Future RN Amphibious Shipping

[rec]

But one paid for paid for by the overseas aid budget would be used for that purpose disaster relief,

[ArmChairCivvy]

Then eventuall replace the Bays with similar

Similar enough? http://marineschepen.nl/schepen/images/ ... S-JWIT.jpg
- now, it comes to mind that we have borrowed designs from thereabouts before

Good wording, SB, as I use the KD metrics to benchmark what is possible/ how many units of what kind would be needed

[ArmChairCivvy]

one paid for paid for by the overseas aid budget would be used for that purpose disaster relief,

The mechanism should be something akin to what is happening with fisheries protection/the Rivers
- lease (not buy; of course we reversed that for, as yet, unknown reasons)
- provide crew (something that we are not short of? Cruises to the Caribbean might qickly change that)
- charge both the operating costs and what needs to be carried/ stored to the responsible Ministry (what's their name this week?)
- brown stuff hits the fan and you STUFT it! Dump the cargo, and refill...

[shark bait]

But one paid for paid for by the overseas aid budget would be used for that purpose disaster relief,

That may be the case, but if it has the prefix RFA or HMS its not going to happen. If there is an intention to use it in amphibious ops, or as a PCRS its not going to happen. One of the headline rules for that budget is no military equipment for us, or the countries we're supporting.

The aid budget is always used to cover the MOD's operational costs when deployed on a HADR mission, but will never directly pay for equipment.

[ArmChairCivvy]

That may be the case, but if it has the prefix RFA or HMS its not going to happen. If there is an intention to use it in amphibious ops, or as a PCRS its not going to happen. One of the headline rules for that budget is

One bn was pledged separately for 2015-16, just to get around that mentality/ way of operating:

"Interesting because the NSC will now set priorties for the fund rather than the three departments did for the conflict pool (you can read their latest guidance here). Will the Home Office and Intelligence Agencies now have seats at the table – with the MoD, FCO and DFID. And what does this mean for DFID in particular? Other GD folk are much better informed on whats happening at 22 Whitehall but I can’t help feeling that DFID is increasingly part of the national security debate – even if some insiders would rather remain at arms length. This can only be a good thing. There are clear benefits to both the UK and priority countries to have access to DFID’s skills, expertise, and presence in countering terrorism and violent extremism as well as tackling organised crime. The security and development nexus has always been a sore point and the cause of plenty of arguments between sides"

Particularly about the way of working (not priorities, ie. what the funds will be directed at - thet's now the NSC - a little guidance snippet:

"A
mix of ODA and non
-
ODA resources
:
th
e Conflict Pool
can support activities that fall
outside O
fficial
D
evelopment
A
ssistance
-
compliant resources.
Non
-
ODA resources are
especially valuable in security related work
. This can
allow the Pool to provide niche support
to
facilitate or support
wider ODA
-
funded programmes. Retention of a significant non
-
ODA
funding
element is
essential to maintain
ing
the value and identity of t
he Pool.
P
olitical
ly
sensitiv
e work
:
Conflict and
in
stability dynamics are highly political. The Pool
, with
the engagement of diplomatic and defence staff in
-
country,
can work in areas that may be
too
sensitive for
development funding.
Results should be j
udged both in terms of specific
results and wider influence gained and future opportunities
enabled
. While the Pool meets its
wider obligations on transparency it retains scope, if justified, to avoid public disclosure of the
details of projects.
Risk
:
I
n line with
international practice
in fragile and conflict affected states
we
recognise we
can exert limited control over risks in the Po
ol’s operating context. This means we need to
balance high levels of programmatic risks
–
a greater chance that we fail to achieve our
objectives
–
and high levels of institutional risks
–
e.g.
fiduciary, reputational or political. The
Pool seeks to mana
ge
,
rather than avoid
,
risk"

A pdf from the HMG... not browser/ web complient to the Nth degree, sorry.

[marktigger]

Yes its is bollocks, the carriers should be well over the horizon from the landing.

It sounds like leadership intends to use the carriers to insert marines over the horizon, which I assume will need supplying once landed because they cant fly much equipment with them. The SSS is intended to help sustain an amphibious operation, which to me means supporting a force after the initial landing is completed by the Albion and aircraft.

And that puts them to far away to effectively land the force or to be used as the Amphibious HQ for the brigade till it establishes ashore

again showing the whole idea as Bollocks

[marktigger]

what happens if something goes wrong with a helicopter landing on? It ends up in the superstructure!

Same thing that happens on any other platform.

nope they go over the stern or over the side.......they go backwards in that configuration they go into the superstructure. Also it makes the pilots task harder knowing there is superstructure outside their field of vision because its aft of them as they take off and land

[shark bait]

One bn was pledged separately for 2015-16, just to get around that mentality/ way of operating:

So the foreign office is going to be buying the MOD equipment now?

That 1bn is the Conflict, Stability and Security Fund, which aims to stabilize unsuccessful regions through training, and will supply equipment. Again they will pay the operational cost of MOD's peacekeeping deployments, but I don't think they've every directly purchased the MOD equipment.

again showing the whole idea as Bollocks

The US marines disagree with you. Why can't marines be landed from over the horizon?

[marktigger]

One bn was pledged separately for 2015-16, just to get around that mentality/ way of operating:

So the foreign office is going to be buying the MOD equipment now?

That 1bn is the Conflict, Stability and Security Fund, which aims to stabilize unsuccessful regions through training, and will supply equipment. Again they will pay the operational cost of MOD's peacekeeping deployments, but I don't think they've every directly purchased the MOD equipment.

again showing the whole idea as Bollocks

The US marines disagree with you. Why can't marines be landed from over the horizon?

Not from a CVF and they have allot more resources in terms of fast seaborne lift and larger helicopter lift capabilities the the FAA & RAF combined. thats before you add in the CBG support!

[shark bait]

We have a lot of Chinooks which are clearly expected to operate from the carriers, and we can rule out longer ranged vertical lift assets during the life time of the carriers. There is no reason why they couldn't be used for an initial OTH assault.

Clearly the carriers cannot sustain a amphibious effort, but they will be key for air support and providing the initial OTH lift before surface platforms can get in close enough and begin to deliver the volume.

[ArmChairCivvy]

aims to stabilize unsuccessful regions through training, and will supply equipment.

That's it; I did try to steer the discussion away from *buying* a vessel.

If the Fast Reaction Facility (£20m allocated within the overall Fund) is used, how do you think the *equipment* will get there? May be through some inter-agency co-operation, and the vessel/ plane might wel be painted gray.

[marktigger]

aims to stabilize unsuccessful regions through training, and will supply equipment.

That's it; I did try to steer the discussion away from *buying* a vessel.

If the Fast Reaction Facility (£20m allocated within the overall Fund) is used, how do you think the *equipment* will get there? May be through some inter-agency co-operation, and the vessel/ plane might wel be painted gray.

ehm are you Quoting the right person have noticed a number of things being atributed to me that aren't!

[ArmChairCivvy]

We have a lot of Chinooks which are clearly expected to operate from the carriers

That's one of the few things we have plenty of, thanks to A-stan.

They can only be hangared (and maintained) on the CVF(s), but then again we have quite a number of Chinook-capable spots on other vessels.
- I think (not sure of my memory recall) that the Bays were tested for having two on their rather large open decks
- therefore, on the doctrinal side CEPP and LitM have quite a bit of overlap

[ArmChairCivvy]

shark bait wrote:

ArmChairCivvy wrote:
One bn was pledged separately for 2015-16, just to get around that mentality/ way of operating:


So the foreign office is going to be buying the MOD equipment now?

That 1bn is the Conflict, Stability and Security Fund, which aims to stabilize unsuccessful regions through training, and will supply equipment. Again they will pay the operational cost of MOD's peacekeeping deployments, but I don't think they've every directly purchased the MOD equipment.

marktigger wrote:
again showing the whole idea as Bollocks


The US marines disagree with you. Why can't marines be landed from over the horizon?

Sorry about that, obviously quoting from within nested quotes is a Black Art (to be more careful with) because logically SB was the next level up (owning the quote) but the engine seems to climb the tree "higher".

[marktigger]

We have a lot of Chinooks which are clearly expected to operate from the carriers

That's one of the few things we have plenty of, thanks to A-stan.

They can only be hangared (and maintained) on the CVF(s), but then again we have quite a number of Chinook-capable spots on other vessels.
- I think (not sure of my memory recall) that the Bays were tested for having two on their rather large open decks
- therefore, on the doctrinal side CEPP and LitM have quite a bit of overlap

How many chinooks can the CVF carry because the chinool doesn't have a foldable rotorhead/blade system

[ArmChairCivvy]

because the chinool doesn't have a foldable rotorhead/blade system

It does. So the number is not restricted by that.

The problem is that there is no power-assisted folding:
- slows down the movement between deck and hangar a lot
- might not even be a safe thing to do manually, in high winds

The CVF design affors wonderful flexibility between alternating (and even partly simultaneous; meaning the dedicated recovery spot for F35s hovering in from the side) helo and fixed-wing air ops... and then we shoot ourselves in the foot by not funding this niche capability (at the technical level)!

[GibMariner]

Continuing from the T31 thread & what Shark Bait and ArmChairCivvy are saying about the SSS ending up like a Karel Doorman jack of all trades and master of none (at least the refuelling aspect shouldn't be necessary on ours, so reducing the demands on crew, vessel & machinery and giving more space for stores/troops/vehicles etc).

There is some historical precedent in using stores ships in amphibious roles - the Ness-class, as a sort of predecessor to the MARS SSS (or FSS, I forget which acronyms are current). RFA Tarbatness was planned to be converted to an auxiliary landing platform - able to ferry a full RM Commando, including vehicles and weapons, an amphibious command & control centre, a medium hangar and up to 6 LCVPs IIRC. That plan never materialised and she was instead sold to the US, were she served as USNS Spica until 2008.

RFA Stromness did operate in an amphibious capacity in the Falklands, where she landed around 400 marines of 45 Commando at San Carlos.

Of course, in the case of Tarbatness, it was more about making use of an existing and capable vessel which had lost its primary role with the withdrawal of Ark Royal and concentration in the NATO area rather than a purpose-built design.

[marktigger]

lynness was the avation stores ship

[GibMariner]

Just posted this in the US thread, but has some relevance to what is being discussed here: https://news.usni.org/2016/08/17/21198_ ... ss_america

ABOARD USS AMERICA — The new amphibious assault ship USS America (LHA-6) has raised more than a few questions in its short life, with sailors and Marines alike wondering what it will mean to have an amphibious ship without a well deck and therefore without the ability to deploy landing craft to move heavy tanks and equipment ashore.

America’s recent participation in the Rim of the Pacific 2016 international exercise may have allayed some concerns – the resounding feedback from those involved in the ship’s operations is that, if the Marines are willing to tweak the composition of the deploying Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), America can move them faster, more agilely and more safely.

“The idea is rapid mobility air assault. So the thinking with me and my Marines right now is, lighter companies, people that can move quickly via the (MV-22) Osprey and the (CH-53Es),” ship commanding officer Capt. Michael Baze told USNI News from his shipboard office last month.

The plus side to that concept is increased speed and safety for both the Marines and the ship’s crew, he said.

“I’m not looking to build a mountain of supply on the beach like the D-Day invasion, I’m looking to go straight to my objective from a great distance,” Baze explained.
“In terms of operations of the ship, I don’t have to worry about force protection for my ship as much because I don’t have to get two and three miles off the beach to deploy my Marines (on surface connectors). The truth is, I’m over 100 miles right now, we could deploy the Marines from here, I don’t have to get any closer. So in a world with mines on the shore, surface-to-surface missiles, these types of threats are always a concern, these are things that I think about. So it’s about mobility, speed, and when you look at operational maneuver from the sea and some of these concepts the Marines talk about, this ship really exemplifies it.”

[GibMariner]

lynness was the avation stores ship

Yes, she was, and she was the first out of service after the last of the carriers was gone. The other two were configured to carry all sorts of stores to support the carrier group(s).

[marktigger]

Continuing from the T31 thread & what Shark Bait and ArmChairCivvy are saying about the SSS ending up like a Karel Doorman jack of all trades and master of none (at least the refuelling aspect shouldn't be necessary on ours, so reducing the demands on crew, vessel & machinery and giving more space for stores/troops/vehicles etc).

There is some historical precedent in using stores ships in amphibious roles - the Ness-class, as a sort of predecessor to the MARS SSS (or FSS, I forget which acronyms are current). RFA Tarbatness was planned to be converted to an auxiliary landing platform - able to ferry a full RM Commando, including vehicles and weapons, an amphibious command & control centre, a medium hangar and up to 6 LCVPs IIRC. That plan never materialised and she was instead sold to the US, were she served as USNS Spica until 2008.

RFA Stromness did operate in an amphibious capacity in the Falklands, where she landed around 400 marines of 45 Commando at San Carlos.

Of course, in the case of Tarbatness, it was more about making use of an existing and capable vessel which had lost its primary role with the withdrawal of Ark Royal and concentration in the NATO area rather than a purpose-built design.

yes but it took the americans to invest in these ships adding flight decks and hangers something we should have done but didn't

[marktigger]

Just posted this in the US thread, but has some relevance to what is being discussed here: https://news.usni.org/2016/08/17/21198_ ... ss_america

ABOARD USS AMERICA — The new amphibious assault ship USS America (LHA-6) has raised more than a few questions in its short life, with sailors and Marines alike wondering what it will mean to have an amphibious ship without a well deck and therefore without the ability to deploy landing craft to move heavy tanks and equipment ashore.

America’s recent participation in the Rim of the Pacific 2016 international exercise may have allayed some concerns – the resounding feedback from those involved in the ship’s operations is that, if the Marines are willing to tweak the composition of the deploying Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), America can move them faster, more agilely and more safely.

“The idea is rapid mobility air assault. So the thinking with me and my Marines right now is, lighter companies, people that can move quickly via the (MV-22) Osprey and the (CH-53Es),” ship commanding officer Capt. Michael Baze told USNI News from his shipboard office last month.

The plus side to that concept is increased speed and safety for both the Marines and the ship’s crew, he said.

“I’m not looking to build a mountain of supply on the beach like the D-Day invasion, I’m looking to go straight to my objective from a great distance,” Baze explained.
“In terms of operations of the ship, I don’t have to worry about force protection for my ship as much because
I don’t have to get two and three miles off the beach to deploy my Marines (on surface connectors). The truth is, I’m over 100 miles right now, we could deploy the Marines from here, I don’t have to get any closer. So in a world with mines on the shore, surface-to-surface missiles, these types of threats are always a concern, these are things that I think about. So it’s about mobility, speed, and when you look at operational maneuver from the sea and some of these concepts the Marines talk about, this ship really exemplifies it.”

Great if the mission is a raid what about a more sustained type operation?

in 82 in the falklands there was something like 72 transport helicopters deployed yet the majority of troops moved to stanley on personnel carrier leather

[GibMariner]

yes but it took the americans to invest in these ships adding flight decks and hangers something we should have done but didn't

They had flight decks in RFA service, but yes, the Americans added large hangars.

[ArmChairCivvy]

resounding feedback from those involved in the ship’s operations is that, if the Marines are willing to tweak the composition of the deploying Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), America can move them faster, more agilely and more safely.

A no brainer: some Marine units are special ops capable, so they are unlikely to go in with heavy kit.

[ArmChairCivvy]

what about a more sustained type operation?

Then you throw in a few San Antonios and a few MLPs, as in:

"The Navy’s first Mobile Landing Platform, or MLP 1, recently completed contract trials and is slated for final delivery in March of next year. The MLP is a massive 80,000-ton, 785 foot-long commercial Alaska-class crude oil carrier configured to perform a range of military missions such as amphibious cargo on-load/off-load and logistics support.

The ship is engineered to ballast down and lower into the water. This allows three Landing Craft Air Cushion, or LCACs, lanes for amphibious loading and unloading as well as equipment transport. The MLP has as much as 25,000 square feet of vehicle and equipment storage space on deck, Walsh explained.

MLP 1, called the USNS Montford Point, was put under contract for construction by the Navy in April 2011, resulting in a deal to General Dynamics owned National Steel and Shipbuilding Company, or NASSCO, in San Diego, Calif. MLP 1 is slated to cost $500 million, Navy officials said.

MLP 2, the USNS John Glenn, is now 96-percent complete and slated for delivery in March 2014. MLP 2, expected to cost $440 million, was also put on contract with NASSCO in April, 2011.

The MLPs can also connect to large cargo ships while at sea using a drivable ramp, allowing equipment to move from a cargo ship to the MLP for transport to shore. Walsh explained that MLPs are designed to augment amphibious assault ships and help move large conventional forces from ship to shore – in the event they are needed.

The MLPs are designed to assist forward-positioned equipment and cargo ships called Maritime Prepositioning Ship Squadrons.

“Now you can get stuff off the cargo ship and get the cargo onto the MLP. The LCACs can come onto the MLP and get the gear to shore. This gives you an amphibious landing capability,” said Walsh."

http://www.dodbuzz.com/2013/12/10/navy- ... ing-ships/