desertswo wrote:Not trying to be a prick or anything but you are sort of lecturing the professor here. 21 years ago as a Commander and Director of Engineering and Damage Control Training at Surface Warfare Officers School Command, Newport, RI, I was the officer in charge of ALL the surface ship and aviation damage control and firefighting in the entire USN. Every DC and FFG course from Yokosuka, JA to Mayport, FL answered to me.
Ten years before that, as an instructor at Surface Warfare Officers School Command Detachment, Coronado, CA, in the rank of Lieutenant, I was tasked with training a cadre of RN junior officers and senior ratings, Falklands participants all, in USN damage control and firefighting systems and techniques. This "train the trainers" program gave them how we went about business and the Admiralty then used part, all, or none of what we passed on.
We on the other hand took copious notes on what they had learned (or not). Of great interest to us was their insistence to a man that a modern destroyer type ship could not survive the detonation of a 500 pound bomb below decks. We told them, very nicely given what they had recently been through, that they were full of shit. And they were. We don't "give up the ship" . . .ever. Stark, Samuel B. Roberts, and " Cole are all testaments to the average USN blue jacket's commitment to that ethos and the quality of our DC/FF training and equipment.
Aluminum superstructures were not new. They were a staple of new construction since the end of WWII; nearly 50 years of new ship classes before the Falklands and our own experiences with Stark and Samuel B. Roberts, as well as lesser known incidents like the Iranian 12.7mm round that penetrated the port bulkhead of Gridley's CIC, passed my head as I was seated at the TAO'S NTDS console by about a foot before passing through the starboard bulkhead. Having seen the elephant and spent more than a little time swapping secrets with others who have from both navies, I feel pretty qualified to discuss the subject.
All of that ended up in the DDG-51 design. It is a ship that took all of those lessons learned from the RN and our own, took the best of our combat systems designs extant, and put it all in a VERY survivable hull. No the Arleigh Burke is not revolutionary, but as a rung on the evolutionary ladder, she ain't half bad. Now they are going to back fit electric drive motors for low speed, ASW ops, and just general loitering. I have been waiting for the design guys at NAVSEASYSCOM to pull their heads out of their fundaments and do this. It's about freaking time.
Most importantly, she can take a hit and punch way above her weight class. I'd take a command ride in a Burke any day. Zumwalt not so much, and other than their speed, an LCS not at all.
Not lecturing anybody. Just pointing out that you had your head where the sun don't shine when you said all steel construction was new. WWII was fought with 100% all steel warships.
And if you read what I said, I started with "The Arleigh Burke has been a tremendously influential design that still is the benchmark for destroyer design".
And I repeat, the original Arleigh Burke's design really only had one new feature i.e. its sea kindly, hull design as copied from the Soviets. Otherwise it was an evolutionary design, which was very, very, closely controlled for cost, using existing, well sorted systems. An approach that's mirrored in the Type 26 design. Hence my reason for making the remarks here.
In hindsight, probably the biggest thing the AB's have brought to the table is their land attack capability. First time an escort warship has been able to influence land warfare from hundreds of miles away. AEGIS, CPS & survivabiity (apart from Cole) haven't been needed thank goodness.
