That is a very interesting interview, but it did raise a few issues. For one, if both the S400 and Bastion rely on ground based radar, how come the effective range, taking into account the radar horizon is double that of the former for the latter, 20km verses 40km? It also infers that aircraft would be flying at the same height or less, as a ships mast.
However looking at some maps I did realise that Kaliningrad is probably located at the widest part of the Baltic Sea, over 200km form the Swedish Coast so maybe ships and aircraft will have more room to manoeuvre, especially if the Swedes turn a blind eye to NATO assets transiting their territorial waters/airspace.
The stationing of nuclear armed short and intermediate range delivery systems within Kaliningrad will also cause NATO to think if things turn hot. An attack on the enclave would be seen as an attack on Russia itself and it is likely Russia would issue a warning that any attack on Russian soil would be meet by any and all means. It might be a bluff but many NATO nations will be deterred by such a threat.
So Kaliningrad is not the all powerful Russian Fortress the hype made it out to be, but the assets based there are still a threat and how to deal with them will be a problem for NATO. Add to that the Air and sea assets able to be deployed form the enclave and Russia itself and transiting the Baltic during a conflict with large transports, even if escorted will be a highly complicated and risky operation still. Any such Task Force will have to rely on land based air support as no one would want to operate a Carrier Group in the Baltic. Imaging the reduction in combat power the sinking of just one Point class when trying to move a reinforcing Brigade to the Baltics would cause.
At the very least the Baltic is gong to be a very contested theatre and probably devolve into attritional warfare on land sea and air. In that sort of conflict public opinion in the west is going to be a major factor, one that Russia's asymmetrical warfare capabilities will no doubt exploit.
The Baltic is certainly not a theatre the FLSS should be sent to operate in. The Norwegian Coastline quite possibly, but I see them both being EOS, maintained and supported by allied ships and port facilities and crews rotated. I can see them replacing the Bay currently in the Gulf, as the facilities in the FLSS as well as the port facilities in Bahrain and other allies should more than compensate. Even EOS though area denial activities by hostile nations will restrict how the FLSS will be able to operate. They are unlikely to stray outside friendly waters which may require then to carry larger and longer ranged platforms than the RHIB based ones currently in use. Again this points to a CB-90 type platform but with greater range, maybe through the use of auxiliary fuel tanks. It will be near impossible to hide the location of an FLSS and so it will have to rely heavily of shore based defences as well as any escort that accompanies it. If a raid is launched form the FLSS, it will be pretty obvious to those on the receiving end where it came from. The FLSS is going to need better damage control capabilities than the mercantile platform on which it may be based. It will be carrying both aviation fuel and munitions and the storage areas for these will need to have protection up to Naval standards. The FLSS will also need last ditch self defences in the form of countermeasures equal to naval vessels even if they are in port.
All of this is going to increase the cost of the FLSS, and may require them to be escorted by more than the T-31 or River currently suggested. Would we be better scrubbing the idea of the FLSS and looking to what platforms will replace the Albions and Bays after we have decided how we intend to conduct amphibious operation moving forward.