Current & Future Escorts - General Discussion

[Tempest414]

One thing differ is, for me T26 does not include "859 million demonstration phase".
I agree it is arguable, but for me, adding its cost to T26 is similar to adding Nimrod MRA4 cost to P-8A cost.

I find it interesting you say this the 859 million contact was signed in 2015 there was an extension in 2016 which ended in June 2017 and the 3.7 billion build contract was signed in July 2017 one month latter which is shows straight & clear development of the program

Nimrod MRA4 was a BAE program that started ran and finished in 2010 without anything to show there was then a 5 year gap before we went to Boeing and another 4 until the first P-8 arrived

[Tempest414]

Tempest414, the whole idea of the LRG operating independently of a CBG protective umbrella outside of a relatively benign environment is a red herring.

In peace time the LSG I have laid out would be a good core group and a good show of force when the CSG was not EoS in the same way the French have a LHD EoS when the CSG is not . And if it went hot our LSG could 1) join a Indian or American Carrier battle group or 2) wait for our CSG to arrive

It should also be said that the RAN battle group ( in real terms a LSG ) is made up of a LHD , 3 x escorts and a tanker

[SD67]

One thing differ is, for me T26 does not include "859 million demonstration phase".
I agree it is arguable, but for me, adding its cost to T26 is similar to adding Nimrod MRA4 cost to P-8A cost.

Second thing is, you think learning curve is guess work, I think it is science.

Of course the program cost always includes the cost of design either directly or indirectly. T31 program cost includes IP royalties and consultancy services provided by OMT. And even if it doesn't, 3.7 billion / 3 = 1.23

In terms of cost curve yes I agree it should in a perfect world come down 20% or so. But we have a specific problem here which is politics, and as a result a sub-optimal 2 yard build on the Clyde, it's a limiting factor. The modules at Govan are being stitched together before they are fully fitted out because of the need to float them up the river to Scotstoun.

[abc123]

I agree it is arguable, but for me, adding its cost to T26 is similar to adding Nimrod MRA4 cost to P-8A cost.

I think it should be added, because MRA4 costed the taxpayers for MPA capability, but they didn't get that capability before P-8.

[donald_of_tokyo]

One thing differ is, for me T26 does not include "859 million demonstration phase".
I agree it is arguable, but for me, adding its cost to T26 is similar to adding Nimrod MRA4 cost to P-8A cost.

I find it interesting you say this the 859 million contact was signed in 2015 there was an extension in 2016 which ended in June 2017 and the 3.7 billion build contract was signed in July 2017 one month latter which is shows straight & clear development of the program

Nimrod MRA4 was a BAE program that started ran and finished in 2010 without anything to show there was then a 5 year gap before we went to Boeing and another 4 until the first P-8 arrived

As I said, it is arguable. But, at least officially, it is not included in T26 cost. Thus, we can guess that it has its own rationale that it shall better NOT be included.

It's not me, its NAO and HMG who do not include that cost.

[donald_of_tokyo]

Of course the program cost always includes the cost of design either directly or indirectly. T31 program cost includes IP royalties and consultancy services provided by OMT. And even if it doesn't, 3.7 billion / 3 = 1.23

In terms of cost curve yes I agree it should in a perfect world come down 20% or so. But we have a specific problem here which is politics, and as a result a sub-optimal 2 yard build on the Clyde, it's a limiting factor. The modules at Govan are being stitched together before they are fully fitted out because of the need to float them up the river to Scotstoun.

Thanks again. No objection. The point is, just because of that reason (political slow down of Y26 build), I prefer "more T26" than "T32". And, I'm just talking about the unit-cost of T26 when it happens = hull 9 and further, not talking about hull 1-8.

[Poiuytrewq]

We don't know this as Fact yet however T-31 will get unmanned systems that type 23 has not got

Exactly but the T23 was designed in an era where unmanned systems didn’t exist as they do now. The T23 is being replaced as it has reached the end of its service life. Direct comparisons therefore are problematic but not without value.

For example:

-The T23 could provide NGS, the T31’s will not have this capability unless a pod is designed with something like a VLS spear3.

-The T23’s could destroy an enemy vessel OTH without using the embarked helicopter. The T31 will not have this capability as far as we know.

- The T23’s could find, track and if necessary destroy an enemy submarine if required without using the embarked helicopter. The T31 will not have this capability as far as we know.

- The number of CAMM fitted is unclear but regardless, the T31 will carry a substantially reduced load out compared with the T23. Will the 57mm and 40mm’s make up the difference? I don’t think that’s proven yet unless the threat is drones and/or fast attack craft.

It is not controversial to argue that credible Frigates should be able conduct NGS, attack OTH vessels, track and destroy submarines or have enough SAM’s to repeal an attack from an adversary with a standard load of 8 AShM. At least, it shouldn’t be unless penny pinching is the priority rather than the safety of T31 crews.

It could (and has) been argued that the T31’s increased range and endurance is an enhancement over the T23 along with higher habitation standards and improved availability. This is all true but how important are these attributes when the talking stops and the shooting starts? Are the hard lessons learnt in the Falklands still being applied or is a future conflict so unlikely now that it is just cheaper to focus on availability rather than arming Frigates correctly? It’s clear what the Treasury thinks.

The T31 has always been the Treasury’s Frigate and RN is making the best of a bad hand. If the T31’s eventually replace the forward based OPV’s and the T32’s arrive on time then the strategy is sound. However if the T32 programme is badly delayed or scrapped, the T31’s will have to be rapidly upgraded to fill the gap. At which point the T31(e) programme will have been a complete failure.

[Repulse]

What I would like to see in addition, is 4 x “Atlantic” Frigates (which could also encompass TAPS & FRE duties), 2 x “Gulf” Frigates, 2 x “Mediterranean” Frigates and 2 x “Indian Ocean” Frigates, with additional hulls in refit etc. to maintain numbers deployed or deployable.

Putting aside the Atlantic for a while, what you are describing is effectively a colonial/mini-world policeman force. The world seems to have moved on from this in the past decades, and I worry without a superpower budget it will never be enough. With the OPVs/Survey craft it’s still a statement of presence, but a low key one, which will be more effective in the surveillance/training role as it will not ruffle feathers.

Btw: According to this month’s Warship World (page 35) the B2 OPVs can operate from over 500 ports in the Indo Pacific region, larger frigates would be limited to 22.

[Repulse]

In peace time the LSG I have laid out would be a good core group and a good show of force when the CSG was not EoS in the same way the French have a LHD EoS when the CSG is not .

2 LSG's with 1 x LHA's , 1 x Bay , 2 x T-32, 1 x T-31 plus a Wave class

I believe the main principle of the LRG would be to provide a low key forward based task group, capable of getting involved in low threat maritime environments projecting SF type formations on to the land or Littoral zones. The whole point is that there doesn’t need to be a show of force as such - you want it below the radar, and not overly sticking out.

What you’ve described it a poorly equipped armada.

Personally I would see it more as a MRSS plus a B2 (or two max) to provide additional low threat security. Anything above that should be with a RN CBG, or as you say an allied task group.

My underlying via is that if you are poking a country, go armed to the teeth with guns and missiles, not with the equivalent of a knife. If you can’t, best not to try.

[Lord Jim]

Why are we walking about LHAs for the LSGs. I thought we were looking at a multirole ship with almost the capacity of a Bay with aviation facilities for three or at most four helicopters, and a well deck. It would have accommodation for at most a Coy of Royal Marines or equivalents.

We have to be careful as well when organising a LSG differently for peace and war. If an LSG is to have a deterrent value is needs to be able to switch from peace to war swiftly, not ask the opposition the wait awhile as we reorganise things. This also determines what sort of operations an LSG will conduct. The T-31 is the bare minimum level of escort for the LSG. They would be better used as gunboats under friendly air cover really, aimed at dealing with threats that caused the requirements to be made in the first place. I am not a fan of classing then as escorts, gunboats seems more apt.

[RichardIC]

The T31 has always been the Treasury’s Frigate and RN is making the best of a bad hand.

This is just nonsense.

The MoD's relationship with the Treasury, like that of all departments, is a complex one. But this belief that the Treasury tells the MoD which frigates to buy is fake.

Type 31 was a result of MoD facing up to the increasingly obvious fact between SDSR 2010 and SDSR 2015 that 8 ASW and 5 GP Type 26 was never going to be affordable. Operational modelling showed they couldn't manage with fewer than 8 ASW Type 26, so something cheaper was needed to fill the GP role. It was a choice between that or nothing.

That's not a Treasury diktat, it's the MoD, as usual, struggling to manage its own budget.

[Tempest414]

We don't know this as Fact yet however T-31 will get unmanned systems that type 23 has not got

Exactly but the T23 was designed in an era where unmanned systems didn’t exist as they do now. The T23 is being replaced as it has reached the end of its service life. Direct comparisons therefore are problematic but not without value.

For example:

-The T23 could provide NGS, the T31’s will not have this capability unless a pod is designed with something like a VLS spear3.

-The T23’s could destroy an enemy vessel OTH without using the embarked helicopter. The T31 will not have this capability as far as we know.

- The T23’s could find, track and if necessary destroy an enemy submarine if required without using the embarked helicopter. The T31 will not have this capability as far as we know.

- The number of CAMM fitted is unclear but regardless, the T31 will carry a substantially reduced load out compared with the T23. Will the 57mm and 40mm’s make up the difference? I don’t think that’s proven yet unless the threat is drones and/or fast attack craft.

It is not controversial to argue that credible Frigates should be able conduct NGS, attack OTH vessels, track and destroy submarines or have enough SAM’s to repeal an attack from an adversary with a standard load of 8 AShM. At least, it shouldn’t be unless penny pinching is the priority rather than the safety of T31 crews.

It could (as has) been argued that the T31’s increased range and endurance is an enhancement over the T23 along with higher habitation standards and improved availability. This is all true but how important are these attributes when the talking stops and the shooting starts? Are the hard lessons learnt in the Falklands still being applied or is a future conflict so unlikely now that it is just cheaper to focus on availability rather than arming Frigates correctly? It’s clear what the Treasury thinks.

The T31 has always been the Treasury’s Frigate and RN is making the best of a bad hand. If the T31’s eventually replace the forward based OPV’s and the T32’s arrive on time then the strategy is sound. However if the T32 programme is badly delayed or scrapped, the T31’s will have to be rapidly upgraded to fill the gap. At which point the T31(e) programme will have been a complete failure.

1) yes type 23 can give NGFS but Type 31 has a different gun for a different job if the RN really wanted a 127mm it should of mandated it

2 ) yes type 23 had a SSGW but right now no ship in the Navy has this type of weapon so not really Babcocks or T-31's fault they can't fit what we don't have

3 ) Type 23 GP only has a HMS don't get to carried away but yes it will better than T-31 unless the off board systems really work out

4 ) As said we will have to wait and see how many CAMM are fitted but if it gets 24 it will be good

the A-140 is not a bad ship in its self and it could be better for not a lot of money

Bashing type 31 for things that are out of it hands is just shit we can all dream of more type 26s but it is not going to happen

[Repulse]

With the last order for the second batch of T26s still to be agreed anything can happen - for better or worse. If I was in the RN/MoD I would be pushing BAE for 6 for the price of 5 with a guaranteed order for a follow on class of 6-8 ships between 2035 and 2045 worth min £8bn, on the basis it invests in a “destroyer factory”.

Having said that I agree that it’s not the T31’s fault that the requirement set its fulfilling is wrong.

[Caribbean]

gunboats seems more apt

But completely inappropriate, I'm afraid. Gunboats were relatively small, shallow draft craft, carrying large guns (and often torpedos) designed to get close inshore to bombard land targets. Doesn't describe the T31 at all. It's focus seems to be more that of a light air-defence frigate

[Scimitar54]

Small shallow fraught vessels carrying Large Guns were not classed as Gunboats, as you have inferred. Such vessels were in fact called Monitors.

[donald_of_tokyo]

I agree the naming of T31 is not appropriate.
1: "Destroyer" is AAW specialist 1st-tier escort.
2: "Frigate" is ASW specialist 1st-tier escort.
3: "Frigate" is also a "GP frigate", which are historically armed as corvette, with frigate-level larger hull?

The jump between 1 and 2 is almost zero, while that between 2 and 3 is huge.

Shall better call it (Long-range) Corvette or Sloop, to clearly identify its difference to 1 and 2.

[Repulse]

donald_of_tokyo, Sloop, none of this French nonsense

[Jensy]

donald_of_tokyo, Sloop, none of this French nonsense

Not like a strong, proud Anglo-Saxon word such as 'Frigate'... Mon dieu!

Shall better call it (Long-range) Corvette or Sloop, to clearly identify its difference to 1 and 2.

Maybe 'Brig-Sloop', based on their dimensions? Then the Rivers can become sloops...

By all means let’s put a 57mm gun and CAMM on the MRSS so it can self escort in a number of scenarios but let’s not waste money on a low grade escort force.

In terms of best case, my vote is for another T26, upgrade to the 5 T31s, and another 5 B2+ Rivers for the £2bn.

Might swap two of those River B3s for a extra Type 31 but feels like a more balanced '2nd and 3rd tier' fleet. What with quantity having a quality of its own...etc.

Seeing Trent off West Africa with embarked forces shows what these (once) somewhat controversial ships can offer for a fraction of the cost of a 'full fat frigate'. Type 31 will deliver more of the same, more capably armed, at greater range and with embarked aviation.

Seemingly, our '1st tier' fleet's main weakness, which is largely down to the Type 45 being curtailed at six, is for air defence. However with the Type 26's Mk41s set to be rather empty (even with FC/ASW eventually in service) perhaps trying to get a longer range AA suite on at least some future ships could allow more flexibility. This could be an opportunity to prove T83 systems and concept.

If Type 32 could be a Type 26 derivative I'd be tempted to broaden their capabilities, not narrow them.

So, my aspirational escort/OPV fleet by the time Type 83 is in build.

6 x T45
6 x T26
3 x T32 (T26 with Aster 30 or similar)
6 x T31
8 x River B2/3

[JohnM]

On the issue of lack of AAW capability has ESSM/ESSM Blk2 been integrated into Artisan? I think most of the Mk-41 VLS load on T26 will be VL and FC/ASW (especially the land attack version, since there will be a canister based solution for the AShM because of the MN and that could be installed on T26), but under certain scenarios it might be interesting to have quad-packed Albatroz, i.e., CAMM-ER, or ESSM Blk2 in some of those cells... for example, as part of a CBG AAW umbrella it would provide a useful mid-range complement to Aster 30 and regular CAMM...

[JohnM]

I know this is a minority opinion on here, but I love the T31, provided the right FFBNW capabilities are installed... if the CAMM load is at least 24 and a decent EW and countermeasures suite is installed, all that's needed is to integrate whatever the I-SSGW ends up being in the Tacticos CMS and you have the perfect patrol frigate for presence and low intensity operations as is, especially when you consider the range of USVs and UUVs that are being developed and the PODS concept that the RN is betting heavily on... if things heat up, all it needs to do is pull into a friendly port, load 8xSSMs and an ISO container (of which it can take 6) with a CAPTAS 1 sonar in 24 h and you have a perfect Tier 2 (the former C2 concept) frigate that can do commercial shipping escort and choke point patrol and clearance (they will already be ideally pre-positioned to do it in Gib, the Suez, Hormuz and the Malaca Straits), releasing the T45s, T26s and, eventually, the T32s to high-end operations... and you have all this for a total investment of 2 billion and change... what's not to like? Just because it’s not an all-singjng-and-dancing Star Destroyer from the get-go, doesn’t mean it’s no good…

[ArmChairCivvy]

postby Poiuytrewq » 26 Oct 2021, 14:29



It is not controversial to argue that credible Frigates should be able conduct NGS, attack OTH vessels, track and destroy submarines or have enough SAM’s to repeal an attack from an adversary with a standard load of 8 AShM.

Quite as that is what makes a frigate; corvettes may have all that but are often more specialised as oiperating close to 'home' helps with numbers/ availability on the 'scene'.
- but then we come to the fact that the RN is not just blue-water, but also globally deployable

It could (and has) been argued that the T31’s increased range and endurance is an enhancement over the T23 along with higher habitation standards and improved availability. This is all true but how important are these attributes when the talking stops and the shooting starts? Are the hard lessons learnt in the Falklands still being applied or is a future conflict so unlikely now that it is just cheaper to focus on availability

- as the @Richard comment quoted further down shows the above operational imperative had to go hand in hand with the budget constraint. Whether the latter emerged as a result of long neglect or as a consequence of the RN 'paying for its carriers' with the numbers of the surface fleet (total displacement went up ) is a wider point than what will fit under the thread's heading

the main principle of the LRG would be to provide a low key forward based task group, capable of getting involved in low threat maritime environments projecting SF type formations on to the land or Littoral zones. The whole point is that there doesn’t need to be a show of force as such - you want it below the radar

Quite.

Anything above that should be with a RN CBG, or as you say an allied task group.

With the budget/ fleet numbers we can't have the in-between thing, like we used to have the FE Cruiser Sqdrn, to be backed up by battleships from closer to home

I thought we were looking at a multirole ship with almost the capacity of a Bay with aviation facilities for three or at most four helicopters, and a well deck. It would have accommodation for at most a Coy of Royal Marines or equivalents.

Yes, and the early renders tried to put this onto one vessel. As the T32 spec emerges, it might become more like as the Austal LAW concept cum a T32?
- we'll hear about the experimentation that is running, in due course

I am not a fan of classing then as escorts, gunboats seems more apt.

A patrol frigate does not escort anything, as a main rule

5 GP Type 26 was never going to be affordable. Operational modelling showed they couldn't manage with fewer than 8 ASW Type 26, so something cheaper was needed to fill the GP role. It was a choice between that or nothing.

Yep

[ArmChairCivvy]

I know this is a minority opinion on here, but I love the T31, provided the right FFBNW capabilities are installed... if the CAMM load is at least 24 and a decent EW and countermeasures suite is installed, all that's needed is to integrate whatever the I-SSGW ends up being in the Tacticos CMS and you have the perfect patrol frigate for presence and low intensity operations

The minority opinion can still be right .

The USCG blue-water (global) patrol cutter derivative did not make it in the frigate context, but even the base model has a full EW suite (not cheap) and is upgradeable much in the way you suggest (and the render for the frigate competition did suggest).

[ArmChairCivvy]

In terms of cost curve yes I agree it should in a perfect world come down 20% or so. But we have a specific problem here which is politics

... which is not new as since the Falklands newbuild numbers have been constantly capped, or when that has been found to have been a mistake, batched. Losing both economies of scale plus some of the learning curve effect; hence 'cost curve' nicely captures these both - without trying to prioritise ex ante.

It is a pity that I didn't bookmark a conference speech by (ex?) Head of BAE shipbuilding in which he showed (with plots) that the only real case for the cost curve benefit had been the T23s... and he should know, having presided over the costings and all the subsequent twisting&turning, to try to bring the total and/or unit production cost down.

It's not me, its NAO and HMG who do not include that cost.

It's clear 'why' that is the case for the HMG... but the watchdog not 'finding them out' is shameful .

[Tempest414]

I agree the naming of T31 is not appropriate.
1: "Destroyer" is AAW specialist 1st-tier escort.
2: "Frigate" is ASW specialist 1st-tier escort.
3: "Frigate" is also a "GP frigate", which are historically armed as corvette, with frigate-level larger hull?

The jump between 1 and 2 is almost zero, while that between 2 and 3 is huge.

Shall better call it (Long-range) Corvette or Sloop, to clearly identify its difference to 1 and 2.

Once again any and always to put Type 31 down and the shit keeps coming

Type 31 is a perfectly good global patrol frigate . And the fact is that type 26 with its size and armament and systems should be classed a ASW destroyer and then this would be put to bed as a WW2 frigate was a class of ship that sat between a corvette and destroyer which type 31 dose

[Repulse]

With the budget/ fleet numbers we can't have the in-between thing, like we used to have the FE Cruiser Sqdrn, to be backed up by battleships from closer to home

Exactly right, nor without an empire is there a requirement.

I know this is a minority opinion on here, but I love the T31, provided the right FFBNW capabilities are installed... if the CAMM load is at least 24 and a decent EW and countermeasures suite is installed, all that's needed is to integrate whatever the I-SSGW ends up being in the Tacticos CMS and you have the perfect patrol frigate for presence and low intensity operations

The minority opinion can still be right .

The USCG blue-water (global) patrol cutter derivative did not make it in the frigate context, but even the base model has a full EW suite (not cheap) and is upgradeable much in the way you suggest (and the render for the frigate competition did suggest).

Agree on minority views can be right - we seem to keen sometimes to close down discussion - fact is no-one knows all the right answers.

However, on this one, the T31 in general is that it will not be cheap. It will have twice the crew, the more complex it is the more complex it is to forward base, and all these FFBNW modules will need to be purchased, maintained and crewed (and this increases as our expectation of availability of these FFBNW modules increases). My guess, even without the FFBNW module dream they will be four times the cost to operate as a B2.

Given people are willing to pay this cost ahead of other capabilities -what is the strategic requirement these Patrol Frigates will be fulfilling? And what specifically in addition to a B2 Patrol Sloop (and where required a B2 / RFA combination)?

I honestly do not understand it.