UK Defence Forum

Tempest414-san

Thanks.

First of all, I think we shall handle 7B GBP shortage of money within 10 years, on which they say many are within 4 years. It is only 3-4% of the total equipment budget, but even if distributed flat, it is 700M GBP per year.

Secondly, I agree it will be better to increase defense from 2% GDP to 2.5%, which is 25% increase. Among them, 4% will be used for the "7B GBP" and money to solve man-power issue (4% in both man-power and equipments budget). So, nearly 20% increase can happen. But this issue must be discussed in "Mid-term review for the Strategic review?" or "fantasy" thread, not here.

Even so, I just think RN shall simply increase T26 for hi-end escort, P-8A for ASW, OPV for patrol, and simple MHC for MCM and Hydrographic works. I think by this way MHC program can maximize its figure of merit, although this is my personal impression. Simple is beautiful.

Tempest414 wrote: with 12 to 14 MHPC ships built in the first 15 years of this plan.

MHPC (rumoured) budget was, when the prgrm kicked off £ 1.4 bn. We can't take away the 'silly' money paid for the "P" part, but whatever the R&D and experimentation has cost - yes, certainly.

The two "E's" are not that old so count them twrds the 14. A dozen, over 15 years. Add mission kits to the hulls... anybody's guess what it would cost. 1SL will undoubtedly pick up the bill for 'survey' to keep the subs on even keel; what else? Not just MCM, but littoral ASW as well? One hull or two might be needed for beach recce and clearing party support. If we have "Bay-sized motherships, too, for delivering and supporting mission modules, that cuts down the money needed for the hulls and moves it to mission kits
- what an ideal retirement job for the Bays... now, what will replace them?
- ohh, and I forgot: TD had planned a complete port opening team, with supporting heavy kit, delivered by one Bay. Two left !

donald_of_tokyo wrote:First of all, I think we shall handle 7B GBP shortage of money within 10 years, on which they say many are within 4 years. It is only 3-4% of the total equipment budget, but even if distributed flat, it is 700M GBP per year.

this 7 billion pound black hole must now be 6 billion pound black hole due to the extra 1 billion form the last budget . Remember this figure comes from the Audit office it may well be that Hammond intends to see how thing go and and pay a extra billion from time to time as needed to cover the hole as it becomes clear.

Perhaps given defences history of financial incompetence we should be preparing worst case rather than best case

From NAO

“The Department’s Equipment Plan remains unaffordable, with forecast costs exceeding budgets by £7.0 billion over the next 10 years. This variance could increase or decrease depending on different circumstances, with the Department estimating a worst-case scenario of costs increasing by £14.8 billion should all the identified risks materialise. However, some of its analysis remains optimistic and costs could increase further. The Department is improving its understanding of affordability risks, but we are not yet fully confident in the robustness of some of its underlying assumptions, particularly around efficiencies.”

Those two add up, and from memory they make appr. 10% more than in the previous report
- the underlying budget/plan has gone up in volume, too

donald_of_tokyo wrote:I think we must omit "high speed" requirement, which will significantly degrade the effectiveness as MHC ship, by requiring more slender hull. I think, 18 knot is max. Even 16 knots is doable.

I see little need for a high speed platform, especially if the vessels are forward based, reducing the need to rush to the scene. In this instance space is more important than speed.

The polar ship is designed to 18 knots on a very fat hull, so I expect that level is totally feasible for a smaller ship. At that speed its still useful across the patrol and security roles if equipped with some form of aircraft and fast boats, let those do the hard work and keep the hull simple.

shark bait wrote:

donald_of_tokyo wrote:I think we must omit "high speed" requirement, which will significantly degrade the effectiveness as MHC ship, by requiring more slender hull. I think, 18 knot is max. Even 16 knots is doable.

I see little need for a high speed platform, especially if the vessels are forward based, reducing the need to rush to the scene. In this instance space is more important than speed.

The polar ship is designed to 18 knots on a very fat hull, so I expect that level is totally feasible for a smaller ship. At that speed its still useful across the patrol and security roles if equipped with some form of aircraft and fast boats, let those do the hard work and keep the hull simple.

The new MHC ships will need to be capable of deployment as part of an amphibious group. This means a maximum speed of 18 knots and a range of 8,000 nautical miles at about 15 knots.

Aethulwulf wrote:The new MHC ships will need to be capable of deployment as part of an amphibious group

Why do they?

shark bait wrote:

Aethulwulf wrote:The new MHC ships will need to be capable of deployment as part of an amphibious group

Why do they?

To clear mines, or conduct survey, prior to an amphibious assault.

Aethulwulf wrote:To clear mines, or conduct survey, prior to an amphibious assault.

When has that ever happened? and more importantly, why would the enemy give the RN time to clear the mines they put there to deny the RN?

It doesn't happen like that. Look at Iraq, the assault comes first, then the mine clearance comes in to open the ports for reinforcements.

The whole point of these new systems is they can be flown out and operated from anywhere, so there is little requirement for a mine hunter to keep up with a task group.

donald_of_tokyo wrote:I think we must omit "high speed" requirement

I'm also going to add a silent propulsion mode would be more important than high speed. A sonar module, similar to the US SURTASS, could come in handy for local patrols, keeping the T26 focused on the carrier group.

In Iraq, the use of mines deterred a surface amphibious assault and the operation just used helicopters. Luckily, there was a land route available for all the heavy equipment.

In the future that may not be the case.

The enemy is always going to use mines to try to deter the use of an area or route; on land or sea. Clearing that route of mines prior to an assault is always going to hard and bloody.

However, prior to such an assault there will probably be what the military like to call shaping operations (e.g. bombing the hell out of the enemy). These will 'shape the environment', i.e. significant degrade the enemies abilities to prevent you from removing the mines. Still, will not be easy.

That sounds unreasonable, clearing a landing site is not a quick job, and furthermore it tells the enemy exactly where the landing is planned a week in advance.

Well, in addition to your 'shaping operations' preventing the enemy from seeing what you are up to, you can also conduct some distraction or deception ops.

And you only clear what you need, just before you need it; initially a few clear 'lanes' for the first wave which then broaden out over time.

Still hard and bloody. There are also different levels of 'clear' - clear enough for the first wave of an amphibious assault while tolerating a degree of risk is not the same as clear to allow the use of port by civilian ships.

Just buy bigger Hovercraft

shark bait wrote: clearing a landing site is not a quick job

Was going to say that the above is different from 'breaching' which is more like the below

Aethulwulf wrote: initially a few clear 'lanes' for the first wave

Lord Jim wrote:Just buy bigger Hovercraft

'Deep skirt' hovercraft that are more immune to mines are few and far in-between.
- USN invested in the technology so as to not to be totally dependent on helicopters in dealing with sea mines planted close to the beach
- how well it works when there is NO layer of water in between... don't know

Aethulwulf wrote:Well, in addition to your 'shaping operations' preventing the enemy from seeing what you are up to, you can also conduct some distraction or deception ops.

And you only clear what you need, just before you need it; initially a few clear 'lanes' for the first wave which then broaden out over time.

Still hard and bloody. There are also different levels of 'clear' - clear enough for the first wave of an amphibious assault while tolerating a degree of risk is not the same as clear to allow the use of port by civilian ships.

Theoretically, it is as you said. But, realistically, there is no example the amphibious landing force did mine hunting before landing in recent years, I guess?

I think "mine survey" (not hunting) using REMUS side-scan sonar UUVs will be done. By sending many dummy REMUS UUVs, the enemy will be in chaos to identify where will be the landing. This is easy, because REMUS UUVs are very cheap and can be deployed from even a small boat.

shark bait wrote:When has that ever happened?

The Falklands. We sent 4 converted trawlers loaded with a bolt on minesweeping kit.

Prior to the San Carlos Landings?

Caribbean wrote:The Falklands. We sent 4 converted trawlers loaded with a bolt on minesweeping kit.

I think they arrived after the landings went in though. They were used to clear the waters around Stanley afterwards. Wasn't the minesweeping kit quite specialised as well (for rumoured Soviet Deepwater mines)

shark bait wrote:Prior to the San Carlos Landings?

That was a Type 21 sailing through Falkland Sound on a mission to see if it went bang...

Poiuytrewq wrote:
The speed requirement is up for debate, I would like to see 21knts but the crucial part is the hanger.

A Venari 95 with a 57mm/76mm, Phalanx and embarked Wildcat would be a very very useful platform in the maritime security role. The ability to embark CB90's, LCVP's and LCAC's is just the icing on the cake.

Donald-of-Tokyo wrote:
MHC is primarily a mine counter measure asset. It must be evaluated as such. Patrol is primarily T31 and River B2s role. For example, I am not sure BOTH ciws and 57/76mm are needed. Either might be better, in view of less crew and more deployment. May be, FFBNW CIWS?

Poiuytrewq wrote:
Apologies Donald, my fault for not being clear (again). The CIWS should be FFBNW along with the Wildcat. Some would argue that for a lot of patrol tasks even the 57mm/76mm is unnecessary but I believe a 57mm/76mm and 2x 30mm's is a basic requirement for patrolling outside the EEZ. The Phalanx and Wildcat can be added if necessary.

My comment above was based on a Black Sea deployment in the current climate. A Venari 95 with a 57mm/76mm, 2x 30mm's, Phalanx and a Wildcat would be a decent platform to send into such a situation. Sending a pair of Venari 95's with maybe a single Wildcat between them would be even better, especially if one was in a Combat MCMV configuration with 12 CAMM and Artisan.

We have to be realistic, these sort of standoff confrontations are going to become more and more common until one side backs down, and there is little sign of that. The days of trotting the globe with a 20mm or 30mm are coming to an end and RN/MOD/HMG need to realise that before a vessel gets into a situation it can't handle.

The Venari will never be an offensive asset but it should have the ability to upgrade its defensive capabilities if required. The Combat MCMV configuration is just an even more capable defensive package that can operate in conflict zones without additional escorts. Some argue that it isn't necessary because a T23/T26/T31 will always be on hand to escort the MCMV's. In that case what is going to escort Echo in the Black Sea? The answer is probably nothing hence the need for the new class of MHC vessels to be able to quickly upgrade their defensive cability if required.

I have moved over here as this is a better thread for this

I think the current climate in the Black sea is an eye opener for HMG/MOD and as said above if we had a ship like Venari 95/100 fitted with

Scanter 4100 radar
hull mounted sonar
wildcat capable hangar
1 x 57mm -2 x 30mm- and was FFBNW Phalanx or Sea-Ram
Plus off board systems that could include MCM , Hyrographic , Littoral ASW , 2 to 3 CB-90s

it could be very useful the ability to be able to scale up from a standard fit of 1 x 57mm & 2 30mm to adding a Sea-Ram unit when faced with a deployment into the Black Sea

Tempest414 wrote:I think the current climate in the Black sea is an eye opener for HMG/MOD

Agreed, what assets do you send to a potential flash point such as this? What is the right balance between a reasonable response and an over reaction which could result in an escalation?

Is a pair of MHC vessels properly configured with 57mm/76mm, Phalanx, CB90's and Wildcat(s) actually the perfect response? Are Frigates or Destroyers actually a provocation at this point? That's up for debate and events can change rapidly but getting the balance right is important.

Personally I think this Black Sea situation highlights the adaptability of Venari type vessels as opposed to a Leander or Arrowhead T31.

One thing that hasn't been mentioned is how much use RN SSK's would be if working with the Venari's and NATO P8's or in the same situation? The same multi asset Littoral ASW force could be just as useful in the Med.

https://warontherocks.com/2018/07/is-a- ... s-it-here/

http://www.navyrecognition.com/index.ph ... rills.html

Tempest414 wrote:Venari 95/100 fitted with,
Scanter 4100 radar
hull mounted sonar
wildcat capable hangar
1 x 57mm -2 x 30mm- and was FFBNW Phalanx or Sea-Ram
Plus off board systems that could include MCM , Hyrographic , Littoral ASW , 2 to 3 CB-90s

Its worth remembering that a Venari 95 is really a 98m vessel and with a more aggressive bow angle it comes in around 103m. A very useful size with a lot of inherent stability to deploy offboard systems due to the beam of around 16m.

I think your spec is bang on.

Tempest414 wrote:it could be very useful the ability to be able to scale up from a standard fit of 1 x 57mm & 2 30mm to adding a Sea-Ram unit when faced with a deployment into the Black Sea

The SeaRam debate will rumble on I would be happy with Phalanx FFBNW but I think your logic is sound. The main problem is the overlap with CAMM.

Going in, to the Black Sea is definitely not a freedom of navigation exercise.

Azov Sea is bounded by territorial waters of the two sates, and now by Russia on both sides of the entry to it. A lake.

The situation that has been created is an embargo in anything but name. And the bridge is so low that a 'proper' warship would not even clear it (nor do many of the commercial shipping that used to visit the Ukrainian ports on the other side).

The only way to deal with the situation is to add it to the wider narrative. The frozen situation is costing Putin a mint, without giving him anything (the domestic propaganda effect has worn off)
- now he is trying to make it cost Ukraine even more

Poiuytrewq wrote:The SeaRam debate will rumble on I would be happy with Phalanx FFBNW but I think your logic is sound. The main problem is the overlap with CAMM.

The only reason I keep coming back to Sea-Ram is that if you have a mount for Phalanx you also have a mount for Sea-Ram and the ability to pull into port with just a 57mm and 2 30mm and 24 hours latter sail out with a AAW missile system without the need to integrate CAMM into the ships CMS add to this that SeaRam can be reloaded at sea by the crew means that the ship could carry 11 missiles ready and 11 more in the magazine. I understand that CAMM is a better system but for me when it comes to MHPC the ability to bolt on and take off Sea-Ram as needed is key so if you had 12 to 14 ships of the class I would have units 6 units these could also be fitted to the Albion class and RFA ships if needed

Tempest414 wrote:MHC is primarily a mine counter measure asset. It must be evaluated as such. Patrol is primarily T31 and River B2s role.

That would be a missed opportunity, it should be considered a multi-role maritime security vessel, that will be just as happy clearing mine as it is chasing pirates. Long term it would be nice to sell off the Rivers and consolidate around a common platform.