Current & Future Amphibious Capability - General Discussion

[ArmChairCivvy]

The thing is that we have both a raiding force and a (light capability to) kick-down the door by establishing an area for further force concentration.

And the new USMC doctrine that places further emphasis on independent company and bn-level ops has stated the RM as being a "role model" for this .

What we need to do is similar to "An article in the Marine Corps Gazette in August 2015 by LtCol Dinsmore and Capt Gowan stated: “The intelligence T/O at an infantry battalion consists of 3 officers and 13 enlisted Marines" and that it is called for to formalise the Company Level Intel Cells, CLICs for short.
- going by the manning, our 6-man strength beach recce teams (SRTs) are about right per company. As the Cdo's now specialise more (one for "nuclear safety"; one for Maritime "safety" and two for over the beach ops with "heavy" weapons) we then end up with 2 x 4 Coy's = 8,
times 6= 48, so we would seem to be covered (I wonder where Gaby pulled the 78 number quoted on the exercise from, but surely there is more to it than just the Marines in the IRCs?) and it is only a matter of honing the organisation further. Greatly assisted by these Ops Sqdrns becoming more undetached from ships, one by one, and taking on new roles relative to being "taxi drivers".

[Gabriele]

78 men was the number given by the Royal Navy news report at the time.

[ArmChairCivvy]

78 men was the number given by the Royal Navy news report at the time.

I did not doubt it for a minute; 30 staying behind, and pulling it all together is not huge if one compares it with what has been reserved onboard the Albions - albeit those facilities are for a Bde+
- if you have a link handy, would be interesting to read the detail (which, in the main, tend to be scarce)

[Gabriele]

I saved the webpage of the time on my computer. If you seek HMS Montrose Pre-Landing Force Cougar 2012 you can find some photos on facebook, but i haven't located the original news. Good thing i saved it.

[donald_of_tokyo]

http://navaltoday.com/2017/07/10/sweden ... ult-craft/
CB90 with 12.7mm gun RWS is 2M GBP per unit for 18 units order, now. Interested in the RWS. LCVP Mk.5 was 1M GBP per unit (but it is the price around late 1990s, I guess, which means similar cost now?).

http://navaltoday.com/2017/08/28/dutch- ... -on-board/
CB90 used as a chaser for African operation. Good example of usage.

[shark bait]

Begs the question why dont we already have CB90?

Perfect for amphibious operations, and also excellent in force protection and maritime security roles. That second link shows a big amphibious platform loaded with combat boats being used as a 'general purpose frigate'. That is the route we should be taking.

[LordJim]

I totally agree, and it gives the RM a better platform than they currently use by quite a large margin.

[Repulse]

I like the LCVP as it can take light vehicles / stores whereas the CB90 can't. Would be an option to complement, but would like a specific small fast attack craft first though.

[ArmChairCivvy]

I like the LCVP as it can take light vehicles / stores whereas the CB90 can't. Would be an option to complement, but would like a specific small fast attack craft first though.

Agree that a combo of the first two is what is needed. And as we already field the third one, that must be the reason (in this budgetary environment) why the CB90 trials went nowhere (after the facts).

[LordJim]

There would be a role for the LCVP but as a follow up platform bringing in additional resources, vehicles, personnel etc. In the amphibious role the RM need to get back to raiding. Retain the ability to operate and a more conventional land force when deployed in to theater like Afghanistan as a larger formation, but the RM should never be considered a formation to assault a defended hostile coastline. If that were the case they could have landed at Port Stanley in the Falklands War.

We need sea lift to get kit and personnel to where they are to fight, and some capability to land said kit onto a safe beach if here are initially no port facilities, but we cannot afford to even attempt full amphibious assaults especially OTH operations.

[Gabriele]

In the amphibious role the RM need to get back to raiding.

Again, what the hell does this even mean, and why / how this is supposed to mean doing it without landing craft. There is a gigantic hole in the train of thought here.

[james k]

Actually the situation is bad but not as bad as it might seem.

Firstly most nations concentrate on their LPD/LPH troop and vehicle capacity but ignore the logistics side of Amphibious warfare. Aside from the US (and to a smaller extent the RAN) the RN/RFA is one of the few services to identify the requirement for logistic capacity with the Point class vessels.

I can't give a direct quote but I once read an MOD document which gave details of the logistics requirements of amphibious and air assault forces and they were vast. The requirements, given in the document as "lines" of vehicles and containerised stores per man, in theatre, indicated that most navies with amphibious forces but no specialised logistics vessels had little capacity for anything other than small landings or raids.

The Point's also have hidden capabilities which are not, at present, utilised. Accommodation containers can be loaded in the open area below the ships bridge. A helicopter platform can be added in a short space of time and has been allowed in the design. Furthermore LCVP or LCU can be carried on deck and launched via the ships crane and MEXE rafts can be carried and supported.

Add to that the fact that we do have two very modern and up to date LPD's (even if we do only use one) with extensive command and control systems. Three equally modern and very useful RFA LSD's all of which have extensive helicopter operating capacity (the LSD's can mount a temporary hanger forward of the crane) a choice of modern high capacity LCU or fast shallow draught LCVP's, fast Combat Support Boats (which can be armed), Workboats (essentially small military tugs) and MEXE rafts (operated by 17 and 165 Port & Maritime Regiments) and the Royal Marines own Offshore Raiding Craft, RIB's and Rigid Raiding Craft (the last two also operated by 17 & 165 Regiments).

17 & 165 Port & Maritime Regiments are well versed and equipped to conduct over the beach logistics supply to Amphibious forces under the direction of Commando Logistics Regiment and (with the assistance of a Specialist Team Royal Engineers) are able to occupy and operate captured ports on enemy territory. A capability demonstrated in Iraq.

Throw RFA Argus into the equation and the UK Amphibious capability is still too small but healthier than other branches of the service. At least we can provide logistic support for the forces we land which is more than many other navies are able to do.

[ArmChairCivvy]

Firstly most nations concentrate on their LPD/LPH troop and vehicle capacity but ignore the logistics side of Amphibious warfare.

Countries like S. Korea, Brazil and Russia that maintain larger Marines formations than we do mainly see them as a capability for flanking moves (or alternatively defence, when tactical movement over water is a necessity).

little capacity for anything other than small landings or raids.

Scale can be large, but it does not do away the limitations on duration; i.e. joining up with a land force for sustainment needs to be part of the plan (and the plan better not fail!)

At least we can provide logistic support for the forces we land which is more than many other navies are able to do.

Agreed.

PS. Lines is actually LIM, lane meters as the design parameter is the width of the AFVs that have any relevance (sure, that goes all the way to Chally 2s, but not on all decks) and thus you end up in cubic, as a measure for capacity

[ArmChairCivvy]

LIM, lane meters

Must be a fairly old measure; cant think of the "I" coming from anything else than "in"
... "IM" Imperial Measures

[necessary evil]

I agree with Gabrielle; the do away with the contested landing (that is, contested by significant enemy ground forces near the beach) capability idea seems to be a bit of a straw man. I don´t think we have had such a capabilty since perhaps WWII. What we have had, and still have, is the ability to land a brigade-sized group in an uncontested landing over the beach. This proved very useful in the Falklands, and it is really is the minimum capacity required to enable independent expeditionary operations, at least those that aren´t merely punitive in nature. Of course, perhaps we shouldn´t be engaging in such operations, but that is a different argument, and the 2015 SDSR was partially built around the idea of enabling such operations, whether that is as part of a coalition or not (to make a significant contribution to a coalition we would need to have independent capabilities in such an area, if no land bases were available).

[james k]

Just out of interest my son was a Mariner with 17 Port & Maritime, before his transfer to the Rifles. The boats they had were the often overlooked Workboat (essential for amphibious operations), the Combat Support Boat which was used for various roles from flank security of a landing, landing troops and directing landing craft onto the beach, and some LCVP (which have now been withdrawn) and some RPL used for navigation training (also withdrawn). I am also good friends with a former Colour Sergeant RM from 539 Assault Squadron and a senior Mariner at 17 Regt.

I asked them about the LCVP and they all told me that it is a small, fast and reliable craft that is able to land troops in a high sea state even on beaches with a steep gradient. The overhead canopy enables it to act as a small mother ship to ORC's and it has BOWMAN communications. They further informed me that Javellin and Mortars (81mm and 60mm) can be fired with some accuracy from the deck giving it a support role.

Raiding isn't always about landing on a specific beach but more often finding an inlet where the craft can lay up under camouflage whilst the raiding party moves inland, often many miles, to recce or attack the target. For this they all confirmed that the LCVP remains the perfect craft and given a choice between the CB90 and LCVP they believed the LCVP to be of more use. They had all experienced the CB90 and would welcome it as an addition, notably for flank security during landings and the follow up landings of logistics. But the CB90 is not a cure all or a replacement for other vessels.

[Repulse]

What's the Auxiliary Fleet Support Helicopter (AFSH) mentioned on page 22 of the NSS report?

[Gabriele]

That would be Fort Austin and Fort Rosalie.

[S M H]

What's the Auxiliary Fleet Support Helicopter (AFSH) mentioned on page 22 of the NSS report?

That was what the requirement that Mv Contender bzant was initially purchased under before morphing into what she is now. Engardine was used in San Calos waters as a auxiliary helicopter support. Post conflict the requirement set the original requirement for Argus

[Caribbean]

And interestingly, SJP made reference to adapting civilian designs for military use

[Gabriele]

Those are Auxilary Helicopter / Aviation Support Ships. Not Auxiliary Fleet Support Helicopter ships.

AFS(H) gives a better idea. Fort Austin and Rosalie are fleet support auxiliaries, but have rather extensive hangar facilities for helicopters.

Argus is listed in the Plan in her role of casualty receiving ship. Unfortunately, in a rather fishy way considering that apparently a decision point for her replacement is not due before 2028 and IOC of her replacement not before 2033.
Considering that 2024 was the last OSD given for RFA Argus, it doesn't look nice. Looks a bit too long for a life extension of an old ship.

[ArmChairCivvy]

AFS(H) gives a better idea. Fort Austin and Rosalie are fleet support auxiliaries, but have rather extensive hangar facilities for helicopters.

So, can we deduce backwards that the same on SSS's won't be that extensive?

[Gabriele]

No, i see no reason to, for now.

[Defiance]

And interestingly, SJP made reference to adapting civilian designs for military use

I'm glad it got a reference, there's a lot of cost-effective potential there.

[~UNiOnJaCk~]

A thought just sprang to mind. With a stated price cap of £250 million for the first batch of five Type 31s, surely the door has been left open to allow following batches to increase in price and, presumably, capability? Or is this just sloppy wording?

Of course, it'd take a change in the winds of fortune, but could we not be looking at a situation where we will have an initial batch of ships with a great deal of deferred capability (i.e. FFBNW) with follow on batches to receive an expanded mission fit should the financial situation at the time allow it?