessels are adequate for such a rapid movement of substantial numbers of troops and amounts of equipment in a possible hostile environment is up for debate.

We get a pointer of what was needed for Falklands, from the excellent Ship to shore logistics piece (San Carlos and beyond) by TD:
"Ships Taken Up From Trade (STUFT)

The LSL’s were not nearly enough for 3CDO let alone the eventual force that sailed, help would be needed.
That help eventually turned out to be a collection of civilian vessels either requisitioned or chartered civilian vessels that would join the significant Royal Fleet Auxiliary (RFA) group. In total, 673 thousand gross tons of shipping were taken up, from 33 different companies and 52 ships."

One could try to equate the landed force (appr. 2 bdes) to what is being talked about above (appr. 2 bdes); the difference being that for Falklands even the kitchen sink needed to be included in the packing, whereas for Norway the matter is more about combat supplies than general supplies - assuming that NATO's preplanning cuts the mustard.

[SW1]

This is sort of indicative of many defence reviews over the years, we like to talk about change we like to think we are being modern and making priorities and then we use emotive language to justify cap badge protectism and end up convincing ourselves just to keep the status quo and some other force in another service we don’t care about can be cut instead, but we have a budget that simply doesn’t support it. We like the idea of raiding forces we like the idea unmanned systems provided we fund the traditional way of doing things first.

I think one thing the last 15 years in Iraq and Afghanistan proved is that across brigade formation there is little difference between the commando brigade, the air assualt brigade or a more regular army brigade they all just slotted into the same roulement. There is no doubt there is elite elements within the commando formations and it is those elements that need to be brought to the fore. It is the assualt Sqn and riverine units, the boarding specialists and the recon specialists.

The idea we are re equipping ourselfs to re fight the Cold War that ended in 1990 is a mistake. Boundaries have changed, populations have expanded, tactic have evolved, new media exploited. It is likely we are seeing in Syria a signpost on what future conflict will look like, irregular conflict involving a peer opponent likely in some form of population centre or confined or congested waterway it will not be in open plains or deep blue sea as not one lives there!.

We say we have enough specialist forces, yet time and again they are the no1 requested assets by the US and one of the principle areas that have more tasks placed on them that they had troops to cover. The demand on forces that can operate covertly is only increasing not diminishing. Any Russian activity in the likes of Norway or Western Europe will likely be gurellia in nature and will require similar type forces to not only hunt them doing but to also attack Russian forces in a similar way.

[Repulse]

SW1, agree completely any focus of UK funds on fighting a conventional continental land war is completely wrong IMO. By all means let’s have an Army that could be scaled up for a major conflict, but it can be held in most at lower readiness and in the UK.

The real Strategic focus has to be Sea and Air Control of the North Atlantic and North Sea coupled with global SLOC presence given the increasing importance of global trade to the UK. Alongside this is energy / food security, anti cyber capabilities and a Space strategy.

This is not a return to the Nott 81 days where all the RN budget was focused on Europe, but a real recalibration of funds between the services and a “Purple” mindset.

[SW1]

“The real Strategic focus has to be Sea and Air Control of the North Atlantic and North Sea coupled with global SLOC presence given the increasing importance of global trade to the UK. Alongside this is energy / food security, anti cyber capabilities and a Space strategy.”

This is were we start to digress towards a policy of the answer is more navy which I’m not convinced is correct. What sea lanes are we protecting any why? What are we protecting it from and with what it will be different to the past? The countries that are selling there wears and putting them in ships have as much interest in seeing them get to the uk as we have. How will adaptive manufacturing techniques change things in the future?

Russia and China are the only real powers with the ability to provide global capability. There is little point worrying about protecting trade routes to China if they are the agreesor they simply won’t send it in the first place! ‘There is a lot hyperbole around energy supplies most of the uks comes from the Atlantic basin and countries that surround it. Most of the oil and gas out of the Middle East actual heads east mainly to China.

The simplest way to close a choke point and most complex to deal with is sea mines. In a era of defining priorities why is it not acceptable to say that our naval contribution to the Middle East area is mimesweepers and their command ship and in future remotely operated systems or question if it’s actually a uk priority at all.

[Repulse]

What sea lanes are we protecting any why? What are we protecting it from and with what it will be different to the past? The countries that are selling there wears and putting them in ships have as much interest in seeing them get to the uk as we have. How will adaptive manufacturing techniques change things in the future?

Good questions - I’ll start by saying that with global supply chains modern industries and supply to consumers can be significantly impacted by even minor disruptions. Now I don’t believe the all of scare stories of Brexit, but it is clear the world is much more complex than the simple view of the 19th and 20th centuries.

The Houthi insurgency in Yemen supported by Iran is just the latest example where proxies can be used to threaten key trade routes. Also, China is building significant capabilities in Africa and the Indian Ocean (e.g. Maldives) whereby they could in the future have significant presence.

Do I expect China to turn off its own trade - no, unless relations turned bad, in which case with its global reach it could interfere with trade with other countries.

IMO in some respects we are going back to the 18th / 19th centuries where who controls the trade levers controls the world - it’s going to be much less about nation building and holding land. The LOCs of the 21st century is not just SLOCs but they still have 90% of physical trade going through them. The UK cannot control them like the 19th century but it does need to be prepared to robustly protect its interests.

[SW1]

Repulse

I would say global supply chains are much more robust that you suggest. There are multiple routes east and west by land sea or air. While any dispute along the route while generate initial hyperbole with a couple of weeks work arounds are in place as people will always want to make money!

To bring it back to amphibious things the houthi insurgence is a gd example of where I’m wanting to go with the commandos. Essentially they as you say are state backed which gives them potientially access to what have historically been peer weapons but with very limited supply like 2 or 3 anti ship missiles. You may be watching the route ships are using say a reaper for weeks at a time and see a missile getting prepared to fire or moved and decide it’s a high value target to be removed and deploy a commando raid to destroy it before it can be used.

I would agree but I would also point out the biggest shock to trade from which we are still recovering was on computer screens of financial institutions. Trade levers maybe more digital than we realise or care to believe.

[ArmChairCivvy]

I think one thing the last 15 years in Iraq and Afghanistan proved is that across brigade formation there is little difference between the commando brigade, the air assualt brigade or a more regular army brigade they all just slotted into the same roulement.

One example whereas the counter (a more specialised case) of the Guards not being quick to adjust to an amph. Op in the early Falklands days to me carries more weight. Specialists can be generalists, but vv. it becomes more difficult.

It is likely we are seeing in Syria a signpost on what future conflict will look like, irregular conflict

Agree

The demand on forces that can operate covertly is only increasing not diminishing.

On all sides: no surprise that the Russian decision in 2013 (detailed upthread) preceded the events of 2014
- they were only thrown off guard when the Ukrainian resistance stiffened as soon as it became clear that Crimea was not the only objective. Pulled in a massive roulement (on the Russian side) of their battle ready battle group of various brigades, from as far as Vladivostok, quite a side of the various VDV-related units

we start to digress towards a policy of the answer is more navy which I’m not convinced is correct.

Agreed. Could be the answer, but need not be (evidence?).

most of the uks comes from the Atlantic basin and countries that surround it. Most of the oil and gas out of the Middle East actual heads east mainly to China.

The geographical origins are a lesser risk than the noose the Gvmnt has decided to put around our neck in this area. Oxfordenergy. org gives a description:
" the greatest challenge to UK security of gas supplies
in the medium
-
term future (to 2022)
is not posed by
UK
dependence on
Russian gas imports. Rather, it stems from the UK’s increasing
exposure to price volatility on the European gas market, in the context of the UK’s increasing import
dependence
and
loss of large
-
scale gas storage, which has left the UK increasingly reliant
on a
combination of
limited
-
volume,
multi
-
cycle gas storage and ‘balancing’ supplies in the form of spot
-
market LNG purchases
and supplies
from the continental European market (delivered via
the two
interconnecto
rs).
The prominent role of Russia in
supplying gas to the European market renders it a
factor in UK gas supply security, to the extent that the UK and European gas markets are inter
-
linked,
both through the physical interconnectors and through competition for LNG deliveries that supplement
p
ipeline supplies in times of high demand
, including LNG supplies that originate in Russia"

More specifically, we have knowingly decided NOT to pay for insurance:
"the closure of the Rough gas storage facility, which deprived the UK of its only large
-
volume,
seasonal gas storage, has left the UK more exposed to price spikes on the conti
nental European
market, from which UK gas traders will seek to acquire gas during short
-
term peaks in UK gas demand.
It has also left the UK in greater need of LNG deliveries during winter, to replenish multi
-
cycle storage
facilities, which may be drawn do
wn and refilled several times during a single winter season.
This means
that the price spikes on the NBP are now part of the system
–
They are needed to attract spot market
supplies of LNG at the times
of high demand
. Indeed, if the NBP price spikes had no
t attracted LNG
deliveries to replenish storage tanks at the UK’s LNG terminals, and the period of both cold weather
and consequent increased UK gas demand had continued, the UK could have faced a more severe gas
shortage. The notion that ‘the system works
’ because the UK is able to attract LNG supplies from the
international spot market is predicated on those LNG supplies being available on the first place.
However, the availability of spot market LNG supplies is related to patterns of supply and demand on
the global LNG market, and the price spreads between Europe and the Asian market,
where the latter
has traditionally commanded a price premium and has therefore attracted LNG supplies away from
Europe in periods of market tightness."

This supposed flexibility and Just-in Time nature of the whole UK arrangement will greatly aggravate risks of even short closures of supply... so the carriers are the insurance ?

with global supply chains modern industries and supply to consumers can be significantly impacted by even minor disruptions.

Tsunami was not quite minor but exposed how easily the cracks could widen, along the global supply chains.

would also point out the biggest shock to trade from which we are still recovering was on computer screens of financial institutions.

Quite. Man-made; just like war and other strife. Difficult to say which type of these events comes along most unexpectedly. Of course, the true exposure is severity x probability (?)

[SW1]

One example whereas the counter (a more specialised case) of the Guards not being quick to adjust to an amph. Op in the early Falklands days to me carries more weight. Specialists can be generalists, but vv. it becomes more difficult.

Not quite the same though the guards were pulled straight from ceremonial duties and sent because combat ready units in Germany were not allowed to be sent. There was also conflicting orders from the senior parts of chain of command that lead to the incident with the welsh guards. One to proceed to the landing zone the other from a more junior officer to get off the ship. That’s nothing to do with being specialist or not.

[Lord Jim]

I agree that the type of conflict we have and are seeing in Syria will continue to be prevalent, especially where one side has basically air dominance forcing the other side to fight unconventionally. A theoretical conflict in northern Norway would be substantially different. Firstly the airspace above both sides would be contested. Secondly Russia has superior artillery support then NATO formations. We would see their use of air, land and sea special forces crossing the boarder before things actually went critical so they would already be in place. The Russian Brigades groups stationed in the theatre as some for their best rained and equipped, especially with specialist equipment for the environment they would be fighting in. These Brigades are scheduled to be expanded to Divisional strength in the near future. A lot will depend on the reaction of Finland and Sweden to the crisis. For Russia to effective move into northern Norway and avoid bottlenecks it needs to move at least through Finish territory so the conflict could rapidly expand.

In a nutshell any conflict in Norway would be the next evolution of how Russia have rewritten their play book. They would, more then ever combine the doctrine they have used successfully in the Crimea and Eastern Ukraine and add significant conventional air, land and sea assets. The specialist nature of the skill sets needed to operate and fight in Northern Norway means NATO cannot simply dispatch its planned Rapid Reaction Force. NATO needs formations trained and equipped to operate their and who are familiar with Norwegian and other Scandinavian militaries. It needs to start holding exercises at least once every two years so than countries like the Netherlands can retrain the units they have that have lost their arctic skill sets. It is interesting that it is the RM who are training he USMC in how to operate in Norway once again.

As for protecting shipping in the North Atlantic and so on, well the key thing for NATO is to protect the US and Canadian forces earmarked for the reinforcement of Europe, especially as these are more important than in the Cold War.

[ArmChairCivvy]

sea special forces crossing the boarder before things actually went critical so they would already be in place. The Russian Brigades groups stationed in the theatre as some for their best rained and equipped, especially with specialist equipment for the environment they would be fighting in. These Brigades are scheduled to be expanded to Divisional strength in the near future.

That is a key point, they (too) have a bde of marines plus a specially fitted out Arctic bde in the area. In fact, the latter is the only one stood up, from the 4 that Putin announced c. 5 yrs ago. I have not spotted any plans/ announcements about upping to divisional strength, though?
- the 4 (divisions) announced practically form a ring around Ukraine, so quite far from the scene. The same does not apply to some of the main VDV formations (esp. when their mobility by air is factored in)

[Lord Jim]

It was mentioned in the Parliamentary Defence Sub Committee report on possible conflict in the Arctic. It seems Russia has a great interest in the region, claiming that it owns vast amounts of it so these four Arctic Warfare units are the next to get bumped from Brigade to Divisional strength.

[ArmChairCivvy]

A lovely read (on this topic) overall: https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/absolute ... ll-taylor/

Picked up the condensed history of how we ended up with an unbalanced amphib fleet (before it was cut further):
"The plan for the recapitalisation of the amphibious fleet following the Falklands War of 1982 was laid down in CDS 11/85 Future Amphibious Capability - Costed Options. The plan was to acquire two landing Platform Dock (LPD), two Landing Platform Helicopter (LPH) and six Landing Ships Logistic (LSL) to meet the endorsed capability requirement (CDS 10/85). The acquisition plan was subsequently modified as a result of pressures on the Long Term Costings (LTC) programme. One LPH was deleted (LTC 93) and one LSL taken at risk (LTC 94) and a complete deck removed from the LPD design. Cost comparison between the Ships Life Extension Programme (SLEP) for the LSLs demonstrated that replacement with the Alternative LSL (ALSL) would be cheaper. Risk in the ALSL programme reduced hull numbers from five to two, before finally settling on four hulls, re-christened Landing Ship Dock Auxiliary (LSD(A)). The final build programme delivered HMS Ocean (1999), HMS Albion (2003), HMS Bulwark (2004), RFA Largs Bay (2006), Lyme Bay (2007) Mounts Bay (2006) and Cardigan Bay (2006) – (not a total of 6 LPDs and the RORO ferries were purchased to service the Army in Cyprus and Germany, not as part of the amphibious capability). The cost of this programme (in 2010 GBP £) was per platform: LPH £215m, LPD £225m, LSD(A) £149m a grand total £1.26bn"
- inflation correction to be applied for our "own" re-capitalisation plan comparisons here

[Lord Jim]

A very good read, though I do think we need to differentiate between Amphibious Assault platforms and military Sea Lift.

[ArmChairCivvy]

we need to differentiate between Amphibious Assault platforms and military Sea Lift.

Absolutely, but there is ground between those polar opposites (this is from a Master's thesis in the Joint Warfighting School):
"The obvious is transport, the movement of troops from
the ho
me nation to a friendly port. Secondly the amphibious assault, akin to the landings
in Normandy in WW2 or at Inchon during the Korean War. Finally, there is the
a
mphibious landing or offload, an unopposed
delivery of forces over a coastline: This is
accomplished. either away from enemy forces, as seen during the landings in San Carlos
Water during the Falklands campaign,
or after sufficient preparation by another force
(naval fires, air power, or pre-landing force operations) to sufficiently degrade the
opposition such that the landing is unopposed."
- as for the last point, the choice of F-35 for the carriers is quite a good one, in dealing with anti-access strategies?

[jedibeeftrix]

"amphibious landing or offload, an unopposed delivery of forces over a coastline"

And nothing to date has convinced me that this is anything other than a vital capability - to be performed at battlegroup level - necessary not least to guarantee the utility of expeditionary warfare with strike delivered by sealift.

[SW1]

A lot of the above is fine if your operating at scale. The uk is not! The uk would struggle operating above brigade sized operations now. So assuming the adage of you need a 3 to 1 ratio to displace a enemy in position any uk operation will be extremely limited in scope. Operation pallister is probably the extent of uk independent action. Given the scale of assets required for even moderately scaled campaigns like Libya or Syria we are contributors to a much larger effort, and amphibious assault is not a must have contribution.